Engineering Papers⌕ Search

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “Security Requirements”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 667 records · Page 37
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2016

Off-Site Source Recovery Project Overview.

This report introduces the Off-Site Source Recovery project and gives a summary of domestic and international work. The mission of OSRP is to eliminate excess, unwanted, abandoned, or orphan radioactive sealed sources that pose a potential risk to health, safety, and national security. OSRP identifies and tracks disused sealed sources potentially requiring recovery, and performs special form encapsulation for sealed sources to simplify transportation.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗
DOE OSTI2012

Second Line of Defense: Electronic Maintenance Reports - Local Maintenance Provider User Guide, Rev.3

The Electronic Maintenance Report forms allow Local Maintenance Providers (LMP) and other program staff to enter maintenance information into a simple and secure system. This document describes the features and information required to complete the Maintenance Report forms. It is expected that all Corrective Maintenance Reports from LMPs will be submitted electronically into the SLD Portal. As an exception (e.g., when access to the SLD Portal is unavailable), Maintenance Reports can be submitted via a secure Adobe PDF form available through the Sustainability Manager assigned to each country.

Leigh, Richard J.↗
DOE OSTI2017

Transient Stability Assessment of Power Systems With Uncertain Renewable Generation: Preprint

The transient stability of a power system depends heavily on its operational state at the moment of a fault. In systems where the penetration of renewable generation is significant, the dispatch of the conventional fleet of synchronous generators is uncertain at the time of dynamic security analysis. Hence, the assessment of transient stability requires the solution of a system of nonlinear ordinary differential equations with unknown initial conditions and inputs. To this end, we set forth a computational framework that relies on Taylor polynomials, where variables are associated with the level of renewable generation. This paper describes the details of the method and illustrates its application on a nine-bus test system.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2019

Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 576: Miscellaneous Radiological Sites and Debris Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, Revision 0 with ROTCs 1-2

This Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report presents information supporting the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 576: Miscellaneous Radiological Sites and Debris, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada. This document complies with the requirements of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) that was agreed to by the State of Nevada; U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Management (EM); U.S. Department of Defense; and DOE, Legacy Management. The purpose of this Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report is to provide justification and documentation supporting the recommendation that no further corrective action is needed for CAU 576 based on the implementation of the corrective actions listed in the document.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2019

A Multidimensional Holistic Framework for the Security of Distributed Energy and Control Systems

The digitization of smart grid distributed generation and industrial control systems has prompted utilities to deploy tools with ubiquitous communications that potentially widen the attack surface. The utilities still continue to rely on the traditional cybersecurity technologies, such as firewalls, anti-malware tools, and passwords that do not ensure security across all dimensions of the information assurance model required for a strong cybersecurity business process. This paper proposes a multidimensional holistic framework that addresses this gap through advanced technologies, intelligent algorithms, and continued assessments. To show proof, the layered defense model, a solution dimension of the framework, is integrated into the National Renewable Energy Laboratory's Security and Resilience Testbed to replicate a utility's enterprise and substation networks. The model is used to evaluate the security and resilience of microgrid control systems, and, based on the insights gathered, recommend best practices for utility cybersecurity analysts for a strong business process. Here, with this baseline, the paper conceptually introduces intelligence-driven solutions comprising contextual data analysis and machine learning to respond to advanced persistent threats sponsored by campaign efforts.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
NASA NTRS2011

L-Band System Engineering - Concepts of Use, Systems Performance Requirements, and Architecture

This document is being provided as part of ITT s NASA Glenn Research Center Aerospace Communication Systems Technical Support (ACSTS) contract NNC05CA85C, Task 7: New ATM Requirements-Future Communications, C-band and L-band Communications Standard Development. Task 7 was motivated by the five year technology assessment performed for the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) under the joint FAA-EUROCONTROL cooperative research Action Plan (AP-17), also known as the Future Communications Study (FCS). It was based on direction provided by the FAA project-level agreement (PLA FY09_G1M.02-02v1) for "New ATM Requirements-Future Communications." Task 7 was separated into two distinct subtasks, each aligned with specific work elements and deliverable items. Subtask 7-1 addressed C-band airport surface data communications standards development, systems engineering, test bed development, and tests/demonstrations to establish operational capability for what is now referred to as the Aeronautical Mobile Airport Communications System (AeroMACS). Subtask 7-2, which is the subject of this report, focused on preliminary systems engineering and support of joint FAA/EUROCONTROL development and evaluation of a future L-band (960 to 1164 MHz) air/ground (A/G) communication system known as the L-band digital aeronautical communications system (L-DACS), which was defined during the FCS. The proposed L-DACS will be capable of providing ATM services in continental airspace in the 2020+ timeframe. Subtask 7-2 was performed in two phases. Phase I featured development of Concepts of Use, high level functional analyses, performance of initial L-band system safety and security risk assessments, and development of high level requirements and architectures. It also included the aforementioned support of joint L-DACS development and evaluation, including inputs to L-DACS design specifications. Phase II provided a refinement of the systems engineering activities performed during Phase I, along with continued joint FAA/EUROCONTROL L-DACS development and evaluation support.

Henriksen, Stephen↗
DOE OSTI2011

Comparison of Routable Control System Security Approaches

This document is an supplement to the 'Secure and Efficient Routable Control Systems.' It addressed security in routable control system communication. The control system environment that monitors and manages the power grid historically has utilized serial communication mechanisms. Leased-line serial communication environments operating at 1200 to 9600 baud rates are common. However, recent trends show that communication media such as fiber, optical carrier 3 (OC-3) speeds, mesh-based high-speed wireless, and the Internet are becoming the media of choice. In addition, a dichotomy has developed between the electrical transmission and distribution environments, with more modern communication infrastructures deployed by transmission utilities. The preceding diagram represents a typical control system. The Communication Links cloud supports all of the communication mechanisms a utility might deploy between the control center and devices in the field. Current methodologies used for security implementations are primarily led by single vendors or standards bodies. However, these entities tend to focus on individual protocols. The result is an environment that contains a mixture of security solutions that may only address some communication protocols at an increasing operational burden for the utility. A single approach is needed that meets operational requirements, is simple to operate, and provides the necessary level of security for all control system communication. The solution should be application independent (e.g., Distributed Network Protocol/Internet Protocol [DNP/IP], International Electrotechnical Commission [IEC] C37.118, Object Linking and Embedding for Process Control [OPC], etc.) and focus on the transport layer. In an ideal setting, a well-designed suite of standards for control system communication will be used for vendor implementation and compliance testing. An expected outcome of this effort is an international standard.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Securing Digital Energy Infrastructure: BESS Procurement Guidance & Sample Contract Terms

Presentation for Procurement webinar providing technical guidance for entities, procuring Battery Energy Storage Systems (BESS), Inverter Based Resources (IBR), Distributed Energy Resource Management Systems (DERMS) and other energy digital systems and services on how to incorporate cybersecurity requirements into the procurement process to enhance both supply chain security as well as entity-specific supply chain risk management (SCRM) programs.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2022

A technique to make an enterprise network a Darknet on the Internet, while providing required services to authorized users

In a well-designed and secure enterprise network, the hosts inside the network are not directly accessible from the Internet. The enterprise firewall blocks direct access to hosts inside the enterprise network and also blocks any attempts to probe or discover information about those hosts from the Internet. However, access to the enterprise network from the Internet is a must in today’s day and age. Hence, specialized mechanisms to allow secure access are implemented.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2019

Maintenance Plan for the Performance Assessments and Composite Analyses for the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites at the Nevada National Security Site (Rev.3)

U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Order 435.1, Radioactive Waste Management, requires that performance assessments (PAs) and composite analyses (CAs) for low-level radioactive waste (LLW) disposal facilities be maintained by the responsible field office. This plan describes the activities performed to maintain the PA and the CA for the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites (RWMSs) at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). The plan is based on DOE Order 435.1 Radioactive Waste Management (DOE 2007), DOE Manual 435.1-1, Radioactive Waste Management Manual (DOE 2011), and DOE Standard DOE-STD-5002-2017, Disposal Authorization Statement and Tank Closure Documentation (DOE 2017). The facility’s Disposal Authorization Statement (DAS) specifies conditions for the continuing operation of a LLW facility. The DAS is issued based on a review of the facility's PA, CA, the maintenance plan, preliminary closure plan, and preliminary monitoring plan. The DAS specifies the limits and conditions on construction, design, operations, and closure of the low-level waste facility based on these reviews. The Maintenance Plan uses an Unreviewed Disposal Question (UDQ)/Unreviewed Composite Analysis Question (UCAQ) change control process to identify, evaluate, and control planned or discovered changes affecting the PA, CA, DAS, or other documents composing the Radioactive Waste Management Basis (RWMB). The UDQ/UCAQ process uses the PA and CA GoldSim models to calculate updated results, assess the significance of changes, and to assess the need to revise the PA, CA, or DAS. In addition to the change control process, the Maintenance Plan requires an annual review of all changes and an annual assessment of the need to revise RWMB documents, plans, and programs. The cumulative effect of all changes is assessed annually by preparing a revised PA and CA baseline model that is used to update PA and CA results. The updated results are used to assess compliance with the PA performance objectives and the CA dose constraint, and to assess the need to revise the PAs, CAs, and other documents, plans, and programs supporting the RWMB. An Annual Summary Report documenting the results and conclusions of the annual review is prepared and submitted to DOE.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2019

Power system effects and mitigation recommendations for DER cyberattacks

Extensive deployment of interoperable distributed energy resources (DER) is increasing the power system cyber security attack surface. National and jurisdictional interconnection standards require DER to include a range of autonomous and commanded grid‐support functions, which can drastically influence power quality, voltage, and bulk system frequency. Here, the authors investigate the impact to the cyber‐physical power system in scenarios where communications and operations of DER are controlled by an adversary. The findings show that each grid‐support function exposes the power system to distinct types and magnitudes of risk. The physical impact from cyber actions was analysed in cases of DER providing distribution system voltage regulation and transmission system support. Finally, recommendations are presented for minimising the risk using engineered parameter limits and segmenting the control network to minimise common‐mode vulnerabilities.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2020

On the operational meaning and practical aspects of using the security parameter in quantum key distribution

We discuss the operational meaning of a commonly accepted security parameter in quantum key distribution, which is based on the trace distance. We separately consider the cases of using a key in a one-time pad and in a computationally secure cipher. Some practical aspects of using the security parameter are also elucidated, which are usually not paid enough attention in theoretical studies and which therefore may cause difficulties for experimentalists and engineers. It is shown that a one-time pad requires not only a higher key generation rate than computationally secure ciphers, but also a significantly stronger condition on the key security parameter. (paper)

71 CLASSICAL AND QUANTUM MECHANICS, GENERAL PHYSIC↗
DOE OSTI2024

Drop Tower Statement of Work

This document details the needs and requirements for a propulsion-assisted drop tower system (further referenced simply as Drop Tower) to perform hardware testing at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). LLNL is managed and operated by Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC (LLNS) for the Department of Energy (DOE). LLNL requires a robust testing platform that will allow for the characterization of interactions between objects of interest. The initial siting of the equipment will be located in an existing test facility (B191). When another test facility becomes online, the objective will be to move the test capability to the new facility as a final location (B132N). The Drop Tower will be a cornerstone capability for testing and model validation for LLNL interested programs.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2017

Improving nuclear criticality safety in maintenance and construction activities at Y-12 national security complex

Maintenance and construction activities inside aging DOE nuclear facilities often impact nuclear criticality safety controls and requirements. Gaps in communication, training, and implementation of criticality safety guidance and controls in maintenance and construction work packages were identified at the Y-12 National Security Complex in 2016 when a maintenance package in the field was discovered to not have been reviewed by criticality safety. This incident resulted in a deficiency because criticality safety review is required any time maintenance or construction is working on equipment containing fissile material or their work impacts fissile material or fissile material activities. This review is required to protect the basis and requirements of criticality safety evaluations. To address these issues, the Y-12 criticality safety group reviewed a large number of maintenance packages, created a new method of communicating criticality safety controls to maintenance and construction, and developed a criticality safety training session designed specifically for maintenance and construction work planners. This paper presents the improvements in communication and implementation made between criticality safety, maintenance, and construction at the Y-12 National Security Complex and possible applications for other DOE sites. (author)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Gridtrust: Electricity Grid Root-of-Trust Decentralized Supply Chain Cyber-Security (Final Scientific/Technical Report)

GridTrust represents a departure from reliance on a single organization or a single person to multiple organizations and therefore multiple people across organizational structures. The motivating idea behind involving multiple organizations is the increase in security due to human factors. More specifically, the requirement that distinct people in different organizations sign off on a change or an update makes a cyberattack much less likely due to the inherent requirement that both organizations be penetrated and fooled. GridTrust focuses on the software update process as the primary exemplar for the research and development work. A novel hardware-based technology referred to as a Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) provides a microchip Root-of-Trust (RoT), i.e., a starting point for verifying that the hardware being communicated with is the hardware the control center believes the hardware to be. As a result, staff at power grid control centers can ensure the accurate and reliable identification of hardware devices from the outset. The GridTrust protocol introduces two key innovations, as detailed in this report. Firstly, the utilization of a PUF as a root-of-trust in the initial phase of a software or firmware update. Secondly, the application of multiple cryptographic signatures from two or more organizations to the update binary. These signatures are verified before implementing the update on a power grid device in the field. In terms of GridTrust hardware design, this report outlines two main components. The first is the GridTrust Native Device, integrating PUF technology intrinsically into the hardware device itself. The second is the GridTrust Interfacing Device, which incorporates PUF technology and multiple cryptographic signatures. These signatures are cross-checked within a separate hardware positioned between the power grid control center and the legacy power grid device, functioning as an intermediary. While the GridTrust Interfacing Device offers the advantage of being applicable to existing power grid equipment, it may have reduced security if the intermediary component is targeted. On the other hand, the GridTrust Native Device boasts increased security due to protocol integration within a unified form factor. The effectiveness of GridTrust technology has been extensively demonstrated, with multiple external red-team attackers unable to breach GridTrust's security measures. This was observed both in controlled laboratory settings during Phase 1 of the project and in real-world conditions within a City of Marietta substation during Phase 2 of the project.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2013

Special Analysis for the Disposal of the Consolidated Edison Uranium Solidification Project Waste Stream at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

The purpose of this Special Analysis (SA) is to determine if the Oak Ridge (OR) Consolidated Edison Uranium Solidification Project (CEUSP) uranium-233( 233 U) waste stream (DRTK000000050, Revision 0) is acceptable for shallow land burial (SLB) at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). The CEUSP 233 U waste stream requires a special analysis because the concentrations of thorium- 229 ( 229 Th), 230 Th, 232 U, 233 U, and 234 U exceeded their NNSS Waste Acceptance Criteria action levels. The acceptability of the waste stream is evaluated by determining if performance assessment (PA) modeling provides a reasonable expectation that SLB disposal is protective of human health and the environment. The CEUSP 233 U waste stream is a long-lived waste with unique radiological hazards. The SA evaluates the long-term acceptability of the CEUSP 233 U waste stream for near-surface disposal as a two tier process. The first tier, which is the usual SA process, uses the approved probabilistic PA model to determine if there is a reasonable expectation that disposal of the CEUSP 233 U waste stream can meet the performance objectives of U.S. Department of Energy Manual DOE M 435.1-1, “Radioactive Waste Management,” for a period of 1,000 years (y) after closure. The second tier addresses the acceptability of the OR CEUSP 233 U waste stream for near-surface disposal by evaluating long-term site stability and security, by performing extended (i.e., 10,000 and 60,000 y) modeling analyses, and by evaluating the effect of containers and the depth of burial on performance. Tier I results indicate that there is a reasonable expectation of compliance with all performance objectives if the OR CEUSP 233 U waste stream is disposed in the Area 5 RWMS SLB disposal units. The maximum mean and 95 th percentile PA results are all less than the performance objective for 1,000 y. Monte Carlo uncertainty analysis indicates that there is a high likelihood of compliance with all performance objectives. Tier II results indicate that the long-term performance of the OR CEUSP 233 U waste stream is protective of human health and the environment. The Area 5 RWMS is located in one of the least populated and most arid regions of the U.S. Site characterization data indicate that infiltration of precipitation below the plant root zone at 2.5 meters (8.2 feet) ceased 10,000 to 15,000 y ago. The site is not expected to have a groundwater pathway as long as the current arid climate persists. The national security mission of the NNSS and the location of the Area 5 RWMS within the Frenchman Flat Corrective Action Unit require that access controls and land use restrictions be maintained indefinitely. PA modeling results for 10,000 to 60,000 y also indicate that the OR CEUSP 233 U waste stream is acceptable for near-surface disposal. The mean resident air pathway annual total effective dose (TED), the resident all-pathways annual TED, and the acute drilling TED are less than their performance objectives for 10,000 y after closure. The mean radon-222 (222Rn) flux density exceeds the performance objective at 4,200 y, but this is due to waste already disposed at the Area 5 RWMS and is only slightly affected by disposal of the CEUSP 233 U. The peak resident all-pathways annual TED from CEUSP key radionuclides occurs at 48,000 y and is less than the 0.25 millisievert performance objective. Disposal of the OR CEUSP 233 U waste stream in a typical SLB trench slightly increases PA results. Increasing the depth was found to eliminate any impacts of the OR CEUSP 233 U waste stream. Containers could not be shown to have any significant impact on performance due to the long half-life of the waste stream and a lack of data for pitting corrosion rates of stainless steel in soil. The results of the SA indicate that all performance objectives can be met with disposal of the OR CEUSP 233 U waste stream in the SLB units at the Area 5 RWMS. The long-term performance of the OR CEUSP 233 U waste stream disposed in the near surface is protective of human health and the environment. The waste stream is recommended for disposal without conditions.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Overview of the MCNP6® SQA Plan and Requirements [Memorandum]

For all X Computational Physics Division (XCP) software under the Associate Laboratory Directorate for Weapons Physics (ALDX), the Weapons Research Services Secure Networks and Assurance Group (WRS-SNA) manages the software quality assurance (SQA) plan, requirements and guidance with respect to development processes and tools to meet the broader LANL SQA requirements. Each XCP software product is categorized into one of three software types: Safety Software, Non-Safety Risk Significant Software, and Non-Safety Commercially Controlled Software. In 2018, using LANL Form 2033, the MCNP6 code was categorized by the XCP division as Non-Safety Commercially Controlled Software, provided in Appendix A. Using WRSFORM- 0001U, the MCNP6 code was graded as a Medium Impact software product, provided in Appendix B. Given these determinations, the WRS-AD-0010U SQA plan is followed for all MCNP6 developments, documentation and code releases.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗