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NASA NTRS1997

Smoldering News From STS-77 Endeavour

The Microgravity Smoldering Combustion (MSC) experiment lifted off aboard the Space Shuttle Endeavour for its second flight in May 1996, as part of the STS-77 mission. This experiment is part of a series of studies focused on the smolder characteristics of porous combustible materials in a microgravity environment. Smoldering is a nonflaming form of combustion that takes place in the interior of combustible materials. Common examples of smoldering are nonflaming embers, charcoal briquettes, and cigarettes. The objective of this study is to provide a better understanding of the controlling mechanisms of smoldering in microgravity and normal Earth gravity (1g). As with other forms of combustion, gravity affects the availability of air and transport of heat, and therefore, the rate of combustion. The results of the microgravity experiments will be compared with identical ones carried out in 1g. In addition, they will be used to verify present theories of smolder combustion and will provide new insights into the process of smoldering combustion, enhancing our fundamental understanding of this frequently encountered combustion process and guiding improvements in fire safety practices. Two smoldering combustion tests with polyurethane foam were successfully accomplished during the STS-77 mission. The tests investigated smoldering combustion in a quiescent (no-flow) enriched oxygen environment, and in an air environment with a 2-mm/sec airflow through the fuel sample. The primary data from the tests are the ignition characteristics, spread rate, smolder reaction temperature, and products of combustion (solid and gas). On both the first mission on STS-69 and the second mission on STS-77, a smolder front propagated the length of the forced-flow samples, with the spread rate between the corresponding upward and downward 1g smolder rates. Neither of the quiescent cases propagated combustion (the first case was due in part to a problem with the experiment electronics). These results show a dramatic difference from the normal gravity results, where smolder propagation is very rapid and complete for both of these conditions. The experiment was conceived by Prof. A. Carlos Fernandez-Pello at the University of California-Berkeley. The MSC hardware was designed and built at the NASA Lewis Research Center by a team of civil servants and contractors from NYMA, Inc., and Aerospace Design & Fabrication, Inc. (ADF). The hardware consists of two sealed aluminum combustion chambers (each being a half a cylinder). The chambers hold the MSC test section, data acquisition electronics, power distribution electronics, and instrumentation. The hardware is fitted into a 5-ft(sup 3) Get-Away-Special (GAS) canister that is mounted in the shuttle cargo bay. The test section consists of a quartz cylinder that contains the polyurethane foam sample and an igniter. This igniter, which is an electrically heated wire sandwiched between two porous ceramic disks, is mounted in contact with the end of the foam sample. An array of 12 thermocouples placed axially and radially along the foam sample provide temperature histories, which are used to determine the rate of smolder propagation, and the characteristics of the reaction.

Koudelka, John M.↗

NASA NTRS2001

Mars Sample Handling Protocol Workshop Series: Workshop 4

In preparation for missions to Mars that will involve the return of samples to Earth, it will be necessary to prepare for the receiving, handling, testing, distributing, and archiving of martian materials here on Earth. Previous groups and committees have studied selected aspects of sample return activities, but specific detailed protocols for the handling and testing of returned samples must still be developed. To further refine the requirements for sample hazard testing and to develop the criteria for subsequent release of sample materials from quarantine, the NASA Planetary Protection Officer convened a series of workshops in 2000-2001. The overall objective of the Workshop Series was to produce a Draft Protocol by which returned martian sample materials can be assessed for biological hazards and examined for evidence of life (extant or extinct) while safeguarding the purity of the samples from possible terrestrial contamination. This report also provides a record of the proceedings of Workshop 4, the final Workshop of the Series, which was held in Arlington, Virginia, June 5-7, 2001. During Workshop 4, the sub-groups were provided with a draft of the protocol compiled in May 2001 from the work done at prior Workshops in the Series. Then eight sub-groups were formed to discuss the following assigned topics: Review and Assess the Draft Protocol for Physical/Chemical Testing Review and Assess the Draft Protocol for Life Detection Testing Review and Assess the Draft Protocol for Biohazard Testing Environmental and Health/Monitoring and Safety Issues Requirements of the Draft Protocol for Facilities and Equipment Contingency Planning for Different Outcomes of the Draft Protocol Personnel Management Considerations in Implementation of the Draft Protocol Draft Protocol Implementation Process and Update Concepts This report provides the first complete presentation of the Draft Protocol for Mars Sample Handling to meet planetary protection needs. This Draft Protocol, which was compiled from deliberations and recommendations from earlier Workshops in the Series, represents a consensus that emerged from the discussions of all the sub-groups assembled over the course of the five Workshops of the Series. These discussions converged on a conceptual approach to sample handling, as well as on specific analytical requirements. Discussions also identified important issues requiring attention, as well as research and development needed for protocol implementation.

Race Margaret S.↗

NASA NTRS2005

Space Based Range Demonstration and Certification (SBRDC)

This viewgraph presentation describes the development, utilization and testing of technologies for range safety and range user systems. The contents include: 1) Space Based Range (SBR) Goals and Objectives; 2) Today s United States Range; 3) Future Range; 4) Another Vision for the Future Range; 5) STARS Project Goals; 6) STARS Content; 7) STARS Configuration Flight Demonstrations 1 & 2; 8) Spaceport And Range Technologies STARS Objectives and Results; 9) Spaceport And Range Technologies STARS FD2 Objectives; 10) Range Safety Hardware; 11) Range User Hardware; and 12) Past/Future Flight Demo Plans

Sakahara, Robert↗

NASA NTRS2009

Got Mercury?

Many of the operational and payload lighting units used in various spacecraft contain elemental mercury. If these devices were damaged on-orbit, elemental mercury could be released into the cabin. Although there are plans to replace operational units with alternate light sources, such as LEDs, that do not contain mercury, mercury-containing lamps efficiently produce high quality illumination and may never be completely replaced on orbit. Therefore, exposure to elemental mercury during spaceflight will remain possible and represents a toxicological hazard. Elemental mercury is a liquid metal that vaporizes slowly at room temperature. However, it may be completely vaporized at the elevated operating temperatures of lamps. Although liquid mercury is not readily absorbed through the skin or digestive tract, mercury vapors are efficiently absorbed through the respiratory tract. Therefore, the amount of mercury in the vapor form must be estimated. For mercury releases from lamps that are not being operated, we utilized a study conducted by the New Jersey Department of Environmental Quality to calculate the amount of mercury vapor expected to form over a 2-week period. For longer missions and for mercury releases occurring when lamps are operating, we conservatively assumed complete volatilization of the available mercury. Because current spacecraft environmental control systems are unable to remove mercury vapors, both short-term and long-term exposures to mercury vapors are possible. Acute exposure to high concentrations of mercury vapors can cause irritation of the respiratory tract and behavioral symptoms, such as irritability and hyperactivity. Chronic exposure can result in damage to the nervous system (tremors, memory loss, insomnia, etc.) and kidneys (proteinurea). Therefore, the JSC Toxicology Group recommends that stringent safety controls and verifications (vibrational testing, etc.) be applied to any hardware that contains elemental mercury that could yield airborne mercury vapor concentrations greater than 0.1 mg/cu m in the total spacecraft atmosphere for exposures lasting 30 days or less or 0.01 mg/cu m mercury vapor for exposures lasting more than 30 days. We also encourage the use of alternative devices that do not contain mercury.

Meyers, Valerie E.↗

NASA NTRS2013

Evidence Report: Risk of Inadequate Human-Computer Interaction

Human-computer interaction (HCI) encompasses all the methods by which humans and computer-based systems communicate, share information, and accomplish tasks. When HCI is poorly designed, crews have difficulty entering, navigating, accessing, and understanding information. HCI has rarely been studied in an operational spaceflight context, and detailed performance data that would support evaluation of HCI have not been collected; thus, we draw much of our evidence from post-spaceflight crew comments, and from other safety-critical domains like ground-based power plants, and aviation. Additionally, there is a concern that any potential or real issues to date may have been masked by the fact that crews have near constant access to ground controllers, who monitor for errors, correct mistakes, and provide additional information needed to complete tasks. We do not know what types of HCI issues might arise without this "safety net". Exploration missions will test this concern, as crews may be operating autonomously due to communication delays and blackouts. Crew survival will be heavily dependent on available electronic information for just-in-time training, procedure execution, and vehicle or system maintenance; hence, the criticality of the Risk of Inadequate HCI. Future work must focus on identifying the most important contributing risk factors, evaluating their contribution to the overall risk, and developing appropriate mitigations. The Risk of Inadequate HCI includes eight core contributing factors based on the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS): (1) Requirements, policies, and design processes, (2) Information resources and support, (3) Allocation of attention, (4) Cognitive overload, (5) Environmentally induced perceptual changes, (6) Misperception and misinterpretation of displayed information, (7) Spatial disorientation, and (8) Displays and controls.

Kritina Holden↗

NASA NTRS2015

Assessing UAS Flight Testing and It's Importance for Beyond-Line-of-Sight UAS Control in Cooperation with Partnering Organizations

From the 1st of June until the 21st of August, the internship has been conducted at NASA Ames Research Center as part of the Master of Space Studies at the International Space University. The main activities consisted of doing research on UAV flight-‐testing and the assessing of safety with respect to Beyond-‐Line-‐Of-‐Sight operations. Further activities consisted of accommodating international partners and potential partners at the NASA Ames site, in order to identify mutual interest and future collaboration. Besides those activities, the report describes the planning process of the ISU Space Coast Trip to 10 different space related companies on the west-‐coast of California. Key words: UAS, UAV, BLOS, Ames, ISU Trip

BLOS↗

NASA NTRS2017

Fuzzy Logic Controller Stability Analysis Using a Satisfiability Modulo Theories Approach

While many widely accepted methods and techniques exist for validation and verification of traditional controllers, at this time no solutions have been accepted for Fuzzy Logic Controllers (FLCs). Due to the highly nonlinear nature of such systems, and the fact that developing a valid FLC does not require a mathematical model of the system, it is quite difficult to use conventional techniques to prove controller stability. Since safety-critical systems must be tested and verified to work as expected for all possible circumstances, the fact that FLC controllers cannot be tested to achieve such requirements poses limitations on the applications for such technology. Therefore, alternative methods for verification and validation of FLCs needs to be explored. In this study, a novel approach using formal verification methods to ensure the stability of a FLC is proposed. Main research challenges include specification of requirements for a complex system, conversion of a traditional FLC to a piecewise polynomial representation, and using a formal verification tool in a nonlinear solution space. Using the proposed architecture, the Fuzzy Logic Controller was found to always generate negative feedback, but inconclusive for Lyapunov stability.

Fuzzy Logic Controller↗

NASA NTRS2017

Fuzzy Logic Controller Stability Analysis Using a Satisfiability Modulo Theories Approach

Fuzzy Logic Controller↗

DOE OSTI2021

Development of phenomena identification and ranking table for Westinghouse lead fast reactor’s safety

The Westinghouse Lead-cooled Fast Reactor (LFR) is a medium-size, passively safe, economic, Gen-IV nuclear reactor. An important effort within the Westinghouse LFR program is the development of the safety analysis methodology, which comprises computer code development, model development, and experimental testing. A key initial task associated with the development of the safety analysis methodology is the identification of processes and phenomena that affect the plant's capability to meet selected safety performance indicators. This is accomplished through the development of a Phenomena Identification and Ranking Table (PIRT) for selected accident scenarios which, for this specific PIRT effort, included selected postulated design basis accidents and hypothetical beyond design basis accidents in LFRs. This paper describes the role of PIRT in the development of the Westinghouse LFR safety analysis methodology and the process used in the PIRT development. Specifically, the Westinghouse LFR PIRT assessed importance of pertinent phenomena and identified gaps in their knowledge-base by evaluating current modeling capabilities and data available for validation. The ultimate goal was to provide guidance on computer code development and validation efforts and to prioritize testing to support LFR design and licensing. The key phenomena and processes that are deemed highly important for the safety performance indicators, but for which the state of knowledge is low, are presented. The testing program and analyses development are planned to address significant phenomena in the PIRT.

Lead fast reactor↗

NASA NTRS2020

Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessel (COPV) Damage Tolerance Life Analysis Methodology and Test Best Practices: Appendices

The NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) Deputy Director requested an independent assessment to develop data to understand the limitations of linear elastic fracture mechanics (LEFM) computational methods used to predict fatigue crack growth rate (da/dN) behavior of small detectable cracks in thin metal liners for composite overwrapped pressure vessels (COPVs). The NESC assessment team was also requested to demonstrate a test-based methodology for validating damage tolerance requirements for COPVs with elastically responding metal liners where LEFM methods are not appropriate. This document contains the appendices to the main report.

Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessels; Linear Ela↗

DOE OSTI2020

Experimental studies on metallic fuel relocation in a pin bundle core structure of a sodium-cooled fast reactor

Understanding the relocation behavior of metallic fuel in severe accident scenarios is one of the most important factors in the safety assessment of sodium-cooled fast reactors (SFRs). In the present study, the relocation behavior of uranium metallic fuel was investigated by conducting metallic fuel relocation experiments using 19-pin bundle test sections in the Argonne's Metallic Uranium Safety Experiment (MUSE) facility. Post-test radiographic images were taken to characterize the uranium fuel relocation within the pin bundle test section. In addition, the pressure drop in the test sections was measured after the relocation experiments to evaluate the blockage of the sodium coolant channel. The pressure drop in the pin bundle test sections was also analytically calculated by varying the porosity and the pore size of the relocated fuel. The porosity and pore size of the relocated fuel in the pin bundle test sections were estimated by comparing those calculated pressure drop values with the measured pressure drop values from the pressure drop tests. In this work, the experimental results showed that the more formation of the eutectics could lead to more fuel dispersion and less blockage due to the lower freezing point of the eutectics.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

NASA NTRS1997

An Impact-Location Estimation Algorithm for Subsonic Uninhabited Aircraft

An impact-location estimation algorithm is being used at the NASA Dryden Flight Research Center to support range safety for uninhabited aerial vehicle flight tests. The algorithm computes an impact location based on the descent rate, mass, and altitude of the vehicle and current wind information. The predicted impact location is continuously displayed on the range safety officer's moving map display so that the flightpath of the vehicle can be routed to avoid ground assets if the flight must be terminated. The algorithm easily adapts to different vehicle termination techniques and has been shown to be accurate to the extent required to support range safety for subsonic uninhabited aerial vehicles. This paper describes how the algorithm functions, how the algorithm is used at NASA Dryden, and how various termination techniques are handled by the algorithm. Other approaches to predicting the impact location and the reasons why they were not selected for real-time implementation are also discussed.

Bauer, Jeffrey E.↗

NASA NTRS2005

Computing Q-D Relationships for Storage of Rocket Fuels

The Quantity Distance Measurement Tool is a GIS BASEP computer program that aids safety engineers by calculating quantity-distance (Q-D) relationships for vessels that contain explosive chemicals used in testing rocket engines. (Q-D relationships are standard relationships between specified quantities of specified explosive materials and minimum distances by which they must be separated from persons, objects, and other explosives to obtain specified types and degrees of protection.) The program uses customized geographic-information-system (GIS) software and calculates Q-D relationships in accordance with NASA's Safety Standard For Explosives, Propellants, and Pyrotechnics. Displays generated by the program enable the identification of hazards, showing the relationships of propellant-storage-vessel safety buffers to inhabited facilities and public roads. Current Q-D information is calculated and maintained in graphical form for all vessels that contain propellants or other chemicals, the explosiveness of which is expressed in TNT equivalents [amounts of trinitrotoluene (TNT) having equivalent explosive effects]. The program is useful in the acquisition, siting, construction, and/or modification of storage vessels and other facilities in the development of an improved test-facility safety program.

Jester, Keith↗

NASA NTRS2013

Orion MPCV Touchdown Detection Threshold Development and Testing

A robust method of detecting Orion Multi ]Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) splashdown is necessary to ensure crew and hardware safety during descent and after touchdown. The proposed method uses a triple redundant system to inhibit Reaction Control System (RCS) thruster firings, detach parachute risers from the vehicle, and transition to the post ]landing segment of the Flight Software (FSW). The vehicle crew is the prime input for touchdown detection, followed by an autonomous FSW algorithm, and finally a strictly time based backup timer. RCS thrusters must be inhibited before submersion in water to protect against possible damage due to firing these jets under water. In addition, neglecting to declare touchdown will not allow the vehicle to transition to post ]landing activities such as activating the Crew Module Up ]righting System (CMUS), resulting in possible loss of communication and difficult recovery. A previous AIAA paper gAssessment of an Automated Touchdown Detection Algorithm for the Orion Crew Module h concluded that a strictly Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU) based detection method using an acceleration spike algorithm had the highest safety margins and shortest detection times of other methods considered. That study utilized finite element simulations of vehicle splashdown, generated by LS ]DYNA, which were expanded to a larger set of results using a Kriging surface fit. The study also used the Decelerator Systems Simulation (DSS) to generate flight dynamics during vehicle descent under parachutes. Proto ]type IMU and FSW MATLAB models provided the basis for initial algorithm development and testing. This paper documents an in ]depth trade study, using the same dynamics data and MATLAB simulations as the earlier work, to further develop the acceleration detection method. By studying the combined effects of data rate, filtering on the rotational acceleration correction, data persistence limits and values of acceleration thresholds, an optimal configuration was determined. The lever arm calculation, which removes the centripetal acceleration caused by vehicle rotation, requires that the vehicle angular acceleration be derived from vehicle body rates, necessitating the addition of a 2nd order filter to smooth the data. It was determined that using 200 Hz data directly from the vehicle IMU outperforms the 40 Hz FSW data rate. Data persistence counter values and acceleration thresholds were balanced in order to meet desired safety and performance. The algorithm proved to exhibit ample safety margin against early detection while under parachutes, and adequate performance upon vehicle splashdown. Fall times from algorithm initiation were also studied, and a backup timer length was chosen to provide a large safety margin, yet still trigger detection before CMUS inflation. This timer serves as a backup to the primary acceleration detection method. Additionally, these parameters were tested for safety on actual flight test data, demonstrating expected safety margins.

Daum, Jared↗

NASA NTRS2014

GPM Timeline Inhibits For IT Processing

The Safety Inhibit Timeline Tool was created as one approach to capturing and understanding inhibits and controls from IT through launch. Global Precipitation Measurement (GPM) Mission, which launched from Japan in March 2014, was a joint mission under a partnership between the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA). GPM was one of the first NASA Goddard in-house programs that extensively used software controls. Using this tool during the GPM buildup allowed a thorough review of inhibit and safety critical software design for hazardous subsystems such as the high gain antenna boom, solar array, and instrument deployments, transmitter turn-on, propulsion system release, and instrument radar turn-on. The GPM safety team developed a methodology to document software safety as part of the standard hazard report. As a result of this process, a new tool safety inhibit timeline was created for management of inhibits and their controls during spacecraft buildup and testing during IT at GSFC and at the launch range in Japan. The Safety Inhibit Timeline Tool was a pathfinder approach for reviewing software that controls the electrical inhibits. The Safety Inhibit Timeline Tool strengthens the Safety Analysts understanding of the removal of inhibits during the IT process with safety critical software. With this tool, the Safety Analyst can confirm proper safe configuration of a spacecraft during each IT test, track inhibit and software configuration changes, and assess software criticality. In addition to understanding inhibits and controls during IT, the tool allows the Safety Analyst to better communicate to engineers and management the changes in inhibit states with each phase of hardware and software testing and the impact of safety risks. Lessons learned from participating in the GPM campaign at NASA and JAXA will be discussed during this session.

Inhibits↗

NASA NTRS1972

Investigation of Structural Factors of Safety for the Space Shuttle

A study was made of the factors governing the structural design of the fully reusable space shuttle booster to establish a rational approach to select optimum structural factors of safety. The study included trade studies of structural factors of safety versus booster service life, weight, cost, and reliability. Similar trade studies can be made on other vehicles using the procedures developed. The major structural components of a selected baseline booster were studied in depth, each being examined to determine the fatigue life, safe-life, and fail-safe capabilities of the baseline design. Each component was further examined to determine its reliability and safety requirements, and the change of structural weight with factors of safety. The apparent factors of safety resulting from fatigue, safe-life, proof test, and fail-safe requirements were identified. The feasibility of reduced factors of safety for design loads such as engine thrust, which are well defined, was examined.

Source record↗

NASA NTRS2003

Implementation of Wireless and Intelligent Sensor Technologies in the Propulsion Test Environment

From the first Saturn V rocket booster (S-II-T) testing in 1966 and the routine Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) testing beginning in 1975, to more recent test programs such as the X-33 Aerospike Engine, the Integrated Powerhead Development (IPD) program, and the Hybrid Sounding Rocket (HYSR), Stennis Space Center (SSC) continues to be a premier location for conducting large-scale propulsion testing. Central to each test program is the capability for sensor systems to deliver reliable measurements and high quality data, while also providing a means to monitor the test stand area to the highest degree of safety and sustainability. As part of an on-going effort to enhance the testing capabilities of Stennis Space Center, the Test Technology and Development group is developing and applying a number of wireless and intelligent sensor technologies in ways that are new to the test existing test environment.

Solano, Wanda M.↗

DOE OSTI2024

Femto-second Laser’s Enabling New Length Scale Fabrications for Rapid Post Irradiation Examination of Materials: Concluding LDRD Project Poster

Mechanical testing campaigns are required to qualify materials for advanced reactor conditions, yet economical and safety limitations restrict the number of standardized mechanical tests that can be performed. Reducing the size of the sample is one approach to addressing these challenges and to accelerating testing. Previous research has shown that smaller mechanical test samples produce higher yield and ultimate stress values compared to values measured from standard sample sizes: the “smaller is stronger” effect. Specimens used in accelerated material testing campaigns must reflect bulk material performance to enable engineering scale material property measurement. The objective of this research project was to determine if engineering scale mechanical behavior—the yield stress—could be measured with micro-tensile test samples smaller than traditional standard testing geometries. The relationship between yield stress and sample size was explored with two different nuclear-relevant structural materials: Zircaloy-4 and tungsten. Mechanical testing of both metals demonstrated decreasing yield stress values with increasing sample gauge size across three different sizes. Yield stress values from the largest gauge size, fabricated with a femto-second laser ablation system, approach bulk material yield stress values reported in published literature. Preliminary analysis of the tungsten samples indicates the yield stress value depends on the grain characteristics within the gauge section, in addition to the gauge size. Accompanying modeling efforts, including response surface generation and crystal plasticity approaches, further demonstrated that the size of the sample gauge section alone cannot explain the change in yield stress values.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗