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At least 649 records · Page 36

Loss of Signal, Aeromedical Lessons Learned for the STS-I07 Columbia Space Shuttle Mishap

Loss of Signal, a NASA publication to be available in May 2014, presents the aeromedical lessons learned from the Columbia accident that will enhance crew safety and survival on human space flight missions. These lessons were presented to limited audiences at three separate Aerospace Medical Association (AsMA) conferences: in 2004 in Anchorage, Alaska, on the causes of the accident; in 2005 in Kansas City, Missouri, on the response, recovery, and identification aspects of the investigation; and in 2011, again in Anchorage, Alaska, on future implications for human space flight. As we embark on the development of new spacefaring vehicles through both government and commercial efforts, the NASA Johnson Space Center Human Health and Performance Directorate is continuing to make this information available to a wider audience engaged in the design and development of future space vehicles. Loss of Signal summarizes and consolidates the aeromedical impacts of the Columbia mishap process-the response, recovery, identification, investigative studies, medical and legal forensic analysis, and future preparation that are needed to respond to spacecraft mishaps. The goals of this book are to provide an account of the aeromedical aspects of the Columbia accident and the investigation that followed, and to encourage aerospace medical specialists to continue to capture information, learn from it, and improve procedures and spacecraft designs for the safety of future crews.

Patlach, Robert↗

Loss of Signal: Aeromedical Lessons Learned from the STS-107 Columbia Space Shuttle Mishap

The editors of Loss of Signal wanted to document the aeromedical lessons learned from the Space Shuttle Columbia mishap. The book is intended to be an accurate and easily understood account of the entire process of recovering and analyzing the human remains, investigating and analyzing what happened to the crew, and using the resulting information to recommend ways to prevent mishaps and provide better protection to crewmembers. Our goal is to capture the passions of those who devoted their energies in responding to the Columbia mishap. We have reunited authors who were directly involved in each of these aspects. These authors tell the story of their efforts related to the Columbia mishap from their point of view. They give the reader an honest description of their responsibilities and share their challenges, their experiences, and their lessons learned on how to enhance crew safety and survival, and how to be prepared to support space mishap investigations. As a result of this approach, a few of the chapters have some redundancy of information and authors' opinions may differ. In no way did we or they intend to assign blame or criticize anyone's professional efforts. All those involved did their best to obtain the truth in the situations to which they were assigned.

Stepaniak, Philip C.↗

Lessons Learned in the First Year Operating Software Defined Radios in Space

Operating three unique software defined radios (SDRs) in a space environment aboard the Space Communications and Navigation (SCaN) Testbed for over one year has provided an opportunity to gather knowledge useful for future missions considering using software defined radios. This paper provides recommendations for the development and use of SDRs, and it considers the details of each SDRs approach to software upgrades and operation. After one year, the SCaN Testbed SDRs have operated for over 1000 hours. During this time, the waveforms launched with the SDR were tested on-orbit to assure that they operated in space at the same performance level as on the ground prior to launch to obtain an initial on-orbit performance baseline. A new waveform for each SDR has been developed, implemented, uploaded to the flight system, and tested in the flight environment. Recommendations for SDR-based missions have been gathered from early development through operations. These recommendations will aid future missions to reduce the cost, schedule, and risk of operating SDRs in a space environment. This paper considers the lessons learned as they apply to SDR pre-launch checkout, purchasing space-rated hardware, flexibility in command and telemetry methods, on-orbit diagnostics, use of engineering models to aid future development, and third-party software. Each SDR implements the SCaN Testbed flight computer command and telemetry interface uniquely, allowing comparisons to be drawn. The paper discusses the lessons learned from these three unique implementations, with suggestions on the preferred approach. Also, results are presented showing that it is important to have full system performance knowledge prior to launch to establish better performance baselines in space, requiring additional test applications to be developed pre-launch. Finally, the paper presents the issues encountered with the operation and implementation of new waveforms on each SDR and proposes recommendations to avoid these issues.

radio equipment↗

An Interview with Joe McMann: Lessons Learned from Fifty Years of Observing Hardware and Human Behavior

Pica Kahn conducted "An Interview with Joe McMann: Lessons Learned in Human and Hardware Behavior" on August 16, 2011. With more than 40 years of experience in the aerospace industry, McMann has gained a wealth of knowledge. This presentation focused on lessons learned in human and hardware behavior. During his many years in the industry, McMann observed that the hardware development process was intertwined with human influences, which impacted the outcome of the product.

McMann, Joe↗

Veggie Hardware Validation Test Preliminary Results and Lessons Learned

The Veggie hardware validation test, VEG-01, was conducted on the International Space Station during Expeditions 39 and 40 from May through June of 2014. The Veggie hardware and the VEG-01 experiment payload were launched to station aboard the SpaceX-3 resupply mission in April, 2014. Veggie was installed in an Expedite-the-Processing-of-Experiments-to-Space-Station (ExPRESS) rack in the Columbus module, and the VEG-01 validation test was initiated. Veggie installation was successful, and power was supplied to the unit. The hardware was programmed and the root mat reservoir and plant pillows were installed without issue. As expected, a small amount of growth media was observed in the sealed bags which enclosed the plant pillows when they were destowed. Astronaut Steve Swanson used the wet/dry vacuum to clean up the escaped particles. Water insertion or priming the first plant pillow was unsuccessful as an issue prevented water movement through the quick disconnect. All subsequent pillows were successfully primed, and the initial pillow was replaced with a backup pillow and successfully primed. Six pillows were primed, but only five pillows had plants which germinated. After about a week and a half it was observed that plants were not growing well and that pillow wicks were dry. This indicated that the reservoir was not supplying sufficient water to the pillows via wicking, and so the team reverted to an operational fix which added water directly to the plant pillows. Direct watering of the pillows led to a recovery in several of the stressed plants; a couple of which did not recover. An important lesson learned involved Veggie's bellows. The bellows tended to float and interfere with operations when opened, so Steve secured them to the baseplate during plant tending operations. Due to the perceived intensity of the LED lights, the crew found it challenging to both work under the lights and read crew procedures on their computer. Although the lights are not a safety hazard, for visual comfort crewmembers were advised to wear sunglasses when working with the plants and then they can lift glasses to read procedures. Steve Swanson had already trail-blazed this procedure when he initiated VEG-01. The temperature and humidity data logger was relocated mid-experiment to provide measurements on both sides of the unit. Images of the plants were downlinked weekly, and videos of installation and harvest were recorded. This imaging frequency was not sufficient to monitor and respond to changes in plant growth. Plants, samples, and data loggers will be returned on SpaceX-4, scheduled to return the fall of 2014. Lessons learned will be translated into hardware and operational modifications for future Veggie payloads.

International Space Station↗

Lessons Learned in the First Year Operating Software Defined Radios in Space

Operating three unique software defined radios (SDRs) in a space environment aboard the Space Communications and Navigation (SCaN) Testbed for over one year has provided an opportunity to gather knowledge useful for future missions considering using software defined radios. This paper provides recommendations for the development and use of SDRs, and it considers the details of each SDR's approach to software upgrades and operation. After one year, the SCaN Testbed SDRs have operated for over 1000 hours. During this time, the waveforms launched with the SDR were tested on-orbit to assure that they operated in space at the same performance level as on the ground prior to launch to obtain an initial on-orbit performance baseline. A new waveform for each SDR has been developed, implemented, uploaded to the flight system, and tested in the flight environment. Recommendations for SDR-based missions have been gathered from early development through operations. These recommendations will aid future missions to reduce the cost, schedule, and risk of operating SDRs in a space environment. This paper considers the lessons learned as they apply to SDR pre-launch checkout, purchasing space-rated hardware, flexibility in command and telemetry methods, on-orbit diagnostics, use of engineering models to aid future development, and third-party software. Each SDR implements the SCaN Testbed flight computer command and telemetry interface uniquely, allowing comparisons to be drawn. The paper discusses the lessons learned from these three unique implementations, with suggestions on the preferred approach. Also, results are presented showing that it is important to have full system performance knowledge prior to launch to establish better performance baselines in space, requiring additional test applications to be developed pre-launch. Finally, the paper presents the issues encountered with the operation and implementation of new waveforms on each SDR and proposes recommendations to avoid these issues.

space communication↗

Aviation Safety Risk Modeling: Lessons Learned From Multiple Knowledge Elicitation Sessions

Aviation safety risk modeling has elements of both art and science. In a complex domain, such as the National Airspace System (NAS), it is essential that knowledge elicitation (KE) sessions with domain experts be performed to facilitate the making of plausible inferences about the possible impacts of future technologies and procedures. This study discusses lessons learned throughout the multiple KE sessions held with domain experts to construct probabilistic safety risk models for a Loss of Control Accident Framework (LOCAF), FLightdeck Automation Problems (FLAP), and Runway Incursion (RI) mishap scenarios. The intent of these safety risk models is to support a portfolio analysis of NASA's Aviation Safety Program (AvSP). These models use the flexible, probabilistic approach of Bayesian Belief Networks (BBNs) and influence diagrams to model the complex interactions of aviation system risk factors. Each KE session had a different set of experts with diverse expertise, such as pilot, air traffic controller, certification, and/or human factors knowledge that was elicited to construct a composite, systems-level risk model. There were numerous "lessons learned" from these KE sessions that deal with behavioral aggregation, conditional probability modeling, object-oriented construction, interpretation of the safety risk results, and model verification/validation that are presented in this paper.

Luxhoj, J. T.↗

International R&M/Safety Cooperation Lessons Learned Between NASA and JAXA

Presented are a number of important experiences gained and lessons learned from the collaboration of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the Japanese Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) on the CoNNeCT (Communications, Navigation, and Networking re-Configurable Testbed) project. Both space agencies worked on the CoNNeCT Project to design, assemble, test, integrate, and launch a communications testbed facility mounted onto the International Space Station (ISS) truss. At the 2012 RAMS, two papers about CoNNeCT were presented: one on Ground Support Equipment Reliability & System Safety, and the other one on combined application of System Safety & Reliability for the flight system. In addition to the logistics challenges present when two organizations are on the opposite side of the world, there is also a language barrier. The language barrier encompasses not only the different alphabet, it encompasses the social interactions; these were addressed by techniques presented in the paper. The differences in interpretation and application of Spaceflight Requirements will be discussed in this paper. Although many, but definitely not all, of JAXA's Spaceflight Requirements were inspired by NASA, there were significant and critically important differences in how they were interpreted and applied. This paper intends to summarize which practices worked and which did not for an international collaborative effort so that future missions may benefit from our experiences. The CoNNeCT flight system has been successfully assembled, integrated, tested, shipped, launched and installed on the ISS without incident. This demonstrates that the steps taken to facilitate international understanding, communication, and coordination were successful and warrant discussion as lessons learned.

Fernandez, Rene↗

Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) Program Lessons Learned

This report has been developed by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate (HEOMD) Risk Management team in close coordination with the COTS Program. This document provides a point-in-time, cumulative, summary of actionable key lessons learned derived from the design project. Lessons learned invariably address challenges and risks and the way in which these areas have been addressed. Accordingly the risk management thread is woven throughout the document.

COTS↗

Systems Engineering Lessons Learned from Solar Array Structures and Mechanisms Deployment

This report has been developed by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate (HEOMD) Risk Management team in close coordination with the Engineering Directorate at LaRC. This document provides a point-in-time, cumulative, summary of actionable key lessons learned derived from the design project. Lessons learned invariably address challenges and risks and the way in which these areas have been addressed. Accordingly the risk management thread is woven throughout the document.

Solar Array Structures↗

Human Flight to Lunar and Beyond - Re-Learning Operations Paradigms

For the first time since the Apollo era, NASA is planning on sending astronauts on flights beyond Low-Earth Orbit (LEO). The Human Space Flight (HSF) program started with a successful initial flight in Earth orbit, in December 2014. The program will continue with two Exploration Missions (EM) to Lunar orbit: EM-1 will be unmanned and EM-2, carrying astronauts, will follow. NASA established a multi-center team to address the communications, and related navigation, needs. This paper will focus on the lessons learned in the team, planning for the missions' parts that are beyond Earth orbit. Many of these lessons had to be re-learned, as the HSF program after operated for many years in Earth orbit. Fortunately, the experience base from tracking robotic missions in deep space by the Deep Space Network (DSN) and close interaction with the HSF community to understand the unique needs (e.g. 2-way voice) resulted in a ConOps that leverages of both the deep space robotic and the Human LEO experiences. Several examples will be used to highlight the unique operational needs for HSF missions beyond Earth Orbit, including: - Navigation. At LEO, HSF missions can rely on Global Positioning System (GPS) devices for orbit determination. For Lunar-and-beyond HSF missions, techniques such as precision 2-way and 3-way Doppler and ranging, Delta-Difference-of-range, and eventually on-board navigation will be used. - Impact of latency - the delay associated with Round-Trip-Light-Time (RTLT). Imagine trying to have a 2-way discussion (audio or video) with an astronaut, with a 2-3 sec delay inserted (for Lunar distances) or 20 minutes delay (for Mars distances). - Balanced communications link. For robotic missions, there has been a heavy emphasis on the downlink data rates, bringing back science data from the instruments on-board the spacecraft. Uplink data rates were of secondary importance, used to send commands to the spacecraft. The ratio of downlink-to-uplink data rates was often 10:1 or more. For HSF, rates for uplink and downlink, at least for high-quality video, need to be similar.

Kenny, Ted↗

Design Evolution of the Wide Field Infrared Survey Telescope using Astrophysics Focused Telescope Assets (WFIRST-AFTA) and Lessons Learned

The design of the Wide Field Infrared Survey Telescope using Astrophysics Focused Telescope Assets (WFIRST-AFTA) continues to evolve as each design cycle is analyzed. In 2012, two Hubble sized (2.4 m diameter) telescopes were donated to NASA from elsewhere in the Federal Government. NASA began investigating potential uses for these telescopes and identified WFIRST as a mission to benefit from these assets. With an updated, deeper, and sharper field of view than previous design iterations with a smaller telescope, the optical designs of the WFIRST instruments were updated and the mechanical and thermal designs evolved around the new optical layout. Beginning with Design Cycle 3, significant analysis efforts yielded a design and model that could be evaluated for Structural-Thermal-Optical-Performance (STOP) purposes for the Wide Field Imager (WFI) and provided the basis for evaluating the high level observatory requirements. Development of the Cycle 3 thermal model provided some valuable analysis lessons learned and established best practices for future design cycles. However, the Cycle 3 design did include some major liens and evolving requirements which were addressed in the Cycle 4 Design. Some of the design changes are driven by requirements changes, while others are optimizations or solutions to liens from previous cycles. Again in Cycle 4, STOP analysis was performed and further insights into the overall design were gained leading to the Cycle 5 design effort currently underway. This paper seeks to capture the thermal design evolution, with focus on major design drivers, key decisions and their rationale, and lessons learned as the design evolved.

Thermal Design↗

Design Evolution of the Wide Field Infrared Survey Telescope Using Astrophysics Focused Telescope Assets (WFIRST-AFTA) and Lessons Learned

The design of the Wide Field Infrared Survey Telescope using Astrophysics Focused Telescope Assets (WFIRST-AFTA) continues to evolve as each design cycle is analyzed. In 2012, two Hubble sized (2.4 m diameter) telescopes were donated to NASA from elsewhere in the Federal Government. NASA began investigating potential uses for these telescopes and identified WFIRST as a mission to benefit from these assets. With an updated, deeper, and sharper field of view than previous design iterations with a smaller telescope, the optical designs of the WFIRST instruments were updated and the mechanical and thermal designs evolved around the new optical layout. Beginning with Design Cycle 3, significant analysis efforts yielded a design and model that could be evaluated for Structural-Thermal-Optical-Performance (STOP) purposes for the Wide Field Imager (WFI) and provided the basis for evaluating the high level observatory requirements. Development of the Cycle 3 thermal model provided some valuable analysis lessons learned and established best practices for future design cycles. However, the Cycle 3 design did include some major liens and evolving requirements which were addressed in the Cycle 4 Design. Some of the design changes are driven by requirements changes, while others are optimizations or solutions to liens from previous cycles. Again in Cycle 4, STOP analysis was performed and further insights into the overall design were gained leading to the Cycle 5 design effort currently underway. This paper seeks to capture the thermal design evolution, with focus on major design drivers, key decisions and their rationale, and lessons learned as the design evolved.

WFIRST↗

A Tale of Two Chambers: Iterative Approaches and Lessons Learned from Life Support Systems Testing in Altitude Chambers

The drive for the journey to Mars is in a higher gear than ever before. We are developing new spacecraft and life support systems to take humans to the Red Planet. The journey that development hardware takes before its final incarnation in a fully integrated spacecraft can take years, as is the case for the Orion environmental control and life support system (ECLSS). Through the Pressure Integrated Suit Test (PIST) series, NASA personnel at Johnson Space Center have been characterizing the behavior of a closed loop ECLSS in the event of cabin depressurization. This kind of testing - one of the most hazardous activities performed at JSC - requires an iterative approach, increasing in complexity and hazards). The PIST series, conducted in the Crew and Thermal Systems Division (CTSD) 11-ft Chamber, started with unmanned test precursors before moving to a human-in-the-loop phase, and continues to evolve with the eventual goal of a qualification test for the final system that will be installed on Orion. Meanwhile, the Human Exploration Spacecraft Testbed for Integration and Advancement (HESTIA) program is an effort to research and develop technologies that will work in concert to support habitation on Mars. September 2015 marked the first unmanned HESTIA test, with the goal of characterizing how ECLSS technologies work together in a closed environment. HESTIA will culminate in crewed testing, but it can benefit from the lessons learned from another test that is farther ahead in its development and life cycle. Discussing PIST and HESTIA, this paper illustrates how we approach testing, the kind of information that facility teams need to ensure efficient collaborations and successful testing, and how we can apply what we learn to execute future tests.

Callini, Gianluca↗

Human Flight to Lunar and Beyond - Re-Learning Operations Paradigms

For the first time since the Apollo era, NASA is planning on sending astronauts on flights beyond LEO. The Human Space Flight (HSF) program started with a successful initial flight in Earth orbit, in December 2014. The program will continue with two Exploration Missions (EM): EM-1 will be unmanned and EM-2, carrying astronauts, will follow. NASA established a multi-center team to address the communications, and related tacking/navigation needs. This paper will focus on the lessons learned by the team designing the architecture and operations for the missions. Many of these Beyond Earth Orbit lessons had to be re-learned, as the HSF program has operated for many years in Earth orbit. Unlike the Apollo missions that were largely tracked by a dedicated ground network, the HSF planned missions will be tracked (at distances beyond GEO) by the DSN, a network that mostly serves robotic missions. There have been surprising challenges to the DSN as unique modern human spaceflight needs stretch the experience base beyond that of tracking robotic missions in deep space. Close interaction between the DSN and the HSF community to understand the unique needs (e.g. 2-way voice) resulted in a Concept of Operations (ConOps) that leverages both the deep space robotic and the Human LEO experiences. Several examples will be used to highlight the unique challenges the team faced in establishing the communications and tracking capabilities for HSF missions beyond Earth Orbit, including: Navigation. At LEO, HSF missions can rely on GPS devices for orbit determination. For Lunar-and-beyond HSF missions, techniques such as precision 2-way and 3-way Doppler and ranging, Delta-Difference-of-range, and eventually possibly on-board navigation will be used. At the same time, HSF presents a challenge to navigators, beyond those presented by robotic missions - navigating a dynamic/"noisy" spacecraft. Impact of latency - the delay associated with Round-Trip-Light-Time (RTLT). Imagine trying to have a 2-way discussion (audio or video) with an astronaut, with a 2-3 sec or more delay inserted (for lunar distances) or 20 minutes delay (for Mars distances). Balanced communications link. For robotic missions, there has been a heavy emphasis on higher downlink data rates, e.g. bringing back science data. Higher uplink data rates were of secondary importance, as uplink was used only to send commands (and occasionally small files) to the spacecraft. The ratio of downlink-to-uplink data rates was often 10:1 or more. For HSF, a continuous forward link is established and rates for uplink and downlink are more similar.

Kenny, Edward (Ted)↗

Thermal Design, Tvac Testing, and Lessons Learned for Critical GSE of ATLAS and the ICESat-2 Mission

This presentation describes the thermal design of the three main of optical components which comprise the Bench Checkout Equipment (BCE) for the Advanced Topographic Laser Altimeter System (ATLAS) instrument, which is flying on the ICESat-2 mission. Thermal vacuum testing of these components is also described in this presentation, as well as a few lessons learned. These BCE components serve as critical GSE for the mission; their purpose is to verify ATLAS is performing well. It has been said that, in one light, the BCE is the most important part of ATLAS, since, without it, ATLAS cannot be aligned properly or its performance verified before flight. Therefore, careful attention was paid to the BCEs thermal design, development, and component-level Tvac testing prior to its use in instrument-level and spacecraft-level Tvac tests with ATLAS. This presentation describes that thermal design, development, and testing, as well as a few lessons learned.

Thermal ATLAS BCE↗

Cleared for Launch - Lessons Learned from the OSIRIS-REx System Requirements Verification Program

Requirements verification of a large flight system is a challenge. It is especially challenging for engineers taking on their first role in space systems engineering. This paper describes our approach to verification of the Origins, Spectral Interpretation, Resource Identification, Security-Regolith Explorer (OSIRIS-REx) system requirements. It also captures lessons learned along the way from developing systems engineers embroiled in this process. We begin with an overview of the mission and science objectives as well as the project requirements verification program strategy. A description of the requirements flow down is presented including our implementation for managing the thousands of program and element level requirements and associated verification data. We discuss both successes and methods to improve the managing of this data across multiple organizational interfaces. Our approach to verifying system requirements at multiple levels of assembly is presented using examples from our work at instrument, spacecraft, and ground segment levels. We include a discussion of system end-to-end testing limitations and their impacts to the verification program. Finally, we describe lessons learned that are applicable to all emerging space systems engineers using our unique perspectives across multiple organizations of a large NASA program.

Requirements Verification↗

Orbiter Water Dump Nozzles Redesign Lessons Learned

Hank Rotter, NASA Technical Fellow for Environmental Control and Life Support System, will provide the causes and lessons learned for the two Space Shuttle Orbiter water dump icicles that formed on the side of the Orbiter. He will present the root causes and the criticality of these icicles, along with the redesign of the water dump nozzles and lessons learned during the redesign phase.

Rotter, Hank↗