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Modeling 233 Pa Generation in Thorium-fueled Reactors for Safeguards

Thorium has been considered as a possible alternative to uranium for nuclear fuel for many decades. It is three to four times more abundant in the earth than uranium and produces significantly less long-lived transuranic nuclear waste. Some claim thorium poses fewer proliferation concerns than other fuel types largely due to 232 U buildup (and associated high energy gamma-emitting decay products) in the irradiated thorium fuel. However, to fully explore potential proliferation concerns, generation and subsequent decay of 233 Pa produced in the reactor core still must be studied. With its half-life of 27 days, 233 Pa decays to 233 U, which is an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) defined special fissionable material that can be used for nuclear weapons production. With more research being dedicated to thorium-fueled reactors, and several of these reactor designs possessing online fuel processing (allowing for on-site protactinium separation), it is important to understand this potential proliferation pathway. In particular, it is theoretically possible to extract protactinium from the irradiated fuel salt before it decays into 233 U. This hypothetical potential diversion can become an even greater proliferation concern if the extracted protactinium is purified through a second separation of protactinium approximately ten days later to remove the short half-life decay products of 232 Pa and 234 Pa, thus resulting in a higher concentration of the 233 Pa isotope, which decays into weapons usable 233 U with hardly any 232 U or 234 U in it. To estimate the concern of this potential proliferation challenge of thorium, different nuclear material accountancy techniques were reviewed for their viability to quantify 233 Pa if extracted from used thorium fuel. Characteristics of interest included technology maturity, cost, precision, and time taken to acquire results. Some technologies, like hybrid K-edge densitometry and passive gamma spectroscopy, appear to be viable techniques based on current literature. Due to the limited scope of this project, only passive gamma spectroscopy was further investigated. Three different reactor types (PWR, CANDU, MSR) were modeled with mixed thorium-uranium oxide fuels that were burned until the fuel was spent. The protactinium in the used fuel was extracted at the time of shutdown and the change in isotopic content of the protactinium quantified. Gamma spectroscopy simulations were performed for the protactinium isotopes and their decay products at various decay times. Given the simplicity of the models and large assumptions made (e.g. no background, no shielding, no self-attenuation), the initial results indicate that though 233 Pa is detectible for all the reactor types modeled at all decay times (0 to 300 days), more work should be done with higher fidelity models.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Technical Review Report for the Model 9978-96 Package Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (S-SARP-G-00002, Revision 1, March 2009)

This Technical Review Report (TRR) documents the review, performed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) Staff, at the request of the Department of Energy (DOE), on the 'Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP), Model 9978 B(M)F-96', Revision 1, March 2009 (S-SARP-G-00002). The Model 9978 Package complies with 10 CFR 71, and with 'Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material-1996 Edition (As Amended, 2000)-Safety Requirements', International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safety Standards Series No. TS-R-1. The Model 9978 Packaging is designed, analyzed, fabricated, and tested in accordance with Section III of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (ASME B&PVC). The review presented in this TRR was performed using the methods outlined in Revision 3 of the DOE's 'Packaging Review Guide (PRG) for Reviewing Safety Analysis Reports for Packages'. The format of the SARP follows that specified in Revision 2 of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Regulatory Guide 7.9, i.e., 'Standard Format and Content of Part 71 Applications for Approval of Packages for Radioactive Material'. Although the two documents are similar in their content, they are not identical. Formatting differences have been noted in this TRR, where appropriate. The Model 9978 Packaging is a single containment package, using a 5-inch containment vessel (5CV). It uses a nominal 35-gallon drum package design. In comparison, the Model 9977 Packaging uses a 6-inch containment vessel (6CV). The Model 9977 and Model 9978 Packagings were developed concurrently, and they were referred to as the General Purpose Fissile Material Package, Version 1 (GPFP). Both packagings use General Plastics FR-3716 polyurethane foam as insulation and as impact limiters. The 5CV is used as the Primary Containment Vessel (PCV) in the Model 9975-96 Packaging. The Model 9975-96 Packaging also has the 6CV as its Secondary Containment Vessel (SCV). In comparison, the Model 9975 Packagings use Celotex{trademark} for insulation and as impact limiters. To provide a historical perspective, it is noted that the Model 9975-96 Packaging is a 35-gallon drum package design that has evolved from a family of packages designed by DOE contractors at the Savannah River Site. Earlier package designs, i.e., the Model 9965, the Model 9966, the Model 9967, and the Model 9968 Packagings, were originally designed and certified in the early 1980s. In the 1990s, updated package designs that incorporated design features consistent with the then-newer safety requirements were proposed. The updated package designs at the time were the Model 9972, the Model 9973, the Model 9974, and the Model 9975 Packagings, respectively. The Model 9975 Package was certified by the Packaging Certification Program, under the Office of Safety Management and Operations. The Model 9978 Package has six Content Envelopes: C.1 ({sup 238}Pu Heat Sources), C.2 ( Pu/U Metals), C.3 (Pu/U Oxides, Reserved), C.4 (U Metal or Alloy), C.5 (U Compounds), and C.6 (Samples and Sources). Per 10 CFR 71.59 (Code of Federal Regulations), the value of N is 50 for the Model 9978 Package leading to a Criticality Safety Index (CSI) of 1.0. The Transport Index (TI), based on dose rate, is calculated to be a maximum of 4.1.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Novel Large Area High Resolution Neutron Detector for the Spallation Neutron Source

Neutron scattering is a powerful technique that is critically important for materials science and structural biology applications. The knowledge gained from past developments has resulted in far-reaching advances in engineering, pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries, to name a few. New facilities for neutron generation at much higher flux, such as the SNS at Oak Ridge, TN, will greatly enhance the capabilities of neutron scattering, with benefits that extend to many fields and include, for example, development of improved drug therapies and materials that are stronger, longer-lasting, and more impact-resistant. In order to fully realize this enhanced potential, however, higher neutron rates must be met with improved detection capabilities, particularly higher count rate capability in large size detectors, while maintaining practicality. We have developed a neutron detector with the technical and economic advantages to accomplish this goal. This new detector has a large sensitive area, offers 3D spatial resolution, high sensitivity and high count rate capability, and it is economical and practical to produce. The proposed detector technology is based on B-10 thin film conversion of neutrons in long straw-like gas detectors. A stack of many such detectors, each 1 meter in length, and 4 mm in diameter, has a stopping power that exceeds that of He-3 gas, contained at practical pressures within an area detector. With simple electronic readout methods, straw detector arrays can provide spatial resolution of 4 mm FWHM or better, and since an array detector of such form consists of several thousand individual elements per square meter, count rates in a 1 m^2 detector can reach 2?10^7 cps. Moreover, each individual event can be timetagged with a time resolution of less than 0.1 ?sec, allowing accurate identification of neutron energy by time of flight. Considering basic elemental cost, this novel neutron imaging detector can be commercially produced economically, probably at a small fraction of the cost of He-3 detectors. In addition to neutron scattering science, the fully developed base technology can be used as a rugged, low-cost neutron detector in area monitoring and surveying. Radiation monitors are used in a number of other settings for occupational and environmental radiation safety. Such a detector can also be used in environmental monitoring and remote nuclear power plant monitoring. For example, the Department of Energy could use it to characterize nuclear waste dumps, coordinate clean-up efforts, and assess the radioactive contaminants in the air and water. Radiation monitors can be used to monitor the age and component breakdown of nuclear warheads and to distinguish between weapons and reactor grade plutonium. The UN's International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) uses radiation monitors for treaty verification, remote monitoring, and enforcing the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. As part of treaty verification, monitors can be used to certify the contents of containers during inspections. They could be used for portal monitoring to secure border checkpoints, sea ports, air cargo centers, public parks, sporting venues, and key government buildings. Currently, only 2% of all sea cargo shipped is inspected for radiation sources. In addition, merely the presence of radiation is detected and nothing is known about the radioactive source until further testing. The utilization of radiation monitors with neutron sensitivity and capability of operation in hostile port environments would increase the capacity and effectiveness of the radioactive scanning processes.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

A Field Evaluation of a Prototype Global Identifier for UF6 Cylinders

The U.S. Department of Energy s National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA), members of the U.S. national laboratories, UF6 industry stakeholders, and international inspectorates have been working on developing a global identifier (ID) for UF6 cylinders. This industry-driven project has identified efficiency gains for facility operations, state and/or regional regulation, and inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency. The global ID features standardized alphanumeric characters, a large font, a barcode (for automated reading), and it is affixed to the cylinder. Four years of active engagement with all of the stakeholders has resulted in on the development of user requirements, implementation guidelines, and a preferred design for the ID. Although this project was conceived and has been largely managed from the DOE/NNSA side to address international non-proliferation concerns, it remains an industry-driven initiative. When designing the field evaluation, the NNSA team worked closely with a World Nuclear Transport Institute (WNTI) Working Group on UF6 Cylinder Identification to determine features that would provide the most benefit. The WNTI Working Group consists predominately of industry members associated with cylinder fabrication, UF6 conversion, enrichment, fuel fabrication, and cylinder transport. Despite its industry-laden focus, the DOE/NNSA team realized that a vote of confidence from the IAEA could serve as a catalyst for the overall project, and its eventual implementation. In April of 2016, a field evaluation was conducted to demonstrate how the key features of the identifier would work in an operational setting. A selected team travelled to Vienna to evaluate the benefits of a global identifier in performing a PIV in a cylinder storage area containing ~50-100 cylinders. The mock tag-checking exercise was conducted three separate times, with varying scenarios with three different teams. The first group performed the exercise according to current inspection methods. The second group focused on the addition of a new global identifier to the cylinders, and the third group used the new global identifier with an automated reader. This paper will discuss the preparation and execution of the field evaluation, its results, and the next steps for the Global Cylinder Identifier Project.

White-Horton, Jessica L↗

Test Methods for Cementitious Seal Materials for Borehole Disposal - 17352

The Nuclear and Energy Research Institute (IPEN-CNEN/SP) in Sao Paulo-Brazil, is considering borehole disposal of disused sealed radioactive sources (DSRS), which were used in smoke detectors, lightning arresters, radiotherapy, industrial gauges, irradiators, and other applications. The current IPEN concept of borehole is a modified BOSS system developed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It differs from the IAEA's design in that the disposal zone is below 300 m, and the DSRS are placed directly in the disposal packages constituted of stainless steel containers with 1.5 L capacity. A borehole drilled through sediment and granite, stabilized with stainless steel casing and cement grout is proposed for the conceptual model. Standard cement-material test methods and performance specific test methods, including accelerated aging methods, are needed for modeling the performance of the candidate cementitious grouts. A cross-disciplinary team from the USA Savannah River National laboratory is providing technical assistance to IPEN in this performance assessment. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

The role of correlation in the ground state energy of confined helium atom

We analyze the ground state energy of helium atom confined by spherical impenetrable walls, and the role of the correlation energy in the total energy. The confinement of an atom in a cavity is one way in which we can model the effect of the external pressure on an atom. The calculations of energy of the system are carried out by the variational method. We find that the correlation energy remains almost constant for a range values of size of the boxes analyzed.

75 CONDENSED MATTER PHYSICS, SUPERCONDUCTIVITY AND↗

2014 Well Completion Report for Corrective Action Unit 447 Project Shoal Area Churchill County, Nevada October 2015

This report summarizes the drilling program conducted by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Legacy Management at the Project Shoal Area (Shoal) Subsurface Corrective Action Unit 447 in Churchill County, Nevada. Shoal was the location of an underground nuclear test conducted on October 26, 1963, as part of the Vela Uniform program sponsored jointly by the U.S. Department of Defense and the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (a predecessor to DOE). The test consisted of detonating a 12-kiloton nuclear device in granitic rock at a depth of approximately 1,211 feet (ft) below ground surface (bgs) (AEC 1964). The corrective action strategy for the site is focused on revising the site conceptual model and evaluating the adequacy of the monitoring well network at the site. Field activities associated with the project were conducted in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO 1996, as amended) and applicable Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) policies and regulations.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

VAMDC FP7 project and STARK-B database: C II Stark broadening parameters for white dwarf atmospheres research

Stark broadening parameters of C II lines were determined within 3s-np spectral series within the semiclassical perturbation method. The atomic energy levels needed for calculations were taken from TOPBASE as well as the oscillator strengths, calculated additionally using the Coulomb approximation (the method of Bates and Damgaard). The both results were compared and the disagreement is found only in one case where the configuration mixing allows a forbidden transition to a close perturbing energy level. Calculations were performed for plasma conditions relevant for atmospheres of DQ white dwarfs and for a new type of white dwarfs, with surface composed mostly of carbon, discovered in 2007 by Dufour et al.. The aim of this work is to provide accurate C II Stark broadening data, which are crucial for this type of white dwarf atmosphere modellisation. Obtained results will be included in STARK-B database (http://stark-b.obspm.fr/), entering in the FP7 project of European Virtual Atomic and Molecular Data Center VAMDC aiming at building an interoperable e-Infrastructure for the exchange of atomic and molecular data (http://www.vamdc.org/).

71 CLASSICAL AND QUANTUM MECHANICS, GENERAL PHYSIC↗

Proposal of a Categorization of the Disused Sealed Radioactive Sources with a View to Safe - 17285

In the Nuclear and Energy Research Institute (IPEN-CNEN/Brazil) many works to improve and develop characterization of radioactive waste techniques have been deployed by the Radioactive Waste Management Department (IPEN-CNEN/SP). In this line, this work aims to suggest a new categorization of sealed sources, which considers their activities, as suggested by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), but also the time required for the activity to decrease to a safe value. We considered the sealed sources categorization system suggested by the IAEA and we applied such categorization system to various sources currently stored by institutes of Brazilian Nuclear and Energy Commission (CNEN). Then, we also applied the categorization system defined herein, it follows that the categorization system presented by the IAEA has many applications and their use should not be abandoned. However, since the new proposed categorization systems allow to differentiate sources that in the IAEA system are in the same category, they can help define the long-term management of radioactive waste. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Semilocal exchange hole with an application to range-separated density functionals

The exchange-correlation hole is a central concept in density functional theory. It not only provides justification for an exchange-correlation energy functional but also serves as a local ingredient for nonlocal range-separated density functionals. However, due to the nonlocal nature, modeling the conventional exact exchange hole presents a great challenge to density functional theory. In this work, we propose a semilocal exchange hole underlying the Tao-Perdew-Staroverov-Scuseria (TPSS) meta-generalized gradient approximation functional. Our model is distinct from previous ones not only at small separation between an electron and the hole around the electron but also in the way it interpolates between rapidly varying and slowly varying densities. Here the interpolation is determined by the wave-vector analysis on the infinite-barrier model for a jellium surface. Numerical tests show that our exchange-hole model mimics the conventional exact one quite well for atoms. As a simple application, we apply the hole model to construct a TPSS-based range-separated functional. We find that this range-separated functional can substantially improve the band gaps and barrier heights of TPSS, without losing much accuracy for atomization energies.

75 CONDENSED MATTER PHYSICS, SUPERCONDUCTIVITY AND↗

Supplemental Report on Nuclear Safeguards Considerations for the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR)

Recent reports by Department of Energy National Laboratories have discussed safeguards considerations for the low enriched uranium (LEU) fueled Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR) and the need for bulk accountancy of the plutonium in used fuel. These reports fail to account effectively for the degree of plutonium dilution in the graphitized-carbon pebbles that is sufficient to meet the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA's) 'provisional' guidelines for termination of safeguards on 'measured discards.' The thrust of this finding is not to terminate safeguards but to limit the need for specific accountancy of plutonium in stored used fuel. While the residual uranium in the used fuel may not be judged sufficiently diluted to meet the IAEA provisional guidelines for termination of safeguards, the estimated quantities of {sup 232}U and {sup 236}U in the used fuel at the target burn-up of {approx}91 GWD/MT exceed specification limits for reprocessed uranium (ASTM C787) and will require extensive blending with either natural uranium or uranium enrichment tails to dilute the {sup 236}U content to fall within specification thus making the PBMR used fuel less desirable for commercial reprocessing and reuse than that from light water reactors. Also the PBMR specific activity of reprocessed uranium isotopic mixture and its A{sub 2} values for effective dose limit if released in a dispersible form during a transportation accident are more limiting than the equivalent values for light water reactor spent fuel at 55 GWD/MT without accounting for the presence of the principal carry-over fission product ({sup 99}Tc) and any possible plutonium contamination that may be present from attempted covert reprocessing. Thus, the potentially recoverable uranium from PBMR used fuel carries reactivity penalties and radiological penalties likely greater than those for reprocessed uranium from light water reactors. These factors impact the economics of reprocessing, but a more significant consideration is that reprocessing technologies for coated particle fuels encased in graphitized-carbon have not progressed beyond laboratory-scale demonstrations although key equipment that has been tested in the past (such as graphite burners and electrolytic disintegration/dissolution devices) are not listed on either the 'Trigger List' or the 'Dual Use List' for mandatory export controls. Finally, if gross burn-up determined from fission product gamma ray inspection of a discharged pebble cannot be correlated acceptably with predicted plutonium content of the pebble, development and testing may be required on detector concepts for more directly measuring the plutonium content in a discharged pebble to ensure that its placement in the spent fuel storage tanks is for an acceptable 'measured discard' of diluted plutonium.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Savannah River Site Composite Analysis (FY2019 Annual Review)

The Savannah River Site (SRS) is a Department of Energy (DOE) site encompassing approximately 310 square miles in South Carolina. It is bounded on the southwest by the Savannah River (SR) and is situated approximately 12 miles south of Aiken, South Carolina, and 15 miles southeast of Augusta, Georgia. Construction of and subsequent operations at the SRS began in 1951 under the direction of the Atomic Energy Commission. The primary mission of the SRS was to produce tritium and plutonium for the national nuclear weapons complex. Between 1953 and 1955, SRS brought five reactors and various support facilities into operation in support of its primary mission. Support facilities included two chemical separations plants, a heavy water extraction plant, a nuclear fuel and target fabrication facility, a tritium extraction facility and waste management facilities. With the declining need for a large nuclear weapons stockpile since the end of the Cold War, many SRS facilities no longer produce or process nuclear materials. All reactors were shut down by 1993. However, the SRS Tritium Extraction Facility continues to supply DOE with tritium. Additionally, operations at the K-Area Complex currently provide interim safe storage for much of DOE’s excess plutonium (Pu) and high enriched uranium, in a building which formerly housed K Reactor. As the SRS mission has changed, many surplus facilities are being dispositioned safely and economically. SRS has completed extensive decommissioning activities in D-Area, M-Area, P-Area, R-Area, and T-Area, with groundwater (GW) remediation ongoing. High-level waste tanks continue to be emptied and closed.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Safeguards Guidance Document for Designers of Commercial Nuclear Facilities: International Nuclear Safeguards Requirements and Practices For Uranium Enrichment Plants

This report is the second in a series of guidelines on international safeguards requirements and practices, prepared expressly for the designers of nuclear facilities. The first document in this series is the description of generic international nuclear safeguards requirements pertaining to all types of facilities. These requirements should be understood and considered at the earliest stages of facility design as part of a new process called “Safeguards-by-Design.” This will help eliminate the costly retrofit of facilities that has occurred in the past to accommodate nuclear safeguards verification activities. The following summarizes the requirements for international nuclear safeguards implementation at enrichment plants, prepared under the Safeguards by Design project, and funded by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Office of NA-243. The purpose of this is to provide designers of nuclear facilities around the world with a simplified set of design requirements and the most common practices for meeting them. The foundation for these requirements is the international safeguards agreement between the country and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Relevant safeguards requirements are also cited from the Safeguards Criteria for inspecting enrichment plants, found in the IAEA Safeguards Manual, Part SMC-8. IAEA definitions and terms are based on the IAEA Safeguards Glossary, published in 2002. The most current specification for safeguards measurement accuracy is found in the IAEA document STR-327, “International Target Values 2000 for Measurement Uncertainties in Safeguarding Nuclear Materials,” published in 2001. For this guide to be easier for the designer to use, the requirements have been restated in plainer language per expert interpretation using the source documents noted. The safeguards agreement is fundamentally a legal document. As such, it is written in a legalese that is understood by specialists in international law and treaties, but not by most outside of this field, including designers of nuclear facilities. For this reason, many of the requirements have been simplified and restated. However, in all cases, the relevant source document and passage is noted so that readers may trace the requirement to the source. This is a helpful living guide, since some of these requirements are subject to revision over time. More importantly, the practices by which the requirements are met are continuously modernized by the IAEA and nuclear facility operators to improve not only the effectiveness of international nuclear safeguards, but also the efficiency. As these improvements are made, the following guidelines should be updated and revised accordingly.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Multilateral Testing Workshop on Relocatable Portal Monitors

The procurement and deployment of radiation detection equipment is a multi-faceted challenge across the globe. Knowledge sharing of the testing methods used to evaluate equipment for deployment scenarios helps improve the understanding of deployed systems by the global community. The United States Department of Energy’s Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence Office (NSDD) performed a series of characterization measurements in 2019, focused on radiation detection systems that could function as relocatable portal monitors. The capstone activity for this project was a multilateral and cross-disciplinary workshop demonstrating, performing, and refining the techniques used in the characterization measurements with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and global partners. A group of technical experts including representatives from nine countries, the IAEA, and NSDD gathered at Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque, NM during September of 2019 for the Operational and Performance Testing and Evaluation of Relocatable Portals Workshop. Over the course of a week, the group discussed the necessity for and process of developing operational and performance requirements, challenges related to deploying radiation detection systems for the countries in attendance, use cases for deploying relocatable radiation detection equipment, and considerations related to testing equipment for appropriate deployment scenarios. All participants were given the opportunity to have hands-on experience with eleven relocatable systems in executing a limited scope characterization test comprised of six test scenarios. At the conclusion of testing, participants reviewed and presented their findings, and the group as a whole compared and contrasted their experiences. Suggested revisions to the test methods and ideas for further collaborations were discussed. This report discusses the logistical and planning considerations for bringing together experts across disciplines in a multilateral workshop on testing of radiation detectors, as well as presenting the testing methods performed, results, and paths forward. Success of workshops related to technical knowledge transfer and improvement of test methods is key to global technical and scientific support of radiation detection deployments.

Erchinger, Jennifer L.↗

Using cyclotron radiation emission for ultra-high resolution x-ray spectroscopy

Abstract Cyclotron radiation emission spectroscopy (CRES) is an approach to measuring the energy of an electron trapped in an externally applied magnetic field. The bare electron can come from different interactions, including photoelectric absorption, Compton scatters, beta decay, and pair production. CRES relies on measuring the frequency of the electron’s cyclotron motion, and because the measurement times extend over 10 6 –10 7 cycles, the energy resolution is on the order of a single electronvolt. To date, CRES has only been performed on internal beta-emitting radioisotopes, but the technology can be applied to x-ray spectrometery through appropriate selection of a target gas and sufficient intensity of the distinct x-ray source. The applications of this technology range from high-precision measurements of atomic energy levels to calibrations of basic science experiments, to trace element identification. In this work we explore the use of CRES for x-ray spectroscopy within the rubric of measuring the energy levels of argon. Though the energy levels of argon are well established, we adopt this motivation as an example question around which a detector may be designed. The issues we explore include target material, density, electron trapping depth, noise levels, and overall efficiency. We also discuss spectral deconvolution and how the multiple peaks obtained from a single target/source pair can be used to enhance the robustness of the measurement.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Regulatory Framework for Salt Waste Disposal and Tank Closure at the Savannah River Site - 13663

The end of the Cold War has left a legacy of approximately 37 million gallons of radioactive waste in the aging waste tanks at the Department of Energy's Savannah River Site (SRS). A robust program is in place to remove waste from these tanks, treat the waste to separate into a relatively small volume of high-level waste and a large volume of low-level waste, and to actively dispose of the low-level waste on-site and close the waste tanks and associated ancillary structures. To support performance-based, risk-informed decision making and to ensure compliance with all regulatory requirements, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and its current and past contractors have worked closely with the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC), the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to develop and implement a framework for on-site low-level waste disposal and closure of the SRS waste tanks. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, provides DOE the authority to manage defense-related radioactive waste. DOE Order 435.1 and its associated manual and guidance documents detail this radioactive waste management process. The DOE also has a requirement to consult with the NRC in determining that waste that formerly was classified as high-level waste can be safely managed as either low-level waste or transuranic waste. Once DOE makes a determination, NRC then has a responsibility to monitor DOE's actions in coordination with SCDHEC to ensure compliance with the Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations Part 61 (10CFR61), Subpart C performance objectives. The management of hazardous waste substances or components at SRS is regulated by SCDHEC and the EPA. The foundation for the interactions between DOE, SCDHEC and EPA is the SRS Federal Facility Agreement (FFA). Managing this array of requirements and successfully interacting with regulators, consultants and stakeholders is a challenging task but ensures thorough and thoughtful processes for disposing of the SRS low-level waste and the closure of the tank farm facilities. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Examining the Impact of Local Constraint Violations on Energy Computations in DFT

ABSTRACT This work examines the impact of locally imposed constraints in Density Functional Theory (DFT). Using a metric referred to as the extent of violation index (EVI), we quantify how well exchange‐correlation functionals adhere to local constraints. Applying EVIs to a diverse set of molecules for GGA functionals reveals constraint violations, particularly for semi‐empirical functionals. We leverage EVIs to explore potential connections between these violations and errors in chemical properties. While no correlation is observed for atomization energies, a significant statistical correlation emerges between EVIs and total energies. Similarly, the analysis of reaction energies suggests weak positive correlations for specific constraints. However, definitive conclusions about error cancellation mechanisms cannot be made at this time. These observations revealed by EVIs may be useful for consideration when designing future generations of semilocal functionals.

Khanna, Vaibhav [Department of Chemistry Universit↗

NPP financial and regulatory risks-Importance of a balanced and comprehensive nuclear law for a newcomer country considering nuclear power programme

The nature of Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) projects are: long duration (10-15 years for new build), high capital investment, reasonable risks and highly regulated industries to meet national and international requirement on Safety, Security, Safeguards (3S) and Liabilities. It requires long term planning and commitment from siting to final disposal of waste/spent fuel. Potential financial and regulatory risks are common in massive NPP projects and will be magnified in the case of using unproven technology. If the risks are not properly managed, it can lead to high project and operation costs, and, fail to fulfil its objectives to provide compatible electricity prices and. energy security. To ensure successful, the government and investors need to ensure that the NPP project is bankable with low cost of project and funding, have fair treatment and proper risk mitigation, and able to complete on time with no cost overrun. One of the requirements as prerequisite for the development of NPP as stipulated by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the establishment of a Legal and Regulatory Framework. The main objective of nuclear law is to ensure that the activities and projects carried-out in the country are legal and compliant to national and international requirements. The law should also be able to provide fair treatment of risks on its activities that is acceptable to investors. The challenge for a newcomer country is to develop a balanced and comprehensive national nuclear law that meet these objectives while taking into consideration various stakeholders’ interest without compromising on safety, security, safeguard, liability requirements and other international obligations. This paper highlights the nature of NPP projects, its potential and associated financial and regulatory risks, and its major concerns and challenges. It proposes possible risks treatment and mitigation through the formulation of a balanced and comprehensive legislation by clear understanding of various requirements of public, regulators, investors, financial institutions, international community, operator and other important stakeholders. Ambiguities and uncertainties, especially with regards to certain conditions and requirements should be minimised by emulating good practices of experienced nuclear regulators. The imposition of various financial requirements such as funds for decommissioning, radioactive waste management, financial security, nuclear liabilities and licensing fees are necessary, but at the same time the quantum needs to be clearly defined. Concerns on absolute liability of the operators need to be addressed through a creation of necessary and proper nuclear insurance legislations to mitigate operator S nuclear liability obligations and other financial risks. Another major risk to investors is the possibility of public resistance which will not only can hinder the construction but can also stop operation of the nuclear power plant which will contribute to huge losses to investors and countries. This may require a provision in the legislation that provide proper compensation for these situations and at the same time to allow operators to engage in nuclear promotional activities, such as community benefit and public consultation as voluntary initiatives. Through proper planning, research, consultation and execution, the proposed nuclear law shall be able to promote good regulatory practices for public and investors’ confidence and benefit. Early involvement of various stakeholders is essential as a platform for regular communications between regulators and interested parties. Stakeholders’ participation in the NPP programme and law developments will also promote transparency of the projects while upholding the independency of the regulators.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗