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All sources NASA NTRS DOE OSTI

DOE OSTI2023

FAST-1.2 User Installation and Verification Guide: Developed Under NQA-1-2017

The purpose of this document is to provide the user information about the installation of Fuel Analysis for Steady state and Transient (FAST)-1.2 on their computers or servers. General information about the code and supported operating systems is described in Section 1.0. Self-service oriented FAST-1.2 software licensing steps are described in Section 2.0. An installation verification test suite is provided with FAST-1.2 and described in Section 3.0. A convenience script for converting Fuel Rod Analysis Program – Constant (FRAPCON) to FAST inputs is discussed in Section 4.0. FAST-1.2 was developed and released under a software quality assurance program based upon NQA-1-2017 at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL). FAST-1.2 is the latest baseline code. The installation verification test suite contains both steady state and transient Anticipated Operation Occurrences (AOOs), accident conditions, such as Reactivity Initiated Accidents (RIAs) and Loss of Coolant Accidents (LOCAs).

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

NASA NTRS2009

Interface Generation and Compositional Verification in JavaPathfinder

We present a novel algorithm for interface generation of software components. Given a component, our algorithm uses learning techniques to compute a permissive interface representing legal usage of the component. Unlike our previous work, this algorithm does not require knowledge about the component s environment. Furthermore, in contrast to other related approaches, our algorithm computes permissive interfaces even in the presence of non-determinism in the component. Our algorithm is implemented in the JavaPathfinder model checking framework for UML statechart components. We have also added support for automated assume-guarantee style compositional verification in JavaPathfinder, using component interfaces. We report on the application of the presented approach to the generation of interfaces for flight software components.

Giannakopoulou, Dimitra↗

DOE OSTI2020

Requirements Description of the REBUS Software for the Versatile Test Reactor

This report presents the modeling and simulation capabilities of Argonne National Laboratory’s fuel cycle analysis code, the REactor BUrnup System (REBUS), that will be relied on for the VTR project. These capabilities will then be used to establish the set of REBUS verification tasks necessary to verify REBUS for usage on the VTR project. A similar path was followed for the DIF3D software where its’ requirements and verification tasks were established. REBUS has been maintained by Argonne since the early 1960s to support its reactor design mission. That software transitioned from the original REBUS to REBUS-2 in the mid 1970s and to REBUS-3 in the mid 1980s. Since then REBUS has gone through many revisions to the current REBUS-11. Note that this version numbering is consistent with the progression of DIF3D, the base flux solver that REBUS is built upon. The name REBUS refers to a pictorial based puzzle as the original developers were inspired by having to track thousands of unique fuel assemblies as they are inserted into the reactor, depleted, shuffled, discharged, and reprocessed.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2016

Verification of BOUT++ by the method of manufactured solutions

BOUT++ is a software package designed for solving plasma fluid models. It has been used to simulate a wide range of plasma phenomena ranging from linear stability analysis to 3D plasma turbulence and is capable of simulating a wide range of drift-reduced plasma fluid and gyro-fluid models. A verification exercise has been performed as part of a EUROfusion Enabling Research project, to rigorously test the correctness of the algorithms implemented in BOUT++, by testing order-of-accuracy convergence rates using the Method of Manufactured Solutions (MMS). We present tests of individual components including time-integration and advection schemes, non-orthogonal toroidal field-aligned coordinate systems and the shifted metric procedure which is used to handle highly sheared grids. The flux coordinate independent approach to differencing along magnetic field-lines has been implemented in BOUT++ and is here verified using the MMS in a sheared slab configuration. Finally, we show tests of three complete models: 2-field Hasegawa-Wakatani in 2D slab, 3-field reduced magnetohydrodynamics (MHD) in 3D field-aligned toroidal coordinates, and 5-field reduced MHD in slab geometry.

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗

NASA NTRS1997

Demonstration of a Safety Analysis on a Complex System

For the past 17 years, Professor Leveson and her graduate students have been developing a theoretical foundation for safety in complex systems and building a methodology upon that foundation. The methodology includes special management structures and procedures, system hazard analyses, software hazard analysis, requirements modeling and analysis for completeness and safety, special software design techniques including the design of human-machine interaction, verification, operational feedback, and change analysis. The Safeware methodology is based on system safety techniques that are extended to deal with software and human error. Automation is used to enhance our ability to cope with complex systems. Identification, classification, and evaluation of hazards is done using modeling and analysis. To be effective, the models and analysis tools must consider the hardware, software, and human components in these systems. They also need to include a variety of analysis techniques and orthogonal approaches: There exists no single safety analysis or evaluation technique that can handle all aspects of complex systems. Applying only one or two may make us feel satisfied, but will produce limited results. We report here on a demonstration, performed as part of a contract with NASA Langley Research Center, of the Safeware methodology on the Center-TRACON Automation System (CTAS) portion of the air traffic control (ATC) system and procedures currently employed at the Dallas/Fort Worth (DFW) TRACON (Terminal Radar Approach CONtrol). CTAS is an automated system to assist controllers in handling arrival traffic in the DFW area. Safety is a system property, not a component property, so our safety analysis considers the entire system and not simply the automated components. Because safety analysis of a complex system is an interdisciplinary effort, our team included system engineers, software engineers, human factors experts, and cognitive psychologists.

Leveson, Nancy↗

DOE OSTI2018

GALE 3.1 Verification Report

This report is documentation of the verification activities that have been performed on GALE-3.1 to ensure that the codes meet the requirements and specifications set forth by NRC and that the code meets its intended purpose. Additional benchmark tests for GALE-3.1 are documented in Appendix A of NUREG-0016, Revision 2 for GALE-BWR 3.1 and Appendix A of NUREG-0017, Revision 2 for GALE-PWR 3.1. These activities are done in accordance with the GALE Software Quality Assurance Plan (PNNL-24249) and the GALE Configuration Management & Maintenance Plan (PNNL-24250). These two plans meet the requirements set for by both PNNL software quality assurance requirements and the NRC’s Software Quality Assurance Program and Guidelines (NUREG/BR-0167). The verification activities are documented to conform to Level 2 requirements of NUREG/BR-0167. Verifications were performed for both GALE-3.1 BWR and GALE-3.1 PWR Codes. The GALE 3.1 BWR and PWR codes are computerized mathematical models for calculating the releases of radioactive material in gaseous and liquid effluents. These computer codes are tools which can be used to determine conformance with the requirements of Appendix I to Title 10, Part 50 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR 50).

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2025

Using a Large Language Model as a Building Block to Generate Usable Validation and Verification Suite for OpenMP

In the HPC area, both hardware and software move quickly. Often new hardware is developed and deployed, the corresponding software stack, including compilers and other tools, are under active development while leading edge software developers are working to port and tune their applications, all at the same time. While the software ecosystem is in flux, one of the key challenges for users is obtaining insight into the state of implementation of key features in the programming languages and models their applications are using – whether they have been implemented, and whether the implementation conforms to the specification, especially for newly implemented features (less tested by widespread use). OpenMP is one of the most prominent shared memory programming models used for on-node programming in HPC. With the shift towards accelerators (such as GPUs and FPGAs) and heterogeneous programming OpenMP features are getting more complex. It is natural to ask whether generative AI approaches, and large language models (LLMs) in particular, can help in producing validation and verification test suites to allow users better and faster insights into the availability and correctness of OpenMP features of interest. In this work, we explore the use of ChatGPT-4 to generate a suite of tests for OpenMP features. We have chosen a set of directives and clauses, a total of 78 combinations, which first appeared in OpenMP 3.0 (released in May 2008) but are also relevant for accelerators. We prompted ChatGPT to generate tests in the C and Fortran languages, for both host (CPU) and device (accelerator). On the Summit super-computer using the GNU implementation, we found that, of the 78 generated tests 67 C tests and 43 Fortran tests compiled successfully and fewer than those executed to completion. On further analysis we show that not all generated tests are valid. We document the process, results, and provide detailed analysis regarding the quality of tests generated. With the aim of providing input to a production quality validation and verification suite, we manually implement the corrections required to make the tests valid according to the current OpenMP specification. We quantify this effort as small, medium, or large, and record the lines of code changed to correct the invalid tests. With the corrected tests we validate recent implementations from HPE, AMD, and GNU on the Frontier supercomputer. Our experiment and subsequent analysis show that although LLMs are capable of producing HPC specific codes, they are limited by their understanding of the deeper semantics and restrictions of programming models such as OpenMP. Unsurprisingly more commonly used features have better support, while some OpenMP 3.0 directives such as sections and tasking are not universally supported on accelerators. We demonstrate that successful compilation and execution to completion are inadequate metrics for evaluating generated code and that, at this time, commodity LLMs require expert intervention for code verification. This points to gaps in the training data that is currently available for HPC. We demonstrate that with "small" effort 37% of generated invalid C tests and 63% of generated invalid Fortran tests could be corrected. This improves productivity of test generation as we circumvent writing from scratch and the common programming errors associated with it.

Pophale, Swaroop [ORNL] (ORCID:0000000185446367)↗

DOE OSTI2024

Sierra/SD – Verification Test Manual – 5.22

Verification and validation (V&V) of scientific computing programs are important at Sandia National Labs due to the expanding role of computational simulation in managing the United States nuclear stockpile. The complexities of structural response calculations used to analyze physical problems, the varieties of codes applied to the calculations, and the importance of accurate predictions when assessing field conditions demand confidence in the consistency and accuracy of computer codes. Confidence in the accuracy of the predictions arising from computer simulations must ultimately be gained through verification and validation. The Sierra salinas structural dynamics analysis code, Sierra/SD, is used at the DOE Laboratories, and in several DOD projects. The roles of Sierra/SD in the qualification of weapon systems and components for normal and hostile environments throughout the Stockpile-to-Target Sequence include to, • Redesign weapon components. • Certify weapon components and systems for target environments such as hypersonic vehicles. • Certify that components will survive the thermal mechanical shock loads associated with hostile environments. • Evaluate current stockpile issues, including issues associated with uncertainty quantification. • Address many other problems that are encountered in stockpile management. The Sierra/SD verification plan is described, and an evolving set of key verification tests are described in detail. The verification tests ensure the correctness of the mathematics and numerical algorithms associated with functionality describing engineering phenomena. Development is in accordance with a set of tailored Software Quality Engineering (SQE) practices. SQE practices guide the overall verification and validation effort.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Simplifying Requirements Formalization for Resource-Constrained Mission-Critical Software

Developing critical software requires adherence to rigorous software development practices, such as formal requirement specification and verification. Despite their importance, such practices are often considered as complex and challenging tasks that require a strong formal methods background. In this paper, we present our work on simplifying the formal requirements specification experience for resource-constrained mission critical software through the use of structured natural language. To this end, we connect NASA’s FRET, a formal requirement elicitation and authoring tool with the Shelley model checking framework for MicroPython code. We report our experience on using these tools to specify requirements and analyze code from the NASA Ames PHALANX exploration concept.

PHALANX exploration concept↗

DOE OSTI2021

A process to verify numerical models for seismic fluid-structure interaction in advanced reactor vessels

Seismic design and qualification of a liquid-filled advanced nuclear reactor will have to account for fluid-structure interaction (FSI). Interaction between the tank, internal components, and contained liquid will rely on analysis of numerical models that must be verified and validated. Here this study demonstrates a verification process for models of a base-supported cylindrical tank by comparing numerical predictions and analytical solutions. The numerical models are consistent with the assumptions made to derive analytical solutions, namely, either a rigid or a linear elastic tank, ideal fluid, and small-amplitude, unidirectional, horizontal inputs. One software platform is used to illustrate the process. Seismic FSI analysis is performed using the Arbitrary Lagrangian-Eulerian (ALE) and Incompressible Computational Fluid Dynamics (ICFD) solvers in LS-DYNA. Reported responses are those used for design, including hydrodynamic pressures on the tank wall, shear forces and moments at the tank base, and wave heights of the contained liquid. The accuracy of the numerical results is discussed. The numerical models are verified for calculating the pressures on the tank wall and reactions at its base. Accurate simulation of wave action is challenging for both solvers. Recommendations for modeling, code development, and steps for verification are provided. Although focused on reactor vessels and one software platform, the verification process described herein is broadly applicable to liquid-filled vessels and other finite element codes.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

NASA NTRS1979

A progress report on a NASA research program for embedded computer systems software

The paper presents the results of the second stage of the Multipurpose User-oriented Software Technology (MUST) program. Four primary areas of activities are discussed: programming environment, HAL/S higher-order programming language support, the Integrated Verification and Testing System (IVTS), and distributed system language research. The software development environment is provided by the interactive software invocation system. The higher-order programming language (HOL) support chosen for consideration is HAL/S mainly because at the time it was one of the few HOLs with flight computer experience and it is the language used on the Shuttle program. The overall purpose of IVTS is to provide a 'user-friendly' software testing system which is highly modular, user controlled, and cooperative in nature.

Foudriat, E. C.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Stochastic Verification by Analysis for Autonomous Systems Management Architecture (ASMA)

The Gateway Vehicle Systems Manager (VSM) is the top-level of a distributed, hierarchical software control system. VSM is data-driven and will make decisions related to mission, fault, resource management and vehicle control. These attributes combined with a high degree of autonomy make it susceptible to emergent behavior. In order to achieve the high level of confidence needed in this critical system, the VSM team has developed a multifaceted verification strategy employing traditional verification techniques, simulation, model checking, and runtime verification. Individual algorithms are verified using conventional testing and model checking using assume-guarantee contracts. A discrete event-based simulation approach is being developed to verify timelines. This presentation describes an enhancement to the verification approach using analysis to enhance system robustness by detecting and resolving the potential for emergent behavior. The verification by analysis employs a Software in the Loop (SITL) environment with real flight software executing on emulated processors, simulations of vehicle subsystems, flight dynamics, and human inputs. Since the possible input space and configuration data set are too large for exhaustive testing, a Monte Carlo approach is used to cover feasible scenarios, augmented with corner cases and known higher-risk scenarios. A key problem in using Monte Carlo-based system verification is evaluating test results to ensure that system behavior is correct. The presentation describes the approach the VSM team uses to monitor behavior for compliance with predetermined boundaries and to identify anomalous behavior for further analysis. This presentation describes the multi-level systems approach to verification, and the simulation-based layer that covers the feasible state space: 1. Overview of the Gateway VSM 2. Special challenges due to heterogeneous, hierarchical architecture 3. Modeling and simulation environment using flight software and system simulations 4. Developing input sets to ensure state-space coverage 5. Developing model and data configuration sets to ensure model coverage 6. Interpreting results without predetermined outcomes 7. Lessons learned and future work

Verification and Validation↗

DOE OSTI2019

Ongoing solution reproducibility of earth system models as they progress toward exascale computing

We present a methodology for solution reproducibility for the Energy Exascale Earth System Model during its ongoing software infrastructure development to prepare for exascale computers. The nonlinear chaotic nature of climate system simulations precludes traditional model verification approaches since machine precision differences—resulting from code refactoring, changes in software environment, and so on—grow exponentially to a different weather state. Here, we leverage the nature of climate as a statistical description of the atmosphere in order to establish model reproducibility. We evaluate the degree to which two-sample equality of distribution tests can confidently detect the change in climate from minor tuning parameter changes on model output variables in order to establish the level of difference that indicates a new climate. To apply this (baselined test), we target a section of the model’s development cycle wherein no intentional science changes have been applied to its source code. We compare an ensemble of short simulations that were conducted using a verified model configuration against a new ensemble with the same configuration but with the latest software infrastructure (Common Infrastructure for Modeling the Earth, CIME5.0), compiler versions, and software libraries. We also compare these against ensemble simulations conducted using the original version of the software infrastructure (CIME4.0) of the earlier model configuration, but with the latest compilers and software libraries, to test the impact of new compilers and libraries in isolation from additional software infrastructure. The two-sample equality of distribution tests indicates that these ensembles indeed represent the same climate.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

NASA NTRS1973

Software approach to automatic patching of analog computer

The Automatic Patching Verification program (APV) is described which provides the hybrid computer programmer with a convenient method of performing a static check of the analog portion of his study. The static check insures that the program is patched as specified, and that the computing components being used are operating correctly. The APV language the programmer uses to specify his conditions and interconnections is similar to the FORTRAN language in syntax. The APV control program reads APV source program statements from an assigned input device. Each source program statement is processed immediately after it is read. A statement may select an analog console, set an analog mode, set a potentiometer or DAC, or read from the analog console and perform a test. Statements are read and processed sequentially. If an error condition is detected, an output occurs on an assigned output device. When an end statement is read, the test is terminated.

Source record↗

NASA NTRS1975

Simulation verification techniques study: Simulation performance validation techniques document

Techniques and support software for the efficient performance of simulation validation are discussed. Overall validation software structure, the performance of validation at various levels of simulation integration, guidelines for check case formulation, methods for real time acquisition and formatting of data from an all up operational simulator, and methods and criteria for comparison and evaluation of simulation data are included. Vehicle subsystems modules, module integration, special test requirements, and reference data formats are also described.

Duncan, L. M.↗

NASA NTRS1974

Simulation verification techniques study. Subsystem simulation validation techniques

Techniques for validation of software modules which simulate spacecraft onboard systems are discussed. An overview of the simulation software hierarchy for a shuttle mission simulator is provided. A set of guidelines for the identification of subsystem/module performance parameters and critical performance parameters are presented. Various sources of reference data to serve as standards of performance for simulation validation are identified. Environment, crew station, vehicle configuration, and vehicle dynamics simulation software are briefly discussed from the point of view of their interfaces with subsystem simulation modules. A detailed presentation of results in the area of vehicle subsystems simulation modules is included. A list of references, conclusions and recommendations are also given.

Duncan, L. M.↗

NASA NTRS1985

Software for PROM Programing

Driver program allows for programing, reading, and verification of various PROM's. Manual entry of data to DATA/I/O PROM Programmer timeconsuming and error-prone. Driver program combines file management capability of EXORCISOR with flexibility of DATA I/O system. Provides user with way of reading, programing and verifying PROM's storing data on disk, modifying files and printing data.

Goolsby, C. W.↗

NASA NTRS2009

Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Proof-Carrying Code and Software Certification

This NASA conference publication contains the proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Proof-Carrying Code and Software Certification, held as part of LICS in Los Angeles, CA, USA, on August 15, 2009. Software certification demonstrates the reliability, safety, or security of software systems in such a way that it can be checked by an independent authority with minimal trust in the techniques and tools used in the certification process itself. It can build on existing validation and verification (V&V) techniques but introduces the notion of explicit software certificates, Vvilich contain all the information necessary for an independent assessment of the demonstrated properties. One such example is proof-carrying code (PCC) which is an important and distinctive approach to enhancing trust in programs. It provides a practical framework for independent assurance of program behavior; especially where source code is not available, or the code author and user are unknown to each other. The workshop wiII address theoretical foundations of logic-based software certification as well as practical examples and work on alternative application domains. Here "certificate" is construed broadly, to include not just mathematical derivations and proofs but also safety and assurance cases, or any fonnal evidence that supports the semantic analysis of programs: that is, evidence about an intrinsic property of code and its behaviour that can be independently checked by any user, intermediary, or third party. These guarantees mean that software certificates raise trust in the code itself, distinct from and complementary to any existing trust in the creator of the code, the process used to produce it, or its distributor. In addition to the contributed talks, the workshop featured two invited talks, by Kelly Hayhurst and Andrew Appel. The PCC 2009 website can be found at http://ti.arc.nasa.gov /event/pcc 091.

Ewen, Denney, W.↗