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2015 Enterprise Strategic Vision

This document aligns with the Department of Energy Strategic Plan for 2014-2018 and provides a framework for integrating our missions and direction for pursuing DOE’s strategic goals. The vision is a guide to advancing world-class science and engineering, supporting our people, modernizing our infrastructure, and developing a management culture that operates a safe and secure enterprise in an efficient manner.

Source record↗

X-Ray Toolkit

Radiographic Image Acquisition & Processing Software for Security Markets. Used in operation of commercial x-ray scanners and manipulation of x-ray images for emergency responders including State, Local, Federal, and US Military bomb technicians and analysts.

Source record↗

This is Brookhaven Lab

Brookhaven National Laboratory delivers discovery science and transformative technology to power and secure America’s future. Operated by Brookhaven Science Associates for the U.S. Department of Energy’s Office of Science, Brookhaven Lab is a multidisciplinary laboratory with seven Nobel Prize-winning discoveries, 36 R&D 100 Awards, and more than 70 years of pioneering research.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Markets and Economic Requirements for Fission Batteries and Other Nuclear Systems

Fission Batteries (FBs) are nuclear reactors defined by five characteristics which enable large-scale deployment: cost competitive, standardized sizes for economic mass production, easy installation and removal, secure and safe unattended operation with high reliability. FBs are not defined by technology or power level. Technical and market considerations suggest that most FBs will produce 20 to 30 MWt. This proceedings reports on the outcomes of two workshops that were held in January 2021 to better define markets and economic challenges for FBs. Three major markets were identified. The largest market is the industrial and commercial heat market. There are about 4000 industrial users (excluding utilities) that require more than one megawatt of heat. The number of customers versus size of heat demand was determined. In a low-carbon world there is the potential for many additional customers—including expanded biofuels production and district heat. The second market is for non-grid electricity. This includes co-generation plants that produce heat and electricity for a single customer. The third market is the maritime market with ~100,000 ships worldwide. In the United States, natural gas is the low-cost energy option today and will remain so unless constraints or taxes impact its use. If restrictions on greenhouse gas emissions, the FB competition includes natural gas with carbon capture, biofuels, hydrogen and grid electricity. Natural gas with carbon capture is not economically viable on a small scale. Biofuels may be expensive but may be the economically preferred option for locations with small energy demands of a few megawatts. Hydrogen is a potential competitor with many of the characteristics of natural gas. Grid electricity is not a competitive source of heat. For FBs to be economically competitive, the price of delivered heat must be $20-50/MWh ($6-15/million BTU). The economically competitive range for non-grid electricity is estimated at $70-100/MWh. These electricity prices are competitive with the retail prices of electricity in many parts of the United States for the customer. FBs are not expected to be competitive selling wholesale electricity to the grid. To achieve the aforementioned cost targets for heat and electricity markets, FB designers must (1) maximize the power output within the constraints of a FB (e.g., truck transportability, passive decay heat removal), (2) drastically reduce the size of onsite staff, (3) adopt core designs with low fuel costs (enrichment and fabrication), and (4) develop a system design that is efficiently manufactured in factories. The business case depends upon more than being just a replacement for natural gas. The largest incentives for adoption of FBs is where they create new markets and new sources of revenue. An example is the paper and pulp industry that burns biomass wastes to provide heat and electricity to make paper. An external heat source could meet the demand for heat and electricity by the paper process and enable converting waste biomass into liquid biofuels rather than burning to provide heat. Other markets, such as data centers, are driven by special energy requirements such as extreme reliability. Most customers are not in the energy business but need heat and electricity to produce a product—a manufactured good, education, retail sales (shopping malls), marine transport or some other product. As a consequence, there will be large incentives to lease rather than own FBs. Leasing avoids the regulatory challenges that remain with the owner of the FB. Leasing creates large incentives for FP standardization of sizes and transportability to maintain the value of the FB at the end of the lease—similar to the leasing of jet engines and aircraft. The economic constraints combined with technical constraints suggest competitive FBs will likely have outputs exceeding 10 MWt. There appear to be little incentives for very long-lived reactor cores because such machines require much larger inventories of fuel. Maintenance requirements and the options to provide technology updates may favor shorter lifetimes (~5 years). The assessment is that there is the potential for FBs to be economically viable and play a major role in global decarbonization in three markets: heat, non-grid electricity and maritime applications.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Y-12 Nuclear Criticality Safety Program Health Model: Development, Use and Benefits

The Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) operates seven diverse enriched uranium processing facilities and maintains a comprehensive nuclear criticality safety (NCS) program. Given the magnitude of the hazard, the NCS program receives significant oversight. Describing the scope and health of the Y-12 NCS program to sometimes non-expert stakeholders with limited time had historically focused on recent events and “hot topics” which did not always convey sufficient context (i.e., how to differentiate between an individual performance issue and a systemic concern). Y-12 created the NCS Program Health (NCSPH) Model to provide a complete and holistic framework to quantify and communicate NCS program health. The model is constructed in a tiered fashion with the top tier broken into three (3) Tier 2 elements, fourteen (14) Tier 3 elements, and 104 Tier 4 and 5 elements. This granularity ensures every feature of the NCS Program is accounted for and stakeholders can see how these features support the collective whole. The model is used as the framework for NCS communications including program plans, reports, health surveys, and meeting agendas. The model has substantially improved stakeholder appreciation for the entirety of the NCS program and how events and assessment results factor into an overarching conclusion on NCS program health. While some details are Y-12 specific, the NCSPH model can easily be tailored for any other site with an NCS program.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Transuranic Waste Processing Center (TWPC) Legacy Tank RH-TRU Sludge Processing and Compliance Strategy - 13255

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) needs to safely and efficiently treat its 'legacy' transuranic (TRU) waste and mixed low-level waste (LLW) from past research and defense activities at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) so that the waste is prepared for safe and secure disposal. The TWPC operates an Environmental Management (EM) waste processing facility on the Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR). The TWPC is classified as a Hazard Category 2, non-reactor nuclear facility. This facility receives, treats, and packages low-level waste and TRU waste stored at various facilities on the ORR for eventual off-site disposal at various DOE sites and commercial facilities. The Remote Handled TRU Waste Sludge held in the Melton Valley Storage Tanks (MVSTs) was produced as a result of the collection, treatment, and storage of liquid radioactive waste originating from the ORNL radiochemical processing and radioisotope production programs. The MVSTs contain most of the associated waste from the Gunite and Associated Tanks (GAAT) in the ORNL's Tank Farms in Bethel Valley and the sludge (SL) and associated waste from the Old Hydro-fracture Facility tanks and other Federal Facility Agreement (FFA) tanks. The SL Processing Facility Build-outs (SL-PFB) Project is integral to the EM cleanup mission at ORNL and is being accelerated by DOE to meet updated regulatory commitments in the Site Treatment Plan. To meet these commitments a Baseline (BL) Change Proposal (BCP) is being submitted to provide continued spending authority as the project re-initiation extends across fiscal year 2012 (FY2012) into fiscal year 2013. Future waste from the ORNL Building 3019 U-233 Disposition project, in the form of U-233 dissolved in nitric acid and water, down-blended with depleted uranyl nitrate solution is also expected to be transferred to the 7856 MVST Annex Facility (formally the Capacity Increase Project (CIP) Tanks) for co-processing with the SL. The SL-PFB project will construct and install the necessary integrated systems to process the accumulated MVST Facilities SL inventory at the TWPC thus enabling safe and effective disposal of the waste. This BCP does not include work to support current MVST Facility Surveillance and Maintenance programs or the ORNL Building 3019 U-233 Disposition project, since they are not currently part of the TWPC prime contract. The purpose of the environmental compliance strategy is to identify the environmental permits and other required regulatory documents necessary for the construction and operation of the SL- PFB at the TWPC, Oak Ridge, TN. The permits and other regulatory documents identified are necessary to comply with the environmental laws and regulations of DOE Orders, and other requirements documented in the SL-PFB, Safety Design Strategy (SDS), SL-A-AD-002, R0 draft, and the Systems, Function and Requirements Document (SFRD), SL-X-AD-002, R1 draft. This compliance strategy is considered a 'living strategy' and it is anticipated that it will be revised as design progresses and more detail is known. The design basis on which this environmental permitting and compliance strategy is based is the Wastren Advantage, Inc., (WAI), TWPC, SL-PFB (WAI-BL-B.01.06) baseline. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Regulations, Policies and Strategies for LLRW Management in Bangladesh - 12368

Low level radioactive waste (LLW) is generated from various nuclear applications in Bangladesh. The major sources of radioactive waste in the country are at present: (a) the 3 MW TRIGA Mark-II research reactor; (b) the radioisotope production facility; (c) the medical, industrial and research facilities that use radionuclides; and (d) the industrial facility for processing monazite sands. Radioactive waste needs to be safely managed because it is potentially hazardous to human health and the environment. According to Nuclear Safety and Radiation Control Act-93, the Bangladesh Atomic Energy Commission (BAEC) is the governmental body responsible for the receipt and final disposal of radioactive wastes in the whole country. Waste management policy has become an important environmental, social, and economical issue for LLW in Bangladesh. Policy and strategies will serve as a basic guide for radioactive waste management in Bangladesh. The waste generator is responsible for on-site collection, conditioning and temporary storage of the waste arising from his practice. The Central Waste Processing and Storage Unit (CWPSU) of BAEC is the designated national facility with the requisite facility for the treatment, conditioning and storage of radioactive waste until a final disposal facility is established and becomes operational. The Regulatory Authority is responsible for the enforcement of compliance with provisions of the waste management regulation and other relevant requirements by the waste generator and the CWPSU. The objective of this paper is to present, in a concise form, basic information about the radioactive waste management infrastructure, regulations, policies and strategies including the total inventory of low level radioactive waste in the country. For improvement and strengthening in terms of operational capability, safety and security of RW including spent radioactive sources and overall security of the facility (CWPSF), the facility is expected to serve waste management need in the country and, in the course of time, the facility may be turned into a regional level training centre. It is essential for safe conduction and culture of research and application in nuclear science and technology maintaining the relevant safety of man and environment and future generations to come. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Innovative Process for Comprehensive Treatment of Liquid Radioactive Waste - 12551

This paper presents the results of research activities aimed at creation of a principally new LRW distilling treatment method. The new process is based on the instantaneous evaporation method widely used in distillation units. The main difference of the proposed process is that the vapor condensation is conducted without using heat exchangers in practically ideal mode by way of direct contacting in a vapor-liquid system. This process is conducted in a specially designed ejector unit in supersonic mode. Further recuperation of excess heat of vaporization is carried out in a standard heat exchanger. Such an arrangement of the process, together with use of the barometric height principle, allows to carry out LRW evaporation under low temperatures, which enables to use excess heat from NPS for heating initial LRW. Thermal calculations and model experiments have revealed that, in this case, the expenditure of energy for LRW treatment by distilling will not exceed 3 kilowatt-hour/m{sup 3}, which is comparable with the reverse-osmosis desalination method. Besides, the proposed devices are 4 to 5 times less metal-intensive than standard evaporation units. These devices are also characterized by versatility. Experiments have revealed that the new method can be used for evaporation of practically any types of LRW, including those containing a considerable amount of oil products. Owing to arrangement of the evaporation process at low temperatures, the new devices are not sensitive to 'scale formation'. This is why, they can be used for concentrating brines of up to 500-600 g/l. New types of such evaporating devices can be required both for LRW treatment processes at nuclear-power plants under design and for treating 'non-standard' LRW with complex physicochemical and radionuclide composition resulting from the disaster at the Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant.) As a result of accidents at nuclear energy objects, as it has recently happened at NPP 'Fukushima-1', personnel faces the necessity to take emergency measures and to use marine water for cooling of reactor zone in contravention of the technological regulations. In these cases significant amount of liquid radioactive wastes of complex physicochemical composition is being generated, the purification of which by traditional methods is close to impossible. According to the practice of elimination of the accident after-effects at NPP 'Fukushima' there are still no technical means for the efficient purification of liquid radioactive wastes of complex composition like marine water from radionuclides. Therefore development of state-of-the-art highly efficient facilities capable of fast and safe purification of big amounts of liquid radioactive wastes of complex physicochemical composition from radionuclides turns to be utterly topical problem. Cesium radionuclides, being extremely dangerous for the environment, present over 90% of total radioactivity contained in liquid radioactive wastes left as a result of accidents at nuclear power objects. For the purpose of radiation accidents aftereffects liquidation VNIIHT proposes to create a plant for LRW reprocessing, consisting of 4 major technological modules: Module of LRW pretreatment to remove mechanical and organic impurities including oil products; Module of sorption purification of LWR by means of selective inorganic sorbents; Module of reverse osmotic purification and desalination; Module of deep evaporation of LRW concentrates. The first free modules are based on completed technological and designing concepts implemented by VNIIHT in the framework of LLRW Project in the period of 2000-2001 in Russia for comprehensive treatment of LWR of atomic fleet. These industrial plants proved to be highly efficient and secure during their long operation life. Module of deep evaporation is a new technological development. It will ensure conduction of evaporation and purification of LRW of different physicochemical composition, including those containing hardness salts, resulted in generation of LRW concentrate 300-600 g/l. The method is based on utilization of supersonic ejector for intensification of thermal physic processes and performance of evaporation in brine recycling mode. All proposed technological solutions are totally based on patented Russian developments. Proposed work will allow to construct modular plants, which will be totally prepared for efficient purification of any types of liquid radioactive wastes from radionuclides in case of force majeure. According to proposed scheme concentration level of cesium radionuclides in safe-for-storage form will make up not less than 5000. With respect to purification from cesium radionuclides of liquid radioactive wastes stored at NPP 'Fukushima' about 10 t of inorganic sorbents, loaded in 160 protective filter-containers, will be required for solving this problem. The amount of secondary wastes will be reduced approximately in 5 times in comparison with traditional schemes, applied in purification of secondary LRW of Fukushima-1 by Areva (France) and Kurion (USA) companies. All units of modular plants will be constructed and manufactured as totally automated, providing their twenty-four-hour safe operation. Modular design will ensure efficiency and let optimize the costs of secondary LRW treatment. In order to ensure off-line operation in emergency conditions the plant should be equipped with auxiliary modules: energy and ventilation ones. Under normal conditions these modules can be stored in 'mothballed' condition at special warehouses under the authority of federal bodies. It will be reasonable to choose required transport facilities, the most suitable for transportation of modules to target destination beforehand, using vessel classification list.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

3-60B Type-B shipping cask enhanced operational features to facilitate leakage rate testing - 15585

EnergySolutions is fabricating a new 3-60B Type B Shipping Cask that will be ready for use in spring 2015, designed for shipping Type B quantities of activated and/or non-fuel-bearing reactor or accelerator components. EnergySolutions, in consult with Leak Testing Specialists, Inc., has implemented an improved design of the 3-60B cask closures to better facilitate periodic and maintenance leakage rate testing and to allow end users to more easily perform pre-shipment leakage rate testing to confirm proper assembly of the cask closures. A typical Type B cask closure lid design incorporates a double O-ring configuration, where the inner O-ring provides containment and the outer O-ring is used for leakage rate testing of the containment O-ring seal. Leakage rate testing of a double O-ring configuration is typically accomplished by filling the cask cavity with helium, pulling a vacuum on the annular space between the two O-rings and monitoring for helium leakage through the containment O-ring. One issue is the potential for helium saturation of the O-ring elastomeric material, which can result in leakage rate test failures. The cask cavity volume is typically large, and takes a significant amount of time to fill with helium. As a result, the saturation time for certain elastomeric compounds may be exceeded, leading to potential false-negative leakage rate testing results. To avoid this, that the cask cavity typically is loaded with sealed container(s) to reduce the free volume and the fill time. The improved 3-60B cask closure lid incorporates a triple O-ring seal configuration that facilitates maintenance leak rate testing of the closure lid containment O-ring seal and eliminates the issues discussed above. The triple O-ring configuration uses the middle O-ring as the containment seal, with the inner and outer test O-rings creating relatively small annular volumes for testing purposes. These small annular volumes are quick to fill, minimizing the issue of Helium saturation of the O-ring material. This seal configuration also makes it possible to detect and replace a damaged O-ring seal during loading operations, or dress a damaged sealing surface, and perform the required maintenance leakage rate testing of the replacement O-ring at the plant site without the need to unload the cask and send it to a maintenance facility. Also, a second test port has been added to each O-ring annulus to allow leakage rate testing to be accomplished using a formal system calibration that complies with the requirements and recommendations of ASME Section V, Article 10 [4], ANSI N14.5-97 [2], and ANSI N14.5-2014 [3]. This provides a simple, reliable, and accurate means to perform leakage rate testing with a test confidence level that cannot be achieved without the second test port. The improved closure and test port design simplifies and shortens the time required to perform leakage testing, resulting in reduced operating costs, greater schedule security, and dose savings for the cask users. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Feasibility of Applying a Human Bio-signals Monitoring to Minimize Insider Threats

With the on-going global war on terror, a potential terrorist attack on a Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) is getting a lot of attention. In particular, the potential threat of an insider is a major concern as it could lead to the loss of a nationally critical asset and thus deserves serious consideration. The current approach to preventing an insider threat is the Insider Mitigation Program (IMP) based on periodic self-assessment or peer and manager review of specific employees. These are potentially biased and subjective assessments and are unreliable. Also, as the approach is reactive-based, identifying a problem employee could be too late to protect NPP assets (i.e., confidential information and nuclear materials). Thus, a new approach for detecting and predicting an insider is necessary. We propose a proactive approach based on using bio-signals as an alternative. To address the vulnerability of current insider detection systems, our studies investigated the possibility of insider detection and prediction by using biosignals (electroencephalogram (EEG), electrocardiogram (ECG), and galvanic skin response (GSR)). But one main question remained in the previous studies was: Is the method using key EEG indicators specific enough to discern the difference between a normal worker's motivation level change and being ready to commit a crime? This study examined the answer to the question.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

OT Defender Presentation - Hacker Mindset

Presentation on hacker mindset and what utilities may be up against from lone hackers or professional groups, with ideas on how to improve defensive posture.

99 - GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Urban hopper.

Hopping robots provide the possibility of breaking the link between the size of a ground vehicle and the largest obstacle that it can overcome. For more than a decade, DARPA and Sandia National Laboratories have been developing small-scale hopping robot technology, first as part of purely hopping platforms and, more recently, as part of platforms that are capable of both wheeled and hopping locomotion. In this paper we introduce the Urban Hopper robot and summarize its capabilities. The advantages of hopping for overcoming certain obstacles are discussed. Several configurations of the Urban Hopper are described, as are intelligent capabilities of the system. Key challenges are discussed.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Module-OT: A Turnkey Solution for Securing Energy Systems

The Modular Security Apparatus for Managing Distributed Cryptography for Command-and-Control Messages on Operational Technology Networks (Module-OT) is a flexible and lightweight solution for grid-edge devices focusing on end-to-end security. It is a bump- in- the-wire solution acting as a secure conduit for data between devices or systems across a network. It improves the cybersecurity posture of DER systems by providing authentication, authorization, and data integrity to secure DER communications. Additionally, it performs key management, provides data security through whitelisting Internet Protocol addresses and ports, blocks unauthorized connections, controls user access, and allows serial or Ethernet connections for added flexibility. The core software is portable to various Linux-based operating systems and is developed to be customized by the developer and researcher communities. Module-OT has been validated in the lab, has been demonstrated at a 500-KW PV-plus-storage site, and has been proven ready to secure operational technology devices. Its core functionality meets current standards, including validation procedures of the NIST Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program (CAVP) and the Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS 140-2). Because of its capability to provide an accessible and affordable option for stepping up security across modern energy systems, Module-OT can serve as an effective technological option to standardize cybersecurity moving forward.

cryptography↗

Management Principles for Nonproliferation Organizations

This paper identifies business models and six management principles that can be applied by a nonproliferation organization to maximize the value and effectiveness of its products. The organizations responsible for reducing the nuclear proliferation threat have experienced a substantial growth in responsibility and visibility since the September 11 attacks. Since then, the international community has witnessed revelations of clandestine nuclear facilities, nuclear black markets, periodic nuclear tests, and a resurgence of interest by countries worldwide in developing nuclear capabilities. The security environment will likely continue to evolve in unexpected ways since most of the proliferation threats with which the world will be forced to contend remain unforeseen. To better prepare for and respond to this evolving security environment, many nonproliferation organizations are interested in finding new or better ways to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of their operations. Of course, all organizations, whether they are market driven or non-profit, must operate effectively and efficiently if they are to succeed. Indeed, as this study demonstrates, many of the management principles that this study recommends can help all organizations succeed. However, this study pays particular attention to nonproliferation organizations because of the mission they are responsible for fulfilling. Nonproliferation organizations, including nonproliferation programs that operate within a larger national security organization, are responsible for reducing the threat of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. These organizations have an enduring mandate from the public and the international community not to fail in the completion of their mission for failure could have detrimental impacts on international security, public health and the environment. Moreover, the public expects nonproliferation organizations and programs to fulfill their mission, even when resources are limited. They are expected to anticipate and react quickly to prevent a potential threat while staying accountable to their public stakeholders, many of whom remain unaware of the very threats the organization is trying to address. When budgets are flush, it is easy to believe that money will solve all problems; but during times of economic hardship, managers must rely on creative and cost-effective management approaches to implement their missions. Fortunately, managers of nonproliferation organizations can draw on a wealth of research on organizational design and culture to help them identify the management strategies most appropriate for them. Such research can help nonproliferation managers think about their own organizational structures and cultures and adapt accepted management principles to their unique organizational mission. This analytical process is not straight forward, as some managers may find themselves taking risks that others might not take, such as making ostensibly risky investments for the common good, or supporting creative thinking to help mission accomplishment. Some management principles that are relatively straightforward for other organizations may be difficult to envision and implement in a nonproliferation organization. Therefore, the goal of this study is to help nonproliferation managers identify management principles that can be implemented in a nonproliferation organization and, in the process, help maximize the value of the organization's products and effectiveness of its mission.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Constructing vulnerabilty and protective measures indices for the enhanced critical infrastructure protection program.

The US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has directed its Protective Security Advisors (PSAs) to form partnerships with the owners and operators of assets most essential to the Nation's well being - a subclass of critical infrastructure and key resources (CIKR) - and to conduct site visits for these and other high-risk assets as part of the Enhanced Critical Infrastructure Protection (ECIP) Program. During each such visit, the PSA documents information about the facility's current CIKR protection posture and overall security awareness. The primary goals for ECIP site visits (DHS 2009) are to: (1) inform facility owners and operators of the importance of their facilities as an identified high-priority CIKR and the need to be vigilant in light of the ever-present threat of terrorism; (2) identify protective measures currently in place at these facilities, provide comparisons of CIKR protection postures across like assets, and track the implementation of new protective measures; and (3) enhance existing relationships among facility owners and operators; DHS; and various Federal, State, local tribal, and territorial partners. PSAs conduct ECIP visits to assess overall site security; educate facility owners and operators about security; help owners and operators identify gaps and potential improvements; and promote communication and information sharing among facility owners and operators, DHS, State governments, and other security partners. Information collected during ECIP visits is used to develop metrics; conduct sector-by-sector and cross-sector vulnerability comparisons; identify security gaps and trends across CIKR sectors and subsectors; establish sector baseline security survey results; and track progress toward improving CIKR security through activities, programs, outreach, and training (Snyder 2009). The data being collected are used in a framework consistent with the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) risk criteria (DHS 2009). The NIPP framework incorporates consequence, threat, and vulnerability components and addresses all hazards. The analysis of the vulnerability data needs to be reproducible, support risk analysis, and go beyond protection. It also needs to address important security/vulnerability topics, such as physical security, cyber security, systems analysis, and dependencies and interdependencies. This report provides an overview of the approach being developed to estimate vulnerability and provide vulnerability comparisons for sectors and subsectors. the information will be used to assist DHS in analyzing existing protective measures and vulnerability at facilities, to identify potential ways to reduce vulnerabilities, and to assist in preparing sector risk estimates. The owner/operator receives an analysis of the data collected for a specific asset, showing a comparison between the facility's protection posture/vulnerability index and those of DHS sector/subsector sites visited. This comparison gives the owner/operator an indication of the asset's security strengths and weaknesses that may be contributing factors to its vulnerability and protection posture. The information provided to the owner/operator shows how the asset compares to other similar assets within the asset's sector or subsector. A 'dashboard' display is used to illustrate the results in a convenient format. The dashboard allows the owner/operator to analyze the implementation of additional protective measures and to illustrate how such actions would impact the asset's Protective Measures Index (PMI) or Vulnerability Index (VI).

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗