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Integrating Public Perspectives in Sample Return Planning

Planning for extraterrestrial sample returns, whether from Mars or other solar system bodies, must be done in a way that integrates planetary protection concerns with the usual mission technical and scientific considerations. Understanding and addressing legitimate societal concerns about the possible risks of sample return will be a critical part of the public decision making process ahead. This paper presents the results of two studies, one with lay audiences, the other with expert microbiologists, designed to gather information, on attitudes and concerns about sample return risks and planetary protection. Focus group interviews with lay subjects, using generic information about Mars sample return and a preliminary environmental impact assessment, were designed to obtain an indication of how the factual content is perceived and understood by the public. A research survey of microbiologists gathered information on experts' views and attitudes about sample return, risk management approaches and space exploration risks. These findings, combined with earlier research results on risk perception, will be useful in identifying levels of concern and potential conflicts in understanding between experts and the public about sample return risks. The information will be helpful in guiding development of the environmental impact statement and also has applicability to proposals for sample return from other solar system bodies where scientific uncertainty about extraterrestrial life may persist at the time of mission planning.

Race, Margaret S.↗

Planetary Protection, Sample Return Missions and Mars Exploration: History, Status, and Future Needs

As the prospect grows for a Mars sample return mission early in the next millennium, it will be important to ensure that appropriate planetary protection (PP) controls are incorporated into the mission design and implementation from the start. The need for these PP controls is firmly based on scientific considerations and backed by a number of national and international agreements and guidelines aimed at preventing harmful cross contamination of planets and extraterrestrial bodies. The historical precedent for the use of PP measures on both unmanned and manned missions traces from post-Sputnik missions to the present, with periodic modifications as new information was obtained. In consideration of the anticipated attention to PP questions by both the scientific/technical community and the public, this paper presents a comprehensive review of the major issues and problems surrounding PP for a Mars Sample Return (MSR) mission, including an analysis of arguments that have been raised for and against the imposition of PP measures. Also discussed are the history and foundations for PP policies and requirements; important research areas needing attention prior to defining detailed PP requirements for a MSR mission; and legal and public awareness issues that must be considered with mission planning.

DeVincenzi, Donald L.↗

Reconsidering the Theological and Ethical Implications of Extraterrestrial Life

As we stand on the threshold of a new millennium, we also find ourselves at the brink of a new and exciting era in space exploration. In fact, this new era has already begun, with the successful landing and exploration of Mars by the Pathfinder mission in July 1997. Pathfinder represents an important scientific accomplishment for NASA because it demonstrated the agency's ability to successfully explore space at a relatively modest price. At the same time, Pathfinder revealed once again the genuine interest and fascination that people all over planet Earth have for space exploration. The Pathfinder mission is just one of several recent events-both scientific and cultural-that reveal this deep and almost unquenchable curiosity about space-and the possibility that there is life "out there." In August 1996, the public was captivated with NASA's announcement that a meteorite from Mars may contain evidence of early microscopic life. Shortly after the NASA announcement, media coverage of the discovery-and public discourse concerning the discovery-turned to an examination of the theological implications of evidence for extraterrestrial, albeit unintelligent, life. To a lesser extent, public reaction to the Hale-Bopp comet in the Spring of 1996 is also suggestive of many persons' deep passion to know more about space.

Randolph, Richard O.↗

Mars Sample Handling Protocol Workshop Series: Workshop 2

Numerous NASA reports and studies have identified Planetary Protection (PP) as an important part of any Mars sample return mission. The mission architecture, hardware, on-board experiments, and related activities must be designed in ways that prevent both forward- and back-contamination and also ensure maximal return of scientific information. A key element of any PP effort for sample return missions is the development of guidelines for containment and analysis of returned sample(s). As part of that effort, NASA and the Space Studies Board (SSB) of the National Research Council (NRC) have each assembled experts from a wide range of scientific fields to identify and discuss issues pertinent to sample return. In 1997, the SSB released its report on recommendations for handling and testing of returned Mars samples. In particular, the NRC recommended that: a) samples returned from Mars by spacecraft should be contained and treated as potentially hazardous until proven otherwise, and b) rigorous physical, chemical, and biological analyses [should] confirm that there is no indication of the presence of any exogenous biological entity. Also in 1997, a Mars Sample Quarantine Protocol workshop was convened at NASA Ames Research Center to deal with three specific aspects of the initial handling of a returned Mars sample: 1) biocontainment, to prevent 'uncontrolled release' of sample material into the terrestrial environment; 2) life detection, to examine the sample for evidence of organisms; and 3) biohazard testing, to determine if the sample poses any threat to terrestrial life forms and the Earth's biosphere. In 1999, a study by NASA's Mars Sample Handling and Requirements Panel (MSHARP) addressed three other specific areas in anticipation of returning samples from Mars: 1) sample collection and transport back to Earth; 2) certification of the samples as non-hazardous; and 3) sample receiving, curation, and distribution. To further refine the requirements for sample hazard testing and the criteria for subsequent release of sample materials from quarantine, the NASA Planetary Protection Officer convened an additional series of workshops beginning in March 2000. The overall objective of these workshops was to develop comprehensive protocols to assess whether the returned materials contain any biological hazards, and to safeguard the purity of the samples from possible terrestrial contamination. This document is the report of the second Workshop in the Series. The information herein will ultimately be integrated into a final document reporting the proceedings of the entire Workshop Series along with additional information and recommendations.

Rummel, John D.↗

Mars Sample Handling Protocol Workshop Series

This report provides a record of the proceedings and recommendations of Workshop 3 of the Series, which was held in San Diego, California, March 19-21, 2001. Materials such as the Workshop agenda and participant lists as well as complete citations of all references and a glossary of terms and acronyms appear in the Appendices. Workshop 3 builds on the deliberations and findings of the earlier workshops in the Series, which have been reported separately. During Workshop 3, five individual sub-groups were formed to discuss the following topics: (1) Unifying Properties of Life, (2) Morphological organization and chemical properties, (3) Geochemical and geophysical properties, (4) Chemical Method and (5) Cell Biology Methods.

Race, Margaret S.↗

A Draft Protocol for Detecting Possible Biohazards in Martian Samples Returned to Earth

In preparation for missions to Mars that will involve the return of samples, it is necessary to prepare for the safe receiving, handling, testing, distributing, and archiving of martian materials here on Earth. Previous groups and committees have studied selected aspects of sample return activities, but a specific protocol for handling and testing of returned -=1 samples from Mars remained to be developed. To refine the requirements for Mars sample hazard testing and to develop criteria for the subsequent release of sample materials from precautionary containment, NASA Planetary Protection Officer, working in collaboration with CNES, convened a series of workshops to produce a Protocol by which returned martian sample materials could be assessed for biological hazards and examined for evidence of life (extant or extinct), while safeguarding the samples from possible terrestrial contamination. The Draft Protocol was then reviewed by an Oversight and Review Committee formed specifically for that purpose and composed of senior scientists. In order to preserve the scientific value of returned martian samples under safe conditions, while avoiding false indications of life within the samples, the Sample Receiving Facility (SRF) is required to allow handling and processing of the Mars samples to prevent their terrestrial contamination while maintaining strict biological containment. It is anticipated that samples will be able to be shipped among appropriate containment facilities wherever necessary, under procedures developed in cooperation with international appropriate institutions. The SRF will need to provide different types of laboratory environments for carrying out, beyond sample description and curation, the various aspects of the protocol: Physical/Chemical analysis, Life Detection testing, and Biohazard testing. The main principle of these tests will be described and the criteria for release will be discussed, as well as the requirements for the SRF and its personnel.

Viso, M.↗

A Draft Test Protocol for Detecting Possible Biohazards in Martian Samples Returned to Earth

This document presents the first complete draft of a protocol for detecting possible biohazards in Mars samples returned to Earth; it is the final product of the Mars Sample Handling Protocol Workshop Series, convened in 2000-2001 by NASA's Planetary Protection Officer. The goal of the five-workshop Series vas to develop a comprehensive protocol by which returned Martian sample materials could be assessed for the presence of any biological hazard(s) while safeguarding the purity of the samples from possible terrestrial contamination The reference numbers for the proceedings from the five individual Workshops.

John D. Rummel↗

Anticipating the reaction: public concern about sample return missions

Shifts in public attitude that may affect extraterrestrial sample return include increased public participation in the legal and regulatory environment, institutionalized public vigilance, politicization of technological debates and shifts in the nature of public decision-making, and a risk-averse public accustomed to mass media coverage that focuses on hazards and disasters. The ice-minus recombinant DNA experiment is used as an example of the effects of public opinion on scientific experimentation.

NASA Center ARC↗

Planetary protection, legal ambiguity and the decision making process for Mars sample return

As scientists and mission planners develop planetary protection requirements for future Mars sample return missions, they must recognize the socio-political context in which decisions about the mission will be made and pay careful attention to public concerns about potential back contamination of Earth. To the extent that planetary protection questions are unresolved or unaddressed at the time of an actual mission, they offer convenient footholds for public challenges in both legal and decision making realms, over which NASA will have little direct control. In this paper, two particular non-scientific areas of special concern are discussed in detail: 1) legal issues and 2) the decision making process. Understanding these areas is critical for addressing legitimate public concerns as well as for fulfilling procedural requirements regardless whether sample return evokes public controversy. Legal issues with the potential to complicate future missions include: procedural review under National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA); uncertainty about institutional control and authority; conflicting regulations and overlapping jurisdictions; questions about international treaty obligations and large scale impacts; uncertanities about the nature of the organism; and constitutional and regulatory concerns about quarantine, public health and safety. In light of these important legal issues, it is critical that NASA consider the role and timing of public involvement in the decision making process as a way of anticipating problem areas and preparing for legitimate public questions and challenges to sample return missions.

NASA Discipline Number 59-10↗

Influence of Planetary Protection Guidelines on Waste Management Operations

Newly outlined missions in the Space Exploration Initiative include extended human habitation on Mars. During these missions, large amounts of waste materials will be generated in solid, liquid and gaseous form. Returning these wastes to Earth will be extremely costly, and will therefore likely remain on Mars. Untreated, these wastes are a reservoir of live/dead organisms and molecules considered to be "biomarkers" i.e., indicators of life). If released to the planetary surface, these materials can potentially confound exobiology experiments and disrupt Martian ecology indefinitely (if existent). Waste management systems must therefore be specifically designed to control release of problematic materials both during the active phase of the mission, and for any specified post-mission duration. To effectively develop waste management requirements for Mars missions, planetary protection guidelines must first be established. While previous policies for Apollo lunar missions exist, it is anticipated that the increased probability of finding evidence of life on Mars, as well as the lengthy mission durations will initially lead to more conservative planetary protection measures. To facilitate the development of overall requirements for both waste management and planetary protection for future missions, a workshop was conducted to identify how these two areas interface, and to establish a preliminary set of planetary protection guidelines that address waste management operations. This paper provides background regarding past and current planetary protection and waste management issues, and their interactions. A summary of the recommended planetary protection guidelines, anticipated ramifications and research needs for waste management system design for both forward (Mars) and backward (Earth) contamination is also provided.

Hogan, John A.↗

Planetary Protection Issues in the Human Exploration of Mars

This workshop report, long delayed, is the first 21st century contribution to what will likely be a series of reports examining the effects of human exploration on the overall scientific study of Mars. The considerations of human-associated microbial contamination were last studied in a 1990 workshop ("Planetary Protection Issues and Future Mars Missions," NASA CP-10086, 1991), but the timing of that workshop allowed neither a careful examination of the full range of issues, nor an appreciation for the Mars that has been revealed by the Mars Global Surveyor and Mars Pathfinder missions. Future workshops will also have the advantage of Mars Odyssey, the Mars Exploration Rover missions, and ESA's Mars Express, but the Pingree Park workshop reported here had both the NCR's (1992) concern that "Missions carrying humans to Mars will contaminate the planet" and over a decade of careful study of human exploration objectives to guide them and to reconcile. A daunting challenge, and one that is not going to be simple (as the working title of this meeting, "When Ecologies Collide?" might suggest), it is clear that the planetary protection issues will have to be addressed to enable human explorers to safely and competently extend out knowledge about Mars, and its potential as a home for life whether martian or human.

Criswell, Marvin E.↗

Mars Sample Handling Protocol Workshop Series: Workshop 4

In preparation for missions to Mars that will involve the return of samples to Earth, it will be necessary to prepare for the receiving, handling, testing, distributing, and archiving of martian materials here on Earth. Previous groups and committees have studied selected aspects of sample return activities, but specific detailed protocols for the handling and testing of returned samples must still be developed. To further refine the requirements for sample hazard testing and to develop the criteria for subsequent release of sample materials from quarantine, the NASA Planetary Protection Officer convened a series of workshops in 2000-2001. The overall objective of the Workshop Series was to produce a Draft Protocol by which returned martian sample materials can be assessed for biological hazards and examined for evidence of life (extant or extinct) while safeguarding the purity of the samples from possible terrestrial contamination. This report also provides a record of the proceedings of Workshop 4, the final Workshop of the Series, which was held in Arlington, Virginia, June 5-7, 2001. During Workshop 4, the sub-groups were provided with a draft of the protocol compiled in May 2001 from the work done at prior Workshops in the Series. Then eight sub-groups were formed to discuss the following assigned topics: Review and Assess the Draft Protocol for Physical/Chemical Testing Review and Assess the Draft Protocol for Life Detection Testing Review and Assess the Draft Protocol for Biohazard Testing Environmental and Health/Monitoring and Safety Issues Requirements of the Draft Protocol for Facilities and Equipment Contingency Planning for Different Outcomes of the Draft Protocol Personnel Management Considerations in Implementation of the Draft Protocol Draft Protocol Implementation Process and Update Concepts This report provides the first complete presentation of the Draft Protocol for Mars Sample Handling to meet planetary protection needs. This Draft Protocol, which was compiled from deliberations and recommendations from earlier Workshops in the Series, represents a consensus that emerged from the discussions of all the sub-groups assembled over the course of the five Workshops of the Series. These discussions converged on a conceptual approach to sample handling, as well as on specific analytical requirements. Discussions also identified important issues requiring attention, as well as research and development needed for protocol implementation.

Race Margaret S.↗

Life Support and Habitation and Planetary Protection Workshop

A workshop entitled "Life Support and Habitation and Planetary Protection Workshop" was held in Houston, Texas on April 27-29, 2005 to facilitate the development of planetary protection guidelines for future human Mars exploration missions and to identify the potential effects of these guidelines on the design and selection of related human life support, extravehicular activity and monitoring and control systems. This report provides a summary of the workshop organization, starting assumptions, working group results and recommendations. Specific result topics include the identification of research and technology development gaps, potential forward and back contaminants and pathways, mitigation alternatives, and planetary protection requirements definition needs. Participants concluded that planetary protection and science-based requirements potentially affect system design, technology trade options, development costs and mission architecture. Therefore early and regular coordination between the planetary protection, scientific, planning, engineering, operations and medical communities is needed to develop workable and effective designs for human exploration of Mars.

Hogan, John A.↗

Mars Sample Return Using Commercial Capabilities: Mission Architecture Overview

Mars Sample Return (MSR) is the highest priority science mission for the next decade as recommended by the recent Decadal Survey of Planetary Science. This paper presents an overview of a feasibility study for an MSR mission. The objective of the study was to determine whether emerging commercial capabilities can be used to reduce the number of mission systems and launches required to return the samples, with the goal of reducing mission cost. We report the feasibility of a complete and closed MSR mission design using the following scenario that covers three synodic launch opportunities, beginning with the 2022 opportunity: A Falcon Heavy injects a SpaceX Red Dragon capsule and trunk onto a Trans Mars Injection (TMI) trajectory. The capsule is modified to carry all the hardware needed to return samples collected on Mars including a Mars Ascent Vehicle (MAV), an Earth Return Vehicle (ERV), and hardware to transfer a sample collected in a previously landed rover mission to the ERV. The Red Dragon descends to land on the surface of Mars using Super Sonic Retro Propulsion (SSRP). After previously collected samples are transferred to the ERV, the single-stage MAV launches the ERV from the surface of Mars. The MAV uses a storable liquid bi-propellant propulsion system to deliver the ERV to a Mars phasing orbit. After a brief phasing period, the ERV, which also uses a storable bi-propellant system, performs a Trans Earth Injection (TEI) burn. Upon arrival at Earth, the ERV performs Earth and lunar swing-bys and is placed into a lunar trailing circular orbit - an Earth orbit, at lunar distance. A later mission, using Dragon and launched by a Falcon Heavy, performs a rendezvous with the ERV in the lunar trailing orbit, retrieves the sample container and breaks the chain of contact with Mars by transferring the sample into a sterile and secure container. With the sample contained, the retrieving spacecraft makes a controlled Earth re-entry preventing any unintended release of pristine martian materials into the Earth's biosphere. The analysis methods employed standard and specialized aerospace engineering tools. Mission system elements were analyzed with either direct techniques or by using parametric mass estimating relationships (MERs). The architecture was iterated until overall mission convergence was achieved on at least one path. Subsystems analyzed in this study include support structures, power system, nose fairing, thermal insulation, actuation devices, MAV exhaust venting, and GN&C. Best practice application of loads, mass growth contingencies, and resource margins were used. For Falcon Heavy capabilities and Dragon subsystems we utilized publically available data from SpaceX, published analyses from other sources, as well as our own engineering and aerodynamic estimates. Earth Launch mass is under 11 mt, which is within the estimated capability of a Falcon Heavy, with margin. Total entry masses between 7 and 10 mt were considered with closure occurring between 9 and 10 mt. Propellant mass fractions for each major phase of the EDL - Entry, Terminal Descent, and Hazard Avoidance - have been derived. An assessment of the effect of the entry conditions on the thermal protection system (TPS), currently in use for Dragon missions, shows no significant stressors. A useful payload mass of 2.0 mt is provided and includes mass growth allowances for the MAV, the ERV, and mission unique equipment. We also report options for the MAV and ERV, including propulsion systems, crewed versus robotic retrieval mission, as well as direct Earth entry. International planetary protection policies as well as verifiable means of compliance will have a large impact on any MSR mission design. We identify areas within our architecture where such impacts occur. We also describe preliminary compliance measures that will be the subject of future work. This work shows that emerging commercial capabilities as well as new methodologies can be used to efficiently support an important planetary science objective. The work also has applications for human exploration missions that use propulsive EDL techniques

Red Dragon↗

Mars Sample Return Using Commercial Capabilities: Mission Architecture Overview

Mars Sample Return (MSR) is the highest priority science mission for the next decade as recommended by the recent Decadal Survey of Planetary Science. This paper presents an overview of a feasibility study for a MSR mission. The objective of the study was to determine whether emerging commercial capabilities can be used to reduce the number of mission systems and launches required to return the samples, with the goal of reducing mission cost. The major element required for the MSR mission are described and include an integration of the emerging commercial capabilities with small spacecraft design techniques; new utilizations of traditional aerospace technologies; and recent technological developments. We report the feasibility of a complete and closed MSR mission design using the following scenario that covers three synodic launch opportunities, beginning with the 2022 opportunity: A Falcon Heavy injects a SpaceX Red Dragon capsule and trunk onto a Trans Mars Injection (TMI) trajectory. The capsule is modified to carry all the hardware needed to return samples collected on Mars including a Mars Ascent Vehicle (MAV); an Earth Return Vehicle (ERV); and hardware to transfer a sample collected in a previously landed rover mission to the ERV. The Red Dragon descends to land on the surface of Mars using Supersonic Retro Propulsion (SRP). After previously collected samples are transferred to the ERV, the single-stage MAV launches the ERV from the surface of Mars to a Mars phasing orbit. The MAV uses a storable liquid, pump fed bi-propellant propulsion system. After a brief phasing period, the ERV, which also uses a storable bi-propellant system, performs a Trans Earth Injection (TEI) burn. Once near Earth the ERV performs Earth and lunar swing-bys and is placed into a Lunar Trailing Orbit (LTO0 - an Earth orbit, at lunar distance. A later mission, using a Dragon and launched by a Falcon Heavy, performs a rendezvous with the ERV in the lunar trailing orbit, retrieves the sample container and breaks the chain of contact with Mars by transferring the sample into a sterile and secure container. With the sample contained, the retrieving spacecraft, makes a controlled Earth re-entry preventing any unintended release of pristine Martian materials into the Earth's biosphere. Other capsule type vehicles and associated launchers may be applicable. The analysis methods employed standard and specialized aerospace engineering tools. Mission system elements were analyzed with either direct techniques or by using parametric mass estimating relationships (MERs). The architecture was iterated until overall mission convergence was achieved on at least one path. Subsystems analyzed in this study include support structures, power system, nose fairing, thermal insulation, actuation devices, MAV exhaust venting, and GN&C. Best practice application of loads, mass growth contingencies, and resource margins were used. For Falcon Heavy capabilities and Dragon subsystems we utilized publically available data from SpaceX; published analyses from other sources; as well as our own engineering and aerodynamic estimates. Earth Launch mass is under 11 mt, which is within the estimated capability of a Falcon Heavy, with margin. Total entry masses between 7 and 10 mt were considered with closure occurring between 9 and 10 mt. Propellant mass fractions for each major phase of the EDL - Entry, Terminal Descent, and Hazard Avoidance - have been derived. An assessment of the entry conditions on the thermal protection system (TPS), currently in use for Dragon missions, has been made. And shows no significant stressors. A useful mass of 2.0 mt is provided and includes mass growth allowances for the MAV, the ERV, and mission unique equipment. We also report on alternate propellant options for the MAV and options for the ERV, including propulsion systems; crewed versus robotic retrieval mission; as well as direct Earth entry. International Planetary Protection Policies as well as verifiable means of compliance will have a large impact on any MSR mission design. We identify areas within our architecture where such impacts occur. This work shows that emerging commercial capabilities can be used to effectively integrated into a mission to achieve an important planetary science objective.

Mars Sample Return↗

Mars Sample Return Using Commercial Capabilities: Mission Architecture Overview

Mars Sample Return (MSR) is the highest priority science mission for the next decade as recommended by the recent Decadal Survey of Planetary Science. This presentation provides an overview of a feasibility study for a MSR mission in which emerging commercial capabilities are used alongside other sources of mission elements. Goal is to reduce the number of mission systems and launches required to return the samples, with the goal of reducing mission cost.. Major elements required for the MSR mission are described. We report the feasibility of a complete and closed MSR mission design

Red Dragon↗