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At least 667 records · Page 37
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS1995

Earthquake recurrence on the southern San Andreas modulated by fault-normal stress

Earthquake recurrence data from the Pallett Creek and Wrightwood paleoseismic sites on the San Andreas fault appear to show temporal variations in repeat interval. We investigate the interaction between strike-slip faults and auxiliary reverse and normal faults as a physical mechanism capable of producing such variations. Under the assumption that fault strength is a function of fault-normal stress (e.g. Byerlee's Law), failure of an auxiliary fault modifies the strength of the strike-slip fault, thereby modulating the recurrence interval for earthquakes. In our finite element model, auxiliary faults are driven by stress accumulation near restraining and releasing bends of a strike-slip fault. Earthquakes occur when fault strength is exceeded and are incorporated as a stress drop which is dependent on fault-normal stress. The model is driven by a velocity boundary condition over many earthquake cycles. Resulting synthetic strike-slip earthquake recurrence data display temporal variations similar to observed paleoseismic data within time windows surrounding auxiliary fault failures. Our simple model supports the idea that interaction between a strike-slip fault and auxiliary reverse or normal faults can modulate the recurrence interval of events on the strike-slip fault, possibly producing short term variations in earthquake recurrence interval.

Palmer, Randy↗
NASA NTRS1993

Reliability of solid rocket motor cases and nozzles

A recent article in Aerospace America claims that 'the average success ratio of the current U.S. stable of launch vehicles, including upper stages, is about 92 percent (without upper stages it is close to 95 percent). The 8 percent failure probability implies an expected loss of $12M per flight, not including the lost opportunity costs'. Since payload costs are likely to be much greater than launch costs and even more so for the new launch vehicles for the Advanced Launch Development Program (ALDP), the cost of rocket motor unreliability at the current 8 percent rate can run into billions of dollars if expected increases in demand are realized. At an 8 percent failure rate, it is extremely unlikely that failure will occur during the first few ground tests of a new system. At that time, most of the design, analysis and tooling costs of the program have not expended. Since most systems are expected to be used ten to a hundred or more times, the likelihood of one or more failures is very large, and it can be expected that the above losses will be realized in the future. This will occur unless the problems are addressed and remedied. Recent trends suggest the problem is not being addressed adequately.

Crose, James G.↗
NASA NTRS2006

The NASA F-15 Intelligent Flight Control Systems: Generation II

The Second Generation (Gen II) control system for the F-15 Intelligent Flight Control System (IFCS) program implements direct adaptive neural networks to demonstrate robust tolerance to faults and failures. The direct adaptive tracking controller integrates learning neural networks (NNs) with a dynamic inversion control law. The term direct adaptive is used because the error between the reference model and the aircraft response is being compensated or directly adapted to minimize error without regard to knowing the cause of the error. No parameter estimation is needed for this direct adaptive control system. In the Gen II design, the feedback errors are regulated with a proportional-plus-integral (PI) compensator. This basic compensator is augmented with an online NN that changes the system gains via an error-based adaptation law to improve aircraft performance at all times, including normal flight, system failures, mispredicted behavior, or changes in behavior resulting from damage.

Buschbacher, Mark↗
NASA NTRS1997

A Comprehensive Reliability Methodology for Assessing Risk of Reusing Failed Hardware Without Corrective Actions with and Without Redundancy

This paper deals with the development of a reliability methodology to assess the consequences of using hardware, without failure analysis or corrective action, that has previously demonstrated that it did not perform per specification. The subject of this paper arose from the need to provide a detailed probabilistic analysis to calculate the change in probability of failures with respect to the base or non-failed hardware. The methodology used for the analysis is primarily based on principles of Monte Carlo simulation. The random variables in the analysis are: Maximum Time of Operation (MTO) and operation Time of each Unit (OTU) The failure of a unit is considered to happen if (OTU) is less than MTO for the Normal Operational Period (NOP) in which this unit is used. NOP as a whole uses a total of 4 units. Two cases are considered. in the first specialized scenario, the failure of any operation or system failure is considered to happen if any of the units used during the NOP fail. in the second specialized scenario, the failure of any operation or system failure is considered to happen only if any two of the units used during the MOP fail together. The probability of failure of the units and the system as a whole is determined for 3 kinds of systems - Perfect System, Imperfect System 1 and Imperfect System 2. in a Perfect System, the operation time of the failed unit is the same as that of the MTO. In an Imperfect System 1, the operation time of the failed unit is assumed as 1 percent of the MTO. In an Imperfect System 2, the operation time of the failed unit is assumed as zero. in addition, simulated operation time of failed units is assumed as 10 percent of the corresponding units before zero value. Monte Carlo simulation analysis is used for this study. Necessary software has been developed as part of this study to perform the reliability calculations. The results of the analysis showed that the predicted change in failure probability (P(sub F)) for the previously failed units is as high as 49 percent above the baseline (perfect system) for the worst case. The predicted change in system P(sub F) for the previously failed units is as high as 36% for single unit failure without any redundancy. For redundant systems, with dual unit failure, the predicted change in P(sub F) for the previously failed units is as high as 16%. These results will help management to make decisions regarding the consequences of using previously failed units without adequate failure analysis or corrective action.

Putcha, Chandra S.↗
NASA NTRS2016

R2U2 in Space: System and Software Health Management for Small Satellites

In order for small but complex systems like rovers, SmallSats, or Unmanned Aircraft (UAS) to operate autonomously, they must have a real-time solution for assessing their own system health. System and Software Health Management (SHM) enables better detection of faulty sensors and software problems, and enables better fault management including mitigation of unpredicted fault scenarios in the absence of a human on-board. In recent work, we have developed a Responsive, Realizable, Unobtrusive Unit (R2U2) for on-board SHM of autonomous UAS and demonstrated its ability to detect faults during flight time. These faults, from sensor failures, to software problems, to malicious security attacks, can present as transient temporal faults that even humans are challenged to find. An R2U2 congfiuration is a modular combination of multiple types of temporal logic runtime observers with fault-specic Bayesian Nets and sensor filters. R2U2 reasons about both on-board hardware and software components; R2U2 itself can be instantiated as an independent FPGA (Field-Programmable Gate Array)-based conguration or as a software component running independently from other software on-board. Small satellites, such as CubeSats, also require on-board SHM and failure mitigation, as limited telemetry bandwidth does not allow the transmission of the entire system state for ground-based health management. However, the autonomous operation of satellites brings a set of challenges different from UAS, including the effects of radiation on non-rad-hard, low-cost components, and the harsher environment of space. We surmise that a new extension of R2U2 could be adapted to help better detect, for example, radiation errors in cheaper COTS (Commercial Off the Shelf) (not rad-hard) components often used in small space systems. Since small satellites often operate in coordination, we will also examine new ways of distributed monitoring of their communication and cooperation and real-time detection of off-nominal situations utilizing multiple satellites. This talk will discuss preliminary work and ideas for building on terrestrial success of system and software health management for the harsher, and differently challenging, environment of space.

Runtime Verification & Validation↗
NASA NTRS1981

Design and verification of a multiple fault tolerant control system for STS applications using computer simulation

General Dynamics/Convair is under NASA contract to integrate the Centaur upper stage into the space transportation system for future planetary missions. This requires that control of all safety critical functions be two-failure tolerant. The control system developed consists of five asynchronous computers, each contributing at their outputs to a 3-out-of-5 voting plane. Subsystem control is based on an end function redundancy management scheme. Analysis of multiple component failures and worst-case time-phase asynchrony among the computers is performed by a real-time computer simulation. The simulation emulates the hardware and subsystem interfaces, wire by wire, providing assessibility to any component for the insertion of preprogrammed failures. Observability is provided via a graphics system and diagnostic software. The simulation provides an engineering tool where the integrity of control system hardware and imbedded software can be demonstrated.

Szatkowski, G. P.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Adaptive Stress Testing: Using Reinforcement Learning to Find Failures in Safety-Critical Systems

Emerging applications in artificial intelligence, such as driverless cars and autonomous aircraft promise to be more efficient, cheaper to operate, and always available. However, ensuring the safety of these systems remains a major challenge to their certification and adoption. These autonomous systems are expected to routinely make safety-critical decisions where failures can have serious consequences including loss of life and property. Testing and validation techniques aim to identify and diagnose potential failures before the system is deployed. However, finding failure scenarios in autonomous systems can be very challenging due to high-dimensional and continuous state spaces, interaction with large environments over many time steps, and the rarity of failures. This talk presents Adaptive Stress Testing (AST), a simulation-based testing framework for finding the most likely path to a failure event of a safety-critical system. The key idea of AST is that stress testing can be formulated as a Partially Observable Markov Decision Process (POMDP), which enables reinforcement learning techniques to be used for finding failure events. Reinforcement learning algorithms can efficiently explore the search space and have been shown to scale to very large systems. We present applications of AST to find failures in various safety-critical systems including the aircraft collision avoidance systems, autonomous cars, and small unmanned aerial vehicles.

autonomous vehicles↗
NASA NTRS1983

Development of a simplified procedure for rocket engine thrust chamber life prediction with creep

An analytical method for predicting engine thrust chamber life is developed. The method accounts for high pressure differentials and time-dependent creep effects both of which are significant in limiting the useful life of the shuttle main engine thrust chamber. The hot-gas-wall ligaments connecting adjacent cooling channels ribs and separating the coolant flow from the combustion gas are subjected to a high pressure induced primary stress superimposed on an alternating cyclic thermal strain field. The pressure load combined with strain-controlled cycling produces creep ratcheting and consequent bulging and thinning of these ligaments. This mechanism of creep-enhanced ratcheting is analyzed for determining the hot-gas-wall deformation and accumulated strain. Results are confirmed by inelastic finite element analysis. Fatigue and creep rupture damage as well as plastic tensile instability are evaluated as potential failure modes. It is demonstrated for the NARloy Z cases analyzed that when pressure differentials across the ligament are high, creep rupture damage is often the primary failure mode for the cycle times considered.

Badlani, M. L.↗
NASA NTRS2005

Structural Analysis for the American Airlines Flight 587 Accident Investigation: Global Analysis

NASA Langley Research Center (LaRC) supported the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) in the American Airlines Flight 587 accident investigation due to LaRC's expertise in high-fidelity structural analysis and testing of composite structures and materials. A Global Analysis Team from LaRC reviewed the manufacturer s design and certification procedures, developed finite element models and conducted structural analyses, and participated jointly with the NTSB and Airbus in subcomponent tests conducted at Airbus in Hamburg, Germany. The Global Analysis Team identified no significant or obvious deficiencies in the Airbus certification and design methods. Analysis results from the LaRC team indicated that the most-likely failure scenario was failure initiation at the right rear main attachment fitting (lug), followed by an unstable progression of failure of all fin-to-fuselage attachments and separation of the VTP from the aircraft. Additionally, analysis results indicated that failure initiates at the final observed maximum fin loading condition in the accident, when the VTP was subjected to loads that were at minimum 1.92 times the design limit load condition for certification. For certification, the VTP is only required to support loads of 1.5 times design limit load without catastrophic failure. The maximum loading during the accident was shown to significantly exceed the certification requirement. Thus, the structure appeared to perform in a manner consistent with its design and certification, and failure is attributed to VTP loads greater than expected.

Young, Richard D.↗
NASA NTRS2003

Monte Carlo Simulation of Sudden Death Bearing Testing

Monte Carlo simulations combined with sudden death testing were used to compare resultant bearing lives to the calculated hearing life and the cumulative test time and calendar time relative to sequential and censored sequential testing. A total of 30 960 virtual 50-mm bore deep-groove ball bearings were evaluated in 33 different sudden death test configurations comprising 36, 72, and 144 bearings each. Variations in both life and Weibull slope were a function of the number of bearings failed independent of the test method used and not the total number of bearings tested. Variation in L10 life as a function of number of bearings failed were similar to variations in lift obtained from sequentially failed real bearings and from Monte Carlo (virtual) testing of entire populations. Reductions up to 40 percent in bearing test time and calendar time can be achieved by testing to failure or the L(sub 50) life and terminating all testing when the last of the predetermined bearing failures has occurred. Sudden death testing is not a more efficient method to reduce bearing test time or calendar time when compared to censored sequential testing.

Vlcek, Brian L.↗
NASA NTRS1976

Failure detection and isolation investigation for strapdown skew redundant tetrad laser gyro inertial sensor arrays

The degree to which flight-critical failures in a strapdown laser gyro tetrad sensor assembly can be isolated in short-haul aircraft after a failure occurrence has been detected by the skewed sensor failure-detection voting logic is investigated along with the degree to which a failure in the tetrad computer can be detected and isolated at the computer level, assuming a dual-redundant computer configuration. The tetrad system was mechanized with two two-axis inertial navigation channels (INCs), each containing two gyro/accelerometer axes, computer, control circuitry, and input/output circuitry. Gyro/accelerometer data is crossfed between the two INCs to enable each computer to independently perform the navigation task. Computer calculations are synchronized between the computers so that calculated quantities are identical and may be compared. Fail-safe performance (identification of the first failure) is accomplished with a probability approaching 100 percent of the time, while fail-operational performance (identification and isolation of the first failure) is achieved 93 to 96 percent of the time.

Eberlein, A. J.↗
NASA NTRS1992

On the estimation of risk associated with an attenuation prediction

Viewgraphs from a presentation on the estimation of risk associated with an attenuation prediction is presented. Topics covered include: link failure - attenuation exceeding a specified threshold for a specified time interval or intervals; risk - the probability of one or more failures during the lifetime of the link or during a specified accounting interval; the problem - modeling the probability of attenuation by rainfall to provide a prediction of the attenuation threshold for a specified risk; and an accounting for the inadequacy of a model or models.

Crane, R. K.↗
NASA NTRS2005

V and V of ISHM Software for Space Exploration

NASA has established a far-reaching and long-term program for robotic and manned exploration of the solar system, beginning with missions to the moon and Mars. The Crew Transportation System (CTS), a key system for space exploration, imposes four requirements' that ISHM addresses. These requirements have a wide range of implications for V&V and certification of ISHM. There is a range of time-criticality for ISHM actions, from prognostication, which is often (but not always) non-time-critical, to time-critical state estimation and system management under off-nominal emergency conditions. These are externally imposed requirements on ISHM that are subject to V&V. - In addition, a range of techniques are needed to implement an ISHM. The approaches to ISHM are described elsewhere. These approaches range from well-understood algorithms for low-level data analysis, validation and reporting, to AI techniques for state estimation and planning. The range of techniques, and specifically the use of AI techniques such as reasoning under uncertainty and mission planning (and re-planning), implies that several V&V approaches may be required. Depending on the ISHM architecture, traditional testing approaches may be adequate for some ISHM functionality. The AI-based approaches to reasoning under uncertainty, model-based reasoning, and planning share characteristics typical of other complex software systems, but they also have characteristics that set them apart and challenge standard V&V techniques. The range of possible solutions to the overall ISHM problem impose internal challenges to V&V. The V&V challenges increase when hard real-time constraints are imposed for time-critical functionality. For example, there is an external requirement that impending catastrophic failure of the Launch Vehicle (LV) at launch time be detected and life-saving action be taken within two seconds. In this paper we outline the challenges for ISHM V&V, existing approaches and analogs in other software application areas, and possible new approaches to the V&V challenges for space exploration ISHM.

Markosian, Lawrence↗
NASA NTRS2005

On Automating Failure Mode Analysis and Enforcing its Integrity

This paper reports our experience on the development of a design-for-safety (DFS) workbench called Risk Assessment and Management Environment (RAME) for microelectronic avionics systems. Our objective is to transform DFS practice from an ad-hoc, inefficient, error-prone approach to a stringent engineering process such that DFS can keep up with the rapidly growing complexity of avionics systems. In particular, RAME is built upon an information infrastructure that comprises a fault model, a knowledge base, and a failure reporting/tracking system. This infrastructure permits systematic learning from prior projects and enables the automation of failure modes, effects and criticality analysis (FMECA). Among other unique features, the most important advantage of RAME is its capability of directly accepting design source code in hardware description languages (HDLs) for automated failure mode analysis, which enables RAME to be compatible and to evolve with most electronic-computer-aided-design systems. Through an initial experimental evaluation of the RAME prototype, we show that our approach to FMECA automation improves failure mode analysis turn-around-time, completeness, and accuracy.

design for safety↗
NASA NTRS2004

Designing to Mitigate Food Growing Failures in Space

Future space life support systems may use crop plants to grow most of the crew s food. A harvest failure can reduce the food available for future consumption. If the previously stored food is insufficient to reach the next harvest, the crew may go hungry. This paper considers how the overall food supply system should be modified to cope with food production failures. The food supply concept for a mission will use grown food, or stored food, cIr both. The optimum food supply mix depends on the costs and failure probabilities of stored and grown food. A simple food system model assumes that either we obtain the nominal harvest or a failure occurs and no food is harvested. Given the probability that any particular harvest fails, it is easy to compute the expected number of failures and the total food shortfall over a mission. If some food is grown and the probability of harvest failure is high, a non-redundant system has an unacceptable likelihood that the crew will have no food for a full harvest period. Food supply reliability must be increased either by supplying more food initially or by increasing food production capacity. We can obtain a very reliable food supply even when the harvest failure rate is high. If the cost of growing food is much less than the cost of providing stored food, it is better to provide redundant food growing capacity than to increase initial storage. A more realistic biomass production failure model allows the harvest amount or time to vary around the nominal values, using stochastic modeling with repeated Monte Carlo simulation, but such failures have minor impact compared to a complete harvest failure.

Jones, Harry↗
NASA NTRS2011

Adding a Second Ku-Band Antenna to the International Space Station

The International Space Station, as originally developed, used the Ku-Band Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System communications link to transmit non-critical data to the ground. Since becoming operational, the use for the link evolved to include additional services that, although also not critical, were deemed to be necessary for the crew. The external Ku-Band Antennas were designed for transport to the ISS in the shuttle cargo bay and thus are not suitable for manifesting on any current cargo vehicle. The original intent was to stow two spare antennas on orbit in a protective container until such time as they were needed to replace a failing unit which is a long and complicated process due to the complexity of the removal and replacement procedure. The Boeing Company proposed manifesting one of those spare antennas in an operable configuration eliminating the need for an Extravehicular Activity (EVA) to correct the first failure and as such minimizing the time to hours rather than weeks required to restore the Ku-Band communications link after failures. After the first failure, an EVA would be scheduled to replace the failed antenna with the stowed spare antenna. Because the hot spare is activated internal to the ISS, the replacement of the failed unit can be done when convenient rather than in haste. This paper describes the methodology used to locate a suitable site to add a new antenna mast to the ISS as well the process followed to fabricate, deliver and install the new interface hardware. Because this was not planned when the ISS was originally designed, structural, power, data and Intermediate Frequency signal connections had to be found for use. With the movement of the P6 solar array element from the initial location in the center zenith location of the ISS to the end of the port side of the truss and concurrent relocation of one string of S-Band communications assets, there were candidate power, data and structural connections available on the Z1 Truss. The engineering team evaluated these residual interfaces for use and designed cabling and structural elements for the candidate interfaces. The antenna was recently installed on ULF-4 and has completed a preliminary checkout. Included in this check out were evaluation of the power level received from the TDRS and evaluation of the gimbal position feedback for consideration in the static bias pointing matrix. This process demonstrates the ability to modify and upgrade manned space vehicles as either need or technology requires.

DuSold, Chuck↗
DOE OSTI2025

Investigation of the temperature-dependent failure processes in PVD Cr-coated ZIRLO nuclear fuel cladding using in situ X-ray micro-tomography imaging

In this work, an accident tolerant fuel cladding system with Cr coating deposited using physical vapour deposition (PVD) method onto commercial Optimized ZIRLO™ was studied. The cladding tubes were machined into C-rings and loaded to failure under compression with real-time synchrotron micro-X-ray computed tomography (XCT) imaging at room temperature (RT), 345 °C, 650 °C and 950 °C in argon (Ar) atmosphere. The mechanical behaviour and failure processes were found strongly temperature-dependent where the Cr coating showed brittle fracture at RT and 345 °C, ductile fracture at 650 °C and a reversion to brittle fracture at 950 °C. Nanoindentation measurements and scanning electron microscopy (SEM) imaging were conducted on the materials after high temperature testing. It was found that recrystallisation of the Cr coating occurred at elevated temperatures, which significantly affected its local properties hence the failure behaviour at different temperatures. This work represents the first in situ 3D XCT observation of progressive failure processes in PVD Cr-coated ZIRLO claddings up to 950 °C providing critical insights into its brittle-to-ductile transition (BDTT) behaviour and subsequent ductile-to-brittle reversion with the increase in temperature. Moreover, results are compared with other PVD Cr-coated Zircaloy materials from open literature; the influences of the coating microstructure and local properties on the failure stress/strain and fracture processes are discussed.

Yuan, Guanjie↗
DOE OSTI2020

In-situ Detection of Glovebox Glove Degradation Prior to Glove Failure; Effects on Safety, Waste, and Operational Costs - 20402

Glovebox glove pressure decay leak testing and analysis of the data can greatly improve glovebox safety, minimize Transuranic (TRU) glove waste, and minimize operational cost. It is well known, the weakest point of containment on a glovebox is the glove. Mitigating unplanned openings in gloves is critical to minimizing operational and safety costs in glovebox operations. Mitigating unplanned glove openings due to glove failures will be discussed in this paper. The lack of an engineered solution to determine a gloves operational life in nuclear operations, has lead to use of theoretical and manual subjective methods to determine the life and safety of a glovebox glove. Whether the glove is inspected visually prior to use, or gloves are changed regularly to theoretically avoid failure, both the operators PPE and the room are being exposed to contamination, or un-necessary amounts of TRU glove waste are being generated. Millions of dollars yearly in operational costs are spent on glove failures due to loss of production, incident analysis, regulatory audits, clean up, and paperwork. In a nuclear application, a glove failure could contaminate an operator and laboratory, shut down the operation for weeks, potentially create a regulatory audit, and potentially create a media frenzy; the damages to the organization can be astronomical. Elimination of glove failures is possible by tracking glove material degradation and setting limits to allow glove change when it becomes necessary, prior to glove failure. Analytical pressure decay leak testing allows the detection of material degradation, and in turn the ability to limit operational glove failures. A German based company called MK Versuchsanlagen, e.K., has developed an advanced Glove Integrity Testing System. The system, with its use of proprietary RFID and special software technology, is unique in its capabilities. The system is capable to perform highly accurate regular glove testing on any size glovebox line in minimal time. The system records and can analyze a tremendous amount of system data that in turn can determine, for example, a safe glove change time prior to a glove material failure. This paper will show how an advanced Glove Integrity Testing System can detect glove material degradation and help determine a safe change point prior to glove failure. Pressure decay curves of new gloves and recorded effects of accelerated aging on the glove over time will be shown. The use of this technology in nuclear facilities can greatly improve glovebox operational safety, minimize glovebox glove TRU waste, and save organizations tremendous costs in downtime, clean up, documentation, and potential regulatory review. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗