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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 667 records · Page 37
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2021

Operating Stresses and their Effects on Degradation of LSM-Based SOFC Cathodes

The overall goals of the program were: To understand how selected operational parameters affect the performance of solid oxide fuel cells (SOFCs), with a focus on parameters affecting cathodes (air electrodes) comprised of lanthanum strontium manganite (LSM, (La 1-x Sr x ) 1-y MnO 3±δ ) and yttria-stabilized zirconia (YSZ, (Zr 1–z Y z )O 2±δ ). To relate the observed relationships between operational parameters and cell performance to the microstructural changes that can be observed in the cells after operation.

01 COAL, LIGNITE, AND PEAT↗
NASA NTRS1972

Analytical and experimental study of axisymmetric truncated plug nozzle flow fields

Experimental and analytical investigation of the flow field and base pressure of internal-external-expansion truncated plug nozzles are discussed. Experimental results for two axisymmetric, conical plug-cylindrical shroud, truncated plug nozzles are presented for both open and closed wake operations. These results include extensive optical and pressure data covering nozzle flow field and base pressure characteristics, diffuser effects, lip shock strength, Mach disc behaviour, and the recompression and reverse flow regions. Transonic experiments for a special planar transonic section are presented. An extension of the analytical method of Hall and Mueller to include the internal shock wave from the shroud exit is presented for closed wake operation. Results of this analysis include effects on the flow field and base pressure of ambient pressure ratio, nozzle geometry, and the ratio of specific heats. Static thrust is presented as a function of ambient pressure ratio and nozzle geometry. A new transonic solution method is also presented.

Muller, T. J.↗
NASA NTRS1981

Deposit formation in liquid fuels. I - Effect of coal-derived Lewis bases on storage stability of Jet A turbine fuel

The development of reasonably precise techniques for the measurement of storage stability of jet aviation fuel is described. Lewis bases, extracted by ligand-exchange from a coal-derived liquid, are shown to adversely affect storage stability (as determined by an accelerated storage test) when added to Jet A turbine fuel. JFTOT results suggesting slight decreases in thermal stability of fuel 'spiked' (i.e., contaminated with a measured quantity of reagent) with extract are reported. Addition to Jet A turbine fuel of individual heterocyclic nitrogen compounds is shown to produce comparable decreases in storage stability.

Dahlin, K. E.↗
NASA NTRS1982

Effects of cobalt in nickel-base superalloys

A study has been carried out to assess the role of cobalt in Udimet 700, a representative nickel-base superalloy containing 17 percent or more cobalt. The study spans the spectrum of microstructural, microchemical, and mechanical behavior aspects which together form a basis for superalloy performance in jet engines. The results suggest that cobalt affects the solubility of elements in the gamma matrix, which leads to enhanced gamma-prime volume fraction and to the stabilization of MC-type carbides and sigma phase. However, these microstructural and microchemical changes are too slight to significantly affect the strength and ductile properties. Depending on the heat treatment, the creep and stress rupture resistance can be cobalt-sensitive. In the coarse-grained, fully solutioned and aged condition, all of the alloy's 17 percent Co can be replaced by nickel without decreasing the creep and stress rupture resistance. These findings are discussed with reference to existing theories and experimental data obtained by other workers.

Tien, J. K.↗
NASA NTRS1982

Cost effective development of a Shuttle-based astronomical instrument control system

The high level language FORTH is used for the electronic control of the Space Shuttle-based Ultraviolet Imaging Telescope, in a flight computer system which minimizes costs. The greater part of the breadboard version of the flight computer is assembled from commercially available components, reducing novel circuit design features and permitting simultaneous development of both hardware and software. The commercial boards are then refabricated on aluminum core heat conducting stock, using high reliability parts to produce the flight versions of the system. The system's ground support equipment employs a MINC-25 minicomputer which performs such functions as flight computer software development, PROM programming, test and integration support, and flight operations support. The implementation of these concepts in flight computer telescope controls is described.

Parise, R. A.↗
NASA NTRS1983

Effects of cobalt in nickel-base superalloys

The role of cobalt in a representative wrought nickel-base superalloy was determined. The results show cobalt affecting the solubility of elements in the gamma matrix, resulting in enhanced gamma' volume fraction, in the stabilization of MC-type carbides, and in the stabilization of sigma phase. In the particular alloy studied, these microstructural and microchemistry changes are insufficient in extent to impact on tensile strength, yield strength, and in the ductilities. Depending on the heat treatment, creep and stress rupture resistance can be cobalt sensitive. In the coarse grain, fully solutioned and aged condition, all of the alloy's 17% cobalt can be replaced by nickel without deleteriously affecting this resistance. In the fine grain, partially solutioned and aged condition, this resistance is deleteriously affected only when one-half or more of the initial cobalt content is removed. The structure and property results are discussed with respect to existing theories and with respect to other recent and earlier findings on the impact of cobalt, if any, on the performance of nickel-base superalloys.

Tien, J. K.↗
NASA NTRS1987

FMEAssist: A knowledge-based approach to Failure Modes and Effects Analysis

A Failure Modes and Effects Analysis workstation (FMESassist) was designed for use during the development of the space station. It assists engineers in the complex task of tracking failures and their effects on the system. Engineers experience increased productivity through reduced clerical loads, reduced data inconsistency, and significantly reduced analysis time. System developments benefit from a more thorough analysis than was available using previous methods.

Carnes, James R.↗
NASA NTRS1986

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the electrical power generation/fuel cell powerplant subsystem

Results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents the independent analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter Electrical Power Generation (EPG)/Fuel Cell Powerplant (FCP) hardware. The EPG/FCP hardware is required for performing functions of electrical power generation and product water distribution in the Orbiter. Specifically, the EPG/FCP hardware consists of the following divisions: (1) Power Section Assembly (PSA); (2) Reactant Control Subsystem (RCS); (3) Thermal Control Subsystem (TCS); and (4) Water Removal Subsystem (WRS). The IOA analysis process utilized available EPG/FCP hardware drawings and schematics for defining hardware assemblies, components, and hardware items. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode.

Brown, K. L.↗
NASA NTRS1987

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the orbital maneuvering system

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The independent analysis results for the Orbital Maneuvering System (OMS) hardware are documented. The OMS provides the thrust to perform orbit insertion, orbit circularization, orbit transfer, rendezvous, and deorbit. The OMS is housed in two independent pods located one on each side of the tail and consists of the following subsystems: Helium Pressurization; Propellant Storage and Distribution; Orbital Maneuvering Engine; and Electrical Power Distribution and Control. The IOA analysis process utilized available OMS hardware drawings and schematics for defining hardware assemblies, components, and hardware items. Each level of hardware was evaluted and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was asigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode.

Prust, C. D.↗
NASA NTRS1986

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the guidance, navigation, and control subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) is presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The independent analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GNC) Subsystem hardware are documented. The function of the GNC hardware is to respond to guidance, navigation, and control software commands to effect vehicle control and to provide sensor and controller data to GNC software. Some of the GNC hardware for which failure modes analysis was performed includes: hand controllers; Rudder Pedal Transducer Assembly (RPTA); Speed Brake Thrust Controller (SBTC); Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU); Star Tracker (ST); Crew Optical Alignment Site (COAS); Air Data Transducer Assembly (ADTA); Rate Gyro Assemblies; Accelerometer Assembly (AA); Aerosurface Servo Amplifier (ASA); and Ascent Thrust Vector Control (ATVC). The IOA analysis process utilized available GNC hardware drawings, workbooks, specifications, schematics, and systems briefs for defining hardware assemblies, components, and circuits. Each hardware item was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode.

Trahan, W. H.↗
NASA NTRS1986

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the nose wheel steering subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The independent analysis results for the Orbiter Nose Wheel Steering (NWS) hardware are documented. The NWS hardware provides primary directional control for the Orbiter vehicle during landing rollout. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode. The original NWS design was envisioned as a backup system to differential braking for directional control of the Orbiter during landing rollout. No real effort was made to design the NWS system as fail operational. The brakes have much redundancy built into their design but the poor brake/tire performance has forced the NSTS to upgrade NWS to the primary mode of directional control during rollout. As a result, a large percentage of the NWS system components have become Potential Critical Items (PCI).

Mediavilla, Anthony Scott↗
NASA NTRS1986

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the DPS subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis/Critical Items List (FMEA/CIL) is presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to independently determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. The independent analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter Data Processing System (DPS) hardware are documented. The DPS hardware is required for performing critical functions of data acquisition, data manipulation, data display, and data transfer throughout the Orbiter. Specifically, the DPS hardware consists of the following components: Multiplexer/Demultiplexer (MDM); General Purpose Computer (GPC); Multifunction CRT Display System (MCDS); Data Buses and Data Bus Couplers (DBC); Data Bus Isolation Amplifiers (DBIA); Mass Memory Unit (MMU); and Engine Interface Unit (EIU). The IOA analysis process utilized available DPS hardware drawings and schematics for defining hardware assemblies, components, and hardware items. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode. Due to the extensive redundancy built into the DPS the number of critical items are few. Those identified resulted from premature operation and erroneous output of the GPCs.

Lowery, H. J.↗
NASA NTRS1986

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the atmospheric revitalization pressure control subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis/Critical Items List (FMEA/CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The independent analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter Atmospheric Revitalization and Pressure Control Subsystem (ARPCS) are documented. The ARPCS hardware was categorized into the following subdivisions: (1) Atmospheric Make-up and Control (including the Auxiliary Oxygen Assembly, Oxygen Assembly, and Nitrogen Assembly); and (2) Atmospheric Vent and Control (including the Positive Relief Vent Assembly, Negative Relief Vent Assembly, and Cabin Vent Assembly). The IOA analysis process utilized available ARPCS hardware drawings and schematics for defining hardware assemblies, components, and hardware items. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode.

Saiidi, M. J.↗
NASA NTRS1986

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the ascent thrust vector control actuator subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The independent analysis results for the Ascent Thrust Vector Control (ATVC) Actuator hardware are documented. The function of the Ascent Thrust Vector Control Actuators (ATVC) is to gimbal the main engines to provide for attitude and flight path control during ascent. During first stage flight, the SRB nozzles provide nearly all the steering. After SRB separation, the Orbiter is steered by gimbaling of its main engines. There are six electrohydraulic servoactuators, one pitch and one yaw for each of the three main engines. Each servoactuator is composed of four electrohydraulic servovalve assemblies, one second stage power spool valve assembly, one primary piston assembly and a switching valve. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode. Critical failures resulting in loss of ATVC were mainly due to loss of hydraulic fluid, fluid contamination and mechanical failures.

Wilson, R. E.↗
NASA NTRS1986

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the body flap subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items (PCIs). To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The independent analysis results for the Orbiter Body Flap (BF) subsystem hardware are documented. The BF is a large aerosurface located at the trailing edge of the lower aft fuselage of the Orbiter. The proper function of the BF is essential during the dynamic flight phases of ascent and entry. During the ascent phase of flight, the BF trails in a fixed position. For entry, the BF provides elevon load relief, trim control, and acts as a heat shield for the main engines. Specifically, the BF hardware comprises the following components: Power Drive Unit (PDU), rotary actuators, and torque tubes. The IOA analysis process utilized available BF hardware drawings and schematics for defining hardware assemblies, components, and hardware items. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode. Of the 35 failure modes analyzed, 19 were determined to be PCIs.

Wilson, R. E.↗
NASA NTRS1986

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the auxiliary power unit

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents the independent analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter Auxiliary Power Unit (APU). The APUs are required to provide power to the Orbiter hydraulics systems during ascent and entry flight phases for aerosurface actuation, main engine gimballing, landing gear extension, and other vital functions. For analysis purposes, the APU system was broken down into ten functional subsystems. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode. A preponderance of 1/1 criticality items were related to failures that allowed the hydrazine fuel to escape into the Orbiter aft compartment, creating a severe fire hazard, and failures that caused loss of the gas generator injector cooling system.

Barnes, J. E.↗