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Enterprise SRS: leveraging ongoing operations to advance radioactive waste management technologies

The Savannah River Site (SRS) is re-purposing its vast array of assets to solve future national issues regarding environmental stewardship, national security, and clean energy. The vehicle for this transformation is Enterprise SRS which presents a new, strategic view of SRS as a united endeavor for 'all things nuclear' as opposed to a group of distinct and separate entities with individual missions and organizations. Key among the Enterprise SRS strategic initiatives is the integration of research into facilities in conjunction with ongoing missions to provide researchers from other national laboratories, academic institutions, and commercial entities the opportunity to demonstrate their technologies in a relevant environment and scale prior to deployment. To manage that integration of research demonstrations into site facilities, The DOE Savannah River Operations Office, Savannah River Nuclear Solutions, and the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) have established a center for applied nuclear materials processing and engineering research (hereafter referred to as the Center). The key objective of this initiative is to bridge the gap between promising transformational nuclear materials management advancements and large-scale deployment of the technology by using SRS assets (e.g. facilities, staff, and property) for those critical engineering-scale demonstrations necessary to assure the successful deployment of new technologies. The Center will coordinate the demonstration of R and D technologies and serve as the interface between the engineering-scale demonstration and the R and D programs, essentially providing cradle-to-grave support to the R and D team during the demonstration. While the initial focus of the Center will be on the effective use of SRS assets for these demonstrations, the Center also will work with research teams to identify opportunities to perform R and D demonstrations at other facilities. Unique to this approach is the fact that these SRS assets will continue to accomplish DOE's critical nuclear material missions (e.g., processing in H-Canyon and plutonium storage in K-Area). These demonstrations can be accomplished in a more cost-effective manner through the use of existing facilities in conjunction with ongoing missions. Essentially, the R and D program would not need to pay the full operational cost of a facility, just the incremental cost of performing the demonstration. Current Center activities have been focused on integrating advanced safeguards monitoring technology demonstrations into the SRS H-Canyon and advanced location technology demonstrations into K-Area Materials Storage. These demonstrations are providing valuable information to researchers and program owners. In addition these demonstrations are providing the Center with an improved protocol for demonstration management that can be exercised across the entire SRS (and to offsite venues) to ensure that future demonstrations are done efficiently and provide an opportunity to use these unique assets for multiple purposes involving national laboratories, academia, and commercial entities. Key among the envisioned future use of SRS assets is the demonstration of new radioactive waste management technologies critical for advancing the mission needs of the DOE-EM program offices in their efforts to cleanup 107 sites across the United States. Of particular interest is the demonstration of separations technologies in H-Canyon. Given the modular design of H-Canyon, those demonstrations would be accomplished using a process frame. The demonstration equipment would be installed on the process frame and that frame would then be positioned into an H-Canyon cell so that the demonstration is performed in a radiological environment involving prototypic nuclear materials. (authors)

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SNF Data Visualization on the Centralized Used Fuel Resource for Information Exchange (CURIE) Website

To better inform stakeholders regarding the nature of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) at utility sites, an online data visualization system has been created for the U.S. Department of Energy's Office of Nuclear Energy (DOENE). The data visualization system is part of the Centralized Used Fuel Resource for Information Exchange (CURIE) website, hosted by the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) for DOE-NE. The visualization employs a database that is part of an analysis tool known as the Used Nuclear Fuel Storage, Transportation and Disposal Analysis Resource and Data System (UNF-ST[and]DARDS). Because many of the previous document management and sharing tools related to SNF have been terminated (or are inaccessible), a new tool, the CURIE, was developed for DOE-NE and launched on March 1, 2013 at http://curie.ornl.gov. In addition to supporting DOE SNF programs, CURIE is a national resource that is accessible to industry, vendor, federal, and laboratory partners, as well as other stakeholders. CURIE's architecture was initially based on previous work that supported DOE's Bioenergy Technologies Office on the Bioenergy Knowledge Discovery Framework (KDF). The site uses an open-source search engine, Apache Solr, which provides intuitive search results based on a faceted search method similar to that used by Amazon.com{sup R}. This algorithm helps to ensure that finding documents and data is straightforward. SNF data visualization capability was added to the CURIE website which provides a capability to post and access documents and data related to the management of SNF. CURIE currently maintains over 4,100 documents and the Siting Experience Database (SED), which was developed in response to a near-term recommendation by the Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future (BRC). The SED is a database of the experience that has been gained and relevant documentation that has been produced in efforts to site nuclear waste facilities, both in the US and abroad. Most of these documents are publicly accessible. In addition, CURIE maintains a current calendar of related events, an SNF image gallery, featured documents, and external links to related databases and websites. CURIE also maintains private groups (or communities) to facilitate collaborative development through sharing and editing documents that are not publicly available. There are more than 250 registered users in 23 different communities within CURIE.ORNL has also been developing UNF-ST[and]DARDS to provide a controlled source of technical data for various waste management system analysis/evaluation tools, access to key technical data, and analysis capabilities for characterizing the SNF inventory. UNF-ST[and]DARDS also provides enhanced capabilities to assess safety, risk, and uncertainty throughout the integrated waste management system. This paper describes the UNF-ST[and]DARDS data available for visualization and the associated visualization techniques used by CURIE to display this data.

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Management of Disused Radioactive Sealed Sources in Egypt - 13512

The future safe development of nuclear energy and progressive increasing use of sealed sources in medicine, research, industry and other fields in Egypt depends on the safe and secure management of disused radioactive sealed sources. In the past years have determined the necessity to formulate and apply the integrated management program for radioactive sealed sources to assure harmless and ecological rational management of disused sealed sources in Egypt. The waste management system in Egypt comprises operational and regulatory capabilities. Both of these activities are performed under legislations. The Hot Laboratories and Waste Management Center HLWMC, is considered as a centralized radioactive waste management facility in Egypt by law 7/2010. (authors)

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Waste Shipments to and from the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), Radioactive Waste Management Complex (Q4 and Annual Transportation Report (FY 2019)

This report satisfies the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office commitment to prepare a quarterly summary of waste shipments to the Nevada National Security Site Radioactive Waste Management Complex in Area 3 and Area 5. This report summarizes the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2019 and serves as an annual report for the following types of shipments: Low-Level Radioactive Waste, Mixed Low-Level Radioactive Waste, Classified Non-Radioactive Waste, Classified Non-Radioactive Hazardous Waste.

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Development of a Universal Canister for Disposal of High-Level Waste in Deep Boreholes - 16482

The mission of the United States Department of Energy's (DOE's) Office of Environmental Management is to complete the safe cleanup of the environmental legacy brought about from five decades of nuclear weapons development and government-sponsored nuclear energy research. Some of the wastes that must be managed have been identified as good candidates for disposal in a deep borehole in crystalline rock. In particular, wastes that can be disposed of in a small package are good candidates for this disposal concept. A canister-based system that can be used for handling these wastes during the disposition process (i.e., storage, transfer, transportation, and disposal) could facilitate the eventual disposal of these wastes. Development of specifications for the universal canister system will consider the regulatory requirements that apply to storage, transportation, and disposal of the capsules, as well as operational requirements and limits that could affect the design of the canister (e.g., deep borehole diameter). In addition, there are risks and technical challenges that need to be recognized and addressed as Universal Canister system specifications are developed. This paper provides an approach to developing specifications for such a canister system that is integrated with the overall efforts of the DOE's Used Fuel Disposition Campaign's Deep Borehole Field Test and compatible with planned storage of potential borehole candidate wastes. (authors)

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Decommissioning Status and Preliminary Engineering Planning for Chinshan NPP in Taiwan - 19114

The Chinshan Nuclear Power Plant, which consists of two BWR units and was owned by Taiwan Power Company (TPC), has an electrical output of 636 MWe for each unit. Unit No. 1 and Unit No. 2 were licensed till December 2018 and July 2019, respectively. According to regulations of decommissioning in Taiwan, decontamination and dismantling of a NPP should be completed within 25 years. Therefore, TPC had started compiling the decommissioning plans (DP, 17 chapters) with INER, national engineering companies and international consultants since 2012. The DP of Chinshan NPP has been approved by the regulator, Atomic Energy Council (AEC), in the end of June, 2017. There are 17 chapters in the decommissioning plans, which deal with all aspects of safety-related considerations during the decommissioning period, such as spent fuel management, waste management, personnel/workers planning, schedules/working items, environmental management and monitoring. Those items are discussed in detail in this paper in accordance with the approved DP. The implementation of decommissioning will be started while the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) is still under approval by EPA, which is expected to be completed in the end of 2018 or the mid of 2019. Once the decommissioning be started, all dismantling, decontamination, management teams, and preparation would be kicked off simultaneously in a very short period of time. In this paper, the planning assumptions, strategies from INER and TPC, management of radioactive waste, conversion of Turbine Building and detailed description of turbine-generator set are discussed. For the Turbine Building dismantling, inventories of equipment, cutting technology determination, storage logistics, container options and radwaste treatment and reduction would be important factors to be evaluated in the beginning. Afterwards, WBS (work breakdown structure) would be determined and be the basis for working bids, construction of a new storage warehouse, an incinerator and a super high pressure compactor. This preliminary engineering planning would be applied in the decommissioning of Chinshan NPP for the first time and be duplicated in Kuosheng NPP and Maanshan NPP in Taiwan as well. (authors)

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National Plan for the Disposal of Existing and Future TRU Wastes - 18616

Now that the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) has re-opened, after being down for three years due to an accident the DOE National TRU Program has re-developed a plan for the disposal of existing and future TRU wastes. The National TRU Waste Management Plan (NTWMP) is an integrated plan to address the needs of DOE sites across the DOE Weapons Complex that create and store TRU waste, and is centered on the capability of WIPP to receive and dispose of TRU waste. The WIPP capability is planned as a weekly shipping rate and is defined by emplacement and receipt rate capabilities since WIPP is not permitted for long-term storage. And, shipping rates may be constrained by new WIPP Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC) and future plans for repository configurations and disposal package capabilities over the next 30 years. Since WIPP is the only disposal system available to the DOE for TRU waste disposal, DOE has a newly projected life-cycle need for WIPP to remain open and available up to 2050. It is projected that the need for WIPP will continue up to the year 2050 for the disposition of the remaining legacy TRU inventories and for the disposal of TRU waste continuing to be generated at DOE's National Laboratories. In addition, there are several other potential new waste streams in which WIPP is being considered an alternative solution for their disposition. The NTWMP has been updated to reflect the short-term and long-term plans for TRU waste disposal at WIPP. The short-term plan is used by DOE for budget projection and integration purposes to facilitate and inform budget planning, both in DOE's Environmental Management (EM) and National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) organizations. Most legacy TRU waste (generated in the past and stored at DOE sites today) is owned and managed by EM. And, EM submits integrated budget requests for DOE sites, including the integration of resources for TRU waste management. NNSA and DOE's Office of Science (OS) funds TRU waste management as part of their mission funding and NNSA should eventually be the primary user of the WIPP resources as EM's legacy TRU waste is cleaned-up. Prior to the unexpected shutdown of WIPP in 2014, there was a small back-log of waste certified for WIPP disposal and shipments of TRU waste to WIPP were 'just-in-time' as waste was certified. After three years of WIPP being down, DOE sites have built significant back-logs of TRU waste to be certified for WIPP. That back-log built up to over 25,000 containers of TRU waste during that three-year period (Table 1). The backlog included both Contact-Handled (CH) TRU waste and Remote-Handled (RH) TRU waste, and even though WIPP re-opened in April of 2017, it is only open for TRU waste containers that can be stacked on disposal room floors. Plans for changing RH waste disposal packages and methods are in-the-works, but are not yet mature enough for significant planning. In addition, the WIPP underground facilities are now partially contaminated with radioactive particulate, which significantly reduces the WIPP operational efficiencies as compared to 2014. With a large back-log of waste ready for WIPP disposal and limited throughput for WIPP disposal rates, the focus of the NTWMP is to prioritize the selection of TRU wastes from the various sites based on WIPP waste emplacement rates and shipping rates to WIPP. Some TRU waste sites have a significant need to be top priority for shipments to WIPP, and that must be balanced with the need for all TRU waste sites to have some shipments to deplete their back-log of TRU wastes. Storage and management of TRU waste is very costly for DOE and many of those resources could be used to optimize the overall disposition of TRU waste and save DOE significant funding. In addition, the plan will show the possible transition of TRU Waste Management from primarily being an EM function to being an NNSA function in the coming years. As legacy TRU waste inventories are removed, and as NNSA mission-related TRU waste inventories are produced, DOE will be faced with deciding where the primary responsibility for TRU waste management should reside. (author)

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I Asked 30,000 People in the Nuclear Industry About Safety Culture; This is What I Learned - 19204

Organizations in the nuclear industry place a high value on maintaining the safety of the workforce and community. Some of these organizations do a better job than others when it comes to developing and sustaining a healthy safety culture. We spent six years studying nuclear organizations to better understand the factors that influence safety culture. We used mixed methods to evaluate perceptions of safety culture in these organizations including administering a valid and reliable safety culture survey, conducting one-on-one interviews with managers, and facilitating focus groups with members of the workforce. We analyzed the quantitative and qualitative data collected from more than 30,000 workers in U.S. based organizations. All of the organizations had a nuclear component to their operations. They operated nuclear reactors, processed nuclear materials, decontaminated and decommissioned buildings with radiological contamination, cleaned-up hazardous/mixed waste, and conducted basic science research and development. We talked to craft workers, technicians, engineers, scientific professionals, support personnel, production workers, supervisors and managers. We conducted extensive statistical analysis and learned that, with rare exception, there is a gap between the perceptions of managers and the workforce that they manage. Managers almost always have a more positive perception of safety culture than the people that are actually performing the work. It is not a question of whether there will be a gap; it is simply a matter of the magnitude of the gap. We also learned through exploratory factor analysis that there is one dominant factor that accounted for almost all (75%) of the variance in the perceptions of safety culture. It was the behavior of the leaders, the decisions they made, and the systems they implemented that most influenced the workforce's perception of safety culture. Personal accountability for safety accounted for 14% of the variance, communication and reporting accounted for another 6%. Everything else accounted for the remaining 5%. Management systems, decision making and behavior is the dominant factor and managers almost always have a more positive perception than the people that work for them. People that work in organizations where management exhibits positive decision-making and safety-related behaviors tend to have more positive perceptions of safety culture. Based upon these results, we developed a theory that there were a few important factors on which management could focus on if they sought to influence the safety culture in their organization. Our experience and research suggests that management often fails to recognize five root causes of employee discontent. Employees seek: - To be recognized as an individual; - To be respected; - A sense of stability; - Fairness; - To make a difference. Understanding the perceptions of the workforce is critical because perceptions influence attitudes, which contribute to behaviors that determine individual performance. An organisation's performance is simply the sum of the performance of all of the members of that organization. To change an organisation's safety culture, interventions should target management behavior and decision making for the greatest return on investment. (authors)

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Preliminary Study on Recycling and Reuse of Metals from Decommissioning in Construction of Disposal Vaults in Slovakia - 17217

The decommissioning of nuclear installations represents a complex process resulting in the generation of large amounts of various waste materials. Majority of them are non-contaminated, however some of them may be hazardous as well (e.g. chemicals, asbestos, oil products, etc.). During decommissioning of NPP, significant quantities of materials with various levels of radionuclides concentration arise as well. All of these materials should be managed appropriately keeping in mind safety principles, legislative requirements, lessons learned and other relevant factors. Therefore, selection of an appropriate strategy for management of the materials arising from decommissioning is crucial and strongly influences the overall effectiveness of decommissioning process. In line with international incentives for optimization of radioactive material management, concepts of recycling and reuse of slightly radioactive materials are widely discussed and applications of these concepts are analyzed. Therefore, the paper is devoted to the preliminary study of potential for recycling of re-melted metals from decommissioning in form of reinforcement bars or mesh used in the construction of ferro-concrete disposal vaults within the near surface repository. The paper presents the preliminary results and discusses the technical and non-technical aspects related to the recycling scenario. Moreover, comparison of various scenarios related to the scrap metal clearance and recycling within nuclear industry is included. Key findings and lessons learned from study may be useful for the international community dealing with waste management optimization and in particular with recycling of materials within nuclear industry. (authors)

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Nuclear Fuels and Reprocessing Technologies: A U.S. Perspective

Reprocessing and/or waste management issues are of concern to the “back end” of the nuclear fuel cycle. Of course, there are a great many “nuclear fuel cycle” scenarios to consider; if not in practice, then at least in theory. The simplest conceptually is the “once through” fuel cycle in which the spent fuel is discarded. The more complex fuel cycle scenarios involve reprocessing spent nuclear fuels and a family of nuclear reactor technologies to accommodate burning and breeding for various military and commercial needs. Therefore, the selection of a specific “fuel cycle” is what ultimately imposes the engineering requirements of the reprocessing and waste management technologies. No one part is independent of the other parts in a fuel cycle flowsheet; all parts are fully integrated. This paper presents a summary of radiochemical processes, nuclear reactor technologies, nuclear fuel types, and the reprocessing technologies that serve the different nuclear fuel types. Comprehending how this series of topics are related to each other is a prerequisite to understanding the requirements of any reprocessing strategy. The summary materials presented here are selective, as opposed to comprehensive. More detailed information on any one subject can be found in the reference materials.

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Nuclear Safety [Vol. 30, No. 3, July-September 1989]

Nuclear Safety is a review journal that covers significant developments in the field of nuclear safety. Its scope includes the analysis and control of hazards associated with nuclear energy, operations involving fissionable materials, and the products of nuclear fission and their effects on the environment. Primary emphasis is on safety in reactor design, construction, and operation; however, the safety aspects of the entire fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing, nuclear waste disposal, handling of radioisotopes, and environmental effects of these operations, are also treated. Table of Contents for this issue follows. GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 325 Safety of Framatome Advanced Nuclear Steam Supply Systems Designs by J. A. Charles and D. Lange, 333 Book Review of Nuclear Accidents: Intervention Levels for the Protection of the Public by H. B. Piper; ACCIDENT ANALYSIS: 335 Living PRA Computer Systems by S. C. Dinsmore and H.-P. Balfanz, 343 Summary of ICAP Assessments of RELAP5/MOD2 by W. E. Driskell and R. G. Hanson; CONTROL AND INSTRUMENTATION: 352 Thermal Performance Monitoring System at Maanshan Nuclear Power Plant by H.-J. Chao, Y.-P. Lin, G.-H. Jou, L.-Y. Liao, and Y.-B. Chen; DESIGN FEATURES: 358 Warning Systems for Nuclear Power Plant Emergencies by J. H. Sorensen and D. S. Mileti; WASTE AND SPENT FUEL MANAGEMENT: 371 Activities Related to Waste Management Compiled by E G. Silver; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 382 Steam Generator Tube Performance: Experience with Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Reactors During 1985 by O. S. Tatone and R. L. Tapping, 400 Systems Interaction Analyses: Concepts and Techniques (Part II) by M. D. Muhlheim and G. A. Murphy, 413 Reactor Shutdown Experience Compiled by J. W. Cletcher, 416 Operating U.S. Power Reactors Compiled by E G. Silver; RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 440 General Administrative Activities Compiled by E G. Silver, 460 Reports, Standards, and Safety Guides by D. S. Queener, 466 Status of Power-Reactor Licensing Activities Compiled by E G. Silver, 470 Proposed Rule Changes as of Mar. 31, 1989; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 334 Proceedings Published, 351 CEC Seminar on Methods and Codes for Assessing the Off-Site Consequences of Nuclear Accidents, 357 Short Course on Multiphase Flow and Heat Transfer: Bases and Applications in A: The Nuclear Power Industry B: The Process Industries, 357 International Conference on Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Management, 478 International Topical Meeting on the Safety, Status, and Future of Non-Commercial Reactors and Irradiation Facilities, 475 The Authors.

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External Engagement During Evaluations of Shutdown Nuclear Power Plant Sites - 19221

This is a technical paper that does not take into account the contractual limitations under the Standard Contract for Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and/or High-Level Radioactive Waste (Standard Contract) (10 CFR Part 961). Under the provisions of the Standard Contract, DOE does not consider spent nuclear fuel in multi-assembly canisters to be an acceptable waste form, absent a mutually agreed to contract amendment. To the extent discussions or recommendations in this paper conflict with the provisions of the Standard Contract, the Standard Contract provisions prevail. The U.S. Department of Energy Office of Integrated Waste Management (DOE-IWM) continues to conduct evaluations of removing spent nuclear fuel (SNF) from shutdown nuclear power plant sites. The 14 shutdown sites included in the evaluation to date have nuclear power reactors that have been permanently shut down and the sites have been decommissioned or are undergoing decommissioning. The 14 shutdown sites are Maine Yankee, Yankee Rowe, Connecticut Yankee, Humboldt Bay, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Trojan, La Crosse, Zion, Crystal River, Kewaunee, San Onofre, Vermont Yankee, and Fort Calhoun. The Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station ceased operations in September 2018 and will be included in future evaluations. A key part of the shutdown site evaluations are visits to the sites. These site visits typically take place over 3 days. The first day is spent at the nuclear power plant site. The second day is spent evaluating the near-site transportation infrastructure, including rail infrastructure, potential heavy-haul routes, and potential rail and barge transload locations. The third day is often spent meeting with community engagement or advisory panels. External engagement activities during site visits are conducted in two areas. The first area involves inviting tribal and state representatives, State Regional Group (SRG) representatives, and Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) representatives to participate in the entire site visit. The SRG representatives are from the Southern States Energy Board, the Western Interstate Energy Board, the Council of State Governments - Midwest, or the Council of State Governments - Eastern Regional Conference, according to the location of the nuclear power plant. State representatives typically represent their state department of energy, state department of environmental or natural resources, State Rail Safety Participation Program, state police, state department of transportation, radiation protection organization, or emergency management organization. Tribal representatives explore issues associated with cultural affiliation and tribal involvement with past and present site activities. As the regulator of the U.S. railroads, the FRA representatives bring unique experience to the site visits. They also coordinate meetings with the railroads that serve the shutdown sites. The second area of external engagement activities during site visits involves meeting with local community engagement or advisory panels. Meeting with local community engagement or advisory panels provides an opportunity to inform these panels on DOE activities and the roles and responsibilities of federal agencies during site decommissioning. (authors)

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Ecological risk assessment software for radioactive waste management facilities - 15464

Environmental Risk Assessment (ERA) is a systematic process which can be used to identify, quantify and characterize the risk posed by contaminants and physical stressors in the environment on biological receptors, including human and non-human biota. Human receptors can be addressed through a Human Health Risk Assessment and non-human biota can be addressed through an Ecological Risk Assessment (EcoRA). In 2012 the Canadian Standards Association (CSA) issued a CSA standard N288.6 Environmental Risk Assessment at Class I Nuclear Facilities and Uranium Mines and Mills. The standard applies to radioactive waste management facilities, as well as nuclear power plants. The ERA can also be used retrospectively, to estimate the effect that a contaminant or stressor has already had on the environment; and can be used to assist in determining possible remedial or risk management options to return the quality of the affected environment to a predetermined state. While industry-standard tools for estimating radiological doses to humans are readily available, there is a need for a tool to implement the CSA N288.6 standard for Ecological Risk Assessment. To address this need, AMEC developed a computer code called -Assessment of Impact of Contaminants on Ecological Receptors (AICER)-. The code was developed to be consistent with the CSA standard N288.6, by assessing the impact of radiological contamination on non-human biota for normal operations. The code can also be used to screen for the potential effects of conventional contamination on the environment. In addition, the code is also applicable for abnormal events and accidents with the appropriate modification of some parameters used in the code. The AICER code was qualified in accordance with the requirements of the Canadian quality standard CSA N286.7 -Quality Assurance of Analytical, Scientific, and Design Computer Programs for Nuclear Power Plants-. The functionality of the code is illustrated with screen shots in the paper, following the introduction of the theoretical model for the dose calculation. An inter-comparison with RESRAD-BIOTA and ERICA Assessment tool at the conceptual level was conducted. In addition, the practical application of the code for the assessment of the impacts related to an existing radioactive waste management facility is provided. In particular, analysis was conducted to evaluate radiological doses to non-human biota resulting from a fire accident scenario involving an existing waste storage and processing facility. Analysis included all feasible waterborne and airborne exposure pathways. Doses were evaluated for a range of species representing valued ecological components at various trophic levels and compared with benchmark values for indicator species. (authors)

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The Evaluation of Chemical Decontamination for Contaminated Carbon Steel Scrap by Multiphase Treatment Process - 20249

There is a significant growth in the field of decommissioning of nuclear facilities due the fact that for a lot of them their end of life is nearing. In Taiwan, the government plans to steadily reduce the dependence on nuclear power and moves gradually towards a nuclear-free homeland. Therefore, the development of decommissioning technology becomes the significant issue for the next coming years. The decommissioning of a nuclear power plant is a long process and practical work including radiological surveys, decontamination, dismantling, and the subsequent waste management. Chemical decontamination is an important task in the decommissioning of nuclear power plants and is usually performed by circulating the chemical solution in selected systems or full systems in order to reduce dose levels. However, the decontamination of segmented metal parts is also considered to reduce the contamination to such levels that they may be disposed of at a lower classification or be unconditionally released, and it helps to achieve the goal of waste minimization and provide a more economical cost for disposal management. Chemical decontamination technology is used to remove the contaminated oxides deposited on the surface of metals by dissolving them with chemical mechanisms, such as chelation, acidic or alkaline dissolution, redox reaction and so on. Carbon steel is the major material used in systems and pipelines in the nuclear power plant, thus it is also commonly selected as the target to be decontaminated in the decommissioning process. In this study, the effectiveness of chemical decontamination is evaluated by using multiphase treatment process including the reduction and the oxidation steps. In the step of redox reaction, the oxidation state of the substance is very important. Especially metals of some oxidation states show solubility in water, which has a decisive influence on the chemical decontamination. The experiment of decontamination of metal scraps is carried out by the immersion method within a chemical solution. The relative operation parameters such as temperature, pH, and concentration of the chemical solution are recorded to demonstrate the effect of the decontamination process. (authors)

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Waste Management 2016 300-296 Soil Remediation Project. Developing Innovative Solutions to Overcome Design Challenges - 16229

The 324 Building is a non-reactor, Hazard Category 2, Nuclear Facility located in the 300 Area of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Hanford Site, located near Richland, Washington. The building is undergoing deactivation, decommissioning, decontamination, and demolition by Washington Closure Hanford (WCH) under the River Corridor Closure Contract. During the Cold War Era, the facility was used for chemical and radionuclide processing associated with nuclear weapons production. Historical records indicate that in October 1986, approximately 516 L of a concentrated liquid waste stream containing cesium-137 and strontium-90 was spilled onto the floor of B-Cell. B-Cell is located in the Radiochemical Engineering Complex (REC) of the 324 Building. It is estimated that this spill contained approximately 1.3 million curies of radioactivity. Some fraction of the spill was recovered; however, an unknown quantity was released into the soil beneath the 324 Building through an undetected breach in the B-Cell floor sump. Unknown quantities of water were used after the spill to wash items contained in B-Cell. When B-Cell was taken out of service, wastes being removed from B-Cell were placed in Grout Containers (GCs) and stabilized using a particulate grout. In the course of grouting activities, grout was spilled on the floor of B-Cell, eventually filling the sump. The primary scope of this project is to design, test, and implement a process capable of removing and isolating contaminated soil below B-Cell. This remediation effort has been divided into two removal zones identified as the primary and secondary removal zones. Based on current assumptions and estimates, the primary phase of this cleanup effort will remove roughly 156.45 m{sup 3} of highly contaminated materials. B-Cell debris, particulate grout, and the floor slab and liner comprise about 21.24 m{sup 3} of the total. The remaining 135.21 m3 will be contaminated soil. All of this material must be disposed of within the existing 324 Facility or packaged for disposal at the Hanford site. The objective of this project is to remove the B-Cell floor and highly contaminated underlying soils from beneath B-Cell using remote equipment to reduce the radiation levels and allow open-air excavation for the remaining contaminated soil. The challenges and subsequent technological solutions encountered from the Conceptual Design phase to the 100% Design Issued For Fabrication/Issued For Construction (IFF/IFC) consisted in part of the following: Design an efficient remote cleanup strategy for highly contaminated Low Level Waste (LLW) given the unknowns. Maintain contamination control down to 18 feet below B-Cell in a highly radioactive environment (12,870 R/Hr Cs-137 and Sr-90). Perform facility upgrades to enable remediation process implementation while maintaining integrity of pre-existing facility structure and license. Designing first-of-a-kind remote equipment for use in high radiation areas. Developing first-of-a-kind operations sequences for remote equipment while minimizing usage of original facility equipment (i.e. cranes, manipulators, etc.). Conducting time-motion studies of operations sequences to maximize efficiency while keeping dose As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) in a high dose environment. Construction of a full scale mockup to conduct performance testing in a clean environment and train the work force to operate the equipment. Overcoming scope, budget and schedule constraints associated with a fast-track DOE project. (authors)

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One System Overview - 16579

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Office of River Protection (ORP) is responsible for managing and completing the River Protection Project mission, which is to 'safeguard the nuclear waste stored in Hanford's 177 underground tanks, and to manage the waste safely and responsibly until it can be treated in the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant for final disposition'. The Office of River Protection's work scope is currently performed through two primary contracts: - The Tank Operations Contract, held by Washington River Protection Solutions LLC, (WRPS) includes the construction, operation, and maintenance activities necessary to safely store, retrieve, and transfer tank wastes; provide supplemental tank waste treatment; provide storage and/or disposal of primary and secondary waste streams; design, construction and commissioning of the Low-Activity Waste Pretreatment System; and support ORP to integrate Hanford Tank Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) completion and startup with Tank Farms operations. - The WTP Contract, held by Bechtel National, Inc. (BNI), includes the design, construction, and commissioning of a Pretreatment Facility, two vitrification facilities (one for high-level waste and one for low-activity waste), a dedicated analytical laboratory, and supporting facilities to treat radioactive tank wastes by immobilizing them into a stable glass waste form. One System was established as a means to improve the integration between the tank farms and the WTP project to support its safe and successful startup. One System's scope and purpose focus on mission integration consistent with DOE's plans to treat tank waste in phases, starting with direct feed of the low-activity waste stream to the WTP's Low-Activity Waste (LAW) Vitrification Facility (referred to as DFLAW). The One System organization now has four major focus areas: - Flowsheet Integration? Integrated River Protection Project (RPP) flowsheet development and management; developing a gaps, risks, and opportunities management plan and technical roadmap; and waste feed qualification. - Mission Analysis and Planning? Strategic planning, system planning, and modeling integration. - WTP Startup, Commissioning, and Operations Integration? Interface Control Document (ICD) management, coordinating facilities startup-to-commissioning-to-operations, contract directives and standards identification, and DFLAW program integration. - Project Integration and Controls? Integrated schedule, metrics/dashboards monitoring, and One System risk register. ORP established the DFLAW Program Office in February 2015 as one of its key performance goals. ORP staff, along with contractor managers, have identified roles and responsibilities for the each of the four major focus areas. One System has established an Executive Council and Governance Board to drive program progress and make decisions on DFLAW. This approach allows appropriate government and contractor senior management involvement in the DFLAW Program. Monthly critical path analysis on the integrated DFLAW schedule is being performed. Interface control documents specific to DFLAW have been developed, and system planning and modeling tools are being used to help define the DFLAW flowsheet. (authors)

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Advanced Nuclear Fuel Cycle Effects on the Treatment of Uncertainty in the Long-Term Assessment of Geologic Disposal Systems - EBS Input

The Used Fuel Disposition (UFD) Campaign within the Department of Energy's Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE) Fuel Cycle Technology (FCT) program has been tasked with investigating the disposal of the nation's spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level nuclear waste (HLW) for a range of potential waste forms and geologic environments. The planning, construction, and operation of a nuclear disposal facility is a long-term process that involves engineered barriers that are tailored to both the geologic environment and the waste forms being emplaced. The UFD Campaign is considering a range of fuel cycles that in turn produce a range of waste forms. The UFD Campaign is also considering a range of geologic media. These ranges could be thought of as adding uncertainty to what the disposal facility design will ultimately be; however, it may be preferable to thinking about the ranges as adding flexibility to design of a disposal facility. For example, as the overall DOE-NE program and industrial actions result in the fuel cycles that will produce waste to be disposed, and the characteristics of those wastes become clear, the disposal program retains flexibility in both the choice of geologic environment and the specific repository design. Of course, other factors also play a major role, including local and State-level acceptance of the specific site that provides the geologic environment. In contrast, the Yucca Mountain Project (YMP) repository license application (LA) is based on waste forms from an open fuel cycle (PWR and BWR assemblies from an open fuel cycle). These waste forms were about 90% of the total waste, and they were the determining waste form in developing the engineered barrier system (EBS) design for the Yucca Mountain Repository design. About 10% of the repository capacity was reserved for waste from a full recycle fuel cycle in which some actinides were extracted for weapons use, and the remaining fission products and some minor actinides were encapsulated in borosilicate glass. Because the heat load of the glass was much less than the PWR and BWR assemblies, the glass waste form was able to be co-disposed with the open cycle waste, by interspersing glass waste packages among the spent fuel assembly waste packages. In addition, the Yucca Mountain repository was designed to include some research reactor spent fuel and naval reactor spent fuel, within the envelope that was set using the commercial reactor assemblies as the design basis waste form. This milestone report supports Sandia National Laboratory milestone M2FT-12SN0814052, and is intended to be a chapter in that milestone report. The independent technical review of this LLNL milestone was performed at LLNL and is documented in the electronic Information Management (IM) system at LLNL. The objective of this work is to investigate what aspects of quantifying, characterizing, and representing the uncertainty associated with the engineered barrier are affected by implementing different advanced nuclear fuel cycles (e.g., partitioning and transmutation scenarios) together with corresponding designs and thermal constraints.

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