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A Review of Tank 48H Treatment of Tetraphenylborate with Permanganate

Tank 48H contains roughly 270,000 gallons of radioactive waste material. The waste stored in this tank was to be processed in multiple stages utilizing facilities at the Savannah River Site (SRS) almost 30 years ago. The In-Tank Precipitation Process (ITP) was initiated in Tank 48H, which precipitated highly radioactive cesium-137 using sodium tetraphenylborate (NaTPB). While the process succeeded in precipitating the Cs, Sr, and other actinides, it also generated an unexpectedly large amount of benzene. The evolved benzene created a safety concern and made the waste incompatible with further downstream processing. This halted the ITP, and a new method of treatment was required to continue processing the legacy waste contained in Tank 48H. A myriad of treatment options have been proposed with multiple teams of researchers assembled to work on this highly complex issue over the last few decades. This review investigated one potentially viable treatment option, in-tank oxidation with sodium permanganate. Permanganate has been well known in literature as a strong oxidizing agent for organic compounds, as well as being utilized at the Savannah River Site (SRS) in other processes. A small number of studies have been conducted utilizing waste simulants to evaluate the use of permanganate as an oxidant for tetraphenylborate (TPB). A search of the literature and data from these studies indicates that permanganate could be a viable treatment for destruction of TPB in Tank 48H. While the scoping studies had a small number of individual experiments and nonideal conditions, the permanganate decomposed up to 90% of the TPB. A free hydroxide concentration above 1.0 M is required for tank corrosion control. Simulant studies indicate no decrease in TPB decomposition by permanganate until pH 14. The simulant studies show an increase in TPB decomposition as the temperature of the solution is increased to 40 °C. The post-reaction analysis of previous simulant tests did not look at all of the organic degradation products. Investigations into what these organic products are and in what quantity will help guide determinations as to whether the downstream processing facilities are able to handle the material that will be generated. Study on the time frame for the reaction between permanganate and TPB should be investigated as the literature reports only extend out to two weeks reaction time. The permanganate treatment conditions indicate no corrosion control concerns and a longer timescale reaction may be needed for in-tank treatment. In addition, further study would be useful to identify a lower boundary condition for the ratio of TPB and oxidant. The simulant tests applied large excesses of permanganate, and this may be unnecessary. The size constraint of the tank means that there will be practical limitations on the amount of sodium permanganate that can be added to the tank. The amount of permanganate should be minimized as much as possible while still ensuring decomposition of the TPB to minimize the amount of manganese dioxide solids generated.

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Conceptual Model Testing Related to SDU 6 Drainwell Observations

From its inception in the early 1950s through the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, the Savannah River Site (SRS) produced nuclear materials for national defense in five reactors. Additionally, irradiated reactor fuel and target tubes were dissolved in nitric acid to recover plutonium and uranium using the PUREX (Plutonium Uranium Reduction EXtraction) process. Liquid waste from these chemical separations processes was then stored onsite in 51 underground tanks. Eight waste storage tanks have been operationally closed (i.e. cleaned and grouted) and the remaining tanks hold a mixture of liquids, insoluble solids, and precipitated salts (SRMC-LWP-2022-00001), the latter generated by evaporating water from the liquid waste. Waste is currently being retrieved from tanks and separated into 1) high-radioactivity, low-volume, and 2) low-radioactivity, high-volume components, principally through the Salt Waste Processing Facility (SWPF) (SRMC-LWP-2023-00001). The former waste stream is vitrified in the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF), stored onsite, and destined for offsite disposal in a deep geologic repository. The latter stream is mixed with dry cementitious materials in the Saltstone Production Facility (SPF) and the wet slurry placed in onsite Saltstone Disposal Units (SDUs) within the Saltstone Disposal Facility (SDF), where it hardens into a cement waste form termed saltstone. A low-infiltration surface cover system will be placed over the SDF at closure, where SDUs will then be in the subsurface post-closure (SRR-CWDA-2019-00001).

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Results of Re-evaluation of FEPs Related to Higher Fissile Content in HLW Glass at SRS

One of the objectives of the United States Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy’s Office of Spent Fuel and High-Level Waste Disposition is to better understand the technical bases, risks, and uncertainties associated with the safe and secure disposition of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste. Domestic defense and research activities have generated a few thousand metric tons of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste, much of which has been or will be processed and vitrified into high-level waste glass. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act 1982 makes the Department of Energy responsible for disposal of these materials.

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Radionuclide Inventory Threshold for Trench 31 and 34 Located Within the 200 West Area Low-Level Burial Grounds

Trenches 31 and 34 located in the 200 West Area Low-Level Burial Ground (LLBG) are authorized for disposal of low-level and mixed low-level radioactive waste under DOE Order 435.1, Radioactive Waste Management. A revised Disposal Authorization Statement was issued in October 2023 following approval of the performance assessment (PA) and supporting technical basis documents. To be consistent with approved PA calculations, the waste acceptance criteria (WAC) needs to be updated to include concentration limits for Category 1 (CAT1) and Category 3 (CAT3) waste along with the inventory limits. This environmental calculation file (ECF) provides the inventory limits for Category 1 and Category 3 waste disposal of radionuclides at Trench 31 and 34 based on the PA calculations. The concentration limits are not calculated as they are provided in the PA itself. The inventory thresholds (or limits) are calculated for only those radionuclides that are identified in the PA as the primary dose contributors. The primary dose contributors for the groundwater pathway are technetium-99, iodine-129, niobium-94, chlorine-36, molybdenum-93, and niobium-93m while those for the air pathway are tritium and carbon-14.

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Assessment of Molybdate Based Corrosion Inhibitor for use at the Savannah River Tank Farm Cooling Water System

The Savannah River Site (SRS) has relied on 51 underground storage tanks, many dating back to the 1950s, to store radioactive liquid waste generated from nuclear processing and radionuclide production. These tanks use carbon steel cooling coils, cooled by soft, acidic water, to dissipate the decayed heat produced by radioactive waste. For decades, following historical industry practices, chromate has been added to the cooling water (~450 ppm at pH 9-11) to effectively inhibit corrosion, ensuring cooling coil longevity. Inspections of failed coils reveal that chromate-treated surfaces are generally well-preserved.

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FOURTH QUARTER / ANNUAL TRANSPORTATION REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2021

Waste Shipments to and from the Nevada National Security Site, Radioactive Waste Management Complex. This report satisfies the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) commitment to prepare a quarterly summary of waste shipments to the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC) in Area 5.

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Next Generation System Analysis Model Recently Added Features and Future Plans - Abstract

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended (NWPA 1982), established the federal government’s responsibility to accept spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level radioactive waste (HLW) from waste owners and generators for ultimate disposition. SNF generated by the current fleet of commercial nuclear reactors is being stored at the reactor sites in spent fuel pools (SFPs) and in dry independent spent fuel storage installations (ISFSIs). The US Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE) is developing an Integrated Waste Management Program (IWMP) comprising a suite of options and supporting analyses to enable future informed choices. The IWMP is applying integrated waste management system architecture analysis, system engineering, and decision analysis principles to inform potential future decisions regarding potential nuclear waste management system architectures. Architecture analyses of the IWM system are being conducted to support the future deployment of a comprehensive system for managing nuclear waste that considers all major aspects of the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle (i.e., transportation, storage, and disposal). The Next Generation System Analysis Model (NGSAM) is an agent-based simulation software tool designed for the express purpose of modeling the IWM system. NGSAM imports data from the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) Unified Database (e.g., historic assembly information, thermal profiles for assembly heat, at-reactor dry storage loadings) to ensure that the simulation initializes with a realistic representation of the state of commercial SNF in the United States. Recent major enhancements that have been implemented into NGSAM since NGSAM was last presented at the WM2019 conference include: • Tracking of railroad escort and buffer car acquisition. • Addition of heavy haul and barge routes for some sites, as well as support for user-defined inter-modal routes. • Updates to the logic that checks the thermal maps prior to package transport. • Addition of an allocation method that predicts when reactor sites will pack assemblies from their pools for dry storage and allocates packages to those reactor sites in the preceding periods, favoring direct transport packages and reducing the number of packages that reactor sites pack for dry storage at their ISFSIs. • Addition of reactor site family operational limits, which are used to limit the number of loads from the pool and from dry storage at a given reactor site per year. • Support has been added for multiple canister loading maps and packages having multiple compatible transportation overpacks. • Updates in the handling of non-commercial fuel, including a new database containing data to support the updates. • Support for repackaging at reactor sites. • Implementing additional output reports or modifying existing reports. • User edits can now be created and edited via the NGSAM website. • Ability to load packages for dry storage at ISF pools. • Same-type package blending at DOE sites. • Support for multi-mode transloading at reactor sites. These new features have improved NGSAM capabilities and/or improve the user experience with the model and will be discussed in more detail. The initial NGSAM requirements for advanced reactor fuels, reprocessing, treatment, and conditioning are preliminary and are described at a high level in this paper: analysts will provide more specific requirements to the NGSAM team in the future. Additionally, there are many data needs associated with modeling advanced reactors in NGSAM, but many of the data or plans are still in progress and/or yet to be fully defined. However, this document describes an initial exploration of the data relevant to this program. Advanced reactor data will likely require revision as concepts evolve and new considerations are made. This is a technical paper that does not take into account contractual limitations or obligations under the Standard Contract for Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and/or High-Level Radioactive Waste (Standard Contract) (10 CFR Part 961). For example, under the provisions of the Standard Contract, spent nuclear fuel in multi-assembly canisters is not an acceptable waste form, absent a mutually agreed to contract amendment. To the extent discussions or recommendations in this paper conflict with the provisions of the Standard Contract, the Standard Contract governs the obligations of the parties, and this paper in no manner supersedes, overrides, or amends the Standard Contract. This paper reflects technical work which could support future decision making by DOE. No inferences should be drawn from this paper regarding future actions by DOE, which are limited both by the terms of the Standard Contract and Congressional appropriations for the Department to fulfill its obligations under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act including licensing and construction of a spent nuclear fuel repository.

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Characterizing The Mechanical Properties of Polyurethane Foams

The Department of Energy has many radioactive facilities that are on the path of deactivation and decommissioning (D and D). These facilities can sit cold and dark for many years before final disposition, and must be maintained to ensure no radiological release occurs in the interim. Improvements and additions to D and D tool sets can greatly: Save time and money, Reduce worker risk. Conventional fixatives widely used often take the form of paints or films that are not readily applicable to 3-dimensional void spaces. Foams are one promising platform that may offer solutions to a number of contaminated problem sets such as: Gloveboxes, Pipes, Tanks. SRNL is working to characterize various commercial foams that would encapsulate the interior volume of a given space and are capable of immobilizing any remaining contamination. One key performance metric of these foams is how well they will perform in an accident scenario. To this end, SRNL is researching the mechanical properties of these foams to ensure that the material can withstand the environment of application while maintaining structural integrity. ASTM standard E3191-18 served as a guiding document for this project, outlining the requirements that foaming fixatives used for the mitigation of radioactive contamination need to meet before being implemented. Objective: Quantification of the mechanical properties of 6 commercial polyurethane foams was performed using multiple ASTM standards to record measurements for: Compression testing: Flexible Foams, Force required to produce 50% compression, Rigid Foams, Compressive and apparent modulus, Point of 10% core deformation, The 'Zero Deformation' point, Compressive strength, Yield point. Tensile testing: Tensile strength, Tensile stress, Percent elongation. Experiment 1: An electromechanical compressive tester (MTS Criterion Series 43) was used to evaluate 6 foams (4 flexible, 2 rigid). Per ASTM D1621, each rigid foam was compressed at 10% of the measured thickness per minute until the sample was 13% of it's original thickness. Per ASTM D35/4, each flexible foam was pre-flexed twice to 80% original thickness at a rate of 250 mm/min, then compressed to 80% original thickness at a rate of 50 mm/min. Experiment 2: An electromechanical tensile tester (MTS Criterion Series 43) was used to evaluate 6 foams (4 flexible, 2 rigid). Per ASTM D1623, rigid foams were pulled apart at a rate of 1.27 mm/min until the sample broke. Per ASTM D35/4, flexible foams were pulled apart at a rate of 500 mm/min until the sample broke. The strongest material in both compression and tensile testing scenarios was found to be the rigid intumescent polyurethane Hilti foam. The experiments revealed that the Hilti foam in a tensile scenario had a peak stress value that was larger than the closest competitor by a factor of 2.3 and a compressive yield point that was larger than the closest competitor by a factor of 1.4, indicating that the Hilti foam is the best choice for implementation in mechanically harsh environments. The performance metrics measured can serve as a basis for future mechanical tests that would help set relevant ASTM standards (E3191) for intumescent polyurethane foams in fixating applications. Tests like surface adhesion, impact, and flame tests would serve as a better indicator as to how this material would perform in environmentally harsh scenarios often found in decommissioned nuclear facilities. Further tests of the foams' intumescent properties would also be important should these foams be implemented in environmentally harsh scenarios.

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A Comparison of Groundwater Sampling Technologies, Including Passive Diffusion Sampling, for Radionuclide Contamination - 20205

Using traditional high-flow purge methods for long-term water quality monitoring of deep groundwater wells can be expensive, affect contaminant migration, and produce excessive volumes of discharge water that can be difficult to manage. The use of low-flow pumping methods and depth discrete bailers (DDBs) can reduce the cost of sampling deep groundwater wells. In general, using different pumping methods to obtain reproducible and representative groundwater can be challenging. Passive diffusion samplers (PDSs) have successfully been used in long-term monitoring for volatile organic compounds, major ions, and trace-elements, but application has been limited for stable and radioactive isotopes. Beginning in 2018, the United States Geological Survey (USGS) conducted three sampling events to test the ability of PDSs and DDBs to obtain reproducible and representative groundwater samples. The sampled well is completed in a regional, permeable carbonate aquifer and is one in a set of wells that have historically been used for tritium tracer testing. All samples were obtained at 180 m (590 ft) below land surface (bls) in a 13.97 cm (5.5 inch) uncased well that has a total depth of 202 m (662 ft) bls. The first sampling event deployed a regenerated cellulose dialysis membrane (RCDM) PDS for 14 days with deionized water as the blank. The second sampling event deployed a RCDM for 27 days also with deionized water as the blank. The third sampling event deployed a Dual Membrane (DM) PDS for 65 days using a blank of tritium-dead carbonate water. The DM PDS was used to assess the effect of longer term deployment on tritium concentrations and address whether or not the PDSs reached equilibrium with ambient groundwater. The day after each of the three passive samplers were retrieved a DDB was used to obtain discrete non-integrated groundwater samples. For each DDB sampling day, the bailer was lowered into the well 10 consecutive times to determine if the water chemistry changed from the first to the last bailed sample. Quality assurance samples including blanks and duplicates were obtained during all three sampling events. All blank waters had tritium concentrations less than 21±33 pCi/L. Major ion (e.g. calcium, chloride, sodium, and sulfate) results were compared between all samples obtained with RCDM and DDB. Major ion concentrations showed a coefficient of variation of less than 6% between all RCDM and DDB samples; however, the coefficient of variation between the different deployment times and the two different methods for trace-element concentrations was much larger, particularly for manganese (82%), lead (41%), and zinc (33%). Stable isotope values were compared between the RCDM and DDB samples. The DDB sample results all fell within analytical uncertainty and were considered representative of the formation groundwater. The stable isotope values from the RCDM samples indicated that a longer deployment time was necessary to gain equilibrium and to obtain representative groundwater samples. Tritium results from groundwater samples obtained from the RCDM, DM, and DDB indicate that groundwaters obtained with PDSs produced tritium concentrations 2 to 3 times higher (between 1,426 and 3,060±87 pCi/L) than groundwaters obtained with a DDB (479 to 1,219±51 pCi/L). The longer the passive diffusion samplers were deployed, the higher the tritium concentration, suggesting that equilibrium with tritium was not reached within a 27-day deployment. DDB samples showed tritium results declining from the first to the last bailed sample for all three sampling events. This research suggests that tritium results from groundwater samples obtained from PDSs are more reproducible than samples obtained from DDBs. Also, PDSs likely do not accumulate isotopes of water but rather equilibrate with the ambient groundwater. On the other hand, both PDSs and DDBs were able to provide representative groundwater samples for major ions and have the potential to produce representative groundwater samples for stable isotopes of water (δD and δ{sup 18}O). Utilizing the most effective method for sampling groundwater is important for long-term groundwater monitoring. Quantifying the ability of passive diffusion groundwater samplers to obtain representative radioactive chemistry samples will help determine if these methods can be a useful alternative to pumping and purging wells for long-term monitoring. (authors)

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Transporting Non-Compliant TRU Wastes in the OPTIMUS{sup TM} Packages - 20493

The OPTIMUS{sup TM} product line of packages was developed with the purpose of providing a versatile and modular packaging option for shipping problematic wastes and fissile material contents. The product line includes a high-activity design in the OPTIMUS-H and a low activity design in the OPTIMUS-L. The two variants utilize a singular containment vessel design, that is enclosed in different protective components that offer different levels of shielding along with thermal and impact protection. The thick shielding provided by the OPTIMUS-H packaging allows for higher activity contents than the OPTIMUS-L to be transported. But the lightweight design of the OPTIMUS-L packaging allows for more packages to be transported in a single shipment. The containment vessel design shared between the two packages provides leak-tight containment of all radioactive contents along with the capabilities to easily leak test and the option to inert and backfill the contents, as necessary, prior to each shipment of the package. Together the OPTIMUS package designs offer significant flexibility and are capable of handling a wide variety of waste materials and other radioactive contents. One of the primary contents covered in the initial design effort for these packages is TRU waste contents beyond the standard waste materials that are compliant with the WIPP Waste Acceptance Criteria. More specifically, the initial content of interest is TRU Waste drums containing sealed containers with potentially flammable gases. While there are multiple other packaging options available for transporting standard WIPP compliant TRU wastes, the goal of the OPTIMUS packages is to offer a superior option for transporting both standard TRU wastes as well as the more problematic non-compliant wastes, among other contents. The non-compliant TRU waste contents explicitly included for the OPTIMUS packages are standard aerosol cans and DOT 3E lecture bottles. However, the methods applied for the package containment can be easily adjusted to cover other sealed container types with potentially flammable gases. The primary challenges with including these items are both the obvious issue of potential for flammable gases (e.g. aerosol propellants) in the package, but also the uncertainty in the exact state of the contents. Because these desired contents are waste materials, the characterization of the materials present in the waste may include some uncertainties. For example, though it may be known that there are one or more aerosol cans in a TRU waste drum, it may not be known if this can is full, spent, or anywhere in between. Also there may be equal uncertainty in the contents of the aerosol can, specifically in the potentially flammable propellant remaining in the can. To include these types of non-compliant items as acceptable contents for the package, the methods utilized in the safety analyses of the OPTIMUS packages must consider all of the uncertainties in the characterization of the waste. The methods utilized cover a range of concerns with transporting contents of this nature including pressure buildup, gas generation, and gaseous combustion for demonstrating the containment of the package. The ability to transport these problematic contents in the OPTIMUS packages gives TRU waste generating sites the option to relocate these drums to an offsite location where the non-compliant items can be properly managed through removal or destruction. (authors)

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Transportation and Systems Analysis Collaborations in Support of a Federal Consolidated Interim Storage Facility

The U.S. Department of Energy’s Integrated Waste Management (IWM) program under the Office of Nuclear Energy is planning for the future transportation, storage, and eventual disposal of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level radioactive waste (HLW) from nuclear power plant sites across the United States. To better enable informed decision-making regarding the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle, the IWM program has been sponsoring the development and application of system analysis tools capable of analyzing various options for managing SNF and HLW. With these tools, integrated waste management system (IWMS) architecture analyses are being conducted to support the future deployment of a comprehensive nuclear waste management system that considers all major back-end aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle (i.e., transportation, storage, and disposal). System analyses and assessments typically use these modeling and simulation tools to investigate implications of changes in various assumptions and parameters such as acceptance rates, receipt logic, facility capacities and capabilities, use of standardized canisters, start and stop dates of facilities, etc. The Next Generation System Analysis Model (NGSAM) is an agent-based simulation toolkit that is used for a system-level simulation and analysis focused on SNF management in the United States. An analyst using NGSAM has the ability to define several factors like the number of storage facilities, capacity at each facility, transportation schedules, shipment rates, and other conditions. NGSAM’s primary purpose is to provide a system analyst with capabilities to model the IWMS and gain insights into SNF and HLW management alternatives including the impact of system choices, associated cost estimates, and development of integrated yet flexible approaches. IWM is also developing the Stakeholder Tool for Assessing Radioactive Transportation (START). START is a web-based geospatial tool developed to provide visualization and initial evaluation of transportation options associated with future SNF and HLW shipment planning and operations. This includes characterizing safety, economic, and environmental conditions on and in proximity to shipment origins as well as along prospective transportation routes. Information from the START tool can be presented/shared as maps, graphics, geospatial files, and tabular form to enable easy data representation and export functionality. The system analysis, NGSAM, and START teams had been working closely for several years before formalizing this collaboration. START provides the SNF routing information for use in NGSAM. System analysts use the NGSAM tool to generate results (schedule, costs, infrastructure acquisitions, shipment rates, etc.). Subject-matter experts and system analysts work together to inform how NGSAM should model the waste management system. Specifically, this paper discusses the collaborations between the system analysis, NGSAM, and START teams and their accomplishments over the past year. Some examples of these efforts include calibrating and adding data to the START output files to meet NGSAM needs, gaining a better understanding of START data used in NGSAM, as well as how updates in START data could result in an improved NGSAM analysis. Detailed examples of various tasks that have been performed by the team will be discussed in the full paper. Continued efforts in this direction are expected in the coming years.

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Transportation and System Analysis Collaborations in Support of a Federal Consolidated Interim Storage Facility

The U.S. Department of Energy’s Integrated Waste Management (IWM) program under the Office of Nuclear Energy is planning for the future transportation, storage, and eventual disposal of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level radioactive waste (HLW) from nuclear power plant and waste custodian sites across the United States. To better enable informed decision-making regarding the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle, the IWM program has been sponsoring the development and application of system analysis tools capable of analyzing various options for managing SNF and HLW. With these tools, integrated waste management system (IWMS) architecture analyses are being conducted to support the future deployment of a comprehensive nuclear waste management system that considers all major back-end aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle (i.e., transportation, storage, and disposal). System analyses and assessments typically use these modeling and simulation tools to investigate implications of changes in various assumptions and parameters such as acceptance rates, receipt logic, facility capacities and capabilities, use of standardized canisters, start and stop dates of facilities, etc. The Next Generation System Analysis Model (NGSAM) is an agent-based simulation toolkit that is used for a system-level simulation and analysis focused on SNF management in the United States. NGSAM’s primary purpose is to provide a system analyst with capabilities to model the IWMS and gain insights into SNF and HLW management alternatives including the impact of system choices, associated cost estimates, and development of integrated yet flexible approaches. An analyst using NGSAM can define several factors like the number of storage facilities, capacity at each facility, transportation schedules, shipment rates, and other conditions. IWM is also developing the Stakeholder Tool for Assessing Radioactive Transportation (START). START is a web-based geospatial tool developed to provide the visualization and initial evaluation of transportation options associated with future SNF and HLW shipment planning and operations. This includes characterizing safety, economic, and environmental conditions at and in proximity to shipment origins as well as along prospective transportation routes. Information from the START tool can be presented/shared as maps, graphics, geospatial files, and tabular form to enable easy data representation and export functionality. The system analysis, NGSAM, and START teams have been working closely for several years before formalizing this collaboration. START provides the SNF transportation routing information for use in NGSAM. System analysts use the NGSAM tool to generate results (schedule, costs, infrastructure acquisitions, shipment rates, etc.). Subject-matter experts and system analysts work together to inform how NGSAM should model the waste management system. Specifically, this paper discusses the collaborations between the system analysis, NGSAM, and START teams and their accomplishments over the past year. Some examples of these efforts include calibrating and adding data to the START output files to meet NGSAM needs, gaining a better understanding of START data used in NGSAM as well as how updates in START data could result in an improved NGSAM analysis. Detailed examples of various tasks that have been performed by the team will be discussed in the full paper. Continued efforts in this direction are expected in the coming years.

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Nuclear Safety [Vol. 16, No. 2, March-April 1975]

Nuclear Safety covers significant developments in the field of nuclear safety. The scope is limited to topics relevant to the analysis and control of hazards associated with nuclear energy, operations involving fissionable materials, and the products of nuclear fission and their effects on the environment. Primary emphasis is on safety in reactor design, construction, and operation; however, safety considerations in regard to the entire fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing, nuclear waste disposal, handling of radioisotopes, and environmental effects of these operations, are also treated. Table of Contents for this issue follows. Table of Contents for this issue follows. GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 127 Quality Assurance in the Construction of Nuclear Power Plants by Sidney A. Bernsen, 141 1974 ANS Topical Meeting on Fast Reactor Safety by M. H. Fontana; CONTROL AND INSTRUMENTATION: 150 GBR-4 Protection Systems: Failures and Their Consequences by Peter Burgsmüller, J. J. Dekais, Albert Krähe, Raffaello Pignatelli, and Gottfried Vieider, 162 Standby Emergency Power Systems. Part 2—The Later Plants by E. W. Hagen; PLANT SAFETY FEATURES: 180 Radiotoxic Hazard Measure for Buried Solid Radioactive Waste by J. Hamstra, 190 The Thirteenth AEC Air-Cleaning Conference by D. W. Moeller, D. W. Underhill, and M. W. First, 203 Book Review: Nuclear Criticality Safety; CONSEQUENCES OF EFFLUENT RELEASE: 204 Environmental Radiation Effects of Nuclear Facilities in New York State by M. S. Terpilak and B. L. Jorgensen, 222 Book Review: Thermal Ecology; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 223 Set-Point Drift in Nuclear Power-Plant Safety-Related Instrumentation Adapted by the Nuclear Safety Staff, 224 Diesel-Generator Operating Experience at Nuclear Power Plants, 227 Summary of Operating U. S. Power Reactors as of Jan. 1, 1975, 232 Selected Safety-Related Occurrences Reported in November and December 1974 Compiled by William R. Casto, 235 Recent Occurrences at Nuclear Reactors and Their Causes Compiled by William R. Casto; CURRENT EVENTS: 243 General Administrative Activities Compiled by Wm. B. Cottrell, 251 Action on Power-Reactor Projects Undergoing Regulatory Review or Consideration Compiled by Wm. B. Cottrell, 266 Action on Nonreactor Projects Undergoing Regulatory Review or Consideration Compiled by Wm. B Cottrell, 268 Proposed Rule Changes as of Jan. 1, 1975; MISCELLANY: 149 Course in Italy on High-Energy Radiation Dosimetry and Protection (Announcement), 250 Course at Northwestern on Safety of Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants (Announcement), 266 Symposium of the Combined Effects on the Environment of Radioactive, Chemical, and Thermal Releases from the Nuclear Industry (Announcement), 271 Short Course on Engineering for Extreme Winds and Tornadoes (Announcement), 272 Three 1-Week Courses at MIT on Nuclear Power-Reactor Safety (Announcement), 272 Harvard University Short Courses (Announcement).

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Nuclear Safety [Vol. 16, No. 1, January-February 1975]

Nuclear Safety covers significant developments in the field of nuclear safety. The scope is limited to topics relevant to the analysis and control of hazards associated with nuclear energy, operations involving fissionable materials, and the products of nuclear fission and their effects on the environment. Primary emphasis is on safety in reactor design, construction, and operation; however, safety considerations in regard to the entire fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing, nuclear waste disposal, handling of radioisotopes, and environmental effects of these operations, are also treated. Table of Contents for this issue follows. Table of Contents for this issue follows. GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 1 AEC Working Paper on Population Density Around Nuclear Power-Plant Sites Adapted by J. Ft. Buchanan, 8 Water-Reactor Safety-Research Information Meeting by Wm. B. Cottrell, D. O. Hobson, and G. D. Whitman; ACCIDENT ANALYSIS: 29 Burnout in Boiling Heat Transfer. Part I: Pool-Boiling Systems by A. E. Bergles; PLANT SAFETY FEATURES: 43 Radionuclide Behavior During Normal Operation of Liquid-Metal-Cooled Fast Breeder Reactors. Part 1: Production by C. A. Erdman and A. B. Reynolds; CONSEQUENCES OF EFFLUENT RELEASE: 60 The Control, Monitoring, and Reporting of Radioactivity in Effluents. Part 1: AEC-Owned Facilities by M. B. Biles and F. E. Coffman, 71 The Control, Monitoring, and Reporting of Radioactivity in Effluents. Part 2: AEC-Licensed Facilities by L. B. Higginbotham and J. T. Collins; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 76 Incident at the Lucens Reactor by J. M. Miller, 79 IAEA Symposium on Experience from Operating and Fueling of Nuclear Power Reactors by William A. Pryor, 87 Recent Occurrences at Nuclear Reactors and Their Causes Compiled by William R. Casto, 98 Summary of Operating U. S. Power Reactors as of Nov. 1. 1974, 101 Selected Safety-Related Occurrences Reported in September and October 1974 Compiled by William R. Casto; CURRENT EVENTS: 104 General Administrative Activities Compiled by Wm. B. Cottrell, 110 Action on Power-Reactor Projects Undergoing Regulatory Review or Consideration Compiled by Wm. B. Cottrell, 119 Action on Nonreactor Projects Undergoing Regulatory Review or Consideration Compiled by Wm. B. Cottrell, 121 Proposed Rule Changes as of Oct. 31, 1974; MISCELLANY: 97 ASTM—Euratom Symposium on Radiation Dosimetry: Developments and Standardization (Announcement), 118 Workshops on In-Pile Filter Testing (Announcement), 119 IAEA Symposium on Radiological Impacts from Releases from Nuclear Facilities into Aquatic Environments (Announcement).

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Modeling Radiolysis and Chemical Reactions during Dry Storage of Aluminum-clad Spent Nuclear Fuel

After aluminum-clad spent nuclear fuel (ASNF) is removed from the reactor, it is initially stored in spent fuel pools, which are specially designed water-filled basins that provide temporary cooling to reduce the temperature of the fuel assemblies and provide radiation shielding. ASNF continues to generate heat due to the radioactive decay of elements within the fuel, which persists for many years post-shutdown as the residual radioactive products decay into more stable elements. During the wet storage period, an oxyhydroxide layer composed of boehmite/bayerite forms on the surfaces of the aluminum cladding from exposure to water in the pools. Road-ready packaging for long-term disposition of the ASNF involves dry storage in helium backfilled DOE standard canisters (DSCs). When the ASNF is removed from water storage and dried, most of the water is removed, but some physisorbed and chemisorbed water remains in the oxyhydroxide layers. This residual water can produce hydrogen when exposed to radiation from the ASNF during dry storage. Predicting hydrogen accumulation over time in the DSCs is critical for long-term storage considerations. Previous modeling efforts have developed coupled computational fluid dynamics (CFD)-chemical models to simulate temperature, pressure, and gas phase concentrations within the DSCs. These models use the thermal field predicted by CFD as input to a radiolysis model for the gas phase and the surface oxyhydroxide layer chemistry. Given the long storage period of the DSCs and the impracticality of long-term experiments, a simulation-based approach is necessary to assess chemical evolution within the canisters. This study advances the development of a modeling framework designed to simulate the chemical evolution of spent fuel canisters. Both thermal and radiation-driven reactions are considered, with radiation kinetics quantified using G-values. Sensitivity analysis identifies key parameters influencing species composition. Reaction pathway diagrams offer insight into dominant species formation routes, enabling more effective comparisons between model predictions and experimental observations, particularly regarding the production of hydrogen. Results show that the model predicts significant hydrogen gas production with minimal oxygen generation, primarily due to hydrogen formation via boehmite pathways. These findings underscore the importance of accurately characterizing surface-bound species and radiolysis kinetics. A deeper understanding of these mechanisms is critical for evaluating the long-term safety of nuclear waste storage.

12 - MGMT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE WASTE↗

Penetration of Fission Products Ions into Complex Solids and the Effect of Ionic Wash Methods

During washing of radiologically impacted building surfaces, penetration of radionuclide ions into complex solids associated with these surfaces may occur. This study investigates the penetration of Cs-137, Sr-85, and Eu-152 solutions into numerous common building materials and radionuclide behavior when these materials were exposed to a static bath or low-pressure flow of tap water, 0.1 M potassium chloride (KCl), and 0.5 M KCl. The decontamination efficacy and the depth profile for residual contamination were measured to determine the conditions under which applying a wash solution has benefit compared to physically removing the surface material. On asphalt, 70-80% of the radionuclides were found to be within 0.02 mm of the surface. Concrete is more porous than asphalt, and 80% of the radionuclides were within 0.2 mm of the surface for Cs-137 and Eu-152 and 50-80% for Sr-85. Water effectively removed all contaminants from hard nonporous surfaces. Finally, this paper illustrates that a wash penalty factor concept-defined as ratio of the depth at which 50% of the radioactivity is found in the washed sample divided by the depth at which 50% of radioactivity is found in the control-can serve as a way to quantify whether the wash method increases the depth at which contamination penetrates into the material and thus the material becomes more difficult to decontaminate.

building materials↗

DECOVALEX-2023: An international collaboration for advancing the understanding and modeling of coupled thermo-hydro-mechanical-chemical (THMC) processes in geological systems

The DECOVALEX initiative is an international research collaboration (www.decovalex.org), initiated in 1992, for advancing the understanding and modeling of coupled thermo-hydro-mechanical-chemical (THMC) processes in geological systems. DECOVALEX stands for “DEvelopment of COupled Models and VALidation against EXperiments”. The creation of this international initiative was motivated by the recognition that prediction of these coupled effects is an essential part of the performance and safety assessment of geologic disposal systems for radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel. DECOVALEX emphasizes joint analysis and comparative modeling of the complex perturbations and coupled processes in geologic repositories and how these impact long-term performance predictions. The most recent phase of the DECOVALEX Project, here referred to as DECOVALEX-2023, started in early 2020 and ended in late 2023. More than fifty research teams associated with 17 international DECOVALEX partner organizations participated in the comparative evaluation of eight modeling tasks covering a wide range of spatial and temporal scales, geological formations, and coupled processes. This Virtual Special Issue on DECOVALEX-2023 provides an in-depth overview of these collaborative research efforts and how these have advanced the state-of-the-art of understanding and modeling coupled THMC processes. While primarily focused on radioactive waste, much of the work included here has wider application to many geoengineering topics.

Coupled processes↗

Overcoming Barriers to Radiopharmaceutical Therapy (RPT): An Overview From the NRG-NCI Working Group on Dosimetry of Radiopharmaceutical Therapy

Radiopharmaceutical therapy (RPT) continues to demonstrate tremendous potential in improving the therapeutic gains in radiation therapy by specifically delivering radiation to tumors that can be well assessed in terms of dosimetry and imaging. Dosimetry in external beam radiation therapy is standard practice. This is not the case, however, in RPT. This NRG (acronym formed from the first letter of the 3 original groups: National Surgical Adjuvant Breast and Bowel Project, the Radiation Therapy Oncology Group, and the Gynecologic Oncology Group)-National Cancer Institute Working Group review describes some of the challenges to improving RPT. The main priorities for advancing the field include (1) developing and adopting best practice guidelines for incorporating patient-specific dosimetry for RPT that can be used at both large clinics with substantial resources and more modest clinics that have limited resources, (2) establishing and improving strategies for introducing new radiopharmaceuticals for clinical investigation, (3) developing approaches to address the radiophobia that is associated with the administration of radioactivity for cancer therapy, and (4) solving the financial and logistical issues of expertise and training in the developing field of RPT.

62 RADIOLOGY AND NUCLEAR MEDICINE↗