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At least 667 records · Page 37

NASA Tech Briefs, July 2004

Topics: Optoelectronic Sensor System for Guidance in Docking; Hybrid Piezoelectric/Fiber-Optic Sensor Sheets; Multisensor Arrays for Greater Reliability and Accuracy; Integrated-Optic Oxygen Sensors; Ka-Band Autonomous Formation Flying Sensor; CMOS VLSI Active-Pixel Sensor for Tracking; Lightweight, Self-Deploying Foam Antenna Structures; Electrically Small Microstrip Quarter-Wave Monopole Antennas; A 2-to-28-MHz Phase-Locked Loop; Portable Electromyograph; Open-Source Software for Modeling of Nanoelectronic Devices; Software for Generating Strip Maps from SAR Data; Calibration Software for use with Jurassicprok; Software for Probabilistic Risk Reduction; Software Processes SAR Motion-Measurement Data; Improved Method of Purifying Carbon Nanotubes; Patterned Growth of Carbon Nanotubes or Nanofibers; Lightweight, Rack-Mountable Composite Cold Plate/Shelves; SiC-Based Miniature High-Temperature Cantilever Anemometer; Inlet Housing for a Partial-Admission Turbine; Lightweight Thermoformed Structural Components and Optics; Growing High-Quality InAs Quantum Dots for Infrared Lasers; Selected Papers on Protoplanetary Disks; Module for Oxygenating Water without Generating Bubbles; Coastal Research Imaging Spectrometer; Rapid Switching and Modulation by use of Coupled VCSELs; Laser-Induced-Fluorescence Photogrammetry and Videogrammetry; Laboratory Apparatus Generates Dual-Species Cold Atomic Beam; Laser Ablation of Materials for Propulsion of Spacecraft; Small Active Radiation Monitor; Hybrid Image-Plane/Stereo Manipulation; Partitioning a Gridded Rectangle into Smaller Rectangles; Digital Radar-Signal Processors Implemented in FPGAs; Part 1 of a Computational Study of a Drop-Laden Mixing Layer; and Some Improvements in Signal-Conditioning Circuits.

Source record↗

How Can You Support RIDM/CRM/RM Through the Use of PRA

Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) is one of key Risk Informed Decision Making (RIDM) tools. It is a scenario-based methodology aimed at identifying and assessing Safety and Technical Performance risks in complex technological systems.

DoVemto. Tpmu↗

Practical Application of PRA as an Integrated Design Tool for Space Systems

This paper presents the application of the first comprehensive Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) during the design phase of a joint NASA/NOAA weather satellite program, Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite Series R (GOES-R). GOES-R is the next generation weather satellite primarily to help understand the weather and help save human lives. PRA has been used at NASA for Human Space Flight for many years. PRA was initially adopted and implemented in the operational phase of manned space flight programs and more recently for the next generation human space systems. Since its first use at NASA, PRA has become recognized throughout the Agency as a method of assessing complex mission risks as part of an overall approach to assuring safety and mission success throughout project lifecycles. PRA is now included as a requirement during the design phase of both NASA next generation manned space vehicles as well as for high priority robotic missions. The influence of PRA on GOES-R design and operation concepts are discussed in detail. The GOES-R PRA is unique at NASA for its early implementation. It also represents a pioneering effort to integrate risks from both Spacecraft (SC) and Ground Segment (GS) to fully assess the probability of achieving mission objectives. PRA analysts were actively involved in system engineering and design engineering to ensure that a comprehensive set of technical risks were correctly identified and properly understood from a design and operations perspective. The analysis included an assessment of SC hardware and software, SC fault management system, GS hardware and software, common cause failures, human error, natural hazards, solar weather and infrastructure (such as network and telecommunications failures, fire). PRA findings directly resulted in design changes to reduce SC risk from micro-meteoroids. PRA results also led to design changes in several SC subsystems, e.g. propulsion, guidance, navigation and control (GNC), communications, mechanisms, and command and data handling (C&DH). The fault tree approach assisted in the development of the fault management system design. Human error analysis, which examined human response to failure, indicated areas where automation could reduce the overall probability of gaps in operation by half. In addition, the PRA brought to light many potential root causes of system disruptions, including earthquakes, inclement weather, solar storms, blackouts and other extreme conditions not considered in the typical reliability and availability analyses. Ultimately the PRA served to identify potential failures that, when mitigated, resulted in a more robust design, as well as to influence the program's concept of operations. The early and active integration of PRA with system and design engineering provided a well-managed approach for risk assessment that increased reliability and availability, optimized lifecyc1e costs, and unified the SC and GS developments.

Kalia, Prince↗

Europa Planetary Protection for Juno Jupiter Orbiter

NASA's Juno mission launched in 2011 and will explore the Jupiter system starting in 2016. Juno's suite of instruments is designed to investigate the atmosphere, gravitational fields, magnetic fields, and auroral regions. Its low perijove polar orbit will allow it to explore portions of the Jovian environment never before visited. While the Juno mission is not orbiting or flying close to Europa or the other Galilean satellites, planetary protection requirements for avoiding the contamination of Europa have been taken into account in the Juno mission design.The science mission is designed to conclude with a deorbit burn that disposes of the spacecraft in Jupiter's atmosphere. Compliance with planetary protection requirements is verified through a set of analyses including analysis of initial bioburden, analysis of the effect of bioburden reduction due to the space and Jovian radiation environments, probabilistic risk assessment of successful deorbit, Monte-Carlo orbit propagation, and bioburden reduction in the event of impact with an icy body.

Juno↗

Exit Presentation Fall 2013

Our current International Space Station Probabilistic Risk Assessment (ISS PRA) model assumes all collisions between a visiting vehicle (VV) and the ISS result in worst case loss of the ISS crew and the vehicle (LOCV). Drawing results from the Mir-Progress collision, we know this assumption is inaccurate because that collision did not lead to LOCV. Therefore the PRA team is conducting a study to determine the likelihood of LOCV when a collision occurs between a VV and the ISS. Kinetic energy is calculated and converted to pounds of TNT for the moving VVs when they collide with the ISS. Different scenarios are evaluated to obtain collision related data such as translational kinetic energy and rotational kinetic energy. These calculated data are integrated into the results from the expert elicitation performed on the Mir- Progress collision. As a result of this study, the PRA model will now calculate the probability of a VV collision with ISS, the probability that collision will result in Loss of Soyuz Crew (LOC) or Loss of ISS Crew and Vehicle (LOCV).

Yang, Qi Rong↗

Common Cause Failure Modeling

Common Cause Failures (CCFs) are a known and documented phenomenon that defeats system redundancy. CCFS are a set of dependent type of failures that can be caused by: system environments; manufacturing; transportation; storage; maintenance; and assembly, as examples. Since there are many factors that contribute to CCFs, the effects can be reduced, but they are difficult to eliminate entirely. Furthermore, failure databases sometimes fail to differentiate between independent and CCF (dependent) failure and data is limited, especially for launch vehicles. The Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) of NASA's Safety and Mission Assurance Directorate at Marshall Space Flight Center (MFSC) is using generic data from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's database of common cause failures at nuclear power plants to estimate CCF due to the lack of a more appropriate data source. There remains uncertainty in the actual magnitude of the common cause risk estimates for different systems at this stage of the design. Given the limited data about launch vehicle CCF and that launch vehicles are a highly redundant system by design, it is important to make design decisions to account for a range of values for independent and CCFs. When investigating the design of the one-out-of-two component redundant system for launch vehicles, a response surface was constructed to represent the impact of the independent failure rate versus a common cause beta factor effect on a system's failure probability. This presentation will define a CCF and review estimation calculations. It gives a summary of reduction methodologies and a review of examples of historical CCFs. Finally, it presents the response surface and discusses the results of the different CCFs on the reliability of a one-out-of-two system.

Hark, Frank↗

Addressing Uniqueness and Unison of Reliability and Safety for a Better Integration

Over time, it has been observed that Safety and Reliability have not been clearly differentiated, which leads to confusion, inefficiency, and, sometimes, counter-productive practices in executing each of these two disciplines. It is imperative to address this situation to help Reliability and Safety disciplines improve their effectiveness and efficiency. The paper poses an important question to address, "Safety and Reliability - Are they unique or unisonous?" To answer the question, the paper reviewed several most commonly used analyses from each of the disciplines, namely, FMEA, reliability allocation and prediction, reliability design involvement, system safety hazard analysis, Fault Tree Analysis, and Probabilistic Risk Assessment. The paper pointed out uniqueness and unison of Safety and Reliability in their respective roles, requirements, approaches, and tools, and presented some suggestions for enhancing and improving the individual disciplines, as well as promoting the integration of the two. The paper concludes that Safety and Reliability are unique, but compensating each other in many aspects, and need to be integrated. Particularly, the individual roles of Safety and Reliability need to be differentiated, that is, Safety is to ensure and assure the product meets safety requirements, goals, or desires, and Reliability is to ensure and assure maximum achievability of intended design functions. With the integration of Safety and Reliability, personnel can be shared, tools and analyses have to be integrated, and skill sets can be possessed by the same person with the purpose of providing the best value to a product development.

Huang, Zhaofeng↗

Characterizing Epistemic Uncertainty for Launch Vehicle Designs

NASA Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) has the task of estimating the aleatory (randomness) and epistemic (lack of knowledge) uncertainty of launch vehicle loss of mission and crew risk, and communicating the results. Launch vehicles are complex engineered systems designed with sophisticated subsystems that are built to work together to accomplish mission success. Some of these systems or subsystems are in the form of heritage equipment, while some have never been previously launched. For these cases, characterizing the epistemic uncertainty is of foremost importance, and it is anticipated that the epistemic uncertainty of a modified launch vehicle design versus a design of well understood heritage equipment would be greater. For reasons that will be discussed, standard uncertainty propagation methods using Monte Carlo simulation produce counter intuitive results, and significantly underestimate epistemic uncertainty for launch vehicle models. Furthermore, standard PRA methods, such as Uncertainty-Importance analyses used to identify components that are significant contributors to uncertainty, are rendered obsolete, since sensitivity to uncertainty changes are not reflected in propagation of uncertainty using Monte Carlo methods. This paper provides a basis of the uncertainty underestimation for complex systems and especially, due to nuances of launch vehicle logic, for launch vehicles. It then suggests several alternative methods for estimating uncertainty and provides examples of estimation results. Lastly, the paper describes how to implement an Uncertainty-Importance analysis using one alternative approach, describes the results, and suggests ways to reduce epistemic uncertainty by focusing on additional data or testing of selected components.

Novack, Steven D.↗

Characterizing Epistemic Uncertainty for Launch Vehicle Designs

NASA Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) has the task of estimating the aleatory (randomness) and epistemic (lack of knowledge) uncertainty of launch vehicle loss of mission and crew risk and communicating the results. Launch vehicles are complex engineered systems designed with sophisticated subsystems that are built to work together to accomplish mission success. Some of these systems or subsystems are in the form of heritage equipment, while some have never been previously launched. For these cases, characterizing the epistemic uncertainty is of foremost importance, and it is anticipated that the epistemic uncertainty of a modified launch vehicle design versus a design of well understood heritage equipment would be greater. For reasons that will be discussed, standard uncertainty propagation methods using Monte Carlo simulation produce counter intuitive results and significantly underestimate epistemic uncertainty for launch vehicle models. Furthermore, standard PRA methods such as Uncertainty-Importance analyses used to identify components that are significant contributors to uncertainty are rendered obsolete since sensitivity to uncertainty changes are not reflected in propagation of uncertainty using Monte Carlo methods.This paper provides a basis of the uncertainty underestimation for complex systems and especially, due to nuances of launch vehicle logic, for launch vehicles. It then suggests several alternative methods for estimating uncertainty and provides examples of estimation results. Lastly, the paper shows how to implement an Uncertainty-Importance analysis using one alternative approach, describes the results, and suggests ways to reduce epistemic uncertainty by focusing on additional data or testing of selected components.

Novack, Steven D.↗

Common Cause Failure Modeling

Common Cause Failures (CCFs) are a known and documented phenomenon that defeats system redundancy. CCFS are a set of dependent type of failures that can be caused by: system environments; manufacturing; transportation; storage; maintenance; and assembly, as examples. Since there are many factors that contribute to CCFs, the effects can be reduced, but they are difficult to eliminate entirely. Furthermore, failure databases sometimes fail to differentiate between independent and CCF (dependent) failure and data is limited, especially for launch vehicles. The Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) of NASA's Safety and Mission Assurance Directorate at Marshal Space Flight Center (MFSC) is using generic data from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's database of common cause failures at nuclear power plants to estimate CCF due to the lack of a more appropriate data source. There remains uncertainty in the actual magnitude of the common cause risk estimates for different systems at this stage of the design. Given the limited data about launch vehicle CCF and that launch vehicles are a highly redundant system by design, it is important to make design decisions to account for a range of values for independent and CCFs. When investigating the design of the one-out-of-two component redundant system for launch vehicles, a response surface was constructed to represent the impact of the independent failure rate versus a common cause beta factor effect on a system's failure probability. This presentation will define a CCF and review estimation calculations. It gives a summary of reduction methodologies and a review of examples of historical CCFs. Finally, it presents the response surface and discusses the results of the different CCFs on the reliability of a one-out-of-two system.

Hark, Frank↗

Common Cause Failure Modeling in Space Launch Vehicles

Common Cause Failures (CCFs) are a known and documented phenomenon that defeats system redundancy. CCFs are a set of dependent type of failures that can be caused for example by system environments, manufacturing, transportation, storage, maintenance, and assembly. Since there are many factors that contribute to CCFs, they can be reduced, but are difficult to eliminate entirely. Furthermore, failure databases sometimes fail to differentiate between independent and dependent CCF. Because common cause failure data is limited in the aerospace industry, the Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Team at Bastion Technology Inc. is estimating CCF risk using generic data collected by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Consequently, common cause risk estimates based on this database, when applied to other industry applications, are highly uncertain. Therefore, it is important to account for a range of values for independent and CCF risk and to communicate the uncertainty to decision makers. There is an existing methodology for reducing CCF risk during design, which includes a checklist of 40+ factors grouped into eight categories. Using this checklist, an approach to produce a beta factor estimate is being investigated that quantitatively relates these factors. In this example, the checklist will be tailored to space launch vehicles, a quantitative approach will be described, and an example of the method will be presented.

Hark, Frank↗

And the Humans Save the Day or Maybe They Ruin It: The Importance of Humans in the Loop

Flying a mission in space requires a massive commitment of resources, and without the talent and commitment of the people involved in this effort we would never leave the atmosphere of Earth. When we use the phrase "humans in the loop", it could apply to almost any endeavor since everything starts with humans developing a concept, completing the design process, building or implementing a product and using the product to achieve a goal or purpose. Narrowing the focus to spaceflights, there are a variety of individuals involved throughout the preparations for flight and the flight itself. All of the humans involved add value and support for program success. The purpose of this paper focuses on how a Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) accounts for the human in the loop for potential missions using a technique called Human Reliability Analysis (HRA). Human actions can increase or decrease the overall risk via initiating events or mitigating them, thus removing the human from the loop doesn't always lower the risk.

DeMott, Diana↗

Estimating Orion Heat Shield Failure Due To Ablator Cracking During The EFT-1 Mission

The Orion EFT-1 heatshield suffered from two major certification challenges: First, the mechanical properties used in design were not evident in the flight hardware and second, the flight article itself cracked during fabrication. The combination of these events motivated the Orion Program to pursue an engineering-level Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) as part of heatshield certification rationale. The PRA provided loss of Mission (LOM) likelihoods considering the probability of a crack occurring during the mission and the likelihood of subsequent structure over-temperature. The methods and input data for the PRA are presented along with a discussion of the test data used to anchor the results. The Orion program accepted an EFT-1 Loss of Vehicle (LOV) risk of 1-in-160,000 due to in-mission Avcoat cracking based on the results of this analysis. Conservatisms in the result, along with future considerations for Exploration Missions (EM) are also addressed.

Avcoat↗

Human Reliability Assessments: Using the Past (Shuttle) to Predict the Future (Orion)

NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration) Johnson Space Center (JSC) Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) uses two human reliability analysis (HRA) methodologies. The first is a simplified method which is based on how much time is available to complete the action, with consideration included for environmental and personal factors that could influence the human's reliability. This method is expected to provide a conservative value or placeholder as a preliminary estimate. This preliminary estimate or screening value is used to determine which placeholder needs a more detailed assessment. The second methodology is used to develop a more detailed human reliability assessment on the performance of critical human actions. This assessment needs to consider more than the time available, this would include factors such as: the importance of the action, the context, environmental factors, potential human stresses, previous experience, training, physical design interfaces, available procedures/checklists and internal human stresses. The more detailed assessment is expected to be more realistic than that based primarily on time available. When performing an HRA on a system or process that has an operational history, we have information specific to the task based on this history and experience. In the case of a Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) that is based on a new design and has no operational history, providing a "reasonable" assessment of potential crew actions becomes more challenging. In order to determine what is expected of future operational parameters, the experience from individuals who had relevant experience and were familiar with the system and process previously implemented by NASA was used to provide the "best" available data. Personnel from Flight Operations, Flight Directors, Launch Test Directors, Control Room Console Operators and Astronauts were all interviewed to provide a comprehensive picture of previous NASA operations. Verification of the assumptions and expectations expressed in the assessments will be needed when the procedures, flight rules and operational requirements are developed and then finalized.

DeMott, Diana↗

Human Reliability Assessments: Using the Past (Shuttle) to Predict the Future (Orion)

NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration) Johnson Space Center (JSC) Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) uses two human reliability analysis (HRA) methodologies. The first is a simplified method which is based on how much time is available to complete the action, with consideration included for environmental and personal factors that could influence the human's reliability. This method is expected to provide a conservative value or placeholder as a preliminary estimate. This preliminary estimate or screening value is used to determine which placeholder needs a more detailed assessment. The second methodology is used to develop a more detailed human reliability assessment on the performance of critical human actions. This assessment needs to consider more than the time available, this would include factors such as: the importance of the action, the context, environmental factors, potential human stresses, previous experience, training, physical design interfaces, available procedures/checklists and internal human stresses. The more detailed assessment is expected to be more realistic than that based primarily on time available. When performing an HRA on a system or process that has an operational history, we have information specific to the task based on this history and experience. In the case of a Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) that is based on a new design and has no operational history, providing a "reasonable" assessment of potential crew actions becomes more challenging. To determine what is expected of future operational parameters, the experience from individuals who had relevant experience and were familiar with the system and process previously implemented by NASA was used to provide the "best" available data. Personnel from Flight Operations, Flight Directors, Launch Test Directors, Control Room Console Operators, and Astronauts were all interviewed to provide a comprehensive picture of previous NASA operations. Verification of the assumptions and expectations expressed in the assessments will be needed when the procedures, flight rules, and operational requirements are developed and then finalized.

DeMott, Diana L.↗

And the Human Saves the Day or Maybe They Ruin It, The Importance of Humans in the Loop

Flying a mission in space requires a massive commitment of resources, and without the talent and commitment of the people involved in this effort we would never leave the atmosphere of Earth as safely as we have. When we use the phrase "humans in the loop", it could apply to almost any endeavor since everything starts with humans developing a concept, completing the design process, building or implementing a product and using the product to achieve a goal or purpose. Narrowing the focus to spaceflight, there are a variety of individuals involved throughout the preparations for flight and the flight itself. All of the humans involved add value and support for program success. The paper discusses the concepts of human involvement in technological programs, how a Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) accounts for the human in the loop for potential missions using a technique called Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) and the tradeoffs between having a human in the loop or not. Human actions can increase or decrease the overall risk via initiating events or mitigating them, thus removing the human from the loop doesn't always lowers the risk.

DeMott, Diana L.↗

Synthesizing a New Launch Vehicle Failure Probability Based on Historical Flight Data

New launch vehicles have historically had significantly higher failure rates in early flights than what has been predicted using Probabilistic Risk Assessment - PRA. This is because PRAs typically model a mature vehicle where a significant portion of the early failure probability contributors have been eliminated due to testing and improvements after actual field operation. To capture a more accurate early flight failure probability estimate, this paper develops a method that estimates ascent failure probability starting with the first flight based on historical launch vehicle records. With new launch vehicles being developed, such as the Space Launch System - SLS, a PRA model must be extended to cover early flight failure probability contributions that are either not covered in the mature-vehicle PRA or are underestimated. These failure probability contributions include design errors, quality control deficiencies, installation errors, and environmental impacts. There are also failure dependencies due to systemic errors that still exist due to limited entire-system testing.

Cross, Robert B.↗

Synthesizing a New Launch Vehicle Failure Probability Based on Historical Flight Data

New launch vehicles have historically had significantly higher failure probabilities in early flights than what has been predicted using Probabilistic Risk Assessment. Work on a new methodology originally started with ARES I-X and the Common Standards Working Group (CSWG) for range safety applications. CSWG consists of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Air Force, and NASA. Historical launch vehicle data was viewed as the best predictor of success/failure for launches of new vehicles. A launch vehicle database was developed that includes all launches from 1980-2017 (both US and foreign). Entries to the database include: Vehicle by model type; Launch dates; Failure description; Failure Result (Loss Of Vehicle (LOV)/Loss Of Mission (LOM); Failure cause (when available); Vehicle designs (stages/engines/etc.)

Early flight risk↗