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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2025

Enabling Secure and Resilient XFC: A Software/Hardware-Security Co-Design Approach

Extremely fast charging (XFC) has the potential to reduce the charging time of battery electric vehicles (BEV) to be equivalent to the filling time of internal combustion engine vehicles (ICEV), thus eliminating one of the few advantages ICEV still poses for light- and heavy-duty vehicles. Enabling XFC will, however, require coordination and cooperation between the grid, charging stations, and the vehicles themselves, which leads to an inevitable increase in the attack surface for all systems combined. In securing the overall system, we must not only embrace traditional cybersecurity, which is chiefly concerned with communications and the operation of digital systems, but also cyber-physical systems security as the proper operation of XFC is critically dependent on systems’ abilities to know about (sense) and interact with (actuate) the physical world. The project team consists of academic and industry researchers with backgrounds in cybersecurity, cyber-physical systems security, learning in adversarial environments, transportation security, grid security and resilience, wireless power transfer, converter design, and battery management systems.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Securing Smart Manufacturing: Detection of Cyber-Physical Attacks in CNC-Based Systems

As Industry 4.0 advances, the integration of computer numerical control (CNC) machines and advanced manufacturing technologies is transforming production into smart manufacturing systems that blend physical and digital processes as cyber-physical systems. However, this increased cyber-physical connectivity exposes manufacturing systems to cyber threats that can cause severe operational and financial disruptions. This paper presents a comparative study on cyber attacks and anomaly detection techniques in manufacturing, focusing on network traffic from CNC machines. The data extracted from network packets includes machine commands and control signals exchanged between the machine's interface and control system, crucial for maintaining operational integrity. We explore two types of cyber attacks, design modification and command injection, which pose substantial risks to CNC machine productivity and system integrity. Our investigation involves experiments on a real CNC system, highlighting the urgent need for effective detection mechanisms. To address these threats, we evaluate three anomaly detection methods: dynamic time warping (DTW), rolling average, and a deep learning, long short-term memory (LSTM) time-series-based autoencoder. Each is assessed for its effectiveness in identifying anomalous behaviors caused by the attacks. Our findings demonstrate the unique strengths and limitations of each detection technique, providing a deeper understanding of their applicability in realworld manufacturing environments. The comparative analysis indicates that while certain methods are highly effective against specific attack types, others offer broader applicability across different attacks. This study contributes to the accurate detection of anomalies in CNC machining processes, thereby enhancing the reliability and security of smart manufacturing systems against diverse cyber threats.

Williams, Bethanie [Tennessee Technological Univer↗
DOE OSTI2014

Secure control systems with application to cyber-physical systems

Control systems are computer-based systems with networked units consisting of sensors, actuators, control processing units, and communication devices. The role of control system is to interact, monitor, and control physical processes. Reactive power control is a fundamental issue in ensuring the security of the power network. It is claimed that Synchronous Condensers (SC) have been used at both distribution and transmission voltage levels to improve stability and to maintain voltages within desired limits under changing load conditions and contingency situations. Performance of PI controller corresponding to various tripping faults are analyzed for SC systems. Most of the eort in protecting these systems has been in protection against random failures or reliability. However, besides failures these systems are subject to various signal attacks for which new analysis are discussed here. When a breach does occur, it is necessary to react in a time commensurate with the physical dynamics of the system as it responds to the attack. Failure to act swiftly enough may result in undesirable, and possibly irreversible, physical eects. Therefore, it is meaningful to evaluate the security of a cyber-physical system, especially to protect it from cyber-attack. Illustrative numerical examples are provided together with an application to the SC systems.

Dong, Jin↗
DOE OSTI2016

Consequence Prioritization Process for Potential High Consequence Events (HCE)

This document describes the process for Consequence Prioritization, the first phase of the Consequence-Driven Cyber-Informed Engineering (CCE) framework. The primary goal of Consequence Prioritization is to identify potential disruptive events that would significantly inhibit an organization’s ability to provide the critical services and functions deemed fundamental to their business mission. These disruptive events, defined as High Consequence Events (HCE), include both events that have occurred or could be realized through an attack of critical infrastructure owner assets. While other efforts have been initiated to identify and mitigate disruptive events at the national security level, such as Presidential Policy Directive 41 (PPD-41), this process is intended to be used by individual organizations to evaluate events that fall below the threshold for a national security. Described another way, Consequence Prioritization considers threats greater than those addressable by standard cyber-hygiene and includes the consideration of events that go beyond a traditional continuity of operations (COOP) perspective. Finally, Consequence Prioritization is most successful when organizations adopt a multi-disciplinary approach, engaging both cyber security and engineering expertise, as in-depth engineering perspectives are required to recognize and characterize and mitigate HCEs. Figure 1 provides a high-level overview of the prioritization process.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2024

Securing the Clean Energy Transition with Cyber-Informed Engineering

The Bipartisan Infrastructure Law kick-started a surge in clean energy investments in the United States. Securing these systems and their supporting infrastructure from the outset is imperative, starting from the conceptual design and continuing through the entire engineering lifecycle. Cyber-Informed Engineering is an ideal approach to seamlessly integrate the necessary advanced control capabilities and adaptive protection systems, especially considering the trend towards cloud-based infrastructure and process controls. Learn more about CIE at https://www.energy.gov/ceser/articles/cyber-informed-engineering-bridge-between-cyber-and-critical-infrastructure-securing.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2023

Reinforcement Learning Approach to Cybersecurity in Space (RELACSS)

Securing satellite groundstations against cyber-attacks is vital to national security missions. However, these cyber threats are constantly evolving. As vulnerabilities are discovered and patched, new vulnerabilities are discovered and exploited. In order to automate the process of discovering existing vulnerabilities and the means to exploit them, a reinforcement learning framework is presented in this report. We demonstrate that this framework can learn to successfully navigate an unknown network and detect nodes of interest despite the presence of a moving target defense. The agent then exfiltrates a file of interest from the node as quickly as possible. This framework also incorporates a defensive software agent that learns to impede the attacking agents progress. This setup allows for the agents to work against each other and improve their abilities. We anticipate that this capability will help uncover unforeseen vulnerabilities and the means to mitigate them. The modular nature of the framework enables users to swap out learning algorithms and modify the reward functions in order to adapt the learning tasks to various use cases and environments. Several algorithms, viz., tabular Q learning, deep Q networks, proximal policy optimization, advantage actor-critic, generative adversarial imitation learning, are explored for the agents and the results highlighted. The agent learns to solve the tasks in a light-weight abstract environment. Once the agent learns to perform sufficiently well, it can be deployed in a minimega virtual machine environment (or a real network) with wrappers that map abstract actions to software commands. The agent also uses a local representation of the actions called a ‘slot-mechanism’. This allows the agent to learn in a certain network and generalize it to different networks. The defensive agent learns to predict the actions taken by an offensive agent and uses that information to anticipate the threat. This information can then either be used to raise an alarm or to take actions to thwart the attack. We believe that with the appropriate reward design, a representative environment, and action set, this framework can be generalized to tackle other cybersecurity tasks. By sufficiently training these agents, we can anticipate vulnerabilities leading to robust future designs. We can also deploy automated defensive agents that can help secure satellite groundstation and their vital national security missions.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2021

Autonomous Tools for Attack Surface Reduction (Final Report)

The electric power grid is a complex critical infrastructure that forms the lifeline of modern society, and its secure and reliable operation is of paramount importance to national security and economic wellbeing. However, recent findings documented in authoritative sources indicate the threat of cyber-based attacks growing in numbers and sophistication. However, securing the grid against stealthy cyberattacks is a challenging task due to legacy nature of the infrastructure coupled with dynamic nature of threat landscape and ever-growing sophistication of the adversaries. Additionally, the grid’s attack surface continues to grow with the increased dependence on digital communications and control that now extends to each consumer through smart meters and distributed energy resources. Unfortunately, this expansive surface increases the grid’s vulnerability and further exposes critical control systems in both substations and control centers. To respond to this emerging need, we had successfully assembled an interdisciplinary team with academic- industry partnership to successfully conduct research, development, evaluation, demonstration, and commercialization of attack surface reduction tools, whose goal was to significantly reduce the cyber attack surface in the North American power grid. Our proposed project was a synergistic collaborative effort leveraging the synergistic expertise of the team members across power systems, cyber security and CPS security, testbeds, field deployments and demonstration, and successful commercialization. The following are the specific tasks that have been successfully completed two phases (2016-2020). Phase I: Task 1: Developed and implemented a robust Project Management and Data Management Plan, coupled with a well thought out Risk Mitigation Plan. Task 2.1: Developed a comprehensive framework that continually assesses and autonomously reduces the attack surface for the power grid control environment spanning across substations, control center and the SCADA network to significantly reduce the risks of cyber attacks. Task 2.2: Developed attack surface analysis techniques, metrics, and tools that assess the attack surface at multiple levels including the control center, substations, and the SCADA network. Task 2.3: Developed attack surface reduction techniques and tools that dynamically reduce attack surface and hence increase attacker’s cost without interfering in the critical functions of the system. Task 2.4: Prototyped, implemented, and quantitatively evaluated/validated the techniques and tools on a realistic industrial CPS security testbed environment by leveraging the unique resources of the team. Task 3: Developed Commercialization plan to transition the developed tools into power system industry stakeholders for a broader adoption by leveraging the expertise of our industrial members. Phase II: Task 4: Successfully completed field demonstration, verification, and evaluation of the effectiveness of the attack surface analysis and reduction techniques on a realistic utility testbed environment. This also involved the development of realistic scenarios, sound metrics, data sets, evaluation criteria, and documentation. Technology integration & Field demonstration: The project had significantly advanced the state-of-the-art research and practice in improving the cybersecurity of our nation’s power grid infrastructure against cyber threats. In particular, the proposed, designed, and deployed attack surface analysis and reduction algorithms and tools have contributed to significantly reducing the exposure and risk of the devices, substations, and the integrated SCADA/EMS/ DMS grid environment to cyber threat. Strong demonstration and evaluation techniques have verified the feasibility of the developed techniques on realistic cyber-physical testbeds and utility partner's real grid environment, and collaborative research and evaluation of attack surface reduction techniques (for wide-are monitoring and control) within a vendor (GE) EMS platform. The Attack Host Analyzer (AHA) tool that was developed through this project was made available through GitHub.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2023

Cyber-Informed Engineering Guidance—Implementing CIE in Early Systems Engineering Lifecycle Stages

Traditionally, cybersecurity is not considered in the design process. Design engineers typically focus on building safety and reliability into their products and applications. Security against malicious cyber incidents is often an afterthought, resulting in deployment of security solutions during installation or operation. Unfortunately, waiting to consider cybersecurity until later in the systems engineering lifecycle often results in less effective and more expense security. Idaho National Laboratory (INL) developed the concept of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) in 2015 to provide a framework that enables cybersecurity to be built into systems beginning at the conceptual design stage. In addition to ongoing research by INL, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response has recently developed a National CIE Strategy document for incorporating CIE into the design and operation of infrastructure systems reliant on digital monitoring or controls. This paper provides a brief review of this National CIE Strategy as well as a roadmap to historical, current, and future CIE research by INL through the U.S. DOE Office of Nuclear Energy (NE) Cybersecurity Crosscutting Technology Development Program. A near-term focus of the DOE-NE’s research and development is to extend the foundational CIE work into detailed guidance for implementation during initial systems engineering stages in nuclear digital instrumentation and control projects and to demonstrate use of the guidance in an integrated energy systems project.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2026

Cyber Labeling for Energy Industrial IoT

The U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security and Emergency Response (CESER), at the request of the Deputy National Security Advisor for Cyber and Emerging Technologies, Anne Neuberger, initiated research in 2023 to develop a cybersecurity labeling proof-of-concept for energy products to expand on the Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) proposed U.S. Cyber Trust Mark program. DOE mobilized researchers from six National Laboratories to develop and gather feedback on a proof-of concept label for solar inverters and smart meters, which serve as representative products for market-facing energy sector Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT). This report details the research team’s process across two phases and the resulting findings, which include challenges facing cyber labeling programs and recommendations to implement an expanded IIoT cyber labeling program in the U.S.

32 - ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZA↗
DOE OSTI2024

A hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) testbed for cyber-physical energy systems in smart commercial buildings

In recent years, there has been a growing trend toward the development of smart buildings that rely on cyber-physical systems (CPS) to optimize occupant comfort, safety, and energy efficiency. To ensure the reliable and efficient operation of CPS with designed control strategies, it is important to evaluate their performance under various scenarios before deploying them in the real world. This is where a Hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) testbed designed for studying sensor and control-related studies in smart buildings can be highly valuable. With the growing threat of cyber-attacks and physical faults targeting smart buildings, it is essential to ensure the security of building operations. A HIL testbed can emulate cyber-attack and physical fault scenarios, allowing researchers to develop and test threat detection and mitigation algorithms. This enables researchers to identify potential issues and optimize the algorithms in a safe and controlled environment before they are deployed in real-world settings, reducing the risk of failures that can negatively impact occupant comfort, safety, and energy efficiency. Therefore, this paper developed a HIL testbed designed for cyber-physical energy systems (e.g. buildings automation system (BAS)) in smart commercial buildings. The HIL testbed is comprised of a real-time building and Heating, Ventilation, and Air-Conditioning (HVAC) emulator using Modelica-based dynamic models, a set of BAS controllers, and a BAS computer server. The data generation capability of the HIL testbed is demonstrated by tracking normal and faulty operating data in the BAS, as well as monitoring detailed network traffic in the local BAS network. Here, this study further demonstrates the HIL testbed’s capability by conducting case studies on real-time physical fault and cyber-attack experiments using a Department of Energy (DOE) prototype commercial building. It is anticipated that the fully functional HIL testbed will be utilized for a variety of sensor and control-related studies, including but not limited to testing, developing, validating of different HVAC control strategies, fault detection & diagnosis, energy monitoring and analysis, cyber security study, etc.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗
DOE OSTI2016

Cyber Threat and Vulnerability Analysis of the U.S. Electric Sector

With utilities in the U.S. and around the world increasingly moving toward smart grid technology and other upgrades with inherent cyber vulnerabilities, correlative threats from malicious cyber attacks on the North American electric grid continue to grow in frequency and sophistication. The potential for malicious actors to access and adversely affect physical electricity assets of U.S. electricity generation, transmission, or distribution systems via cyber means is a primary concern for utilities contributing to the bulk electric system. This paper seeks to illustrate the current cyber-physical landscape of the U.S. electric sector in the context of its vulnerabilities to cyber attacks, the likelihood of cyber attacks, and the impacts cyber events and threat actors can achieve on the power grid. In addition, this paper highlights utility perspectives, perceived challenges, and requests for assistance in addressing cyber threats to the electric sector. There have been no reported targeted cyber attacks carried out against utilities in the U.S. that have resulted in permanent or long term damage to power system operations thus far, yet electric utilities throughout the U.S. have seen a steady rise in cyber and physical security related events that continue to raise concern. Asset owners and operators understand that the effects of a coordinated cyber and physical attack on a utility’s operations would threaten electric system reliability–and potentially result in large scale power outages. Utilities are routinely faced with new challenges for dealing with these cyber threats to the grid and consequently maintain a set of best practices to keep systems secure and up to date. Among the greatest challenges is a lack of knowledge or strategy to mitigate new risks that emerge as a result of an exponential rise in complexity of modern control systems. This paper compiles an open-source analysis of cyber threats and risks to the electric grid, utility best practices for prevention and response to cyber threats, and utility suggestions about how the federal government can aid utilities in combating and mitigating risks.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2017

Akatosh: Automated Cyber Incident Verification and Impact Analysis

Akatosh, a U.S. Department of Homeland Security Transition to Practice Program (TTP) project developed by Oak Ridge National Laboratory with industry and academic partnership, enables automated, real-time forensic analysis of endpoints after malware-attacks and other cyber security incidents by automatically maintaining detailed snapshots of host-level activity on endpoints over time. It achieves this by integrating intrusion detection systems (IDS) with forensic tools. The combination allows Akatosh to collect vast amounts of endpoint data and assists in verifying, tracking, and analyzing endpoints in real time. This provides operations personnel and analysts as well as managers and executives with continuous feedback on the impact of malicious software and other security incidents on endpoints in their network.

Smith, Jared M.↗
NASA NTRS2016

Cyber-Threat Assessment for the Air Traffic Management System: A Network Controls Approach

Air transportation networks are being disrupted with increasing frequency by failures in their cyber- (computing, communication, control) systems. Whether these cyber- failures arise due to deliberate attacks or incidental errors, they can have far-reaching impact on the performance of the air traffic control and management systems. For instance, a computer failure in the Washington DC Air Route Traffic Control Center (ZDC) on August 15, 2015, caused nearly complete closure of the Centers airspace for several hours. This closure had a propagative impact across the United States National Airspace System, causing changed congestion patterns and requiring placement of a suite of traffic management initiatives to address the capacity reduction and congestion. A snapshot of traffic on that day clearly shows the closure of the ZDC airspace and the resulting congestion at its boundary, which required augmented traffic management at multiple locations. Cyber- events also have important ramifications for private stakeholders, particularly the airlines. During the last few months, computer-system issues have caused several airlines fleets to be grounded for significant periods of time: these include United Airlines (twice), LOT Polish Airlines, and American Airlines. Delays and regional stoppages due to cyber- events are even more common, and may have myriad causes (e.g., failure of the Department of Homeland Security systems needed for security check of passengers, see [3]). The growing frequency of cyber- disruptions in the air transportation system reflects a much broader trend in the modern society: cyber- failures and threats are becoming increasingly pervasive, varied, and impactful. In consequence, an intense effort is underway to develop secure and resilient cyber- systems that can protect against, detect, and remove threats, see e.g. and its many citations. The outcomes of this wide effort on cyber- security are applicable to the air transportation infrastructure, and indeed security solutions are being implemented in the current system. While these security solutions are important, they only provide a piecemeal solution. Particular computers or communication channels are protected from particular attacks, without a holistic view of the air transportation infrastructure. On the other hand, the above-listed incidents highlight that a holistic approach is needed, for several reasons. First, the air transportation infrastructure is a large scale cyber-physical system with multiple stakeholders and diverse legacy assets. It is impractical to protect every cyber- asset from known and unknown disruptions, and instead a strategic view of security is needed. Second, disruptions to the cyber- system can incur complex propagative impacts across the air transportation network, including its physical and human assets. Also, these implications of cyber- events are exacerbated or modulated by other disruptions and operational specifics, e.g. severe weather, operator fatigue or error, etc. These characteristics motivate a holistic and strategic perspective on protecting the air transportation infrastructure from cyber- events. The analysis of cyber- threats to the air traffic system is also inextricably tied to the integration of new autonomy into the airspace. The replacement of human operators with cyber functions leaves the network open to new cyber threats, which must be modeled and managed. Paradoxically, the mitigation of cyber events in the airspace will also likely require additional autonomy, given the fast time scale and myriad pathways of cyber-attacks which must be managed. The assessment of new vulnerabilities upon integration of new autonomy is also a key motivation for a holistic perspective on cyber threats.

Complex Networks↗
DOE OSTI2022

Smart Microgrids

The Nation’s electrical power depends on one bulk power grid to support security and economic prosperity. According to the Department of Homeland Security’s Homeland Threat Assessment of 2020, the largest cyber threat to homeland security is potential disruption to critical infrastructure, including power grids. Critical infrastructure includes the physical and cyber systems which generate, transmit, and distribute electricity with an impact on economic security, public health, or safety. The surety of the Nation’s power grid is vital for providing essential services and would put the population at risk if disrupted. Power outages can have catastrophic consequences for critical organizations such as hospitals and military installations. Additionally, the current fossil-fuel dependent power grid is extremely fragile and vulnerable to overloads, storms that destroy power lines, and cyber-attacks.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2020

Innovation in Radiological Security, Part 2 of 2 – Insights into Developing a Cloud-hosted Security Technology

A Sentry Remote Monitoring System (Sentry-RMS) is a stand-alone security system that provides detection, assessment, and communication of priority alarms as an additional means of thwarting internal and external threats to sites that maintain radiological material. The SEntry-RMS CommUnications and REsponse (Sentry-SECURE) platform is an optional feature of the Sentry-RMS that relays priority alarm information to the identified response stakeholders. Sentry-SECURE is hosted in a cloud environment that abstracts the data owner’s and data consumer’s platforms to allow for greater information sharing. This promotes situational awareness amongst authorized users and enables future innovation among modern response platforms. When securely architecting a cloud solution such as this, the use of design paradigms can be an effective tool to increase the accuracy and reliability of cyber- and information-security-related decisions made throughout the development process. This approach also supports the categorization of design considerations into three levels: industry concepts, project approaches, and data protections for digital processes. Industry concepts consist of the notional underpinnings that guide or motivate a security process, system, or design but often lack any tangible attributes. Project approaches represent decisions made during the design and development process to prioritize a solution, method, or practice above another that may provide a comparable functional output but lacks a desired security benefit. Data protections for digital processes represent the selection, integration, and implementation of specific controls for a given asset. This paper will explore specific examples of how Sentry-SECURE has been designed to account for considerations at each of these three levels, while balancing the operational intent of the platform with the security enhancements necessary to maintain data integrity, availability, and confidentiality.

assessment, RMS, security, physical, cloud, Cyber ↗
DOE OSTI2021

Modeling Data Flows with Network Calculus in Cyber-Physical Systems: Enabling Feature Analysis for Anomaly Detection Applications

The electric grid is becoming increasingly cyber-physical with the addition of smart technologies, new communication interfaces, and automated grid-support functions. Because of this, it is no longer sufficient to only study the physical system dynamics, but the cyber system must also be monitored as well to examine cyber-physical interactions and effects on the overall system. To address this gap for both operational and security needs, cyber-physical situational awareness is needed to monitor the system to detect any faults or malicious activity. Techniques and models to understand the physical system (the power system operation) exist, but methods to study the cyber system are needed, which can assist in understanding how the network traffic and changes to network conditions affect applications such as data analysis, intrusion detection systems (IDS), and anomaly detection. In this paper, we examine and develop models of data flows in communication networks of cyber-physical systems (CPSs) and explore how network calculus can be utilized to develop those models for CPSs, with a focus on anomaly and intrusion detection. This provides a foundation for methods to examine how changes to behavior in the CPS can be modeled and for investigating cyber effects in CPSs in anomaly detection applications.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗