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Computer program for determining manpower costs for full time, part time, and contractor personnel is discussed. Twelve different tables resulting from computer output are described. Program is written in FORTRAN 4 for IBM 360/65 computer.
Data from a substantial number of oxygen mishaps obtained from NASA and contractor records are presented. Information from several Air Force records, concerning oxygen accidents involving aircraft operations, are also included. Descriptions of the mishaps and their causes, for both liquid and gaseous oxygen in ground test facilities and space vehicle systems, are given. A number of safety regulations aimed at reducing the accident probability is discussed. The problems related to material compatibility and materials testing are considered, and the limited information on factors affecting the ignition of materials in oxygen is presented. In addition, details are given of several of the accident/incidents listed in order to define the combination of conditions causing the mishap. In addition to propellant system mishaps, accident/incidents which occurred in space and ground system structures were included, as well as those in electrical systems, ground support facilities, ordnance, and related operations.
The results of a solid polymer electrolyte fuel cell development program are summarized. A base line design was defined, and materials and components of the base line configuration were fabricated and tested. Concepts representing base line capability extensions in the areas of life, power, specific weight and volume, versatility of operation, field maintenance, and thermal control were identified and evaluated. Liaison and coordination with space shuttle contractors resulted in the exchange of engineering data.
The design plan requirements define the design implementation and control requirements for Phase C/D of the Modular Space Station Project and specifically address the Initial Space Station phase of the Space Station Program (modular). It is based primarily on the specific objective of translating the requirements of the Space Station Program, Project, Interface, and Support Requirements and preliminary contract end x item specifications into detail design of the operational systems which comprise the initial space station. This document is designed to guide aerospace contractors in the planning and bidding for Phase C/D.
The methods employed by NASA to establish configuration control of nonmetallic materials on Apollo spacecraft are described. A five step procedure for examining contractor materials for suitability and compatibility is presented. The compatibility of the materials with the oxygen enriched environment of the spacecraft enclosures is emphasized.
The space shuttle fact sheet is presented. Four important reasons for the program are considered to be: (1) It is the only meaningful new manned space program which can be accomplished on a modest budget. (2) It is needed to make space operations less complex and costly. (3) It is required for scientific applications in civilian and military activities. (4) It will encourage greater international participation in space flight. The space shuttle and orbiter configurations are discussed along with the missions. The scope of the study and the costs of each contract for the major contractor are listed.
The collection and classification of information for a manually operated information retrieval system on the subject of space food and nutrition research are described. The system as it currently exists is designed for retrieval of documents, either in hard copy or on microfiche, from the technical files of the MSC Food and Nutrition Section by accession number, author, and/or subject. The system could readily be extended to include retrieval by affiliation, report and contract number, and sponsoring agency should the need arise. It can also be easily converted to computerized retrieval. At present the information retrieval system contains nearly 3000 documents which consist of technical papers, contractors' reports, and reprints obtained from the food and nutrition files at MSC, Technical Library, the library at the Texas Medical Center in Houston, the BMI Technical Libraries, Dr. E. B. Truitt at MBI, and the OSU Medical Libraries. Additional work was done to compile 18 selected bibliographies on subjects of immediate interest on the MSC Food and Nutrition Section.
The results of 7 months of study, tradeoffs, test design, and fabrication are presented for an effort to modify three ground stations in support of the ATS-F program. As a result of tests on the existing feed system of the Rosman No. 2 85-foot antenna and on the transportable ground station (TGS) 40-foot antenna, it was determined that modifications of the existing phase-compensating rotary joints at Rosman are feasible. Other components must be completely replaced. In the TGS antenna feed system, it was found to be feasible to broadband the existing monopulse comparator by adding simple irises and posts; both spare and active comparators were modified. The TGS polarizers can be broadbanded by adjusting existing pins and adding two new pins. These modifications are also directly applicable to the Mojave 40-foot antenna. Detailed electrical and mechanical characteristics are presented for the new equipment, as well as installation plans to enable NASA and its contractors to determine the adequacy of the designs and to confirm that planned locations are both available and compatible with planned operational concepts.
The design of principal multilayer insulation (MLI) systems being investigated by Marshall Space Flight Center and its contractors for application to flight-type cryogenic tankage for long-term storage in space vehicles is described. The MLI systems were designed for application to a 105 in. diameter cryogenic test tank to simulate full-scale design and installation methods representative of flight-type hardware. The MLI systems selected for design represent systems suitable for use on space vehicles such as the modular nuclear vehicles that require application of thicknesses up to 6 in. The MLI systems are lightweight and structurally efficient.
Improvements in the processes and design to reduce the manufacturing costs for low density ablative panels for the space shuttle are discussed. The areas that were studied included methods of loading honeycomb core, alternative reinforcement concepts, and the use of reusable subpanels. A review of previous studies on the fabrication of low-cost ablative panels and on permissible defects that do not affect thermal performance was conducted. Considerable differences in the quoted prices for ablative panels, even though the various contractors had reported similar fabrication times were discovered. How these cost differences arise from different estimating criteria and which estimating assumptions and other costs must be included in order to arrive at a realistic price are discussed.
Factors that cause system safety programs to fail are discussed from the viewpoint that in general these programs have not achieved their intended aims. The one item which is considered to contribute most to failure of a system safety program is a poor statement of work which consists of ambiguity, lack of clear definition, use of obsolete requirements, and pure typographical errors. It is pointed out that unless safety requirements are stated clearly, and where they are readily apparent as firm requirements, some of them will be overlooked by designers and contractors. The lack of clarity is stated as being a major contributing factor in system safety program failure and usually evidenced in: (1) lack of clear requirements by the procuring activity, (2) lack of clear understanding of system safety by other managers, and (3) lack of clear methodology to be employed by system safety engineers.
Data are given concerning the safety requirements that are, or should be, part of the hierachy of the contractual relationship between government and prime contractors, prime and subcontractors, and subcontractors and vendors.
The overall management approach to the NASA Phase B definition studies for space stations, which were initiated in September 1969 and completed in July 1972, is reviewed with particular emphasis placed on the management approach used by the Manned Spacecraft Center. The internal working organizations of the Manned Spacecraft Center and its prime contractor, North American Rockwell, are delineated along with the interfacing techniques used for the joint Government and industry study. Working interfaces with other NASA centers, industry, and Government agencies are briefly highlighted. The controlling documentation for the study (such as guidelines and constraints, bibliography, and key personnel) is reviewed. The historical background and content of the experiment program prepared for use in this Phase B study are outlined and management concepts that may be considered for future programs are proposed.
Technology is considered as a culture for changing a physical world and technology assessment questions the inherent cultural capability to modify power and material in support of living organisms. A comprehensive goal-parameter-synthesis-criterion specification is presented as a basis for a rational assessment of technology. The thesis queries the purpose of the assessed problems, the factors considered, the relationships between factors, and the values assigned those factors to accomplish the appropriate purpose. Stationary and sequential evaluation of enviro-organismic systems are delegated to the responsible personalities involved in design; from promoter/designer through contractor to occupant. Discussion includes design goals derived from organismic factors, definitions of human responses which establish viable criteria and relevant correlation models, linking stimulus parameters, and parallel problem-discipline centered design organization. A consistent concept of impedance, as a degradation in the performance of a specified parameter, is introduced to overcome the arbitrary inoperative connotations of terms like noise, discomfort, and glare. Applications of the evaluative specification are illustrated through design problems related to auditory impedance and sound distribution.
A fuel cell technology program was established to advance the state-of-the art of hydrogen oxygen fuel cells using low temperature, potassium hydroxide electrolyte technology as the base. Cell and component testing confirmed that low temperature, potassium hydroxide electrolyte technology is compatible with the requirements of the space shuttle Phase B contractors. Testing of the DM-1 powerplant demonstrated all of the important requirements of the shuttle except operating life. Testing also identified DM-1 powerplant life limiting mechanisms; hydrogen pump gear wear and pressurization of the cell stack over its design limits.
The major conclusion of the detailed examination of the human factors engineering design standard is that it is unsuitable for future spacecraft design. The standard, published in 1966, was not intended to be a zero or reduced gravity standard and was directed primarily toward ground support equipment and technology. Futhermore, ambiguities, conflicts, and unenforceable requirements contribute to the difficulty. The role of man in future space missions and its impact on human engineering standards are also discussed, and it is concluded that greater standardization is vital to the success of future missions. A survey of NASA/MSFC contractors was made, and it was found that MSFC-STD-267A is largely ignored and the most significant problems are inaccessibility and nonspecificity of the data. The resistance of contract management and designer and of program managers is a primary reason for poor human engineering design. Specific recommendations for improvement of format and organization, including an interim solution, are given.
Findings concerning project management in the NASA Apollo program are presented. The Apollo program in the context of the total NASA organization is examined along with the nature of project management and the manner in which project managers functioned in the Apollo program. The utilization of the in-house technical competence in the support of the Apollo program, and the formal and informal relationships between Apollo managers and the contractors are discussed.
The analysis followed five selected motors through initial design, development, test, qualification, manufacture, and final flight reports. An audit was conducted at the manufacturing plants to complement the literature search with firsthand observations of the current philosophies and practices that affect reliability of the motors. A second literature search emphasized acquisition of spacecraft and satellite data bearing on solid motor reliability. It was concluded that present practices at the plants yield highly reliable flight hardware. Reliability can be further improved by new developments of aft-end bonding and initiator/igniter nondestructive test methods, a safe/arm device, and an insulation formulation. Minimum diagnostic instrumentation is recommended for all motor flights. Surplus motors should be used in margin testing. Criteria should be established for pressure and zone curing. The motor contractor should be represented at launch. New design analyses should be made of stretched motors and spacecraft/motor pairs.