Engineering Papers⌕ Search

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “Radiological”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 649 records · Page 36
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2021

Geochemical data package for performance assessment calculations related to the Savannah River Site

The Savannah River Site (SRS) disposes of low-level radioactive waste (LLW) and stabilizes high-level radioactive waste (HLW) tanks in the subsurface environment. Calculations used to establish the radiological limits of these facilities are referred to as Performance Assessments (PAs), Special Analyses (SAs), and Composite Analyses (CAs). The purpose of this document is to revise the existing geochemical data package used for these calculations (Kaplan, 2016). This work builds on earlier compilations of geochemical data, referred to a geochemical data packages (Kaplan, 2007; Kaplan, 2010; Kaplan, 2016; McDowell-Boyer et al., 2000). This work is being conducted as part of the on-going maintenance program of the SRS PA programs that periodically updates calculations and data packages when new information becomes available.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2021

Distribution of Infiltration in the 216-U-10, 216-B-3 Pond, and 216-T-4 Pond Systems 1944-1997

A modeling system to simulate fate and transport of contaminant plumes in groundwater beneath the Central Plateau to support the Cumulative Impact Evaluation (CIE) and Composite Analysis (CA) is being developed. The CIE will evaluate the cumulative effect of multiple Central Plateau radiological and chemical sources on groundwater quality. This will enable cleanup decisions to be evaluated in the context of all Central Plateau waste sites and existing groundwater conditions. The purpose of this Environmental Calculation File (ECF) is to partition the infiltration of wastewater and contaminant inventory between the main pond and each expansion lobe of the 216-B-3 Pond system, and to partition the infiltration of wastewater and contaminant inventory between the ditches and ponds of the 216-U-10 Pond and 216-T-4 Pond systems.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2021

Radiation Dispersal Devices. A brief overview [Slides]

In this presentation I lump together the "classified RDD" - a dispersion of aerosolized radioactive material - with the nefarious use of radioactive materials. This can include other means of dispersal as well as an RED - a Radiological Exposure Device. This combination is because the threat is the nefarious use of radioactive material, and most of our concerns are in regards to the loss of control of the material, potential(s) for misuse, and detection.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2021

Validation of the Public Radiation Exposure Calculation for the Incident at the National Institute of Standards and Technology Center for Neutron Research on February 3, 2021

The Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration Consequence Management Program was contacted by the Health Physics Chief of the National Institute of Standards and Technology Center for Neutron Research (NCNR) to review public radiation exposure calculations for an event that occurred on its Gaithersburg, Maryland, campus on February 3, 2021. Subject matter experts from the Nuclear Emergency Support Team (NEST) assets, specifically the Consequence Management Home Team (CMHT) and the National Atmospheric Release Advisory Center (NARAC), were selected to provide support. CMHT used three separate modeling codes to validate the results the scientists at NCNR calculated using the HotSpot model. The analyses were performed using NARAC’s in-house Lagrangian dispersion codes known as LODI and Aeolus, as well as the Turbo FRMAC software from Sandia National Laboratories. The team used parameters provided by the NCNR scientists regarding the site, applicable observable meteorological data, and environmental survey and sampling data to estimate public exposure. Each model estimated public dose at much less than 0.5 mrem. CMHT concurs with the NCNR public radiation exposure calculations which state that members of the public at the 400-meter boundary would have received a radiological dose of less than 0.5 mrem.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
DOE OSTI2021

Thermal Evaluation of the SAVY-4000 1 Quart Container at High Heat Loads

The SAVY-4000 Safety Analysis Report (SAR) was published in 2013 which established the design life of the container series through physical testing that meets applicable requirements from DOE M 441.1-1, Nuclear Material Packaging Manual. One critical requirement in DOE M 441.1-1 is to set a maximum heat load for the entire series to ensure that throughout the lifetime of the container, each of the components still performs within manufacture specifications. The original maximum decay heat limit has been defined within the SAVY-4000 SAR, which was accomplished by completing a series of tests that heat loaded the SAVY-4000 series and measured the steady state temperature and graded it against manufacture specifications. The container series is comprised of a corrosion resistant 316L stainless steel containment boundary, ceramic composite filter for the prevention of radiological particulate release and a chemically stable O-ring made of Viton ® . Currently, the SAVY 4000 maximum decay heat load is set at 25 Watts and the heat load expected during normal handling and storage is considered sufficient that the SAVY 4000 container requirements will not be the limiting factor for storage of most common material in use at TA-55, e.g. weapons grade oxide, americium, Pu-238 oxide and encapsulated heat sources. The SAVY 4000 lifetime was originally set as 5 years within the SAVY-4000 SAR, but in July 2019 the lifetime was extended to 15 years through a technical basis justification approved by the Department of Energy (DOE) Los Alamos Field Office. The 25 Watt limit applies to all SAVY 4000 container sizes; 1-quart, 2-quart, 3-quart, 5-quart, 8-quart, 12-quart, 5-gallon, and 10-gallon.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2021

Project 57 Air Monitoring Report: January 1 through December 31, 2019

On April 24, 1957, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) (now the Department of Energy [DOE]) conducted the Project 57 safety experiment in western Emigrant Valley northeast of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) (formerly the Nevada Test Site) on lands withdrawn by the Department of Defense (DOD) for the Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR). The test was performed to (1) assess a technique for estimating plutonium distribution resulting from a nonnuclear detonation, (2) develop biomedical evaluation techniques for use in plutonium-laden environments, (3) evaluate methods of surface decontamination, and (4) evaluate instruments and field procedures for the prompt estimation of alpha contamination (Shreve, 1958). Although the test did not result in the fission of nuclear materials, it did disseminate plutonium across the land surface. Following the experiment, the AEC fenced the contaminated area and returned control of the surrounding land to the DOD. Various radiological surveys were performed in the area and the DOE expanded the demarked Contamination Area (CA) in 2007 by posting signs 200 ft to 400 ft (60 m to 120 m) outside of the original fence.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2021

A Risk-Informed Performance-Based Methodology to Manage Fire Protection Systems in Nuclear Facilities

Fire protection systems (FPSs) and features are installed in U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Hazard Category 1, 2, or 3 nuclear facilities to protect property (maximum possible fire loss thresholds), life, and nuclear safety (i.e., structures, systems, and components). These FPSs and features are designed and maintained in accordance with the prescriptive guidance provided in applicable building codes and National Fire Protection Association codes and standards. Management, operations, and maintenance activities of FPSs involve significant effort. A DOE facility’s documented safety analysis or other safety basis document could also rely on FPSs to provide either a safety significant or safety class function to mitigate fire hazards and minimize radiological consequences. In some cases, the designation of safety significant or safety class may be determined to provide a layer of defense-in-depth to minimize nuclear safety risks independent of the fire risk. DOE standards allow the use of performance-based design alternatives developed by the fire industry but do not consider the defense-in-depth layers of protection provided in DOE facilities to prevent or mitigate the risks associated with unintended release of radioactive materials into the environment. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory developed a decision-making methodology tailored for DOE non-reactor nuclear facilities to manage FPSs and features by integrating nuclear safety risk insights into a performance-based analysis. This risk-informed, performance-based (RIPB) methodology can be used to provide the technical basis for classifying an FPS as safety class and safety significant, tailoring administrative controls (e.g., technical safety requirements), and ranking the importance of FPSs to prioritize maintenance, upgrades, and replacement activities. The RIPB methodology is a graded approach to inform DOE facility owners and Fire Protection Program managers of the most risk-significant FPSs and equipment, and those systems would be cost-beneficial to relax rigor if there is a need to re-design the FPS coverage or deviate from DOE and National Fire Protection Association standards for those systems that would be less significant. This paper describes the framework used to develop the RIPB methodology and the outcome of implementing this methodology in a use-case nuclear facility. This paper also discusses the impact to DOE policies and standards and the safety margins and defense-in-depth measures credited in nuclear safety assessments in a facility’s documented safety analysis and the benefits of implementing an RIPB methodology in lieu of a prescriptive method to comply with fire protection requirements.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2021

B332 & B151 ACL Events

In September 2019, two Unexpected Radiological Event (HP-FO-601) reports were submitted to document the exceedance of a worker's default Administrative Control Level (ACL) of 100 mrem/y. One involved work in B332; the second in B151. B332 event: The worker was new to B332 and had completed qualification as an Associate Fissile Material Handler (FMH) in April of 2019. The worker received 61 mrem in June and an additional 100 mrem in July. The worker was on a monthly TLD exchange cycle. B151 event: A PLS radiochemist received ~20 mrem for the 1st quarter of the year and ~120 mrem for the 2nd quarter of the year. The worker was on a quarterly TLD exchange cycle.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
DOE OSTI2021

Nuclear Safeguards and Nondestructive Assay

What can we do? Encourage/ensure peaceful nuclear uses; Secure, safeguard, and/or dispose of dangerous nuclear and radiological material; Detect and control the proliferation of related WMD technology and expertise.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2020

Production Through Simulation: Using Simulation Technologies to Create and Evaluate Nuclear Fuel Fabrication Facility Designs

This project explores how physics-based and discrete-event simulation technologies can be jointly employed to model a suite of nuclear fuel fabrication facility designs with variable radiological environments, optimize their design to lower operational costs subject to a set of design constraints, and evaluate their performance. Initially, three variants of U-20Pu-10Zr metallic nuclear fuel in three specific geometric configurations are modeled and studied across more than 50 physics simulations in nuclear physics software packages SCALE and Monte Carlo N-Particle Transport (MCNP6.2). From these tests, values for effective dose rate and criticality are recorded for each of the nine alloy-geometry configurations. These values are then incorporated into discrete-event models of fuel fabrication in the simulation program ExtendSim Pro 10 as process attributes. This allows one to track the dose to facility personnel as fuel is fabricated, dually enabling us to evaluate the safety of a given facility design in terms of absorbed dose per worker per year and to craft operational guidelines that adhere to federal and local safety regulations.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Vadose and Saturated Zone Flow and Transport Calculations for the Active Trenches of the Low-Level Burial Grounds, Hanford Site, Washington

The purpose of the fate and transport modeling described in this environmental calculation file (ECF) is to evaluate the impacts to groundwater associated with waste disposal operations at Mixed Waste Low-Level Burial Ground (LLBG) Trenches 31 and 34 to satisfy requirements in DOE O 435.1, Radioactive Waste Management. The model integrates the flow and transport in the vadose zone beneath the active trenches with the saturated zone downgradient of the trenches to predict the radionuclide concentration at the point of assessment (POA). DOE M 435.1-1, Radioactive Waste Management Manual, defines the POA as the point of highest projected dose or concentration beyond a 100 m (328 ft) buffer zone surrounding the disposed waste. The modeling is conducted in accordance with the DOE G 435.1, Implementation Guide for Use with DOE M 435.1-1, performance assessment (PA) guidelines. The modeling involves evaluation of the groundwater concentrations and radionuclide arrival times during the 1,000-year compliance and 10,000-year sensitivity-uncertainty periods per DOE O 435.1 and DOE M 435.1. This analysis does not consider radionuclide release during facility operations, only the post-closure impacts of the radionuclides to the environment. The evaluation of potential radiological dose to groundwater receptors caused by releases from a closed facility containing radioactive waste typically includes the following: (1) Release of radionuclides from that facility (2) Transport of those radionuclides through the environment, and (3) Exposure to humans to environmental concentration levels of those radionuclides The fate and transport three-dimensional (3D) model analysis involves the post-closure impacts to the environment of the technetium-99, iodone-129, and uranium (all isotopes in the waste). The residual inventory estimates include several radionuclides, but technetium-99 is typically responsible for almost all of the beta-gamma dose equivalent associated with groundwater (water resources) protection per 40 CFR 141, “National Primary Drinking Water Regulations” (e.g., see the results in WCH-520, Performance Assessment of Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility, Hanford Site, Washington; hereinafter referred to as the ERDF PA), and iodone-129 can also be a significant dose contributor for some waste (e.g., RPP-RPT-59958, Performance Assessment for the Integrated Disposal Facility, Hanford Site, Washington; hereinafter referred to as the IDF PA). Uranium does not typically factor significantly into the impacts to groundwater, even during the 10,000-year sensitivity-uncertainty period, but always remains of interest as a contaminant. This ECF does not address vadose and saturated zone modeling for Trench 94 of the 200 East Area LLBG. Current information confirms the validity of the low corrosion rate of the naval reactor plant carbon steel (HY-80), and the even lower corrosion rate of the nickel-iron-chromium alloy reactor vessel (Inconel Alloy 600) presented in DOE/EIS-0259, Final Environmental Impact Statement on the Disposal of Decommissioned, Defueled Cruiser, Ohio Class, and Los Angeles Class Naval Reactor Plants. Based on these low corrosion rates, the time to breach the reactor vessel to allow release of radionuclides from the activated metal of the reactor vessel internal structure is at least 10,000 years. This time to breach precludes the need to evaluate the vadose and saturated zone transport of contaminants released from the reactor compartment disposal packages in the 200 East Area LLBGs PA (CP-63826, Waste Release Model Package Report for the Active Trenches of the Low-Level Burial Grounds, Hanford Site, Washington).

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2021

Novel Molten Salt Neutron Imaging Furnace Design [Slides]

Project Statement: Design a furnace capable of reaching 1200° C, with temperature monitoring and the ability to support the neutron imaging of radiological samples while rotating the sample containment.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2020

Performance Criteria for Capture and/or Immobilization Technologies (Revision 1)

The capture and subsequent immobilization of regulated volatile radionuclides from the off-gas streams of a used nuclear fuel (UNF) reprocessing facility has been a topic of substantial research interest for the US Department of Energy and its international counterparts. Removal of specific radionuclides from the plant effluent streams before discharge to the environment is required to meet regulations set forth by the US Environmental Protection Agency. Upon removal, the radionuclides, as well as associated sorbents that cannot be regenerated in a cost-effective manner, are destined for conversion to a waste form. Research in separation and capture methodologies has included a wide range of technology types, and studies of waste forms are correspondingly diverse. In considering the future development and implementation of both sorbents and waste forms, it is necessary to identify benchmark measures of performance to objectively evaluate each sorbent system or waste form. Sets of performance criteria and associated metrics have been developed for sorbent and waste form evaluation. These criteria address physical, radiological, and chemical characteristics, technical practicality, technical maturity, cost, and, for sorbents, system performance. The criteria and metrics appear to be robust and should be applicable despite the eventual waste classification (as either high- or low-level waste). They are flexible enough to address both aqueous reprocessing and electrochemical reprocessing of UNF. These criteria sets can serve as tools to evaluate performance at multiple stages within the development process, and in this revision (Revision 1) they have been used to assess technologies relating to krypton/xenon separations and iodine capture from off-gas streams arising from UNF reprocessing. Assessment of krypton/xenon separations using engineered forms of two zeolite minerals (silver mordenite and hydrogen mordenite in a polyacrylonitrile-based binder [AgZ-PAN/HZ-PAN]) found that the zeolite-based separation is relatively advanced in its development, but several key issues require resolution. First, desorption processes for both krypton and xenon require refinement to provide an understanding of the product purity that can be achieved. Second, adsorption rate data is needed in order to calculate the bed depth required for effective separation. Finally, it is strongly recommended that a technical review of krypton/xenon separation by AgZ-PAN/HZ-PAN be performed to synergize available data and assess the cost savings and operational benefits that may be realized from implementation of this technology. Assessment of metal organic frameworks (MOFs) for their use in the separation of krypton/xenon found that the ideal separation would be performed using a single-column system with a MOF selective for krypton over xenon. A robust research effort should work to identify a krypton-selective MOF designed to operate at temperatures of approximately 0°C or higher, which could be preferred over cryogenic krypton/xenon capture for used fuel reprocessing off-gas streams. In the case of the CaSDB-MOF (the most well-understood xenon sorbent to date), two issues are judged of high importance. First, xenon breakthrough capacity for the CaSDB-MOF in prototypical conditions should be determined. Preliminary research indicates that breakthrough may be near immediate, presenting a substantial obstacle in separative system design. Second, development of desorption methodology should be performed to determine regeneration time, energy requirements, and the product stream composition. Silver-based sorbents (AgZ and AgAero) for use in iodine capture from the dissolver off-gas were evaluated against the established criteria. These sorbents are significantly better understood for this application as a result of research efforts over the past decade. The potential implementation of AgAero at a large scale is hindered by its physical degradation by components of the dissolver off-gas stream. Less is known about the adsorption of iodine by these sorbents from other off-gas streams in the plant. Initial experimental efforts have been closely coordinated in an effort to understand organic iodine (such as would be found in the vessel off-gas) adsorption by AgZ and AgAero. Future work should expand this experimental program, and analysis of other reprocessing facility off-gas streams such as the vitrification off-gas stream should be conducted to better understand other potential applications for iodine sorbents. A review of iodine waste form development shows that this area is diverse and that multiple promising waste forms have been identified for the immobilization of radioactive iodine. Efforts related to the direct conversion of iodine sorbents (including AgZ and AgAero) should be continued because of the advantages of direct conversion in a waste management strategy and other sorbents should continue to be advanced as merited.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2021

System Model Calculations for the Active Trenches of the Low-Level Burial Grounds, Hanford Site, Washington

Two lined trenches (Trench 31 and 34) located within the 200 West Low-Level Burial Ground (LLBG) area of the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) Hanford Site are designated for permanent disposal of low-level radioactive waste (LLW) and mixed low-level radioactive waste (MLLW). In accordance with DOE O 435.1, Radioactive Waste Management, radioactive waste shall be managed and disposed in a manner that is protective of worker, public health and safety, and the environment. DOE O 435.1 requires a site-specific radiological performance assessment (PA) that includes calculations of potential releases and subsequent doses to members of the public for a period of 1,000 years after closure of a low-level waste (LLW) disposal facility. The purpose of this environmental calculation file (ECF) is to document the various dose calculations performed to support DOE’s LLBG PA. The dose assessments are performed to evaluate the potential exposure of an all-pathway representative person to radionuclide contaminants of potential concern (COPCs) that may be released from the LLBG Trenches 31 and 34 to the point of calculation (POC) located at the outer edge of a 100 m buffer zone surrounding the trench boundary. This ECF uses inputs from other ECFs and their associated model package reports (MPRs) supporting the LLBG PA. The five major objectives of this ECF are to present the results of the following: (1) Deterministic dose assessments for both groundwater and atmospheric exposure scenarios; (2) Radon-222 (Rn-222) flux emanating at the surface from the disposed wastes; (3) Uncertainty analyses of the groundwater pathway annual dose due to uncertainty in input parameters; (4) Sensitivity analyses of the input parameters that could potentially impact the fate and transport of the contaminants and doses; (5) Doses arising from inadvertent intruder exposure scenarios.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2021

Argonne National Laboratory Site Environmental Report (CY2020)

This report discusses the status and the accomplishments of the environmental protection program at Argonne National Laboratory for calendar year 2020. The status of Argonne environmental protection activities with respect to compliance with the various laws and regulations is discussed, along with environmental management, sustainability efforts, environmental corrective actions, and habitat restoration. To evaluate the effects of Argonne operations on the environment, samples of environmental media collected on the site, at the site boundary, and off the Argonne site were analyzed and compared with applicable guidelines and standards. A variety of radionuclides were measured in air, surface water, groundwater, and bottom sediment samples. In addition, chemical constituents in surface water, groundwater, and wastewater were analyzed. External penetrating radiation doses were measured, and the potential for radiation exposure to off site population groups was estimated. Results are interpreted with respect to the origin of the radioactive and chemical substances (i.e., natural, Argonne, and other) and are compared with applicable standards intended to protect human health and the environment. A U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) dose calculation methodology, based on International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) recommendations and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) CAP 88 Version 4.1 computer code, was used in preparing this report.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗
DOE OSTI2021

CFD Analysis of RLUOB Zone 1 HEPA Filter Plenum and Testing Manifolds

The purpose of this computational fluid dynamics (CFD) analysis is to ensure that Camfil Farr’s upstream and downstream injection and sampling manifolds can meet or exceed the requirements outlined in the ASME AG-1 1997 a(2000) Code on Nuclear Air and Gas Treatment for the testing of HEPA and adsorbent filters. This paper will present a numerical simulation of airflow in the Radiological Laboratory Utility Office Building (RLUOB) zone 1 HEPA filter plenum and testing manifolds using the commercial CFD software ANSYS FLUENT 2020R1. The CFD analysis focuses on the investigation of the air flow distribution and air-aerosol mixing uniformity. The evaluation was done for all steps of the modeling process: grid generation, physics setup, simulation, and post-processing. The mass flow rate in each section of the zone 1 injection and sampling manifolds is also reported.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2021

Development of an Activation Analysis Methodology to Support the Disposal of the High Flux Isotope Reactor Original Reflector Container

The original beryllium reflector container was installed prior to the first ever High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) cycle and was removed at the end of cycle 382. The original beryllium reflector was part of every HFIR irradiation cycle from September of 1966 to October of 2000. After its service lifetime, the beryllium reflector container has been interim stored at the fuel pool storage, which is located adjacent to the reactor. Due to space limitations in the pool fuel storage, it is necessary to remove the beryllium reflector container and send it to a location that can be stored permanently. Prior to shipping the beryllium reflector container, the radiological activity must be known. The challenge in determining the overall activity as well as the isotopic inventory and volumetric material fractions lays on the fact that some of the original reflector container stainless steel quantities are not known. Therefore, a methodology to determine a conservative activation scenario was developed.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2021

Physical Sciences Vistas Issue 3 2021

In this issue, highlights of our contributions to mission operations include descriptions of the following. • How exact and scrupulous planning in concert with sophisticated science enabled a first-ever direct measurement of a radionuclide with a half-life as short as six days. The work, which included operations at the Los Alamos Neutron Science Centers (LANSCE) Weapons Neutron Research Facility and the Isotope Production Facility’s hot cell facility, is a boon for both astrophysics and weapons science. • An introduction to Christie Davis and her role in ensuring the Lab’s execution of simultaneous excellence. • A look at progress by AOT’s Target and Experimental Support Team in reclaiming long-dormant space in a radiological controlled area for new work improving target systems for the Lujan Center. • A story showcasing a cross-organizational effort to minimize the directorate’s legacy and environmental footprint. Staff from across the Lab joined together to ensure the safe and efficient disposal of Rocky Flats legacy waste stored in a transportainer at the Target Fabrication Facility. • How the Lab’s Utilities and Infrastructure experts collaborated with stakeholders in our directorate to safety execute preventive maintenance on the LANSCE mesa’s large electrical substation. The Safe Conduct of Research principles provided a common framework for the planning and process. • A description of the resources called upon and the procedures undertaken by MPA to inventory the division’s time-sensitive chemicals, including the careful and conscientious response of an alert team member when something seemed amiss.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗