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NASA NTRS1996

NASA's Advanced Life Support Systems Human-Rated Test Facility

Future NASA missions to explore the solar system will be long-duration missions, requiring human life support systems which must operate with very high reliability over long periods of time. Such systems must be highly regenerative, requiring minimum resupply, to enable the crews to be largely self-sufficient. These regenerative life support systems will use a combination of higher plants, microorganisms, and physicochemical processes to recycle air and water, produce food, and process wastes. A key step in the development of these systems is establishment of a human-rated test facility specifically tailored to evaluation of closed, regenerative life supports systems--one in which long-duration, large-scale testing involving human test crews can be performed. Construction of such a facility, the Advanced Life Support Program's (ALS) Human-Rated Test Facility (HRTF), has begun at NASA's Johnson Space Center, and definition of systems and development of initial outfitting concepts for the facility are underway. This paper will provide an overview of the HRTF project plan, an explanation of baseline configurations, and descriptive illustrations of facility outfitting concepts.

NASA Discipline Number 61-10↗

NASA NTRS2006

NASA Critical Facilities Maintenance Assessment

Critical Facilities Maintenance Assessment (CFMA) was first implemented by NASA following the March 2000 overtest of the High Energy Solar Spectroscopic Imager (HESSI) spacecraft. A sine burst dynamic test using a 40 year old shaker failed. Mechanical binding/slippage of the slip table imparted 10 times the planned force to the test article. There was major structural damage to HESSI. The mechanical "health" of the shaker had not been assessed and tracked to assure the test equipment was in good working order. Similar incidents have occurred at NASA facilities due to inadequate maintenance (e.g., rainwater from a leaky roof contaminated an assembly facility that housed a spacecraft). The HESSI incident alerted NASA to the urgent need to identify inadequacies in ground facility readiness and maintenance practices. The consequences of failures of ground facilities that service these NASA systems are severe due to the high unit value of NASA products.

maintenance↗

NASA NTRS2014

A New Large Vibration Test Facility Concept for the James Webb Space Telescope

The James Webb Space Telescope consists of three main components, the Integrated Science Instrument Module (ISIM) Element, the Optical Telescope Element (OTE), and the Spacecraft Element. The ISIM and OTE are being assembled at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's Goddard Spaceflight Center (GSFC). The combined OTE and ISIM Elements, called OTIS, will undergo sine vibration testing before leaving Goddard. OTIS is the largest payload ever tested at Goddard and the existing GSFC vibration facilities are incapable of performing a sine vibration test of the OTIS payload. As a result, a new large vibration test facility is being designed. The new facility will consist of a vertical system with a guided head expander and a horizontal system with a hydrostatic slip table. The project is currently in the final design phase with installation to begin in early 2015 and the facility is expected to be operational by late 2015. This paper will describe the unique requirements for a new large vibration test facility and present the selected final design concepts.

test facilities↗

NASA NTRS2014

A New Large Vibration Test Facility Concept for the James Webb Space Telescope

vibration↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Current Test Capabilities of NASA Langley’s Arc-Heated Scramjet Test Facility

The Arc-Heated Scramjet Test Facility at NASA Langley Research Center has demonstrated itself repeatedly as a key contributor to fundamental hypersonic research and scramjet engine technology development in the Mach 4.7 to 8 range. Since its inception in the 1970’s, the facility has hosted numerous scramjet engine configurations that explored the performance and operability of airframe-integrated hydrogen-fueled scramjet flow path concepts, successfully maturing both analysis tools and design technique and methodology for hypersonic propulsion. Contributions to major programs include extensive tests of the hydrogen-fueled NASP and Hyper-X scramjet engines, and the hydrocarbon-fueled HIFiRE Flight 2 scramjet flow path, in addition to fundamental in-house research. The facility capabilities have expanded to include direct-connect flow path support, gaseous hydrocarbon fuels, dynamic trajectory simulation and extension of flight simulation down to Mach 2.2. The low-Mach upgrades include increased air flow rate and controls capability and two new low-Mach nozzles (Mach 2.2 and 3.5). The facility recently completed verification of the new operational range through successful envelope expansion tests with the Mach 2.2 nozzle. With these new modifications, the operating envelope for the facility is now Mach 2.2 – 8.0(+), with a demonstrated dynamic pressure simulation of 2000 psf at the low end, and margin available for even more. Lastly, a continuous run time of over 5 minutes has been demonstrated, indicating that run time is limited only by test hardware or back-pressure requirements. This paper will provide a detailed description of these previously unreported upgrades and expanded simulation capabilities.

Hypersonic↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Predicting contamination accumulation in facilities with limited data

In preparation for the James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) launch at Centre Spatial Guyanias (CSG) in French Guiana, particulate contamination accumulation predictions were necessary for each facility in which the hardware would be exposed because the Telescope would be uncovered in each of the facilities and had strict particulate requirements. These included facilities for final integration and testing, fueling, transportation and encapsulation. Minimal heritage data existed from CSG and previous launch campaigns to use as a basis for contamination predictions. Data from the Automatic Transfer Vehicle and Herschel & Planck launch campaigns were used in conjunction with facility monitoring data provided by ESA and data collected during JWST working group visits to CSG. These campaigns were conducted at varying cleanliness levels that were typically less stringent than JWST requirements. Each facility was evaluated using the data provided and likely performance improvement with the addition of High Efficiency Particulate Air filter (HEPA) banks operating when possible. Once the launch campaign was completed, the predicted fallout was compared with actual data collected throughout the campaign. Based on the actual measurements, JWST’s primary and secondary mirrors turned out to be much cleaner than what was predicted.

James Webb Space Telescope, contamination, cleanro↗

DOE OSTI2016

Passive Safety Feature of KIPT Neutron Source Facility

Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) of the United States and Kharkov Institute of Physics and Technology (KIPT) of Ukraine have cooperated on the development, design, and construction of a neutron source facility. The facility was constructed at Kharkov, Ukraine and its commissioning process is underway. The facility has an electron accelerator driven subcritical assembly. The electron beam power is 100 kW using 100 MeV electrons. Tungsten or natural uranium is the target material for generating neutrons driving the subcritical assembly. The subcritical assembly is composed of WWR-M2 Russian fuel assemblies with U-235 enrichment of 19.7 wt%, surrounded by beryllium reflector assembles and graphite blocks. The water coolant operates at room temperature during normal operation, when the facility is operating at full power using 100-KW electron beam power. The passive safety features of the facility are discussed in in this study. Monte Carlo computer code MCNPX was utilized in the analyses with ENDF/B VII.0 nuclear data library.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2018

Technical Basis for the Uranium Processing Facility Criticality Accident Alarm System

The technical basis for the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) 90% design has been completed. The CAAS design was evaluated for two primary processing facilities, the Main Processing Building (MPB) and the Salvage and Accountability Building (SAB), and for connected facilities known as the Personnel Support Building (PSB) and the Highly Enriched Uranium Materials facility (HEUMF) Connector (HCON), which connects UPF to existing Y-12 facilities. The evaluation focused on three primary areas to address requirements of ANSI/ANS-8.3: (1) detectability of the minimum accident of concern; (2) determination of areas where total dose could exceed 12 rad for the maximum anticipated accident yield; and (3) evaluation of the radiation tolerance of the detectors and associated control cabinets. The design was based on extensive analyses performed in MCNP6.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗

DOE OSTI2018

Downgrade of the 9204-2 Facility at Y-12 National Security Complex

This paper describes the downgrade of nuclear operations carried out in the 9204-2 facility at the Y-12 National Security Complex. Downgrading the 9204-2 Facility to non-nuclear status presented a unique challenge as an adjacent facility, 9204-2E, conducted nuclear operations in 9204-2 and analyzed those operations in the safety basis for the 9204-2 Facility. This paper discusses the methodologies used to downgrade the 9204-2 Facility and determine the final hazard categorization.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2013

Decommissioning an Active Historical Reactor Facility at the Savannah River Site - 13453

The Savannah River Site (SRS) is an 802 square-kilometer United States Department of Energy (US DOE) nuclear facility located along the Savannah River near Aiken, South Carolina, where Management and Operations are performed by Savannah River Nuclear Solutions (SRNS). In 2004, DOE recognized SRS as structure within the Cold War Historic District of national, state and local significance composed of the first generation of facilities constructed and operated from 1950 through 1989 to produce plutonium and tritium for our nation's defense. DOE agreed to manage the SRS 105-C Reactor Facility as a potentially historic property due to its significance in supporting the U.S. Cold War Mission and for potential for future interpretation. This reactor has five primary areas within it, including a Disassembly Basin (DB) that received irradiated materials from the reactor, cooled them and prepared the components for loading and transport to a Separation Canyon for processing. The 6,317 square meter area was divided into numerous work/storage areas. The walls between the individual basin compartments have narrow vertical openings called 'slots' that permit the transfer of material from one section to another. Data indicated there was over 830 curies of radioactivity associated with the basin sediments and approximately 9.1 M liters of contaminated water, not including a large quantity of activated reactor equipment, scrap metal, and debris on the basin floor. The need for an action was identified in 2010 to reduce risks to personnel in the facility and to eliminate the possible release of contaminants into the environment. The release of DB water could potentially migrate to the aquifer and contaminate groundwater. DOE, its regulators [U. S. Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA)-Region 4 and the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC)] and the SC Historical Preservation Office (SHPO) agreed/concurred to perform a non-time critical removal action for the In Situ Decommissioning (ISD) of the 105-C Disassembly Basin. ISD consisted of stabilization/isolation of remaining contaminated water, sediment, activated reactor equipment, and scrap metal by filling the DB with underwater non-structural grout to the appropriate (-4.877 meter) grade-level, thence with dry area non-structural grout to the final -10 centimeter level. The roof over the DB was preserved due to its potential historical significance and to prevent the infiltration of precipitation. Forced evaporation was the form of treatment implemented to remove the approximately 9.1 M liters of contaminated basin water. Using specially formulated grouts, irradiated materials and sediment were treated by solidification/isolation thus reducing their mobility, reducing radiation exposure and creating an engineered barrier thereby preventing access to the contaminants. Grouting provided a low permeability barrier to minimize any potential transport of contaminants to the aquifer. Efforts were made to preserve the historical significance of the Reactor in accordance with the National Historic Preservation Act. ISD provides a cost effective means to isolate and contain residual radioactivity from past nuclear operations allowing natural radioactive decay to reduce hazards to manageable levels. This method limits release of radiological contamination to the environment, minimizes radiation exposure to workers, prevents human/animal access to the hazardous substances, and allows for ongoing monitoring of the decommissioned facility. Field construction was initiated in August 2011; evaporator operations commenced January 2012 and ended July 2012 with over 9 M liters of water treated/removed. Over 8,525 cubic meters of grout were placed, completing in August 2012. The project completed with an excellent safety record, on schedule and under budget. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2013

Decommissioning and Environmental Cleanup of a Small Arms Training Facility - 13225

US DOE performed a (CERCLA) non-time critical removal (NTCR) action at the Small Arms Training Area (SATA) Site Evaluation Area (SEA) located at the Savannah River Site (SRS), in Aiken, South Carolina. From 1951 to May 2010, the SATA was used as a small weapons practice and qualifying firing range. The SATA consisted of 870.1 ha (2,150 ac) of woodlands and open field, of which approximately 2.9 ha (7.3 ac) were used as a firing range. The SATA facility was comprised of three small arms ranges (one static and two interactive), storage buildings for supplies, a weapons cleaning building, and a control building. Additionally, a 113- m (370-ft) long earthen berm was used as a target backstop during live-fire exercises. The berm soils accumulated a large amount of spent lead bullets in the berm face during the facilities 59- years of operation. The accumulation of lead was such that soil concentrations exceeded the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) residential and industrial worker regional screening levels (RSLs). The RSL threshold values are based on standardized exposure scenarios that estimate contaminant concentrations in soil that the USEPA considers protective of humans over a lifetime. For the SATA facility, lead was present in soil at concentrations that exceed both the current residential (400 mg/kg) and industrial (800 mg/kg) RSLs. In addition, the concentration of lead in the soil exceeded the Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Procedure (TCLP) (40 Code of Federal Regulations [CFR] 261.24) regulatory limit. The TCLP analysis simulates landfill conditions and is designed to determine the mobility of contaminants in waste. In addition, a principal threat source material (PTSM) evaluation, human health risk assessment (HHRA), and contaminant migration (CM) analysis were conducted to evaluate soil contamination at the SATA SEA. This evaluation determined that there were no contaminants present that constitute PTSM and the CM analysis revealed that no constituents posed a migration risk to groundwater. The NTCR action involved removal of approximately 12,092 m{sup 3} (15,816 yd{sup 3}) of spent bullets and lead-impacted soil and off-site disposal. The removal action included soils from the berm area, a fill area that received scraped soils from the berm, and soil from a drainage ditch located on the edge of the berm area. Also included in the removal action was a mixture of soil, concrete, and asphalt from the other three range areas. Under this action, 11,796 m{sup 3} (15,429 yd{sup 3}) of hazardous waste and impacted soil were removed from the SATA and transported to a permitted hazardous waste disposal facility (Lone Mountain Facility in Oklahoma) and 296 m{sup 3} (387 yd{sup 3}) of nonhazardous waste (primarily concrete debris) were removed and transported to a local solid waste landfill for disposal. During the excavation process, the extent was continuously assessed through the use of a hand-held, field-portable X-ray fluorescence unit with results verified using confirmation sampling with certified laboratory analysis. Following the completion of the excavation and confirmation sampling, final contouring, grading, and establishment of vegetative cover was performed to stabilize the affected areas. The NTCR action began on August 17, 2010, and mechanical completion was achieved on April 27, 2011. The selected removal action met the removal action objectives (RAOs), is protective of human health and the environment both in the short- and long-term, was successful in removing potential ecological risks, and is protective of surface water and groundwater. Furthermore, the selected NTCR action met residential cleanup goals and resulted in the release of the SEA from restricted use contributing to the overall footprint reduction at SRS. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2017

Integrated Disposal Facility Performance Assessment: Modeling Consistency to Support Regulatory Decision Making at Hanford - 17398

Under DOE Order 435.1, 'Radioactive Waste Management', Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC and INTERA, Inc are currently preparing a performance assessment for the Hanford Integrated Disposal Facility, a near-surface low-activity waste disposal facility located on the Hanford Site in southeast Washington State. The disposal facility is expected to receive vitrified low-activity waste produced at the Hanford Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant, as well as other secondary solid wastes generated during the treatment process. The performance assessment performs the analyses that will be relied upon to receive the Disposal Authorization Statement, establish waste acceptance criteria, modify the RCRA permit for the facility and make a waste-incidental-to-reprocessing determination for the vitrified tank waste. In January 2006 in the case State of Washington v. Bodman (Civil No. 2:03-cv-05018-AAM), DOE, the Washington State Department of Ecology (Ecology) and the State of Washington Attorney General's office reached a settlement agreement in Ecology's claim regarding off-site waste shipments to Hanford and the adequacy of modeling in the environmental impact statement. In response to the agreement, the DOE Office of Environmental Management set a policy to establish a consistent use of commercially available and public domain software for a vadose zone and groundwater model platform to support regulatory decisions at Hanford. In October 2012, the Associate Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management released a memorandum to the manager of the Richland Operation Office directing how future environmental modeling activities to support regulatory decision making on the Hanford Site would be undertaken to be consistent with the 2006 settlement agreement. The preparation of the performance assessment must meet DOE Order 435.1 requirements and the additional direction provided by DOE. This paper will identify the approach taken to comply with the requirements in the 2012 memorandum. The paper will describe how environmental modeling performed for the 2017 Integrated Disposal Facility Performance Assessment was planned in a phased approach and how the current modeling is tied to the analyses that supported the decisions made in the environmental impact statement published in 2012. Additionally, the selection and qualification of the software selected to perform modeling activities for the performance assessment will be described. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2017

Characterization and D and D of PET Cyclotron and Radioisotope Production Facility - 17536

The State University of New York at Buffalo is in the process of the decontamination and decommissioning (D and D) of a cyclotron and radioisotope production facility located in Parker Hall on the South Campus. Many unique characterization activities are needed for compliant waste packaging, transportation, and disposal. In addition to the cyclotron used for successful production of radioisotopes, the facility features hot cells and glove boxes used for the purification and conditioning of the final product. Many challenges exist for the decommissioning of the cyclotron and the radioisotope production facility. These challenges include the proper characterization and management of the cyclotron, its associated equipment, and the remaining facility. Slightly activated concrete constitutes the majority of the remaining radioactive materials to be disposed of during the decommissioning. Challenges for this project include; - Regulatory interface between the New York Department of Health (NYDOH) and the New York Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) for license closure; - Characterization of the cyclotron, its support equipment and the activated vault areas; - The most cost effective disposal options and the Data Quality Objectives needed for the various disposal options. The paper primarily focuses on challenges for characterization of the cyclotron and the remaining radioisotope production facility at the University at Buffalo. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2015

Centre de la manche disposal facility after ten years of institutional control - 15255

Centre de la Manche disposal facility is the first French surface disposal facility for low and intermediate level short lived radioactive waste. It has been operated for 25 years, from 1969 to 1994. The facility was licensed for the institutional control period in 2003. As there were significant changes in the design of vaults or in waste acceptance criteria during the 25 years of operation, it was decided to implement a capping system including a bituminous membrane that would be able to sustain strains that might be caused by the settlement of waste packages in the eldest parts of the facility, where conditioning modes were different than those as presently practiced. In 2008 Andra submitted to ASN, the regulatory body in France, a file related to the safety of the facility including a study of the opportunity to modify capping system. Andra's project was to improve long term watertightness and to stabilize the sides of the cover by smoother slopes through a progressive approach. This file was completed in early 2015 by a progress report providing in particular results on studies related to the durability of the bituminous membrane. They take into account periodical measurements performed on samples of the membrane extracted from the capping system and studies performed on the phenomenology of ageing of the membrane. These data support the strategy of improvement of the capping system developed by Andra in order to achieve a more passive surveillance. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2015

Safety assessment for the radon-type surface disposal facility at Saakadze, Georgia - 15406

The Saakadze disposal facility is located about 40 km from Tbilisi and was planned and constructed during Soviet times as Radon-type surface facility to accommodate up to 600 m{sup 3} of low and intermediate level waste generated on the territory of Georgia. The disposal facility was operated from 1963 until its closure in 1995. The vast majority of waste in the Saakadze facility has been disposed of in two near surface concrete vaults with typical Radon-type dimensions, which cover layers already show significant structural damages. In order to assess the present safety of the site and provide the competent Georgian authorities with the necessary basis to take decisions in regard to the future of the repository, the European Commission launched and financially supported a project, which was assigned to a consortium of TUV-Nord ENSYS GmbH and DBE Technology GmbH. The safety assessment of Saakadze facility, which was an essential part of this project and which is the subject of this paper was carried out by DBE Technology GmbH. The Government of Georgia has been gradually increasing efforts to improve the regulatory processes and the legislation on nuclear and radiation safety, and, in particular, on safe management of radioactive waste and sealed radioactive sources. Currently, however, there are still areas where specific Georgian laws and regulations do not exist. Accordingly, in certain aspects IAEA recommendations and best practices were used as guidelines for the methodology of the safety assessment. In spite of the large uncertainties to be considered, especially in regard to the inventory, preliminary results of the safety assessment indicate that scenarios related to the groundwater pathway do not lead to radiological impacts that are above or near to limiting values. However, human intrusion scenarios might lead to dose rates for the critical group that are exceeding these values. This is mainly due to the fact that today there is no proper engineered cover on top of the concrete vaults. Based on the comparison of existing options and considering the results of the long-term safety assessment, it is recommended to backfill the remaining voids inside the concrete vaults and to construct an engineered cover to reduce the probability of human intrusion scenarios and to minimize their potential impact. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2016

Realization of the National Disposal Facility for Radioactive Waste in Bulgaria - 16611

Radioactive waste is generated in the Republic of Bulgaria from the operation and decommissioning of the country's nuclear power plants and from other sources in research, medical applications, and the industry. The need for building a National Disposal Facility (NDF) is recognized by the Bulgarian government and described and justified in its Environment Impact Assessment Decision. The Bulgarian State Enterprise for Radioactive Waste Management (SERAW) is endeavoring to build a near-surface repository for short-lived low- and intermediate-level radioactive waste (SL-LILW) to discharge its statutory responsibilities in waste management is. The European Union (EU) finances the establishment of the NDF through the Kozloduy International Decommissioning Support Fund (KIDSF). After an international tendering procedure, SERAW placed a contract for the development of the design of the NDF to the Consortium of Westinghouse Electric Spain S.A.R and DBE Technology GmbH of Germany, with ENRESA, the Spanish National Waste Management Agency providing technical review and support. Two Bulgarian companies participate also in the project as subcontractors - EQE Bulgaria and to a lesser extent KK-Project. The repository project official name is 'Technical Design and ISAR Preparation for the National Disposal Facility at Bulgaria', usually abbreviated as 'R-Project 5'. After obtaining SERAW's approval for the preferred repository conceptual design variant, the R Project 5 focused on developing the Technical Design on the one hand, and on preparing the Intermediate Safety Analysis Report (ISAR) to demonstrate the safety and suitability of the proposed NDF design on the other. These documents were handed over to the Bulgarian Nuclear Regulatory Authority (BNRA) as well as to the different authorities involved in the comprehensive licensing process required for nuclear facilities in the country. The corresponding permits have mostly been received or are expected for early 2016. In the last quarter of 2015 the procurement procedure for repository construction as turn-key project was started with the pre-qualification of possible constructors for the Phase I repository realization on a lump sum contract basis. Repository construction is now expected to start in 2016, with the start of waste disposal now scheduled for around 2020. With the realization of the Bulgarian National Disposal Facility an important milestone for waste disposal in the European Union is about to be achieved. This paper is a sequel of previously presented papers on the NDF construction, now including details of the complex licensing process that this disposal facility underwent, now in its final stages. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2018

Unique Facilities, Innovative Treatment Processes, and a Talented Workforce Allow Fluor Idaho to Successfully Disposition Transuranic Waste - 18388

Fluor Idaho is utilizing state-of-the-art equipment, treatment technologies, and employee expertise at the Department of Energy's (DOE) Idaho Site to treat contact-handled transuranic (CH-TRU) waste, as well as extremely challenging remote-handled transuranic (RH-TRU) waste forms, to prepare the material for shipment and permanent disposal at the Department's Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). Nowhere else in the DOE Complex - perhaps the world - will one find the compilation of tools and an experienced workforce with an unparalleled history of safely retrieving, characterizing, treating, repackaging, certifying, and shipping TRU waste. Since 2003, the Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Project (AMWTP) has used both conventional and unique retrieval concepts, high-tech characterization equipment - including real-time radiography and radioassay - robotics, and automated treatment processes to retrieve and treat 65,000 cubic meters of above-ground CH-TRU waste. Additionally, engineered controls and specialized personal protective equipment have allowed employees to make thousands of entries into high-radiation areas without a skin or clothing contamination incident - evidence of the employees' commitment to safety. AMWTP has encountered and found solutions for many challenging waste forms, including polychlorinated biphenyl-contaminated wastes, TRU waste containers with up to 1,000 fissile gram equivalent plutonium-239, oversized TRU boxes, and partially absorbed organic sludge waste. By utilizing additional facilities and equipment at the Accelerated Retrieval Project V and VII, Fluor Idaho has developed new processing lines and capabilities to ensure worker safety and milestone completion. These two soft-sided buildings, located at a facility adjacent to AMWTP, were originally constructed to exhume Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) TRU wastes from a section of a 97-acre landfill. After a total of 1,150 cubic meters of targeted waste were removed, personnel, working in collaboration with state regulators, successfully implemented a unique regulatory strategy that allowed these CERCLA facilities to be modified and permitted to treat Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) wastes from the AMWTP - a savings of tens of millions of dollars over the cost of constructing new buildings. Adding to the AMWTP's technological uniqueness is its ability to treat wastes from other facilities in the DOE Complex. Two prior decision documents and an agreement with the state of Idaho have allowed AMWTP to treat wastes from 15 other DOE sites. It is the only project in the complex to have done so. At another project located next to AMWTP, targeted waste exhumation within the Subsurface Disposal Area is approximately two years ahead of schedule. Crews have removed more than 8,600 cubic meters of CH-TRU and hazardous wastes from eight exhumation areas that equal a combined footprint of 4.75 acres. Less than one acre remains to be exhumed to satisfy the 2008 Record of Decision waste exhumation end state between the DOE, Environmental Protection Agency, and state of Idaho. Construction of the final building where targeted waste exhumation will continue was completed during the summer of 2017. Exhumation will be completed within the next few years. Following exhumation completion, an evapotranspiration barrier (or cap) will be constructed over the entire landfill. Fluor Idaho continues to make progress on a more challenging project involving an inventory of RH-TRU waste that also contains the reactive metal sodium. Crews are utilizing hot cells, once used for spent nuclear fuel reprocessing and high-level waste treatment at the Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center, to render this challenging waste form safe for disposal in a national geologic waste repository. The treatment methods being employed on this RH-TRU waste are unique in the DOE Complex. Minute concentrations of water are sprayed onto the sodium-contaminated material in a process called 'spritzing' to chemically change the sodium from a reactive metal to a non-reactive salt. In other cases, sodium-contaminated waste is dipped in water to initiate a reaction in a process called 'immersion.' Lastly, for more challenging waste shapes that could not be successfully treated with the two prior methods, crews lower the sodium-contaminated RH-TRU waste into a one-of-a-kind distillation unit that uses high temperature and vacuum to volatilize the sodium and recapture it in a condenser unit for disposal. The RH-TRU waste treated with this technology is then safe for permanent disposal. Fluor Idaho is proud to operate DOE's CH- and RH-TRU waste treatment facilities, as well as use innovative processes and its talented workforce to complete this important work-scope. Such capabilities allow the contractor to meet the commitments made by the DOE to the state of Idaho. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2018

Integration of Models for the Hanford Integrated Disposal Facility Performance Assessment - 18541

The Department of Energy Office of River Protection and its contractors have performed a performance assessment for the near-surface disposal of low-level and mixed low-level waste at the Hanford Integrated Disposal Facility. The long-term performance of the Hanford Integrated Disposal Facility to be protective of human health and the environment was evaluated under the requirements of United States Department of Energy Order 435.1, Radioactive Waste Management. Computer simulations were performed to evaluate whether or not the disposal facility would comply with the performance objectives specified in the order. The evaluation was performed using numerical models to simulate source term releases from vitrified and cement-based waste forms. Source term releases were subsequently transported through the facility into the natural system beneath the facility (comprised of an 85-meter thick vadose zone and thinner but highly conductive saturated zone overlying basalt) to a point of compliance 100-meters downstream from the disposed waste. Due to the differing scales in the finite difference models developed for the source terms and those developed for the natural system, numerical models for source term release and natural system flow and transport were not directly coupled. Instead, the output from the source term simulations were used as input to the natural system flow and transport simulations. The decoupling of the modeled systems makes it difficult to explore synergies and investigate the impact of parameter uncertainties. In order to explore system synergies and evaluate parameter uncertainty, an integrated system model was developed that includes source term release models, natural system transport models, and dose calculations. This paper will describe how the numerical models were used to develop abstractions that could be incorporated into the integrated system level model that was then used to explore system synergies and parameter uncertainties. (authors)

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