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At least 667 records · Page 37

Security proof of practical quantum key distribution with detection-efficiency mismatch

Quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols with threshold detectors are driving high-performance QKD demonstrations. The corresponding security proofs usually assume that all physical detectors have the same detection efficiency. However, the efficiencies of the detectors used in practice might show a mismatch depending on the manufacturing and setup of these detectors. A mismatch can also be induced as the different spatial-temporal modes of an incoming signal might couple differently to a detector. Here we develop a method that allows to provide security proofs without the usual assumption. Our method can take the detection-efficiency mismatch into account without having to restrict the attack strategy of the adversary. Especially, we do not rely on any photon-number cutoff of incoming signals such that our security proof is directly applicable to practical situations. We illustrate our method for a receiver that is designed for polarization encoding and is sensitive to a number of spatial-temporal modes. In our detector model, the absence of quantum interference between any pair of spatial-temporal modes is assumed. For a QKD protocol with this detector model, we can perform a security proof with characterized efficiency mismatch and without photon-number cutoff assumption. Our method also shows that in the absence of efficiency mismatch in our detector model, the key rate increases if the loss due to detection inefficiency is assumed to be outside of the adversary's control, as compared to the view where for a security proof this loss is attributed to the action of the adversary.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Development of a security-by-design handbook.

There is an increasing awareness that efficient and effective nuclear facility design is best achieved when requirements from the 3S disciplines Safety, Safeguards, and Security - are balanced and intrinsic to the facility design. This can be achieved when policy, processes, methods, and technologies are understood and applied in these areas during all phases of the design process. For the purposes of this paper, Security-by-design will be defined as the system level incorporation of the physical protection system (PPS) into a new or retrofitted nuclear power plant (NPP) or nuclear facility (NF) resulting in intrinsic security. Security-by-design can also be viewed as a framework to achieve robust and durable security systems. This paper reports on work performed to date to create a Security-by-Design Handbook, under a bilateral agreement between the United States and Japan, specifically, a review of physical protection principles and best practices, and a decommissioning to better understand where these principles and practices can be applied. This paper describes physical protection principles and best practices to achieve security-by- design that were gathered from International, Japanese, and U.S. sources. Principles are included for achieving security early in the design process where security requirements are typically less costly and easier to incorporate. The paper then describes a generic design process that covers the entire facility lifecycle from scoping and planning of the project to decommissioning and decontamination. Early design process phases, such as conceptual design, offer opportunities to add security features intrinsic to the facility design itself. Later phases, including design engineering and construction, are important for properly integrating security features into a coherent design and for planning for and assuring the proper performance of the security system during the operation and decommissioning of the facility. The paper also describes some future activities on this bilateral project to create a Security-by-Design Handbook. When completed, the Handbook is intended to assist countries with less experience in nuclear power programs to apply principles and best practices in an effective and efficient manner as early in the design as possible to achieve robust and durable security.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

FY 2017 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan - Biennial Plan Summary

This year’s summary report updates the Fiscal Year 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan (FY 2016 SSMP), the 25-year strategic program of record that captures the plans developed across numerous NNSA programs and organizations to maintain and modernize the scientific tools, capabilities, and infrastructure necessary to ensure the success of NNSA’s nuclear weapons mission. The SSMP is a companion to the Prevent, Counter, and Respond: A Strategic Plan to Reduce Global Nuclear Threats (FY 2017-2021) report, the planning document for NNSA’s nuclear threat reduction mission. New versions of both reports are published each year in response to new requirements and challenges. Much was accomplished in FY 2015 as part of the program of record described in this year’s SSMP. The science-based Stockpile Stewardship Program allowed the Secretaries of Energy and Defense to certify for the twentieth time that the stockpile remains safe, secure, and effective without the need for underground nuclear explosive testing. The talented scientists, engineers, and technicians at the three national security laboratories, the four nuclear weapons production plants, and the national security site are primarily responsible for this continued success. Research, development, test, and evaluation programs have advanced NNSA’s understanding of weapons physics, component aging, and material properties through first-of-a-kind shock physics experiments, along with numerous other critical experiments conducted throughout the nuclear security enterprise. The multiple life extension programs (LEPs) that are under way made progress toward their first production unit dates. The W76-1 LEP is past the halfway point in total production, and the B61-12 completed three development flight tests. Critical to this success is the budget. The Administration’s budget request for NNSA’s Weapons Activities has increased for all but one of the past seven years, resulting in a total increase of approximately 45 percent since 2010. If adopted by Congress, the FY 2017 budget request will increase funding by $396 million (about 4.5 percent) from the enacted FY 2016 level. A significant portion of the increase would fund the research for multiple life extension programs, support the programs in Directed Stockpile Work, and modernize the physical infrastructure of the nuclear security enterprise.

Source record↗

Communication-efficient certificate revocation management for Advanced Metering Infrastructure and IoT Integration

Advanced Metering Infrastructure forms a communication network for the collection of power data from smart meters in Smart Grid. As the communication between smart meters could be secured utilizing public-key cryptography, however, public-key cryptography still has certain challenges in terms of certificate revocation and management particularly related distribution and storage overhead of revoked certificates. To address this challenge, in this work, we propose a novel revocation management approach by utilizing cryptographic accumulators which reduces the space requirements for revocation information significantly and thus enables efficient distribution of such information to all smart meters. We implemented the proposed approach on both ns-3 network simulator and a testbed. We demonstrated its superior performance with respect to traditional methods for revocation management.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Enhancing Security and Resiliency in Operational Technology Environments Through Network Slicing and Federated Learning

The growing convergence of Information Technology (IT) and Operational Technology (OT) within Industry 4.0 environments has introduced new demands on industrial network infrastructure. As cyber-physical systems become increasingly interconnected, ensuring the secure, timely, and efficient exchange of critical data is essential. This thesis explores how network slicing, a method of creating isolated virtual network segments, can be applied within OT environments to address challenges such as latency, security, and resource allocation. The first research question addressed in this thesis is: How can OT networks take advantage of NFV and SDN technology to become cyber resilient? This study examines the operational, security, and architectural implications of introducing network slicing into traditionally static OT infrastructures such as Industrial Control Systems (ICS) and SCADA. Through simulated deployments and case studies, the research demonstrates how slicing enables better isolation between critical and non-critical services, thereby improving response time, throughput, and security in sensitive environments. The second question considers: How to dynamically implement network slicing and take advantage of network resources towards integrating decentralized machine learning? In response, this thesis proposes a framework that combines Software-Defined Networking (SDN), Network Function Virtualization (NFV), and Federated Learning (FL) to enable real-time analytics while maintaining data locality. The proposed approach reduces the burden on centralized infrastructure and minimizes privacy risks by supporting on-site training of models across distributed OT nodes, coordinated through dynamically allocated network slices. The third focus explores: How slicing helps to increase the resiliency of OT networks through the orchestration of a dynamic DMZ? To answer this, the thesis presents a method for creating and managing Dynamic Demilitarized Zones (DMZs) using network slicing. This enables flexible and automated isolation of sensitive subsystems during threat scenarios or high-risk operations. Coupled with intelligent orchestration and containerized security services, the dynamic DMZ significantly enhances the system's ability to respond to cyber incidents without halting production. Ultimately, this thesis contributes a comprehensive architecture that blends network slicing with machine learning, secure segmentation, and automation, paving the way for resilient, adaptive, and intelligent OT environments. Performance evaluations across multiple scenarios show improvements in system reliability, threat response time, model accuracy, and resource utilization, providing a strong foundation for future industrial automation systems.

Rodiles Delgado, Brian G↗

Los Alamos Shows Airport Security Technology at Work

Los Alamos scientists have advanced a Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) technology that may provide a breakthrough for screening liquids at airport security. They've added low-power X-ray data to the mix, and as a result have unlocked a new detection technology. Funded in part by the Department of Homeland Security's Science and Technology Directorate, the new system is named MagRay. The goal is to quickly and accurately distinguish between liquids that visually appear identical. For example, what appears to be a bottle of white wine could potentially be nitromethane, a liquid that could be used to make an explosive. Both are clear liquids, one would be perfectly safe on a commercial aircraft, the other would be strictly prohibited. How to tell them apart quickly without error at an airport security area is the focus of Michelle Espy, Larry Schultz and their team. In this video, Espy and the MagRay team explain how the new technology works, how they've developed an easy operator interface, and what the next steps might be in transitioning this technology to the private sector.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Charliecloud

Charliecloud is a set of scripts to let users run a virtual cluster of virtual machines (VMs) on a desktop or supercomputer. Key functions include: 1. Creating (typically by installing an operating system from vendor media) and updating VM images; 2. Running a single VM; 3. Running multiple VMs in a virtual cluster. The virtual machines can talk to one another over the network and (in some cases) the outside world. This is accomplished by calling external programs such as QEMU and the Virtual Distributed Ethernet (VDE) suite. The goal is to let users have a virtual cluster containing nodes where they have privileged access, while isolating that privilege within the virtual cluster so it cannot affect the physical compute resources. Host configuration enforces security; this is not included in Charliecloud, though security guidelines are included in its documentation and Charliecloud is designed to facilitate such configuration. Charliecloud manages passing information from host computers into and out of the virtual machines, such as parameters of the virtual cluster, input data specified by the user, output data from virtual compute jobs, VM console display, and network connections (e.g., SSH or X11). Parameters for the virtual cluster (number of VMs, RAM and disk per VM, etc.) are specified by the user or gathered from the environment (e.g., SLURM environment variables). Example job scripts are included. These include computation examples (such as a "hello world" MPI job) as well as performance tests. They also include a security test script to verify that the virtual cluster is appropriately sandboxed. Tests include: 1. Pinging hosts inside and outside the virtual cluster to explore connectivity; 2. Port scans (again inside and outside) to see what services are available; 3. Sniffing tests to see what traffic is visible to running VMs; 4. IP address spoofing to test network functionality in this case; 5. File access tests to make sure host access permissions are enforced. This test script is not a comprehensive scanner and does not test for specific vulnerabilities. Importantly, no information about physical hosts or network topology is included in this script (or any of Charliecloud); while part of a sensible test, such information is specified by the user when the test is run. That is, one cannot learn anything about the LANL network or computing infrastructure by examining Charliecloud code.

Priedhorsky, Reid↗

Charliecloud

Charliecloud is a set of scripts to let users run a virtual cluster of virtual machines (VMs) on a desktop or supercomputer. Key functions include: 1. Creating (typically by installing an operating system from vendor media) and updating VM images; 2. Running a single VM; 3. Running multiple VMs in a virtual cluster. The virtual machines can talk to one another over the network and (in some cases) the outside world. This is accomplished by calling external programs such as QEMU and the Virtual Distributed Ethernet (VDE) suite. The goal is to let users have a virtual cluster containing nodes where they have privileged access, while isolating that privilege within the virtual cluster so it cannot affect the physical compute resources. Host configuration enforces security; this is not included in Charliecloud, though security guidelines are included in its documentation and Charliecloud is designed to facilitate such configuration. Charliecloud manages passing information from host computers into and out of the virtual machines, such as parameters of the virtual cluster, input data specified by the user, output data from virtual compute jobs, VM console display, and network connections (e.g., SSH or X11). Parameters for the virtual cluster (number of VMs, RAM and disk per VM, etc.) are specified by the user or gathered from the environment (e.g., SLURM environment variables). Example job scripts are included. These include computation examples (such as a "hello world" MPI job) as well as performance tests. They also include a security test script to verify that the virtual cluster is appropriately sandboxed. Tests include: 1. Pinging hosts inside and outside the virtual cluster to explore connectivity; 2. Port scans (again inside and outside) to see what services are available; 3. Sniffing tests to see what traffic is visible to running VMs; 4. IP address spoofing to test network functionality in this case; 5. File access tests to make sure host access permissions are enforced. This test script is not a comprehensive scanner and does not test for specific vulnerabilities. Importantly, no information about physical hosts or network topology is included in this script (or any of Charliecloud); while part of a sensible test, such information is specified by the user when the test is run. That is, one cannot learn anything about the LANL network or computing infrastructure by examining Charliecloud code.

Priedhorsky, Reid↗

Nonproliferation, Nuclear Security, and the Insider Threat

Insider threat concept is evolving and getting more attention: (1) Domestically, internationally and in foreign countries, (2) At the government, academia, and industry levels, and (3) Public awareness and concerns are also growing. Negligence can be an insider's action. Technology advancements provide more opportunities, new tools for the insider. Our understanding of the insider is shaped by our cultural, social and ethnic perceptions and traditions. They also can limit our recognition of the issues and response actions.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

5G Securely Energized and Resilient: (5G-SER) (Final Report)

NREL's work on 5G integration with physical power systems (versus simulated systems demonstrated in task 3) under 5G-Securely Energized and Resilient (5G-SER) achieved a major milestone in with the completion of Task 4 activities. After many months (6+) of planning and development along with scaling challenges along the way, a full 5G end-to-end network with physical hardware components (physical inverter, physical power panel, physical battery, etc.) was deployed in a containerized environment. In parallel, a distributed controls architecture for a microgrid powering 5G resources was also successfully modified from its previous instantiation for a simulated environment to work with these physical components. These accomplishments set the stage to use newly setup 5G technology with physical microgrid components to test the feasibility of 5G wireless with physical systems to enable resilient communications between controls and distributed solar and storage resources while exploring ways to configure 5G components to survive power disturbances. The results detailed in the report below show that even utilizing physical components, 5G wireless systems were able to provide resilient results that were similar to the results from the simulated environment Task 3).

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Integrating Safety, Security, and Nuclear Operations for Advanced Reactors

The traditional separation between safety, security, and operations teams has created significant barriers to achieving optimal outcomes. When security considerations are introduced late in the design process, they often conflict with already-established architectural, operational, or engineering parameters. Retrofitting security measures can lead to increased costs, schedule delays, and compromises in security effectiveness. For instance, the need to retrofit physical barriers or surveillance systems often results in trade-offs that could have been avoided with earlier input from security professionals. Delayed integration can also affect regulatory processes and result in licensing delays. Security reviews conducted at later stages frequently identify gaps that necessitate significant redesign efforts, impacting not only scope, schedule, and budget, but also adding risk and lowering stakeholder confidence in the project. This paper aims to address these challenges by identifying practical opportunities for integrating security considerations seamlessly with design and operations teams throughout the entire lifecycle of nuclear facilities—from conceptual design to commissioning and beyond. The research emphasizes the value of early and continuous collaboration among stakeholders to ensure that security measures are robust, operationally effective, and cost-efficient. By examining case studies, analyzing past incidents, and leveraging best practices from other high-security industries, this study highlights actionable strategies for bridging the gap between safety, security, and operations teams.

Zineddin, Dr. Z. [ORNL] (ORCID:0009000848740725)↗

Geologic Assessment of the Damage Zone from the Second Test at Source Physics Experiment-Nevada (SPE-N)

The National Center for Nuclear Security (NCNS), established by the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, is conducting a series of explosive tests at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS; formerly the Nevada Test Site) that are designed to increase the understanding of certain basic physical phenomena associated with underground explosions. These tests will aid in developing technologies that might be used to detect underground nuclear explosions in support of verification activities for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). The initial NCNS project is a series of explosive tests, known collectively as the Source Physics Experiment at the NNSS (SPE-N), being conducted in granitic rocks at the Climax stock in northern Yucca Flat. The SPE-N test series is designed to study the generation and propagation of seismic waves. The data will be used to improve the predictive capability of calculational models for detecting and characterizing underground explosions. The first SPE-N test (SPE-N-1) was a “calibration” shot conducted in May 2011, using 100 kilograms (kg) of explosives at the depth of 54.9 meters (m) (180 feet [ft]) in the U-15n source hole. SPE-N-2 was conducted in October 2011, using 1,000 kg of explosives at the depth of 45.7 m (150 ft) in the same source hole. Following the SPE-N-2 test, the core hole U-15n#10 was drilled at an angle from the surface to intercept the SPE-N-2 shot point location to obtain information necessary to characterize the damage zone. The desire was to determine the position of the damage zone near the shot point, at least on the northeast side, where the core hole penetrated it. The three-dimensional shape and symmetry of the damage zone are unknown at this time. Rather than spherical in shape, the dimensions of the damage zone could be influenced by the natural fracture sets in the vicinity. Geologic characterization of the borehole included geophysical logging, a directional survey, and geologic description of the core to document visual evidence of damage. Selected core samples were provided to Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) for laboratory tests (to be reported by SNL). A significant natural fault zone was encountered in the U-15n#10 angle core hole between the drilled depths of 149 and 155 ft (straight-line distance or range station [RS] from the shot point of 7.5 to 5.7 m). However, several of the fractures observed in the U-15n#10 hole are interpreted as having been caused by the explosion. These fractures are characterized by a “fresh,” mechanically broken look, with uncoated and very irregular surfaces. They tend to terminate against natural fractures and have orientations that differ from the previously defined natural fracture sets. The most distant fracture from the shot point that could be interpreted as having been caused by the explosion was seen at approximately RS 10.0 m. No other possibly explosion-induced fractures are apparent above the fault, but are common starting at RS 5.4 m, which is below the fault. It is unknown how the fault zone might have affected the propagation of seismic waves or how the materials in the fault zone (altered granite, breccia, gouge) were affected by the explosion. From RS 3.3 m to the end of the recovered core at RS 1.6 m, some of the core samples are softer and lighter in color, but do not appear to be weathered. It is thought this could be indicative of the presence of distributed microfracturing.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

NNSA Administrator Addresses the Next Generation of Nuclear Security Professionals: Part 1

Administrator Thomas DAgostino of the National Nuclear Security Administration addressed the next generation of nuclear security professionals during the opening session of todays 2009 Department of Energy (DOE) Computational Science Graduate Fellowship Annual Conference. Administrator DAgostino discussed NNSAs role in implementing President Obamas nuclear security agenda and encouraged the computing science fellows to consider careers in nuclear security.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Nanomagnet-Based Physically Unclonable Functions

Physically unclonable functions are physical entities or devices that generate unique, unpredictable responses to inputs. They are important in many security applications, including encryption, authentication, anti-counterfeiting, etc. Physical unclonable functions are based on the unavoidable randomness in the manufacturing processes and are impossible to duplicate, even by the original manufacturer. In this project, we studied the feasibility of using hardened SmCo nanomagnets as the physical implementation of physically unclonable functions. Hardened SmCo nano-magnets were fabricated through a lift-off process as well as an etch-back process. The magnetization of these nano-magnets was mapped out as a function of shapes, dimensions, and processing conditions, using magnetic force microscopy. A systematic, uncontrolled bias in the polarity was identified. Attempts to mitigate this bias were made but were unsuccessful. Nevertheless, we found in the process that blanket SmCo films themselves may serve as the desired physically unclonable functions.

77 NANOSCIENCE AND NANOTECHNOLOGY↗

A physical unclonable neutron sensor for nuclear arms control inspections

Abstract Classical sensor security relies on cryptographic algorithms executed on trusted hardware. This approach has significant shortcomings, however. Hardware can be manipulated, including below transistor level, and cryptographic keys are at risk of extraction attacks. A further weakness is that sensor media themselves are assumed to be trusted, and any authentication and encryption is done ex situ and a posteriori. Here we propose and demonstrate a different approach to sensor security that does not rely on classical cryptography and trusted electronics. We designed passive sensor media that inherently produce secure and trustworthy data, and whose honest and non-malicious nature can be easily established. As a proof-of-concept, we manufactured and characterized the properties of non-electronic, physical unclonable, optically complex media sensitive to neutrons for use in a high-security scenario: the inspection of a military facility to confirm the absence or presence of nuclear weapons and fissile materials.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Cyber security using multi-threaded architecture data diode at the NBSR - 114

Ongoing upgrades for the control room of the National Bureau of Standards Reactor (NBSR) located at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) require the ability to collect sensor data from the secured reactor network and transfer to the outside network for trend analysis, while maintaining the security of the reactor network. To accomplish this, a data diode was created to provide a physical barrier that prevents any outside data from reaching the secured reactor network. The hardware of the data diode consists of two embedded computers, running Unix based operating systems, connected by three DB-9 serial cables. The serial cables have been modified so that only two wires, a ground and a transmission line, provide connection between the computers. The data diode relies on a multi-threaded architecture to collect and simultaneously transfer data over three serial connections. A software program, implemented in Java, has been written to request data from the digital recorders installed to monitor the NBSR process instrumentation and transfer that data across the serial connections. The data diode can collect over 1200 data points from multiple digital recorders each second. The collected data can then be stored in a relational database for later analysis. The source codes for the software are available open source on GitHub. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Investigating the Effectiveness of P/S Amplitude Ratios for Local Distance Event Discrimination

The ability to discriminate between underground explosions and earthquakes is an important operation for global security and test-ban-treaty monitoring, and seismology plays a key role in this endeavor. The use of seismic P- to S-wave amplitude ratios has been demonstrated to be an effective discriminant at regional distances for a variety of emplacement conditions and test sites around the world. Increasing interest in detecting and discriminating smaller events, both for purposes of nuclear monitoring and seismic hazard estimation, requires the use of data with shorter event-to-station paths. At these local distances (≤ 200 km), the use of P/S ratios for event discrimination is poorly studied compared with regional distances (200-1500 km). The path averaging that allows for relatively simple corrections to P/S ratios to remove bias from along-path structural differences at regional distances may be insufficient to remove enough scatter from the ratios to allow for accurate event identification at local distances. We use data from a series of chemical explosions detonated as part of the Source Physics Experiment at the Nevada National Security Site in southern Nevada and surrounding seismicity to investigate the discrimination performance of P/S ratios at local distances. We find that discrimination at individual stations is highly variable, regardless of frequency. Network averaging of ratios improves discrimination performance above 6 Hz, as a result of the reduction of scatter among the earthquake ratios. Furthermore, azimuthal and distance–limited averaging suggests that explosion ratios are affected by a complicated source and path relationship that may lead to substantial variability in local P/S ratios at different locations.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗