Game-Theoretic Strategies for Cyber-Physical Infrastructures Under Component Disruptions
In this work, networked infrastructures of recursively defined systems composed of discrete cyber and physical components are considered. The components of basic systems at the finest levels can be disrupted by cyber or physical means, and can be reinforced to survive at certain costs. A problem of ensuring the infrastructure performance is formulated as a game between a provider and an attacker, who probabilistically choose components to reinforce and attack, respectively. The disruptions of this infrastructure are characterized using the aggregate failure correlation function that specifies the conditional failure probability of the infrastructure given the failure of an individual system at that level. The survival probabilities of basic systems satisfy simple product-form, first-order differential equations expressed in terms of the multiplier functions. The utility functions of the provider and attacker are composed of the reward and cost terms, both expressed in terms of the component reinforcement and attack probabilities. The Nash equilibrium of this game is characterized, along with the sensitivity functions of the survival probabilities of basic systems that highlight their dependence individually on the cost-benefit terms, the correlation functions, and the multiplier functions. These results are illustrated using simplified models of a distributed cloud servers infrastructure, a 5G data network infrastructure, a high performance computing federation, and a smart energy grid infrastructure.