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At least 667 records · Page 37

Imaging for dismantlement verification: information management and analysis algorithms

The level of detail discernible in imaging techniques has generally excluded them from consideration as verification tools in inspection regimes. An image will almost certainly contain highly sensitive information, and storing a comparison image will almost certainly violate a cardinal principle of information barriers: that no sensitive information be stored in the system. To overcome this problem, some features of the image might be reduced to a few parameters suitable for definition as an attribute, which must be non-sensitive to be acceptable in an Information Barrier regime. However, this process must be performed with care. Features like the perimeter, area, and intensity of an object, for example, might reveal sensitive information. Any data-reduction technique must provide sufficient information to discriminate a real object from a spoofed or incorrect one, while avoiding disclosure (or storage) of any sensitive object qualities. Ultimately, algorithms are intended to provide only a yes/no response verifying the presence of features in the image. We discuss the utility of imaging for arms control applications and present three image-based verification algorithms in this context. The algorithms reduce full image information to non-sensitive feature information, in a process that is intended to enable verification while eliminating the possibility of image reconstruction. The underlying images can be highly detailed, since they are dynamically generated behind an information barrier. We consider the use of active (conventional) radiography alone and in tandem with passive (auto) radiography. We study these algorithms in terms of technical performance in image analysis and application to an information barrier scheme.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

HTGR Resilient Control System Strategy

A preeminent objective for corporate and government organizations is the protection of major investments, which is attained by achieving state awareness, a comprehensive understanding of security and safety, for critical infrastructures. Given the dependence of critical infrastructure on control systems for automation, the integrity of these systems and their ability to provide owner/operators a high degree of state awareness is essential in attaining a high degree of investment protection and public acceptance. Operators as well as government are therefore burdened to ensure they have a timely understanding of the status of their plant or all plants, respectively, to ensure efficient operations and investment and public protection. “This characterization is a significant objective that must consider many aspects of instrumentation, control, and intelligent systems in order to achieve the required result. These aspects include sensory, communication, analysis, decision, and human system interfaces necessary to achieve fusion of data and presentation of results that will provide an understanding of what issues are important and why.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Computer Security for I and C Systems at Nuclear Facilities - 116

Cyber-attacks on Instrumentation and Control (I and C) systems may jeopardize the safety and security of nuclear facilities by contributing to sabotage or aiding in the unauthorized removal of nuclear material. The effects of cyber-attacks on I and C systems important to safety to safety may result in a wide range of consequences, such as a temporary loss of process control or unacceptable radiological consequences. Public awareness of cyber-attacks that affect I and C systems may also undermine confidence in the safety and security of nuclear facilities. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) recognizes the need for the guidance on the protection of I and C systems that provide safety, security, or auxiliary functions at nuclear facilities from cyber-attacks. To meet this need, The IAEA has developed a new Nuclear Security Series publication with the provisional title Computer Security of Instrumentation and Control Systems at Nuclear Facilities which builds upon and expands the guidance published in Nuclear Security Series No. 17 Computer Security at Nuclear Facilities (2011) . This publication will be formally released in 2017 as Technical Guidance and will be the second international consensus publication dedicated to Computer Security at Nuclear Facilities. It was developed in parallel with the new IAEA Nuclear Safety publications providing recommendations on I and C systems at research reactors (RR) and nuclear power plants (NPP) . The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of this publication and its application. The paper will also discuss its relation to other IAEA Nuclear Security Series (NSS) publications on computer security. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

A Novel Sliding Mode Network Perimeter Controller

Congestion in urban areas is a chronic problem that faces many US and worldwide cities. It results in inefficient use of the infrastructure as well as increased fuel consumption and vehicle emissions. Congestion is intertwined with delay. Road users waste precious hours on the road, which reduces productivity. Throughout this decade researchers were and are developing tools and systems that alleviate this problem. Network perimeter control is one of these tools that has been studied extensively. It attempts to control the flow of vehicles entering a protected area so as not to reach the congested regime that is pre-determined using the Network Fundamental Diagram (NFD). In this paper, we present a novel and simple approach derived from sliding mode control theory that achieves the desired objective. Its main advantages over other control strategies include but are not limited to (1) ease of implementation, (2) minimal and straightforward model tuning, and (3) high performance. This controller was implemented and tested on a congested grid network. The results show that, the new logic performs as expected, producing network-wide delay savings that are consistent with other control approaches described in the literature. Furthermore, unlike other controllers, we demonstrate that the controller is robust to its hyper-parameter values, making the algorithm easy to implement and calibrate to local conditions. http://pubsindex.trb.org/

Sliding mode control, network perimeter control, n↗

INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEM CYBER SECURITY: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS RELEVANT TO NUCLEAR FACILITIES, SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY

Typical questions surrounding industrial control system (ICS) cyber security always lead back to: What could a cyber attack do to my system(s) and; how much should I worry about it? These two leading questions represent only a fraction of questions asked when discussing cyber security as it applies to any program, company, business, or organization. The intent of this paper is to open a dialog of important pertinent questions and answers that managers of nuclear facilities engaged in nuclear facility security and safeguards should examine, i.e., what questions should be asked; and how do the answers affect an organization's ability to effectively safeguard and secure nuclear material. When a cyber intrusion is reported, what does that mean? Can an intrusion be detected or go un-noticed? Are nuclear security or safeguards systems potentially vulnerable? What about the digital systems employed in process monitoring, and international safeguards? Organizations expend considerable efforts to ensure that their facilities can maintain continuity of operations against physical threats. However, cyber threats particularly on ICSs may not be well known or understood, and often do not receive adequate attention. With the disclosure of the Stuxnet virus that has recently attacked nuclear infrastructure, many organizations have recognized the need for an urgent interest in cyber attacks and defenses against them. Several questions arise including discussions about the insider threat, adequate cyber protections, program readiness, encryption, and many more. These questions, among others, are discussed so as to raise the awareness and shed light on ways to protect nuclear facilities and materials against such attacks.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Scientific Opportunities for Monitoring of Environmental Remediation Sites (SOMERS) - 12224

The US Department of Energy (DOE) is responsible for risk reduction and cleanup of its nuclear weapons complex. DOE maintains the largest cleanup program in the world, currently spanning over a million acres in 13 states. The inventory of contaminated materials includes 90 million gallons of radioactive waste, 6.4 trillion liters of groundwater, and 40 million cubic meters of soil and debris. It is not feasible to completely restore many sites to pre-disposal conditions. Any contamination left in place will require monitoring, engineering controls and/or land use restrictions to protect human health and environment. Research and development efforts to date have focused on improving characterization and remediation. Yet, monitoring will result in the largest life-cycle costs and will be critical to improving performance and protection. Through an inter-disciplinary effort, DOE is addressing a need to advance monitoring approaches from sole reliance on cost- and labor-intensive point-source monitoring to integrated systems-based approaches such as flux-based approaches and the use of early indicator parameters. Key objectives include identifying current scientific, technical and implementation opportunities and challenges, prioritizing science and technology strategies to meet current needs within the DOE complex for the most challenging environments, and developing an integrated and risk-informed monitoring framework. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Radiation Impact of Very Low Level Radioactive Steel Reused in Building Industry with Emphasis on External Exposure Pathway - 12569

Considerable quantities of various materials are accumulated during the decommissioning process of nuclear installations. Some of arising materials are activated or contaminated. However, many of them continue to have an economic value and exist in a form that can be recycled or reused for special purposes. Furthermore much of the material generated during decommissioning process will contain only small amounts of radionuclides. For these materials there exist environmental and economic incentives to maximize the use of the concept of clearance from further regulatory control. This impact analysis is devoted to mentioned incentives. The aim is to conditionally clear maximum amount of the scrap steel and consequently recycle and reuse it in form of reinforcing components in tunnel and bridge building scenarios. Recent calculations relevant for external exposure pathway indicate that concept of conditional clearance represent a feasible option for the management of radioactive materials. Even in chosen specific industrial applications it is possible to justify new, approximately one order of magnitude higher, clearance levels. However analysis of other possible exposure pathways relevant for particular scenario of reuse of conditionally cleared materials has to be performed in order to confirm indications from partially obtained results. Basically, the concept of conditional clearance can bring two basic benefits. Firstly it is saving of considerable funds, which would be otherwise used for treatment, conditioning and disposal of materials at appropriate radioactive waste repository. Moreover materials with intrinsic value (particularly metals) can be recycled and reused in industrial applications instead of investing resources on mining and production process in order to obtain new, 'fresh' materials. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Radiological Survey of Contaminated Installations of Research Reactor before Dismantling in High Dose Conditions with Complex for Remote Measurements of Radioactivity - 12069

Decontamination and decommissioning of the research reactors MR (Testing Reactor) and RFT (Reactor of Physics and Technology) has recently been initiated in the National Research Center (NRC) 'Kurchatov institute', Moscow. These research reactors have a long history and many installations - nine loop facilities for experiments with different kinds of fuel. When decommissioning nuclear facilities it is necessary to measure the distribution of radioactive contamination in the rooms and at the equipment at high levels of background radiation. At 'Kurchatov Institute' some special remote control measuring systems were developed and they are applied during dismantling of the reactors MR and RFT. For a survey of high-level objects a radiometric system mounted on the robotic Brokk vehicle is used. This system has two (4π and collimated) dose meters and a high resolution video camera. Maximum measured dose rate for this system is ∼8.5 Sv/h. To determine the composition of contaminants, a portable spectrometric system is used. It is a remotely controlled, collimated detector for scanning the distribution of radioactive contamination. To obtain a detailed distribution of contamination a remote-controlled gamma camera is applied. For work at highly contaminated premises with non-uniform background radiation, another camera is equipped with rotating coded mask (coded aperture imaging). As a result, a new system of instruments for remote radioactivity measurements with wide range of sensitivity and angular resolution was developed. The experience and results of measurements in different areas of the reactor and at its loop installations, with emphasis on the radioactive survey of highly-contaminated samples, are presented. These activities are conducted under the Federal Program for Nuclear and Radiation Safety of Russia. Adaptation of complex remote measurements of radioactivity and survey of contaminated installations of research reactor before dismantling in high dose conditions has proven successful. The radioactivity measuring devices for operation at high, non-uniform dose background were tested in the field and a new data of measurement of contamination distribution in the premises and installations were obtained. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Cyber security using multi-threaded architecture data diode at the NBSR - 114

Ongoing upgrades for the control room of the National Bureau of Standards Reactor (NBSR) located at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) require the ability to collect sensor data from the secured reactor network and transfer to the outside network for trend analysis, while maintaining the security of the reactor network. To accomplish this, a data diode was created to provide a physical barrier that prevents any outside data from reaching the secured reactor network. The hardware of the data diode consists of two embedded computers, running Unix based operating systems, connected by three DB-9 serial cables. The serial cables have been modified so that only two wires, a ground and a transmission line, provide connection between the computers. The data diode relies on a multi-threaded architecture to collect and simultaneously transfer data over three serial connections. A software program, implemented in Java, has been written to request data from the digital recorders installed to monitor the NBSR process instrumentation and transfer that data across the serial connections. The data diode can collect over 1200 data points from multiple digital recorders each second. The collected data can then be stored in a relational database for later analysis. The source codes for the software are available open source on GitHub. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Low-Intrusion Techniques and Sensitive Information Management for Warhead Counting and Verification: FY2011 Annual Report

Future arms control treaties may push nuclear weapons limits to unprecedented low levels and may entail precise counting of warheads as well as distinguishing between strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. Such advances will require assessment of form and function to confidently verify the presence or absence of nuclear warheads and/or their components. Imaging with penetrating radiation can provide such an assessment and could thus play a unique role in inspection scenarios. Yet many imaging capabilities have been viewed as too intrusive from the perspective of revealing weapon design details, and the potential for the release of sensitive information poses challenges in verification settings. A widely held perception is that verification through radiography requires images of sufficient quality that an expert (e.g., a trained inspector or an image-matching algorithm) can verify the presence or absence of components of a device. The concept of information barriers (IBs) has been established to prevent access to relevant weapon-design information by inspectors (or algorithms), and has, to date, limited the usefulness of radiographic inspection. The challenge of this project is to demonstrate that radiographic information can be used behind an IB to improve the capabilities of treaty-verification weapons-inspection systems.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

The Next Generation NC3 Enterprise: Opportunities and Challenges

The 2018 Department of Defense Nuclear Posture Review emphasized the importance of modernizing the existing nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) architecture. Heightened awareness of US reliance upon technology developed in the 1970s and emerging challenges posed by frontier technologies spurred Secretary of Defense Mattis to task USSTRATCOM with identifying the technologies, processes, and institutions needed to build a next-generation NC3 system. General Hyten, USAF Commander, has noted that this will require an “overhaul of our existing processes from requirements definition to systems engineering and integration, acquisition, and budgeting. A framework is required for modern processes to enable delivery of a flexible, continuously evolving, threat-driven set of capabilities.” This brief, prepared in response to Gen. Hyten’s call for memoranda to address the “Next Generation NC3 Enterprise,” outlines three distinct approaches to NC3 modernization, each with a system lifecycle of approximately 50 years (2030-2080): upgrading the existing system, a hybrid approach to integrating new technologies, and creating an entirely new NC3 architecture. It is organized as follows: First, it outlines the integral role of NC3 in strategic operations. Second, it examines the current status of NC3 tools and the contemporary challenges that future systems must address. Third, it provides a series of paths forward for USSTRATCOM’s consideration. Fourth and finally, it recommends a “hybrid” approach to maintain the strengths of the current NC3 architecture, increase the resilience of the system, and leverage the advantages of new sensing, ISR, and communication technology.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Recent Developments In Fast Neutron Detection And Multiplicity Counting With Verification With Liquid Scintillator

For many years at LLNL, we have been developing time-correlated neutron detection techniques and algorithms for applications such as Arms Control, Threat Detection and Nuclear Material Assay. Many of our techniques have been developed specifically for the relatively low efficiency (a few percent) attainable by detector systems limited to man-portability. Historically, we used thermal neutron detectors (mainly {sup 3}He), taking advantage of the high thermal neutron interaction cross-sections. More recently, we have been investigating the use of fast neutron detection with liquid scintillators, inorganic crystals, and in the near future, pulse-shape discriminating plastics which respond over 1000 times faster (nanoseconds versus tens of microseconds) than thermal neutron detectors. Fast neutron detection offers considerable advantages, since the inherent nanosecond production time-scales of spontaneous fission and neutron-induced fission are preserved and measured instead of being lost by thermalization required for thermal neutron detectors. We are now applying fast neutron technology to the safeguards regime in the form of fast portable digital electronics as well as faster and less hazardous scintillator formulations. Faster detector response times and sensitivity to neutron momentum show promise for measuring, differentiating, and assaying samples that have modest to very high count rates, as well as mixed fission sources like Cm and Pu. We report on measured results with our existing liquid scintillator array, and progress on the design of a nuclear material assay system that incorporates fast neutron detection, including the surprising result that fast liquid scintillator detectors become competitive and even surpass the precision of {sup 3}He-based counters measuring correlated pairs in modest (kg) samples of plutonium.

71 CLASSICAL AND QUANTUM MECHANICS, GENERAL PHYSIC↗

Measurement and Analysis of Dose Rate Distribution in the Seismic Base-Isolation pit of the Electron Linac Oncology Facility - Paper 87

Recently electric linac oncology facilities incorporating seismic base-isolation structure have become very popular in Japan to prevent strong impact to the equipment by the earthquakes. When the boundary of the controlled area is set below the base-isolated foundations, additional shielding of iron plate is needed and the cost for shielding sometimes increases up to $1 M Since no one usually accesses underneath the treatment room, except short maintenance period for base-isolation structure, it is reasonable to set the boundary around the downstairs room (pit) by fence. However, it is very difficult to estimate the dose rate of new boundary by using the simple shielding calculation method, because of rotating gantry head and effect of scattering radiation in the base-isolation floor. In this study detail calculations by using Monte-Carlo calculation code MCNP5 have been performed to find out the practical shielding design. To be more specific, investigation for the complicated behavior of photons in the 'pit' have been performed by the analysis, i.e. (1) How much can we reduce the thickness of additional iron plate?, (2) Which angle of the beam direction will influence the most to the dose rate at the new boundary?, (3) Which component of the radiation is dominant at the new boundary? We also verified the calculated results by the measurement. We have performed the analysis of the behavior of photons in the pit and found out no additional iron shielding was necessary, which carried out an extreme reduction of costs. The main contribution to the dose rate at the boundary was scattered photons in the case of 0- degree beam direction. Good agreement between calculated and measured results were obtained, and passed the examination by the authority. It is concluded that the Monte-Carlo calculation code MCNP5 is very effective for the optimistic design of the electron linac oncology facilities incorporating seismic base-isolation structure. (authors)

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗

SAS4A/SASSYS-1 Validation with EBR-II Tests Performed During the SHRT Testing Program

The EBR-II sodium-cooled fast reactor supported a wide range of fast reactor research activities. The final fifteen years of operations at EBR-II were used for experiments and tests to demonstrate the importance of passive safety in liquid metal reactors and the capability of such systems to provide strong passive responses during off-normal conditions. The Shutdown Heat Removal Test program at EBR-II provided test data supporting the validation of computer codes for design, licensing, and operation of LMRs, among other objectives. The program included nearly sixty tests, most of which were protected and unprotected loss of flow and loss of heat sink tests run at various initial powers and flow rates. This report documents the results of modeling and simulation of tests from the Shutdown Heat Removal Test program to support validation of Argonne’s SAS4A/SASSYS-1 fast reactor safety analysis code. SHRT-17 was a protected loss of flow test where a loss of electrical power to all sodium coolant pumps was simulated to demonstrate the effectiveness of natural circulation cooling characteristics. SHRT-45R was an unprotected loss of flow test where the control rod scram function of the plant protection system was disabled to demonstrate the effectiveness of EBR-II’s passive reactivity feedbacks. BOP-301 and BOP-302R were unprotected loss of heat sink tests that demonstrated how reactivity feedback effects driven by changes to the core inlet temperature can shut down the fission process. This validation activity leverages modeling and simulation efforts that originated under an International Atomic Energy Agency Coordinated Research Project for benchmark analysis of the EBR-II Shutdown Heat Removal Tests. The SAS4A/SASSYS-1 models originally developed for the CRP have been modernized to utilize new code features and modeling practices. Differences between the predicted and measured test data were explored and the causes of these differences were identified as being due to modeling approximations, uncertainty in transient component behavior, and instrumentation uncertainties. Overall, it was concluded that for SHRT-17, SHRT-45R, BOP-301, and BOP-302R there was good agreement between the flow, power, and temperature predictions and the measured data.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Optimising National WM Strategies through early consideration of Nuclear Safeguards - 18607

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards stand alongside safety and security as one of the three pillars for prudent management of all nuclear material, including nuclear waste. Although safety considerations, including public and environmental radiation protection, are the traditional drivers of waste management strategies, there is a requirement for nuclear safeguards in shaping and quantifying long-term solutions for special classes of radioactive waste. This is especially important when considering the disposal of nuclear material in a repository that could be released from regulatory oversight for radiation protection after a period of institutional control, as some safeguards oversight would still be required. Failure to consider nuclear safeguards at the early stages of planning may alternatively lead to excessive volumes for disposal or the need to recondition already treated wastes. At the very least, safeguards measures should be considered before countries seek to dispose of legacy nuclear materials, decommissioning wastes and other materials containing uranium, thorium or plutonium in an operating repository. Nuclear safeguards are the set of tools and techniques used by the IAEA to verify that countries comply with their international obligations not to divert nuclear materials to nuclear explosive devices. Under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), nuclear safeguards apply to all uranium, thorium and plutonium held in non-weapons NPT states, with limited exceptions. In nuclear-weapon states, much of their material is likewise subject to IAEA safeguards through conditions in agreements with respective suppliers of the uranium. Under IAEA safeguards, such nuclear material must remain accounted for and accessible for periodic verification-analogous to the safety concepts of reversibility and retrievability. Nevertheless, safeguards requirements can be terminated - provided that the State and the [IAEA] agree that such nuclear material is practicably irrecoverable - through dilution or immobilisation in solid form (such as cement, glass or ceramic). This means candidate material can be disposed of as non- nuclear material, with no further safeguards requirements, provided this criterion is met. Unlike radiological wastes where repository design strongly influences pathways for radionuclide migration and overall safety performance, repository design is not a factor in considering the termination of safeguards on nuclear material. This paper looks at similarities and differences in the safety, security and safeguards regulatory requirements for the management of radioactive waste and nuclear material in Australia. In particular, it outlines recent experience gained from participation in Australia's waste acceptance criteria working group for a national low-level waste repository and intermediate-level waste store, as well as from Australia's overall waste management strategy. These items of work have coincided with the IAEA update of its internal policy on termination of safeguards on nuclear material. Australia's experience shows how inclusion of safeguards criteria in the planning process is leading to optimisations in choice of facility concepts, project sequencing and equitable distribution of economic risk. By considering the three pillars-safety, security and safeguards-early on in the planning process, Australia's waste management strategy will provide a benchmark for other states in establishing and updating their own waste acceptance criteria for the disposal of nuclear material. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Improvement of efficiency and temperature control of induction heating vapor source on electron cyclotron resonance ion source

An electron cyclotron resonance ion source (ECRIS) is used to generate multicharged ions for many kinds of the fields. We have developed an evaporator by using induction heating method that can generate pure vapor from solid state materials in ECRIS. We develop the new matching and protecting circuit by which we can precisely control the temperature of the induction heating evaporator. We can control the temperature within {+-}15 deg. C around 1400 deg. C under the operation pressure about 10{sup -4} Pa. We are able to use this evaporator for experiment of synthesizing process to need pure vapor under enough low pressure, e.g., experiment of generation of endohedral Fe-fullerene at the ECRIS.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Data Diodes in Support of Trustworthy Cyber Infrastructure and Net-Centric Cyber Decision Support

Data diodes provide protection of critical cyber assets by the means of physically enforcing traffic direction on the network. In order to deploy data diodes effectively, it is imperative to understand the protection they provide, the protection they do not provide, their limitations, and their place in the larger security infrastructure. In this work, we study data diodes, their functionalities and limitations. We then propose two critical infrastructure systems that can benefit from the additional protection offered by data diodes: process control networks and net-centric cyber decision support systems. We review the security requirements of these systems, describe the architectures, and study the trade-offs. Finally, the architectures are evaluated against different attack patterns.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Two Strategies for the Development of Mitochondrion-Targeted Small Molecule Radiation Damage Mitigators

Purpose: To evaluate the effectiveness of mitigation of acute ionizing radiation damage by mitochondrion-targeted small molecules. Methods and Materials: We evaluated the ability of nitroxide-linked alkene peptide isostere JP4-039, the nitric oxide synthase inhibitor-linked alkene peptide esostere MCF201-89, and the p53/mdm2/mdm4 protein complex inhibitor BEB55 to mitigate radiation effects by clonogenic survival curves with the murine hematopoietic progenitor cell line 32D cl 3 and the human bone marrow stromal (KM101) and pulmonary epithelial (IB3) cell lines. The p53-dependent mechanism of action was tested with p53{sup +/+} and p53{sup -/-} murine bone marrow stromal cell lines. C57BL/6 NHsd female mice were injected i.p. with JP4-039, MCF201-89, or BEB55 individually or in combination, after receiving 9.5 Gy total body irradiation (TBI). Results: Each drug, JP4-039, MCF201-89, or BEB55, individually or as a mixture of all three compounds increased the survival of 32D cl 3 (p = 0.0021, p = 0.0011, p = 0.0038, and p = 0.0073, respectively) and IB3 cells (p = 0.0193, p = 0.0452, p = 0.0017, and p = 0.0019, respectively) significantly relative to that of control irradiated cells. KM101 cells were protected by individual drugs (p = 0.0007, p = 0.0235, p = 0.0044, respectively). JP4-039 and MCF201-89 increased irradiation survival of both p53{sup +/+} (p = 0.0396 and p = 0.0071, respectively) and p53{sup -/-} cells (p = 0.0007 and p = 0.0188, respectively), while BEB55 was ineffective with p53{sup -/-} cells. Drugs administered individually or as a mixtures of all three after TBI significantly increased mouse survival (p = 0.0234, 0.0009, 0.0052, and 0.0167, respectively). Conclusion: Mitochondrial targeting of small molecule radiation mitigators decreases irradiation-induced cell death in vitro and prolongs survival of lethally irradiated mice.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗