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Accelerating Nuclear Fuels and Materials Qualification by Multi-Level Irradiation Experiment Campaign

The advanced reactor technologies feature fuels, coolants, and materials that promise safer operating conditions under normal and accident scenarios. However, the nuclear fuels and materials qualifications require several decades (for example, new reactor fuel qualification from conceptualization requires about 20 years). Therefore, accelerating nuclear fuels and materials qualification is essential, and it can be achieved by combining high through-put materials irradiation and testing, advanced post-irradiation examinations, and Multiphysics modeling. This paper addressed the associated challenges in accelerating nuclear fuels and material qualification for new and advanced reactor designs, which differ based on fuel, coolant, operating conditions, and structural materials. These challenges vary for radiation level, operating conditions (e.g., temperature and pressure), and coolant type (e.g., corrosion environment). In addition, the challenges and limitations in modeling tools, experimental facilities, and licensing guidelines are also discussed, and a general solution path forward is recommended.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Cutting-Edge Operations Concepts: Intelligent Infrastructure, Cooperative Driving, Signal Control, and Curbside Management

The objective of this breakout session at the NREL Mobility workshop was to examine emerging traffic operations concepts built on key detection technology such as radars, lidars, and imaging recognition - and identify challenges and paths forward to integrate into our current roadway system. The key objective were to identify the opportunities for intelligent infrastructure to support near-term safety, equity, energy, and congestion mitigation goals, while supporting longer term connected-automated vehicle objectives. In the plenary session, Eric Raamot, from the USDOT Highly Automated Safety Systems Office challenged the participants to think broadly about the roll of standards and reference architecture to provide both an accelerated rollout of intelligent infrastructure, but also a repeatable and supportable framework upon which many infrastructure owners and operators (IOOs) could utilize for their implementation purposes.

ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗

Presentation: Accelerating Nuclear Fuels and Materials Qualification by Multi-Level Irradiation Experiment Campaign

The advanced reactor technologies feature fuels, coolants, and materials that promise safer operating conditions under normal and accident scenarios. However, the nuclear fuels and materials qualifications require several decades (for example, new reactor fuel qualification from conceptualization requires about 20 years). Therefore, accelerating nuclear fuels and materials qualification is essential, and it can be achieved by combining high through-put materials irradiation and testing, advanced post-irradiation examinations, and Multiphysics modeling. This paper addressed the associated challenges in accelerating nuclear fuels and material qualification for new and advanced reactor designs, which differ based on fuel, coolant, operating conditions, and structural materials. These challenges vary for radiation level, operating conditions (e.g., temperature and pressure), and coolant type (e.g., corrosion environment). In addition, the challenges and limitations in modeling tools, experimental facilities, and licensing guidelines are also discussed, and a general solution path forward is recommended.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

UMERC Materials and Manufacturing Workshop

On October 4, 2023, DOE's Water Power Technology Office (WPTO) hosted a half-day workshop as part of the annual UMERC conference. The workshop brought together universities, industry, DOE offices, and national labs sharing their work, outcomes, capabilities, and critical gaps around materials and manufacturing (M&M) in the marine energy industry. There were breakout sessions for groups to make connections and explore paths forward to advance marine energy. The stated objectives included the following: 1) identify developers and universities highest priority M&M needs to reduce cost and improve performance to inform future DOE funding priorities; 2) raising awareness across the industry, around universities' M&M capabilities and key M&M projects, around developers' M&M needs, around national labs' M&M projects, capabilities, and opportunities to support research and deployment, and around TEAMER, IEC TC114, and other DOE offices that can support M&M research through resources and financial assistance.

manufacturing↗

The new MCNP6 depletion capability

The first MCNP based in-line Monte Carlo depletion capability was officially released from the Radiation Safety Information and Computational Center as MCNPX 2.6.0. Both the MCNP5 and MCNPX codes have historically provided a successful combinatorial geometry based, continuous energy, Monte Carlo radiation transport solution for advanced reactor modeling and simulation. However, due to separate development pathways, useful simulation capabilities were dispersed between both codes and not unified in a single technology. MCNP6, the next evolution in the MCNP suite of codes, now combines the capability of both simulation tools, as well as providing new advanced technology, in a single radiation transport code. We describe here the new capabilities of the MCNP6 depletion code dating from the official RSICC release MCNPX 2.6.0, reported previously, to the now current state of MCNP6. NEA/OECD benchmark results are also reported. The MCNP6 depletion capability enhancements beyond MCNPX 2.6.0 reported here include: (1) new performance enhancing parallel architecture that implements both shared and distributed memory constructs; (2) enhanced memory management that maximizes calculation fidelity; and (3) improved burnup physics for better nuclide prediction. MCNP6 depletion enables complete, relatively easy-to-use depletion calculations in a single Monte Carlo code. The enhancements described here help provide a powerful capability as well as dictate a path forward for future development to improve the usefulness of the technology. (authors)

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Development of an Integrated Waste Plan for Chalk River Laboratories - 13376

To further its Strategic Planning, the Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) required an effective approach to developing a fully integrated waste plan for its Chalk River Laboratories (CRL) site. Production of the first Integrated Waste Plan (IWP) for Chalk River was a substantial task involving representatives from each of the major internal stakeholders. Since then, a second revision has been produced and a third is underway. The IWP remains an Interim IWP until all gaps have been resolved and all pathways are at an acceptable level of detail. Full completion will involve a number of iterations, typically annually for up to six years. The end result of completing this process is a comprehensive document and supporting information that includes: - An Integrated Waste Plan document summarizing the entire waste management picture in one place; - Details of all the wastes required to be managed, including volume and timings by waste stream; - Detailed waste stream pathway maps for the whole life-cycle for each waste stream to be managed from pre-generation planning through to final disposition; and - Critical decision points, i.e. decisions that need to be made and timings by when they need to be made. A waste inventory has been constructed that serves as the master reference inventory of all waste that has been or is committed to be managed at CRL. In the past, only the waste that is in storage has been effectively captured, and future predictions of wastes requiring to be managed were not available in one place. The IWP has also provided a detailed baseline plan at the current level of refinement. Waste flow maps for all identified waste streams, for the full waste life cycle complete to disposition have been constructed. The maps identify areas requiring further development, and show the complexities and inter-relationships between waste streams. Knowledge of these inter-dependencies is necessary in order to perform effective options studies for enabling facilities that may be necessary for multiple related waste streams. The next step is to engage external stakeholders in the optioneering work required to provide enhanced confidence that the path forward identified within future iterations of the IWP will be acceptable to all. (authors)

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Continuous Improvement and the Safety Case for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Geologic Repository - 13467

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) is a geologic repository 2150 feet (650 m) below the surface of the Chihuahuan desert near Carlsbad, New Mexico. WIPP permanently disposes of transuranic waste from national defense programs. Every five years, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) submits an application to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to request regulatory-compliance re-certification of the facility for another five years. Every ten years, DOE submits an application to the New Mexico Environment Department (NMED) for the renewal of its hazardous waste disposal permit. The content of the applications made by DOE to the EPA for re-certification, and to the NMED for permit-renewal, reflect any optimization changes made to the facility, with regulatory concurrence if warranted by the nature of the change. DOE points to such changes as evidence for its having taken seriously its 'continuous improvement' operations and management philosophy. Another opportunity for continuous improvement is to look at any delta that may exist between the re-certification and re-permitting cases for system safety and the consensus advice on the nature and content of a safety case as being developed and published by the Nuclear Energy Agency's Integration Group for the Safety Case (IGSC) expert group. DOE at WIPP, with the aid of its Science Advisor and teammate, Sandia National Laboratories, is in the process of discerning what can be done, in a reasonably paced and cost-conscious manner, to continually improve the case for repository safety that is being made to the two primary regulators on a recurring basis. This paper will discuss some aspects of that delta and potential paths forward to addressing them. (authors)

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Design Improvements and Analysis of Innovative High-Level Waste Pipeline Unplugging Technologies - 12171

Transferring high-level waste (HLW) between storage tanks or to treatment facilities is a common practice performed at the Department of Energy (DoE) sites. Changes in the chemical and/or physical properties of the HLW slurry during the transfer process may lead to the formation of blockages inside the pipelines resulting in schedule delays and increased costs. To improve DoE's capabilities in the event of a pipeline plugging incident, FIU has continued to develop two novel unplugging technologies: an asynchronous pulsing system and a peristaltic crawler. The asynchronous pulsing system uses a hydraulic pulse generator to create pressure disturbances at two opposite inlet locations of the pipeline to dislodge blockages by attacking the plug from both sides remotely. The peristaltic crawler is a pneumatic/hydraulic operated crawler that propels itself by a sequence of pressurization/depressurization of cavities (inner tubes). The crawler includes a frontal attachment that has a hydraulically powered unplugging tool. In this paper, details of the asynchronous pulsing system's ability to unplug a pipeline on a small-scale test-bed and results from the experimental testing of the second generation peristaltic crawler are provided. The paper concludes with future improvements for the third generation crawler and a recommended path forward for the asynchronous pulsing testing. (authors)

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Safety Enhancements for TRU Waste Handling - 12258

For years, proper Health Physics practices and 'As Low As Reasonably Achievable' (ALARA) principles have fostered the use of glove boxes or other methods of handling (without direct contact) high activities of radioactive material. The physical limitations of using glove boxes on certain containers have resulted in high-activity wastes being held in storage awaiting a path forward. Highly contaminated glove boxes and other remote handling equipment no longer in use have also been added to the growing list of items held for storage with no efficient method of preparation for proper disposal without creating exposure risks to personnel. This is especially true for wastes containing alpha-emitting radionuclides such as Plutonium and Americium that pose significant health risks to personnel if these Transuranic (TRU) wastes are not controlled effectively. Like any good safety program or root cause investigation PFNW has found that the identification of the cause of a negative change, if stopped, can result in a near miss and lessons learned. If this is done in the world of safety, it is considered a success story and is to be shared with others to protect the workers. PFNW believes that the tools, equipment and resources have improved over the past number of years but that the use of them has not progressed at the same rate. If we use our tools to timely identify the effect on the work environment and immediately following or possibly even simultaneously identify the cause or some of the causal factors, we may have the ability to continue to work rather than succumb to the start and stop-work mentality trap that is not beneficial in waste minimization, production efficiency or ALARA. (authors)

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Managing Waste Inventory and License Limits at the Perma-Fix Northwest Facility to Meet CH2M Hill Plateau Remediation Company (CHPRC) American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) Deliverables - 12335

CH2M Hill Plateau Remediation Company (CHRPC) is a prime contractor to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) focused on the largest ongoing environmental remediation project in the world at the DOE Hanford Site Central Plateau, i.e. the DOE Hanford Plateau Remediation Contract. The East Tennessee Materials and Energy Corporation (M and EC); a wholly owned subsidiary of Perma-Fix Environmental Services, Inc. (PESI), is a small business team member to CHPRC. Our scope includes project management; operation and maintenance of on-site storage, repackaging, treatment, and disposal facilities; and on-site waste management including waste receipt from generators and delivery to on-site and off-site treatment, storage, and disposal facilities. As part of this scope, M and EC staffs the centralized Waste Support Services organization responsible for all waste characterization and acceptance required to support CHPRC and waste generators across the Hanford Site. At the time of the CHPRC contract award (August 2008) slightly more than 9,000 cubic meters (m{sup 3}) of legacy waste was defined as 'no-path-forward waste'. A significant portion of this waste (7,650 m{sup 3}) comprised wastes with up to 50 grams of special nuclear materials (SNM) in oversized packages recovered during retrieval operations and large glove boxes removed from the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP). Through a collaborative effort between the DOE, CHPRC, and Perma-Fix Environmental Services, Inc. (PESI), pathways for these problematic wastes were developed that took advantage of commercial treatment capabilities at a nearby vendor facility, Perma-Fix Northwest (PFNW). In the spring of 2009, CHPRC initiated a pilot program under which they began shipping large package, low gram suspect TRU (<15 g SNM per container), and large package contact and remote handled MLLW to the off-site PFNW facility for treatment. PFNW is restricted by the SNM limits set for the total quantity of SNM allowed at the facility in accordance with the facility's radioactive materials license(s) (RML). While both CHPRC and PFNW maintain waste databases to track all waste movements, it became evident early in the process that a tool was needed that married the two systems to better track SNM inventories and sequence waste from the point of generation, through the PFNW facility, and back to the Hanford site for final disposition. This tool, known as the Treatment Integration and Planning Tool (TIPT), has become a robust planning tool that provides real-time data to support compliant and efficient waste generation, transportation, treatment, and disposition. TIPT is developing into the next generation tool that will change the way in which legacy wastes, retrieval wastes and decontamination and decommissioning operations are conducted on the Plateau Remediation Contract (PRC). The real value of the TIPT is its predictive capability. It allows the W and FMP to map out optimal windows for processing waste through the PFNW facility, or through any process that is in some way resource limited. It allows project managers to identify and focus on problem areas before shipments are affected. It has been modified for use in broader applications to predict turnaround times and identify windows of opportunity for processing higher gram wastes through PFNW and to allow waste generators, site-wide, to accurately predict scope, cost, and schedule for waste generation to optimize processing and eliminate storage, double handling, and related costs and unnecessary safety risks. The TIPT addresses the years old problem of how to effectively predict not only what needs to be done, but when. 'When' is the key planning parameter that has been ignored by the generator and processor for many years, but has proven to be the most important parameter for both parties. While further refinement is a natural part of any development process, the current improvements on the TIPT have shown that prediction is a powerful consideration. Even in lean times expected for the foreseeable future, the improved TIPT continues to play a central role in managing our way through those times to assure facilities remain viable and available. It is recommended that other major remediation projects and waste processing facilities incorporate a tool such as TIPT to improve customer-commercial supplier communications and better optimization of resources. (authors)

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A Practical Approach to a Closed Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Sustained Nuclear Energy - 12383

Recent systems analysis studies at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) have shown that sufficient information is available from previous research and development (R and D), industrial experience, and current studies to make rational decisions on a practical approach to a closed nuclear fuel cycle in the United States. These studies show that a near-term decision is needed to recycle used nuclear fuel (UNF) in the United States, to encourage public recognition that a practical solution to disposal of nuclear energy wastes, primarily UNF, is achievable, and to ensure a focus on essential near-term actions and future R and D. Recognition of the importance of time factors is essential, including the multi-decade time period required to implement industrial-scale fuel recycle at the capacity needed, and the effects of radioactive decay on proliferation resistance, recycling complexity, radioactive emissions, and high-level-waste storage, disposal form development, and eventual emplacement in a geologic repository. Analysis of time factors led to identification of the benefits of processing older fuel and an 'optimum decay storage time'. Further benefits of focused R and D can ensure more complete recycling of UNF components and minimize wastes requiring disposal. Analysis of recycling costs and nonproliferation requirements, which are often cited as reasons for delaying a decision to recycle, shows that (1) the differences in costs of nuclear energy with open or closed fuel cycles are insignificant and (2) nonproliferation requirements can be met by a combination of 'safeguards-by-design' co-location of back-end fuel cycle facilities, and applied engineered safeguards and monitoring. The study shows why different methods of separating and recycling used fuel components do not have a significant effect on nonproliferation requirements and can be selected on other bases, such as process efficiency, maturity, and cost-effectiveness. Finally, the study concludes that continued storage of UNF without a decision to recycle is not a solution to the problem of nuclear waste disposal, but can be a deterrent to public confidence in nuclear energy. In summary, our studies have shown, in contrast to findings of the more prominent studies, that today we do have sufficient knowledge to make informed choices for the values and essential methods of UNF recycling, based on previous research, industrial experience, and current analyses. We have shown the significant importance of time factors, including the benefits of an optimum decay storage time on deploying effective nonproliferation safeguards, enabling reduced recycling complexity and environmental emissions, and optimizing waste management and disposal. Together with the multi-decade time required to implement industrial-scale UNF recycle at the capacity needed to match generation rate, our conclusion is that a near-term decision to recycle as many UNF components as possible is vitally needed. Further indecision and procrastination can lead to a loss of public confidence and favorable perception of nuclear energy. With no near-term decision, the path forward for UNF disposal will remain uncertain, with many diverse technologies being considered and no possible focus on a practical solution to the problem. However, a near-term decision to recycle UNF fuel and to take advantage of processing UNF and surface storing HLW, together with development and incorporation of more-complete recycling of UNF components, can provide the focus needed for a practical solution to the problem of nuclear waste disposal. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

A Journey From Sandia To Los Alamos - 12465

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) relies on laboratory experiments and computer-based models to verify the reliability of the nation's nuclear stockpile. Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico (SNL/NM) tests various materials in extreme environments designed to mimic those of nuclear explosions using the Z machine. The Z machine is a key tool in the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) stockpile stewardship mission and is used to study the dynamic properties of nuclear weapon materials. In 2006, SNL/NM and Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) defining experiments to be conducted in the Z machine involving plutonium (Pu) provided by LANL. Five Pu experiments have been completed with as many as 20 more planned through 2016. The experimental containment vessel used for the experiment and containing the Pu residues, becomes transuranic (TRU) waste after the experiment and termination of safeguards and is considered a LANL waste stream. Each containment vessel is placed in a 55-gallon Type A drum or standard waste box (SWB) for shipment back to LANL for final certification and eventual disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). The experimental containment vessels are greater than 99% metallic materials (ferrous and non-ferrous metals). In addition to the Pu targets, detonators with high explosives (HE) are used in the experiments to isolate the containment vessel from the Z machine as energy is delivered to the Pu samples. The characterization requirements, transportation issues, required documentation, and the approvals needed before shipments were challenging and required close coordination between SNL/NM, Sandia Site Office, LANL, Los Alamos Site Office, Washington TRU Solutions, Inc., the Central Characterization Project, and the Carlsbad Field Office. Between 2006 and 2010, representatives from SNL/NM and LANL worked to develop an approved path forward to meet the requirements of all stakeholders. This project clearly demonstrates successful cooperation between LANL and SNL/NM, and support from the LASO, SSO, CBFO, WTS, and CCP. Key elements were communication and documented plans with responsible parties and due dates. Now that the first successful shipment has been accomplished, it is believed that future shipments will become a more routine activity. (authors)

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Mercury Reduction and Removal from High Level Waste at the Defense Waste Processing Facility - 12511

The Defense Waste Processing Facility processes legacy nuclear waste generated at the Savannah River Site during production of enriched uranium and plutonium required by the Cold War. The nuclear waste is first treated via a complex sequence of controlled chemical reactions and then vitrified into a borosilicate glass form and poured into stainless steel canisters. Converting the nuclear waste into borosilicate glass is a safe, effective way to reduce the volume of the waste and stabilize the radionuclides. One of the constituents in the nuclear waste is mercury, which is present because it served as a catalyst in the dissolution of uranium-aluminum alloy fuel rods. At high temperatures mercury is corrosive to off-gas equipment, this poses a major challenge to the overall vitrification process in separating mercury from the waste stream prior to feeding the high temperature melter. Mercury is currently removed during the chemical process via formic acid reduction followed by steam stripping, which allows elemental mercury to be evaporated with the water vapor generated during boiling. The vapors are then condensed and sent to a hold tank where mercury coalesces and is recovered in the tank's sump via gravity settling. Next, mercury is transferred from the tank sump to a purification cell where it is washed with water and nitric acid and removed from the facility. Throughout the chemical processing cell, compounds of mercury exist in the sludge, condensate, and off-gas; all of which present unique challenges. Mercury removal from sludge waste being fed to the DWPF melter is required to avoid exhausting it to the environment or any negative impacts to the Melter Off-Gas system. The mercury concentration must be reduced to a level of 0.8 wt% or less before being introduced to the melter. Even though this is being successfully accomplished, the material balances accounting for incoming and collected mercury are not equal. In addition, mercury has not been effectively purified and collected in the Mercury Purification Cell (MPC) since 2008. A significant cleaning campaign aims to bring the MPC back up to facility housekeeping standards. Two significant investigations are being undertaken to restore mercury collection. The SMECT mercury pump has been removed from the tank and will be functionally tested. Also, research is being conducted by the Savannah River National Laboratory to determine the effects of antifoam addition on the behavior of mercury. These path forward items will help us better understand what is occurring in the mercury collection system and ultimately lead to an improved DWPF production rate and mercury recovery rate. (authors)

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The Effect of Kr-85 Decay to Rb-85 on Waste Forms - 17105

Krypton-85 (Kr-85) is a volatile radionuclide released during the reprocessing of used nuclear fuel (UNF). Prior to discharge of process off-gas streams to the environment, removal of Kr-85 is required to meet emission regulations. Once removed from the off-gas streams, Kr (containing stable Kr in addition to Kr-85) must be placed in storage until the Kr-85 has decayed to levels such that its potential release would meet regulatory guidelines. The current method of storage is high-pressure metal canisters. Historically, concerns have been expressed that the decay product of Kr-85, Rubidium-85 (Rb-85), could cause corrosion and weakening in the canisters that would ultimately lead to premature failure and release of Kr-85. Alternate methods and materials, such as matrix isolation in a vapor deposited metal and immobilization in zeolites, have been investigated as storage approaches for Kr. However, even these storage methods may become compromised due to the chemical effects of Rb-85 arising from the decay of Kr-85. A review was conducted of the available literature to examine topics relevant to the effects of Rb on the long-term storage of Kr-85, examine the source terms in the context of this concern, and suggest a path forward to resolve outstanding knowledge gaps. In the course of this analysis, several knowledge gaps were identified. Examples include: o The use of solid sorbents to potentially permit more Kr-85-bearing gas to be loaded into canisters, either at the pressures used in the current method or at significantly lower pressures. o A cost-to-benefit analysis is needed to ascertain the practicality of manufacturing waste forms for Kr-85 storage with solid sorbents. o The effects of radiation and chemical transmutation in solid sorbents or matrices for this application are virtually unknown. o Fundamental data are needed on corrosion rates and mechanisms as functions of Rb concentration, storage temperature, etc., for various storage approaches (e.g., as compressed gas or encapsulated in a getter material) and storage container materials. The present analysis focused on the available information regarding storage of Kr-85 in high-pressure containers. It was judged unlikely that such containers would be compromised by corrosion from the Rb decay product, especially if the Kr recovery operations result in a gas composition with very low oxygen content. However, this conclusion should be revisited based on preliminary data gathered from analysis of legacy Kr waste forms. These legacy waste forms are a result of experiments conducted at Idaho National Laboratory over 30 y ago and have been stored for more than three Kr-85 half-lives. Evaluation of these forms indicates significant corrosion, the cause of which has not been conclusively determined. (authors)

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Update on Development of a U.S. Rail Transport Capability for Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Waste - 17138

The U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE) is laying the groundwork for implementing an integrated nuclear waste management system. This includes preparing for future large-scale transport of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level radioactive waste (HLW) since transport will be a necessary component of an integrated waste management system. This paper provides an overview of the progress to date, and discussion of the path forward, for the current DOE-NE effort related to designing and fabricating prototype rail-cars for rail transport of SNF from commercial nuclear power reactor sites when a receiving site becomes operational. (authors)

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Peer Review Lessons Learned - DOE and Regulator Perspectives - 17140

The DOE NNSA Nevada Field Office (NFO) Underground Test Area (UGTA) Activity requires an external peer review to complete an extensive stage of site characterization and groundwater flow and contaminant transport model(s) development. The external peer review evaluates whether assumptions, methods, and conclusions derived from model(s) outputs are based on sound scientific principles and examines the scientific appropriateness of the model(s) outputs for informing the regulatory decision. The regulatory decision which is made by the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) is whether the model is acceptable to advance to the next UGTA strategy stage. Depending on the specific corrective action unit, the next stage is a Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan or Closure Stage. Three external peer reviews have taken place to date for the UGTA Activity. The first one resulted in a second phase of characterization and model development. The second external peer review resulted in advancement to the next UGTA strategy stage. While advancement to the next strategy stage was recommended by the third external peer review, a series of supplemental data collection and analyses and model simulation activities to address external peer review comments, including drilling three new wells and sampling multiple wells, occurred before moving into the next UGTA strategy stage. Twelve participants representing different aspects of the peer reviews (NDEP, NNSA/NFO, science advisors, presenters, and external peer reviewers) were interviewed to generate a combined lessons learned. Questions were asked regarding their experience with the process including panel selection, focused questions, presentations, interactions between UGTA Activity participants and reviewers, and results. The interview results were combined with the outcome of a published lessons learned report developed following the first external peer review. In general, those interviewed believed that all three external peer reviews were satisfactory and met the goals of the FFACO process. The following seven lessons learned were identified: (1) Ensure the panel is not biased and has a balance of technical and regulatory background; (2) Clearly state the review objective(s) at the start of the review; (3) Ask focused questions that support the peer review objective(s) but that do not ask the specific regulatory question; (4) Establish a peer review panel earlier in the strategy process; (5) Establish one point of contact for the entire review and conduct periodic meetings with the peer review panel to ensure focus remains on the review objective(s) and to ensure that pertinent information is provided; (6) Ensure that presentations are well coordinated, anomalous data or analysis results are addressed, and are focused on supporting the peer review objective(s); and (7) Carefully consider the panel's recommendations prior to embarking on a particular path forward. (authors)

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Stakeholder Involvement in the Revegetation of the 92-Acre Area - 17152

The U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) works closely with stakeholders that have an interest in the revegetation of a closed landfill on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Located at the Radioactive Waste Management Complex on the NNSS, the 92-Acre Area was operational from 1961 to 2010. In 2009, the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) and NNSA/NFO agreed on a closure path consisting of a vegetative cover. Closure activities were initially completed in 2012. Although revegetation was initially promising, subsequent monitoring revealed that a viable plant community had not been established. Subsequently, sections of the site were chosen as test plot locations to determine the best path forward. Despite various seeding methods, mulching techniques, and irrigation frequencies, the test plots failed to produce viable plant communities in 2013 and 2014. NNSA/NFO had been in communication with one stakeholder, NDEP, during the revegetation process. NDEP agreed that after three failed revegetation attempts, a change in strategy was necessary. The Consolidated Group of Tribes and Organizations (CGTO), a coalition of tribal members representing seventeen culturally affiliated tribes and one organization, agreed to provide guidance using traditional ecological knowledge for re-vegetating the 92-Acre Area. A Tribal Revegetation Committee (TRC) was formed and tasked with developing guidance from a unique tribal perspective. After visiting the 92-Acre Area and receiving background information, the TRC held several meetings and deliberated on how to address the revegetation challenges. The TRC submitted recommendations to NNSA/NFO identifying approaches that incorporate tribal perspectives in re-vegetating the site. The Nevada Site-Specific Advisory Board (NSSAB), which is made up of community members who represent Nevada stakeholders, was also asked for input regarding the 92-Acre Area. After a public meeting in May 2016, the NSSAB submitted recommendations, which included a suggestion to consider input from the CGTO. (authors)

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A Practical Application of Integrated Systems Engineering and Project Management on a Complex EPC Project - 17207

This paper introduces how an integrated set of Systems Engineering (SE) and Project Management (PM) processes were applied in a practical way, to address the challenges on a complex, highly technical, Engineering Procurement Construction project within the nuclear field. This approach was inspired by: - the principles contained in a Community of Practice on Lean in Program Management jointly established in May 2012 by MIT, PMI and INCOSE; - an opportunity to apply international standard ISO/IEC 15288:2008(E) Systems and software engineering - System life cycle processes on a real-life situation; - and the belief that there is great value in applying Systems Engineering and Project Management in an integrated manner on a project. The project offering this opportunity was the Detail Engineering, Procurement, Construction and Cold Commissioning (EPC) of the Silo Direct-encapsulation Plant (SDP). This project was undertaken by the Joint Venture (JV) formed by Areva, Mace and Atkins (a.m.a. Nuclear Ltd). Unfortunately, early termination of the project, at a stage when only a part of the processes and tools were being implemented, did not allow this integrated approach to be demonstrated in full. However, the benefits achieved in the early stages in aligning and forming an integrated project execution team, showed potential for great benefits. This paper covers an introductory analysis of the situation, the successes and benefits achieved from implementing an integrated SE - PM approach up to the stage when the project was terminated, and possible path forward had the project continued. (authors)

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