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At least 649 records · Page 36

Identification of Security related Bug Reports via Text Mining using Supervised and Unsupervised Classification

This paper is focused on automated classification of software bug reports to security and non-security related, using both supervised and unsupervised approaches. For both approaches, three types of feature vectors are used. For supervised learning, we experiment with multiple learning algorithms and training sets with different sizes. Furthermore, we propose a novel unsupervised approach based on anomaly detection. The evaluated is based on three NASA datasets. The results show that supervised classification is affected more by the learning algorithms than by feature vectors and using only 25% of the data for training provides as good results as if 90% of data are used for training. Both supervised and unsupervised learning can be used for identification of security bug reports; the former slightly outperforms the latter at the expense of labeling the testing set. In general, the performance differs across datasets, mainly due to the different amounts of security related information.

Goseva-Popstojanova, Katerina↗

Ensuring Flexibility and Security in SDN-Based Spacecraft Communication Networks Through Risk Assessment

Software-defined networking (SDN) has enabled elastic networking and resource distribution in cloud computing. The centralization and separation of the Control Plane also offers a high degree of network configurability and management, which can be used to mitigate and manage threats to the network. Space communication networks have historically been restricted and circuit switching in these networks has been a manual process. This study evaluates the potential role of SDN in space communication networks from a networking security standpoint. The evaluation covers the networking security needs of spacecraft missions and their associated assets. The results from the evaluation lead to a risk assessment that identifies vulnerabilities in an SDN-based communications architecture. Security challenges introduced into the network from integrating SDN are also considered. A risk register summarizes the severity of the attack outcomes, as well as occurrence likelihood. The study identifies Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks as a new threat (presently unmitigated by existing security controls) that would be prevalent in an SDN-based space communication environment. A Mininet-based emulation testbed is built to demonstrate the susceptibility of spacecraft flight software to a flooding DoS attack when on an interconnected SDN-managed network. This type of attack would be highly consequential to mission assets, and therefore SDN-based space communications would need to be resilient to such attacks. Future work will need to be performed to fully characterize DoS attack methods that can apply to the space communication scenario, as well as to devise a comprehensive DoS-resilient solution.

Baker, Dylan Z.↗

Secure multi-party communication with quantum key distribution managed by trusted authority

Techniques and tools for implementing protocols for secure multi-party communication after quantum key distribution ("QKD") are described herein. In example implementations, a trusted authority facilitates secure communication between multiple user devices. The trusted authority distributes different quantum keys by QKD under trust relationships with different users. The trusted authority determines combination keys using the quantum keys and makes the combination keys available for distribution (e.g., for non-secret distribution over a public channel). The combination keys facilitate secure communication between two user devices even in the absence of QKD between the two user devices. With the protocols, benefits of QKD are extended to multi-party communication scenarios. In addition, the protocols can retain benefit of QKD even when a trusted authority is offline or a large group seeks to establish secure communication within the group.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

Intrusion detection using secure signatures

A method and device for intrusion detection using secure signatures comprising capturing network data. A search hash value, value employing at least one one-way function, is generated from the captured network data using a first hash function. The presence of a search hash value match in a secure signature table comprising search hash values and an encrypted rule is determined. After determining a search hash value match, a decryption key is generated from the captured network data using a second hash function, a hash function different form the first hash function. One or more of the encrypted rules of the secure signatures table having a hash value equal to the generated search hash value are then decrypted using the generated decryption key. The one or more decrypted secure signature rules are then processed for a match and one or more user notifications are deployed if a match is identified.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Secure multi-party communication with quantum key distribution managed by trusted authority

Techniques and tools for implementing protocols for secure multi-party communication after quantum key distribution ("QKD") are described herein. In example implementations, a trusted authority facilitates secure communication between multiple user devices. The trusted authority distributes different quantum keys by QKD under trust relationships with different users. The trusted authority determines combination keys using the quantum keys and makes the combination keys available for distribution (e.g., for non-secret distribution over a public channel). The combination keys facilitate secure communication between two user devices even in the absence of QKD between the two user devices. With the protocols, benefits of QKD are extended to multi-party communication scenarios. In addition, the protocols can retain benefit of QKD even when a trusted authority is offline or a large group seeks to establish secure communication within the group.

71 CLASSICAL AND QUANTUM MECHANICS, GENERAL PHYSIC↗

Method and device for detecting impact events on a security barrier which includes a hollow rebar allowing insertion and removal of an optical fiber

A method and device for the detection of impact events on a security barrier. A hollow rebar is farmed within a security barrier, whereby the hollow rebar is completely surrounded by the security barrier. An optical fiber passes through the interior of the hollow rebar. An optical transmitter and an optical receiver are both optically connected to the optical fiber and connected to optical electronics. The optical electronics are configured to provide notification upon the detection of an impact event at the security barrier based on the detection of disturbances within the optical fiber.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Exploring Operational Safeguards, Safety, and Security by Design to Address Real Time Threats in Nuclear Facilities

Over the last few years, significant attention has been paid to both encourage application and provide domestic and international guidance for designing in safeguards and security in new facilities.1,2,3 However, once a facility is operational, safeguards, security, and safety often operate as separate entities that support facility operations. This separation is potentially a serious weakness should insider or outsider threats become a reality.Situations may arise where safeguards detects a possible loss of material in a facility. Will they notify security so they can, for example, check perimeter doors for tampering? Not doing so might give the advantage to an insider who has already, or is about to, move nuclear material outside the facility building. If outsiders break into a facility, the availability of any information to coordinate the facility’s response through segregated alarm stations or a failure to include all available radiation sensors, such as safety’s criticality monitors can give the advantage to the adversary who might know to disable camera systems, but would most likely be unaware of other highly relevant sensors in a nuclear facility.This paper will briefly explore operational safeguards, safety, and security by design (3S) at a high level for domestic and State facilities, identify possible weaknesses, and propose future administrative and technical methods, to strengthen the facility system’s response to threats.

Schanfein, Mark J.↗

Secure multi-party communication with quantum key distribution managed by trusted authority

Techniques and tools for implementing protocols for secure multi-party communication after quantum key distribution ("QKD") are described herein. In example implementations, a trusted authority facilitates secure communication between multiple user devices. The trusted authority distributes different quantum keys by QKD under trust relationships with different users. The trusted authority determines combination keys using the quantum keys and makes the combination keys available for distribution (e.g., for non-secret distribution over a public channel). The combination keys facilitate secure communication between two user devices even in the absence of QKD between the two user devices. With the protocols, benefits of QKD are extended to multi-party communication scenarios. In addition, the protocols can retain benefit of QKD even when a trusted authority is offline or a large group seeks to establish secure communication within the group.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Securing your Site in Development and Beyond

Why wait until production deployment, or even staging and testing deployment to identify security vulnerabilities? Using tools like Burp Suite, you can find security vulnerabilities before they creep up on you. Prevent cross-site scripting attacks, and establish a firmer trust between your website and your client. Verify that Apache/Nginx have the correct SSL Ciphers set. We explore using these tools and more to validate proper Apache/Nginx configurations, and to be compliant with modern configuration standards as part of the development cycle. Your clients can use tools like https://securityheaders.io and https://ssllabs.com to get a graded report on your level of compliance with OWASP Secure Headers Project and SSLLabs recommendations. Likewise, you should always use the same sites to validate your configurations. Burp Suite will find common misconfigurations and will also perform more thorough security testing of your applications. In this session you will see examples of vulnerabilities that were detected early on, as well has how to integrate these practices into your daily workflow.

Akopov, Mikhail S.↗

Method for Determining the Sensitivity of a Physical Security System.

Modern systems, such as physical security systems, are often designed to involve complex interactions of technological and human elements. Evaluation of the performance of these systems often overlooks the human element. A method is proposed here to expand the concept of sensitivity—as denoted by d’—from signal detection theory (Green & Swets 1966; Macmillan & Creelman 2005), which came out of the field of psychophysics, to cover not only human threat detection but also other human functions plus the performance of technical systems in a physical security system, thereby including humans in the overall evaluation of system performance. New in this method is the idea that probabilities of hits (accurate identification of threats) and false alarms (saying “threat” when there is not one), which are used to calculate d’ of the system, can be applied to technologies and, furthermore, to different functions in the system beyond simple yes-no threat detection. At the most succinct level, the method returns a single number that represents the effectiveness of a physical security system; specifically, the balance between the handling of actual threats and the distraction of false alarms. The method can be automated, and the constituent parts revealed, such that given an interaction graph that indicates the functional associations of system elements and the individual probabilities of hits and false alarms for those elements, it will return the d’ of the entire system as well as d’ values for individual parts. The method can also return a measure of the response bias* of the system. One finding of this work is that the d’ for a physical security system can be relatively poor in spite of having excellent d’s for each of its individual functional elements.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Quantifying Human Behavior and Decision Errors in Security Screening Operations

The potential for human errors in conducting security related screening operations can lead to inadvertent and adverse decision outcomes. This paper overviews an initial mathematical framework designed to model and quantify the various human factors and decision outcomes that may occur in conducting security screening operations, such as U.S. port of entry radiological and nuclear (rad/nuc) security screening. This framework is based on the Human Error Assessment and Reduction (HEART) technique. As applied here, the framework incorporates a set of rules for human engagement, including a prescribed concept of operations (CONOPS) and deviations that may occur from this established CONOPS due to inadvertent personnel decision errors. We also review some of the various factors that may adversely influence such decisions by security screening personnel. Some of these factors include current workload, environmental conditions, training, and various other intangible factors. Using the HEART methodology, we translate each of these factors into error producing conditions, their effects on error, an assessed proportion of effects, and finally the overall probability of human error at each stage of the screening process. We then include a small scale example to demonstrate the methodology and results based on an assumed set of input conditions at a notional port of entry.

Brigantic, Robert T.↗

Assembling a Cyber Range to Evaluate Artificial Intelligence / Machine Learning (AI/ML) Security Tools

In this case study, we will describe the design and assembly of a cyber security test range we have built at Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Oak Ridge, TN, USA. The range is designed to provide a flexible environment to evaluate cyber security tools—particularly those involving AI/ML—in a way that provides realistic environments and where we can control the experiments to determine the strengths and weaknesses of the tools. We have designed in the ability to repeat the evaluations, so additional tools can be evaluated and compared at a later time. The system is one that can be scaled up or down for experiment sizes. At the time of the conference we will have completed two full-scale, national, government challenges on this range. These challenges are evaluating the performance and operating costs for AI/ML-based cyber security tools for application into large, government-sized environments. These evaluations will be described, in order to provide motivation and context for various design decisions and adaptations we have made. The first challenge measured end-point security tools against 100K malware samples chosen across a range of types. The second is network detection of attempted penetration and exploitations with varying levels of covertness in a high-volume, business network. The scale of each of these challenges is requiring us to create automation systems to repeat the experiments identically for each tool. Preventing there being easy signs of malicious activity for the AI/ML tools to focus on has been a particularly interesting and challenging aspect of designing and executing these challenge events. After the events, the range continues to be used for other research such as adversarial machine learning where the repeatability, scale, and automation required for the national challenge events become essential elements for research.

Nichols, Jeff↗

2021 ROMANIA TRANSPORT SECURITY TABLE-TOP EXERCISE (TTX) – LESSONS LEARNED AND GOOD PRACTICES

During the period of 15-18 March 2021, the IAEA conducted a national workshop addressing the security of radioactive material in transport. The workshop was jointly hosted by the Romanian regulatory authority and the General Inspectorate of Romanian Gendarmerie. The workshop assisted Romania in improving its capability to evaluate the ability of response forces to counter a malicious act against radioactive material in transport. The event consisted of briefings, exercises, a demonstration of transport security equipment, and a transport security table-top exercise (TTX). The workshop was conducted in a virtual-hybrid format in such a way as to meet the COVID-19 related requirements in compliance with Romania’s guidelines. This paper provides an overview of the workshop’s activities, lessons-learned, and good practices related to the transport security TTX exercises.

Maican, Catalin↗

Implementing Cybersecurity for Distributed Wind: An Exercise in ICS Security Application

Distributed wind is unique and fast-growing component of the energy production mix, but cybersecurity for distributed wind is not well developed. In this presentation, we will introduce distributed wind as an example of difficult-to-secure critical infrastructure. We will first provide background on distributed wind architectures, applications, and stakeholder roles. We will explain the need and challenges for cybersecurity for distributed wind, pointing to both academic studies and real-world events. The key component of the presentation will discuss recommendations for different aspects of security, such as risk assessments, communications, and access control, that specifically call out considerations that apply uniquely to distributed wind. We will discuss what sets distributed wind apart from other ICS and energy applications, and how to account for these features in a comprehensive security plan. This process is demonstrative of the type of analysis needed to adapt traditional security guidelines and standards to narrow and focused applications.

17 WIND ENERGY↗

A National Secure-by-Design Strategy

The US National Cybersecurity Strategy published March 2, 2023 uses plain language to communicate that the US is calling for a major change in how we prioritize the security of software systems used in critical infrastructure. It acknowledges that our current approach, which is essentially, “let the buyer beware,” leaves entities who are least able to assess or defend vulnerable software responsible for the impacts of designed-in weaknesses while the makers of the technology bear no liability. The strategy recommends a security-by-design approach, recommending that software vendors be held liable to uphold a “duty of care” to consumers and for systems to be designed to “fail safely and recover quickly” . For energy infrastructure, the strategy calls out the need to implement the National Cyber-Informed Engineering Strategy to achieve higher confidence security for energy infrastructures. The Idaho National Laboratory, a pioneer in cyber-informed engineering concepts, is at the forefront of organizations educating others in industry, academia, and government on how to apply these concepts to real-world challenges. In this brief, we'll outline some of the basic principles of security-by-design and offer examples of how, in a water sector context, they're being put into successful practice.

42 ENGINEERING↗

What Role Do Aggregators Play in Power System Security and Resilience? Preprint

Barriers to the participation of distributed energy resources (DERs) in wholesale electricity markets have limited the use of DERs for power system security and resilience. In September 2020, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) approved an order to reduce these barriers. FERC Order No. 2222 enables the participation of DER aggregators in wholesale electricity markets. DERs include renewable generation and technologies that support the integration of renewable generation by increasing grid flexibility and resilience. Requiring wholesale energy markets to allow DER aggregator participation provides a path for DERs to become competitive in these markets. As the contribution from aggregated DERs continues to increase, the aggregator's role in supporting grid security and resilience will become more critical. This paper reviews work that demonstrates how DER aggregators can provide resilience support through technical capabilities, operational strategies, and secure communication architectures. Socioeconomic influences and impacts of aggregators, including implications for social resilience, are presented. There is no one-size-fits-all approach to enhancing resilience in a power grid that includes a growing cohort of DER aggregators, but there are many options for aggregators to contribute to a more resilient and secure power grid.

aggregator↗

Securing Future Energy Supplies: From Renewables to Microreactors

This session will provide insight into how future energy deployments, critical to national-level programs focused on reducing carbon emissions, can be secured-by-design using lessons learned from current energy infrastructure. It will begin with an overview of current threats and risks associated with renewable energy assets and systems, primarily wind and solar, focusing on their control architecture and key system functions for both efficient and safe operations. This talk will then translate the key takeaways from current renewable infrastructure into applications for securing future energy systems, including microreactors and small modular reactors (SMRs), based on planned concepts of operations and control. Microreactors and SMRs are intended to be factory-assembled with commercially available components and deployed in more remote or distributed environments, necessitating centralized control centers, remote monitoring, and offsite maintenance and technical support. All of these factors lead these assets to a security posture and controls more similar to today's renewable energy assets than today's nuclear reactors, which represents a significant shift in mindset for the nuclear industry. This talk will provide justification for this shift as well as a path forward to motivate securing these groundbreaking technologies from the outset of their design and deployment.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

A Comprehensive Assessment of the Viability of Small Modular Reactors in Africa: A Nuclear Security and Nonproliferation Perspective

In response to escalating global energy demands driven by industrialization and the pressing need for decarbonization, this paper explores the potential of Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) as a sustainable energy solution in Africa. Focusing on nuclear security and non-proliferation concerns, the study assesses Africa's energy landscape, emphasizing the need for diverse and reliable power sources. While highlighting the scalability and cost-effectiveness of SMRs, the analysis acknowledges potential challenges associated with their introduction, particularly concerning nuclear security and non-proliferation. Given the recommendation to use High Assay Low Enriched Uranium (HALEU) in some SMRs, it is important to critically consider the security implications of transporting nuclear materials, the proximity of the public to the plant, and the time taken to respond to planned assaults. The possibility of using HALEU makes the nuclear material more prone to adversaries such as sabotage, theft, and terrorism. Utilizing PESTLE analysis, this research seeks to outline the detailed political, economic, social, technological, environmental, and legal readiness of Africa to embrace the first-of-a-kind technology (SMR) while fulfilling its mandate to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Examining regulatory frameworks, international cooperation, and safety protocols, the study underscores the importance of regional collaboration to prevent the misuse of nuclear technology for military and malicious intent. Drawing insights from successful case studies, the paper concludes by synthesizing key findings and proposing recommendations for policymakers and stakeholders. These recommendations encompass regulatory enhancement, capacity building, technology transfer, and diplomatic efforts to strengthen nuclear security, non-proliferation, and safeguards in Africa.

Prah, Christina↗