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DOE OSTI2021

Autonomous Tools for Attack Surface Reduction (Final Report)

The electric power grid is a complex critical infrastructure that forms the lifeline of modern society, and its secure and reliable operation is of paramount importance to national security and economic wellbeing. However, recent findings documented in authoritative sources indicate the threat of cyber-based attacks growing in numbers and sophistication. However, securing the grid against stealthy cyberattacks is a challenging task due to legacy nature of the infrastructure coupled with dynamic nature of threat landscape and ever-growing sophistication of the adversaries. Additionally, the grid’s attack surface continues to grow with the increased dependence on digital communications and control that now extends to each consumer through smart meters and distributed energy resources. Unfortunately, this expansive surface increases the grid’s vulnerability and further exposes critical control systems in both substations and control centers. To respond to this emerging need, we had successfully assembled an interdisciplinary team with academic- industry partnership to successfully conduct research, development, evaluation, demonstration, and commercialization of attack surface reduction tools, whose goal was to significantly reduce the cyber attack surface in the North American power grid. Our proposed project was a synergistic collaborative effort leveraging the synergistic expertise of the team members across power systems, cyber security and CPS security, testbeds, field deployments and demonstration, and successful commercialization. The following are the specific tasks that have been successfully completed two phases (2016-2020). Phase I: Task 1: Developed and implemented a robust Project Management and Data Management Plan, coupled with a well thought out Risk Mitigation Plan. Task 2.1: Developed a comprehensive framework that continually assesses and autonomously reduces the attack surface for the power grid control environment spanning across substations, control center and the SCADA network to significantly reduce the risks of cyber attacks. Task 2.2: Developed attack surface analysis techniques, metrics, and tools that assess the attack surface at multiple levels including the control center, substations, and the SCADA network. Task 2.3: Developed attack surface reduction techniques and tools that dynamically reduce attack surface and hence increase attacker’s cost without interfering in the critical functions of the system. Task 2.4: Prototyped, implemented, and quantitatively evaluated/validated the techniques and tools on a realistic industrial CPS security testbed environment by leveraging the unique resources of the team. Task 3: Developed Commercialization plan to transition the developed tools into power system industry stakeholders for a broader adoption by leveraging the expertise of our industrial members. Phase II: Task 4: Successfully completed field demonstration, verification, and evaluation of the effectiveness of the attack surface analysis and reduction techniques on a realistic utility testbed environment. This also involved the development of realistic scenarios, sound metrics, data sets, evaluation criteria, and documentation. Technology integration & Field demonstration: The project had significantly advanced the state-of-the-art research and practice in improving the cybersecurity of our nation’s power grid infrastructure against cyber threats. In particular, the proposed, designed, and deployed attack surface analysis and reduction algorithms and tools have contributed to significantly reducing the exposure and risk of the devices, substations, and the integrated SCADA/EMS/ DMS grid environment to cyber threat. Strong demonstration and evaluation techniques have verified the feasibility of the developed techniques on realistic cyber-physical testbeds and utility partner's real grid environment, and collaborative research and evaluation of attack surface reduction techniques (for wide-are monitoring and control) within a vendor (GE) EMS platform. The Attack Host Analyzer (AHA) tool that was developed through this project was made available through GitHub.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

NASA NTRS2011

Deployment of an Advanced Electrocardiographic Analysis (A-ECG) to Detect Cardiovascular Risk in Career Firefighters

INTRODUCTION Sudden cardiac death is the leading cause of line of duty death among firefighters, accounting for approximately 45% of fatalities annually. Firefighters perform strenuous muscular work while wearing heavy, encapsulating personal protective equipment in high ambient temperatures, under chaotic and emotionally stressful conditions. These factors can precipitate sudden cardiac events like myocardial infarction, serious dysrhythmias, or cerebrovascular accidents in firefighters with underlying cardiovascular disease. Screening for cardiovascular risk factors is recommended but not always followed in this population. PHASER is a project charged with identifying and prioritizing risk factors in emergency responders. We have deployed an advanced ECG (A-ECG) system developed at NASA for improved sensitivity and specificity in the detection of cardiac risk. METHODS Forty-four professional firefighters were recruited to perform comprehensive baseline assessments including tests of aerobic performance and laboratory tests for fasting lipid profiles and glucose. Heart rate and conventional 12-lead ECG were obtained at rest and during incremental treadmill exercise testing (XT). In addition, a 5-min resting 12-lead A-ECG was obtained in a subset of firefighters (n=18) and transmitted over a secure networked system to a physician collaborator at NASA for advanced-ECG analysis. This A-ECG system has been proven, using myocardial perfusion and other imaging, to accurately identify a number of cardiac pathologies including coronary artery disease (CAD), left ventricular hypertrophy, hypertrophic cardiomyopathy, non-ischemic cardiomyopathy, and ischemic cardiomyopathy. RESULTS Subjects mean (SD) age was 43 (8) years, weight 91 (13) kg, and BMI of 28 (3) kg/square meter. Maximum oxygen uptake (VO2max) was 39 (9) ml/kg/min. This compares with the 45th %ile in healthy reference values and a recommended standard of 42 ml/kg/min for firefighters. The metabolic threshold (VO2Theta) above which lactate accumulates was 23 (8) ml/kg/min. The chronotropic index, a measure of cardiovascular strain during XT was 35 (8) /L compared with reference values for men of 40 /L. Total cholesterol, LDL-C and HDL-C were 202 (34),126 (29), and 55 (15) mg/dl, respectively. Fifty-one percent of subjects had .3 cardiovascular risk factors, 2 subjects had resting hypertension (BP.140/90), and 23 had pre-hypertension (.120/80 but <140/90). Seven had exaggerated exercise induced hypertension but only one had ST depression on XT ECG, at least one positive A-ECG score for CAD, and documented CAD based on cardiology referral. While all other subjects, including those with fewer risk factors, higher aerobic fitness, and normal exercise ECGs, were classified as healthy by A-ECG, there was no trend for association between risk factors and any of 20 A-ECG parameters in the grouped data. CONCLUSIONS A-ECG screening correctly identified the individual with CAD although there was no trend for A-ECG parameters to distinguish those with elevated BP or multiple risk factors but normal XT ECG. We have demonstrated that a new technology, advanced-ECG, can be introduced for remote firefighter risk assessment. This simple, time and cost-effective approach to risk identification that can be acquired remotely and transmitted securely can detect individuals potentially at risk for line-of-duty death. Additional research is needed to further document its value.

Dolezal, B. A.↗

DOE OSTI2020

US Department of Energy, Office of Science High Performance Computing Facility Operational Assessment 2019 Oak Ridge Leadership Computing Facility

Oak Ridge National Laboratory's (ORNL's) Leadership Computing Facility (OLCF) continues to surpass its operational target goals: supporting users; delivering fast, reliable computational ecosystems; creating innovative solutions for high performance computing (HPC) needs; and managing risks, safety, and security associated with operating some of the most powerful computers in the world. The results can be seen in the cutting-edge science conducted by users and the praise from the research community. Calendar year (CY) 2019 was a big year as OLCF staff ran five world-class resources (the leadershipclass computers Titan and Summit, the large analysis cluster called Eos, and the massive parallel filesystems called Atlas and Alpine)) and also began power and cooling upgrades for a 2021 exascale system called Frontier. While continuing exceptional operation of Titan, Eos, and Rhea, the OLCF released the Summit supercomputer for production on January 1, 2019. Summit debuted as the most capable and efficient system in its class and has been recognized as the most powerful system in the world for its performance on both the high performance linpack (HPL) and conjugate gradient (HPCG) benchmark applications since June 2018 according to TOP500. Summit represents the culmination of a multiyear effort between the OLCF, IBM, NVIDIA, and Mellanox to deliver a system that is unmatched for modeling, simulation, data analysis, and learning. To hit the ground running with science-ready applications on day one, application teams worked closely with the OLCF through the Center for Accelerated Application Readiness (CAAR) program for years in advance of the Summit deployment. CY 2019 was filled with outstanding results and accomplishments: a very high rating from users on overall satisfaction for the sixth year in a row; a tremendous amount of core-hours delivered to researchers from two leadership-class systems; and success in delivering on the allocation split of roughly 60%, 30%, and 10% of core-hours offered for the Innovative and Novel Computational Impact on Theory and Experiment (INCITE), Advanced Scientific Computing Research Leadership Computing Challenge (ALCC), and Director's Discretionary (DD) programs, respectively (see Operational Performance section). These accomplishments, coupled with the high utilization rates (overall and capability usage), represent the fulfillment of the promise of both leadership-class machines: efficient facilitation of leadership-class computational applications. Table ES.1 presents a summary of the 2019 OLCF metric targets and the associated results. More information can be found in the Operational Performance section for each OLCF resource. The scientific accomplishments of OLCF users are a strong indication of long-term operational success, with publications this year in such notable journals and publications as Nature, Nature Physics, Nature Plants, Physical Review X, Journal of the American Physical Society, Cell, Nano Letters, and Trends in Biotechnology. Crucial domain-specific discoveries facilitated by resources at the OLCF are described in the High Performance Computing Facility Operational Assessment 2019 Oak Ridge Leadership Computing Facility (OAR) Strategic Results section. For example, researchers used Summit to pinpoint and understand the production of proteins from genetic information, including mutations and the functional expression of disease (Section 8.2).

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

DOE OSTI2023

Cyber threat assessment of machine learning driven autonomous control systems of nuclear power plants

We report advanced cyber-attacks against critical infrastructure and the energy sector are becoming more common. With the invention of autonomous control systems (ACS) within advanced nuclear reactor designs, system designers, reactor operators, and regulators must consider cybersecurity during the design and operational phases. This article provides a cyber threat assessment of machine learning (ML)-based digital twinning (DT) technologies in the context of advanced reactor ACS. A cyber–physical testbed was created to emulate nuclear reactor digital instrumentation and controls (I&C) and act as a basis for the ACS. The ACS was designed as two plant-level DTs predicting reactor malfunctions and determining control actions and two component-level DTs responsible for classifying component states and forecasting component inputs and outputs (I/O). Two duplicate ACS designs– one using a traditional ML framework and one using an automated ML (AutoML) framework– were created and tested against cyber-attacks on training data, real-time process data, and ML model architectures to determine their respective qualitative cyber-risk in terms of likelihood and impact. Both frameworks showed similar cyber-resilience against training, real-time, and ML architecture attacks, proving that neither is inherently more secure. Recommended safeguard and security measures are posed to system designers, reactor operators, and regulators to maintain the cybersecurity of ML-based DT technologies such as ACS, prompting a holistic view of shared responsibility for maintaining cyber-secure ML-based systems.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

DOE OSTI2024

Spot size measurement of a deuterium–tritium dense plasma focus using neutron radiography

Neutron radiography is a technique uniquely suited to applications in nuclear diagnostics, non-destructive testing, and subcritical experiments. The spatial resolution of neutron radiographs is degraded by optical blur in the imaging system and the neutron source size, where the ideal source is point-like to optimize the point-spread function. A potential neutron source for radiography is the dense plasma focus (DPF), a coaxial Z-pinch that produces thermonuclear and beam-target neutrons. To assess if the source size is suitable for radiography, a neutron imaging system was used to measure the source size of the 4 MA Sodium DPF at the Nevada National Security Site operating with deuterium–tritium gas-fill. The source size was measured using the edge-spread function of tungsten objects, each having a rolled (convex) edge. The spot size was found to be 7–12 mm full-width at half-max (FWHM) assuming a Gaussian source, though comparison is presented for Lorentzian and Bennett distributions. The average FWHM was found to be 8.6 ± 1.2 mm vertically and 10.8 ± 1.2 mm horizontally with respect to the image plane, averaging over varied edges and alignments. The results were sensitive to source alignment and edge metrology, which introduced notable uncertainties. These results are consistent with separate experimental measurements as well as magnetohydrodynamics simulations of this DPF, which suggest that neutron production can originate from pinches ∼5–7 mm off-axis. These results suggest that the DPF should be used for radiography at low magnification (M < 1) where spot size does not dominate spatial blur.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

DOE OSTI2020

Securing Vehicle Charging Infrastructure

As the US electrifies the transportation sector, cyber attacks targeting vehicle charging could bring consequences to electrical system infrastructure. This is a growing area of concern as charging stations increase power delivery and must communicate to a range of entities to authorize charging, sequence the charging process, and manage load (grid operators, vehicles, OEM vendors, charging network operators, etc.). The research challenges are numerous and are complicated because there are many end users, stakeholders, and software and equipment vendors interests involved. Poorly implemented electric vehicle supply equipment (EVSE), electric vehicle (EV), or grid communication system cybersecurity could be a significant risk to EV adoption because the political, social, and financial impact of cyberattacks - or public perception of such - ripples across the industry and has lasting and devastating effects. Unfortunately, there is no comprehensive EVSE cybersecurity approach and limited best practices have been adopted by the EV/EVSE industry. There is an incomplete industry understanding of the attack surface, interconnected assets, and unsecured interfaces. Thus, comprehensive cybersecurity recommendations founded on sound research are necessary to secure EV charging infrastructure. This project is providing the power, security, and automotive industry with a strong technical basis for securing this infrastructure by developing threat models, determining technology gaps, and identifying or developing effective countermeasures. Specifically, the team is creating a cybersecurity threat model and performing a technical risk assessment of EVSE assets, so that automotive, charging, and utility stakeholders can better protect customers, vehicles, and power systems in the face of new cyber threats.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗

DOE OSTI2023

Data Summary Report for Soil and Slab Sampling at Former Building 175

Lawrence Livermore National Security (LLNS) and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) are in the process of returning the area where Building 175 existed to beneficial use for future site development. The completed assessment will help LLNS and DOE to outline project scope and costs associated with the removal, characterization, and disposal of materials generated when the concrete slab for the former building and any associated remaining subsurface structures are demolished. Slab removal under the Transition & Disposition process requires full screening for potential site contamination to determine appropriate future land use. Borehole locations and depths were designed to correctly assess DOE’s future liability for characterizing residual vadose zone contamination. If a residual source area is identified at depth, DOE will need to evaluate the additional cost of future subsurface cleanup (with limited access) due to planned development. This is necessary to leave the location in a “ready-to-build” status. As a result, Phase II sampling requirements may in some cases extend beyond the construction zone required for slab removal to ensure the necessary due diligence. To avoid the potential spread of contamination and/or the creation of an environmental release by impacting the integrity of known contamination areas (e.g., pit within room 102 and the east to west boundary seam), these locations were not sampled for this project. During demolition of the slab, these locations and their underlying soils should be further evaluated. The assessment was conducted in accord with the May 2022 Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Former Building 175 Assessment Soil Sampling and Analysis Plan / Quality Assurance Plan. Thirty-six, direct-push borings were advanced, along with collecting concrete (where present) and soil samples for laboratory analyses. Thirty-two of the borings were advanced to a depth of 25 feet below ground (bgs), and four borings were advanced to a depth of 55 feet bgs. The concrete slab for former Building 175 ranged from approximately 8 inches to over two feet in thickness. Soils encountered during the investigation consisted primarily of clayey silt, with interbeds of sandy gravel and silty sand to the total depth explored of 55 feet bgs. Field photoionization detector readings – checking for volatile organic compound (VOC) vapors in soils, ranged from zero (0) to a peak of 33 parts per million at 25 feet bgs in boring PC-B175- 028. The cause for the peak reading is unknown, however, no visually discolored or odorous soils were encountered during the assessment and all VOC results were below Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory’s (LLNL’s) Soil Screening and Management Plan (SSMP) soil screening levels (SSL). Groundwater was not encountered during the assessment and is expected to occur at roughly 65 feet bgs in the project area. No metals were detected at concentrations of concern in the concrete core samples collected and analyzed. Low gross alpha and beta activity concentrations were detected in the concrete core samples collected and analyzed. The detected activity concentrations would appear to be from naturally occurring radioactive isotopes, i.e., potassium 40, present in the raw materials used to make concrete and not artificially added. Tritium was not detected above the testing laboratory's Method Detection Limit (MDL) in any of the concrete core samples collected and analyzed. The radioactive isotopes - actinium 228, bismuth 214, lead 212, lead 214, potassium 40, radium 226, radium 228, and thallium 208, were detected at low activity concentrations in the concrete core samples analyzed. Based on the detected activity concentrations, the isotopes would appear to be naturally occurring in the raw materials used to make concrete and not artificially added. Acetone – a common laboratory contaminant, was detected in nine of the soil samples collected and analyzed. Concentrations of two other volatile organic compounds (benzene and tetrachloroethene) were detected in five of the soil samples analyzed. All concentrations were below SSLs. Total petroleum hydrocarbons as diesel range organics were detected at 43.9 milligrams per kilogram (mg/kg) in the 20-foot bgs duplicate sample from boring PC-B175-007. Total petroleum hydrocarbons as motor oil were detected at 7.20 mg/kg in the 15-foot bgs routine sample from boring PC-B175-001, and at 20.7 mg/kg in the 20-foot bgs duplicate sample from boring PC-B175-007. The SSL for diesel-range TPHs is 260 mg/kg. LLNL does not have an SSL for motor oil range TPHs. No indications of a release, e.g., visibly stained, or odorous soil, were present at the boring locations. No samples collected contained polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) in concentrations above the laboratory reporting limit. Arsenic was detected above its SSL of 8.51 mg/kg in the 25-foot bgs routine sample collected from boring PC-B175-023. Nickel was detected above its SSL of 86.0 mg/kg in the 10-foot bgs routine sample from boing PC-B175-005, the 20-foot bgs routine sample from boring PC-B175-025, and the 25-foot bgs routine sample from boring PC-B175-034. The detected concentrations, however, were well below ten times (10x) their respective STLCs. Gross alpha and/or gross beta were detected above their respective SSL activity concentrations in three routine soil samples. Retesting (two per sample) of the samples showed that the initial reported activity concentrations were anomalous. Tritium was not detected in any of the routine or duplicate soil samples collected and analyzed during the investigation. The radioactive isotopes - actinium 228, bismuth 212 and 214, lead 212 and 214, potassium 40, radium 224, 226 and 228, thallium 208, thorium 234 and uranium, were detected at low activity concentrations in the soil samples analyzed for radioactive constituents. The detected isotopes and their associated activity concentrations are typical of those naturally occurring in the marine-type sedimentary deposits underlying the Livermore Valley. No radiological controls are necessary for the soil evaluated.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2024

EMP Testing of NAE Magnetic Motor Starters

Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) performed a high-altitude nuclear electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) critical generation station component vulnerability test campaign with a focus on high-frequency, conducted early-time (E1) HEMP for the Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER). This report provides vulnerability test results to investigate component response and/or damage thresholds to reasonable HEMP threat levels that will help to inform site vulnerability assessments, mitigation planning, and modeling calibrations. This work details testing of North American Electric (NAE) magnetic motor starters to determine the effects of conducted HEMP environments. Motor starters are the control elements that provide power to motors throughout a generating plant; a starter going offline would cause loss of power to critical pumps and compressors, which could lead to component damage or unplanned plant outages. Additionally, failed starters would be unable to support plant startup. Six industrial motor starters were tested: two 2 horsepower (HP) starters with breaker disconnects and typical protection equipment, two 20 HP starters with breaker disconnects, and two 20 HP starters with fused disconnects. Each starter was placed in a circuit with a generator and inductive motor matching the starter rating. The conducted EMP insult was injected on the power cables passing through the motor starter, with separate tests for the generator and motor sides of the starter.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2025

Evaluation of IEC 62443 Standard Gaps for Electric Grid Substation Model Use Case

This report presents an evaluation of the IEC 62443 standards in the context of electric grid substations, as part of a collaborative effort among Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), Idaho National Laboratory (INL), and the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL). The primary objective is to assess the applicability of these standards to enhance cybersecurity measures for industrial automation and control systems (IACS) within the energy sector. The evaluation identifies strengths, such as the scalability of security levels and the structured lifecycle guidance provided by IEC 62443. However, it also highlights significant gaps, including limited integration of physical security, insufficient guidance for legacy systems, and challenges in addressing emerging threats like supply chain vulnerabilities. Recommendations for refining the standards are proposed, including the need for tailored guidance for securing legacy systems, integrating physical security with cybersecurity frameworks, and enhancing interoperability across multi-vendor environments. By addressing these gaps, the IEC 62443 standards can be strengthened to ensure comprehensive cybersecurity for electric grid substations, thereby supporting the resilience and reliability of critical energy infrastructure.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2025

Commercialization of Pumped Storage Hydropower Technologies

Argonne National Laboratory and the National Laboratory of the Rockies were tasked by the U.S. Department of Energy’s Water Power Technology Office (WPTO) to conduct the Commercialization of Pumped Storage Hydropower Technologies study to investigate commercialization challenges faced by developers of pumped storage hydropower (PSH) projects and technologies by going beyond literature review to gather direct industry insights, lessons learned and best practices from interviews and webinars with industry specialists to create this report for PSH stakeholders and the general public. Researchers explored key challenges faced by PSH developers and innovators seeking to commercialize new technologies to improve PSH design, siting, construction, and operations. Along with highlighting challenges, the study sought to identify the best practices in developing and deploying new PSH projects and innovations. This report is designed to present insights, lessons learned, and best practices relevant to those with an interest in highlighting, informing, or advancing these PSH commercialization efforts. Along with highlighting challenges and best practices, the study sought to identify avenues by which DOE and national laboratories can help support and streamline PSH commercialization and project development processes.

13 HYDRO ENERGY↗

NASA NTRS2008

Enhanced Flight Termination System (EFTS): Flight Demonstration and Results

The Enhanced Flight Termination System (EFTS) program was initiated and propelled due to the inadvertent terminations of Global Hawk and the Strategic Target System and the NASA Inspector General's assessment letter and recommendations regarding the exploration of low-cost, lightweight space COMSEC for FTS. Additionally, the standard analog and high alphabet systems most commonly used in FTS are secure, but not encrypted. A study group was initiated to select and document a robust, affordable, reliable technology that provides encrypted FTS capability. A flight demonstration was conducted to gain experience using EFTS in an operational environment, provide confidence in the use of the EFTS components, integrate EFTS into an existing range infrastructure to demonstrate the scalability of system components, to provide a command controller that generated the EFTS waveform using an existing range infrastructure, and to provide a report documenting the results of the demonstration. The primary goal of the demonstration was to obtain operational experience with EFTS. Areas of operational experience include: mission planning, pre-flight configuration and testing, mission monitoring and recording, vehicle termination, developing mission procedures. and post mission data reduction and other post mission activities. An Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) was selected to support the EFTS demonstration due to interest in future use of EFTS by the AMRAAM program, familiarity of EFTS by range personnel, and the availability of existing operational environment to support EFTS testing with available program funding. For demonstration purposes, the AMRAAM was successfully terminated using an EFTS receiver and successfully demonstrating EFTS. The EFTS monitoring software with spectrum analyzer and digital graphical display of aircraft, missile, and target were also demonstrated.

Tow, David↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Trace Oxygen Measurements of Asteroid Sample Storage Desiccators

The Astromaterials Curation facility at the NASA Johnson Space Center is currently curating more than 120 g of carbonaceous asteroid Bennu material as well as over 500 mg of asteroid Ryugu [1 and 2]. These astromaterials are stored in isolating desiccators and gloveboxes under a continuous purge of pure (<1 ppm O 2 ) gaseous nitrogen. The oxygen and moisture concentrations in our OSIRIS-REx sample processing gloveboxes are continuously monitored via integrated sensors; however, our sample storage desiccators lack integrated oxygen and humidity sensors. In previous studies, we used PreSens Fibox 4 trace oxygen meters and optochemical PSt9 spot sensors to measure the oxygen concentrations in candidate asteroid sample containers that had been sealed in nitrogen; we determined that Eagle stainless steel containers inhibit the ingress of external oxygen for several weeks [3]. This optochemical sensor technology allowed us to take precise, contactless measurements within a trace range of 0 to 200 ppmv O 2 . The effectiveness of the trace oxygen sensors in our container experiments inspired us to utilize them to assess the performance of our desiccators that previously lacked trace oxygen monitoring. In this study, our goal was to determine the quality of the nitrogen purge in the isolating desiccator under normal operating conditions by measuring the trace oxygen content. Utilizing optochemical sensor technology, we determined how long the oxygen concentration takes to reach an equilibrium in the desiccator; that is, determine the rate at which the oxygen diffusion into the desiccator equals the rate at which oxygen diffuses out of the desiccator via N2 purge. Additionally, we wanted to determine the oxygen concentration at this equilibrium, the state in which our desiccators are in during normal operating conditions. We tested a custom three chamber desiccator manufactured by Germfree using a PSt9 trace oxygen sensor spot that was mounted into a ¼” National Pipe Tapered (NPT) metal flow-through cell and attached it to the desiccator exhaust. The desiccator consists of top, middle, and bottom isolating chambers. The top chamber door was opened for several minutes to simulate a sample exchange, it was sealed, and then purged ~15 Standard Cubic Feet per Hour (SCFH). Oxygen measurements were automatically recorded via the Fibox 4 trace oxygen meter in 5-minute intervals over the course of a 24-hour period. Our results indicate the desiccator reached an equilibrium value of 10-15 ppm O 2 after ~5 hours (Fig. 1). This data allows us to explore standards for purging and exchange protocols that can be applied to similar types of desiccators in Hayabusa2, OSIRIS-REx, and for sample return collections. The assessment of the internal gaseous compositions of desiccators also allows us to share with the community the N 2 environment in which many of our asteroid samples and hardware are securely curated. Future measurements will include other nitrogen flow rates and measuring the trace oxygen concentration as a function of time for the levels of the previous commercial desiccator in which the Hayabusa2 sample collection was stored. We will also analyze how long the desiccators hold N2 after being disconnected from their N2 source, an extended measurement for sample security reassurance.

Curation↗

DOE OSTI2026

Work With Us to Advance Cybersecurity for the Current and Future Grid

The energy sector is undergoing rapid change. Advanced technologies and controls, digitally connected devices, and a mix of generation sources offer increased energy reliability and security, reduced energy costs, and enhanced grid operations. But they can also carry physical and cybersecurity risks that are not yet fully understood. With deep expertise in advanced energy technologies, the National Laboratory of the Rockies is examining the cybersecurity implications of evolving systems and developing cutting-edge tools, novel approaches, and innovative research capabilities to address sector-wide challenges. Together with our partners, we are working to achieve a more secure, defensible, and reliable grid.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

DOE OSTI2022

Assessing the Threat: Weaving Cybersecurity into the Building Development Process

Today’s connected lighting systems have the potential to reduce energy consumption and operational costs via the use of the data they collect and share with other building systems (e.g., HVAC, building automation, security). However, many market available products are new to being networked, and when networked components in lighting and other building systems are not sufficiently secured, they present opportunities for criminals to exploit. Further, security vulnerabilities in one system can be used as lateral steppingstones that allow access to other prized assets on the same network. These cybersecurity concerns could deter the adoption and use of connected systems, which then could jeopardize long-term national objectives for reduced energy usage. The workflows described here and presented in more detail in the referenced reports are examples of how these frameworks and tools can be put to practical use during system design and specification.

attack surface, Building development, threat analy↗

NASA NTRS1982

Assessing the representativeness of wind data for wind turbine site evaluation

Once potential wind turbine sites (either for single installations or clusters) are identified through siting procedures, actual evaluation of the sites must commence. This evaluation is needed to obtain estimates of wind turbine performance and to identify hazards to the machine from the turbulence component of the atmosphere. These estimates allow for more detailed project planning and for preliminary financing arrangements to be secured. The site evaluation process can occur in two stages: (1) utilizing existing nearby data, and (2) establishing and monitoring an onsite measurement program. Since step (2) requires a period of at least 1 yr or more from the time a potential site has been identified, step (1) is often an essential stage in the preliminary evaluation process. Both the methods that have been developed and the unknowns that still exist in assessing the representativeness of available data to a nearby wind turbine site are discussed. How the assessment of the representativeness of available data can be used to develop a more effective onsite meteorological measurement program is also discussed.

Renne, D. S.↗

DOE OSTI2024

Emergency Management of Tomorrow Research: Emergency Operations Center of the Future Tabletop Exercise Nashua, NH Tabletop Exercise

As part of the Emergency Management (EM) of Tomorrow Research (EMOTR) program, sponsored by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) developed concepts for the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) of the Future to provide recommendations to assist DHS S&T in future decision-making with regards to research and development (R&D) and investments toward establishing a framework for a national, coordinated approach to EM. PNNL is conducting tabletop exercises (TTXs) designed to assess the impacts and benefits of emerging technologies on EM organizations.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

DOE OSTI2024

Emergency Management of Tomorrow Research: Emergency Operations Center of the Future Seattle, WA Tabletop Exercise

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Satellite Conjunction Assessment, Risk Analysis and Collision Avoidance Best Practices: The History, Evolution and Opportunities

Since Explorer 1 was launched on January 31, 1958, the United States (U.S.) has reaped the benefits of space exploration. New markets and new technologies have spurred the economy and changed lives in many ways across the national security, civil, and commercial sectors. Space technologies and space-based capabilities now provide global communications, navigation and timing, weather forecasting, and more. Space exploration also presents challenges that impact not only the U.S. but also its allies and other partners. A significant increase in the volume and diversity of activity in space means that it is becoming increasingly congested. Emerging commercial ventures such as satellite servicing, in-space manufacturing, and tourism as well as new technologies enabling small satellites and large constellations of satellites present serious challenges for safely and responsibly using space in a stable, sustainable manner. To meet these challenges, the U.S. seeks to improve global awareness of activity in space by publicly sharing flight safety-related information and by coordinating its own on-orbit activity in a safer, more responsible manner. It seeks to bolster stability and reduce current and future operational on-orbit risks so that space is sustained for future generations. To this end, new and better Space Situational Awareness (SSA) capabilities are needed to keep pace with the increased congestion, and the U.S. seeks to create a dynamic environment that encourages and rewards commercial providers who improve these capabilities. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Spacecraft Conjunction Assessment and Collision Avoidance Best Practices Handbook reflects how NASA currently operates, which has evolved over time. Consideration is given to important topics such as spacecraft and constellation design; spacecraft “trackability;” pre-launch preparation and early launch activities; on-orbit collision avoidance; and automated trajectory guidance and maneuvering. This talk aims to present examples of responsible practices for spacecraft Owners/Operators (O/O) to consider for lowering collision risks and operating safely in space (from LEO and beyond) in a stable and sustainable manner. As technology and innovation continues to improve upon existing capabilities, what kind of new challenges are presented in the SSA community? Can space exploration and commercial ventures thrive while keeping paramount the safety and protection of the space environment? What are the challenges and opportunities that need to be addressed and considered for space situational awareness in Cis-Lunar Space? It may prove useful for entities offering, or intending to offer, SSA or Conjunction Assessment (CA) services to consider such examples of responsible practices to protect the space environment for future use by all.

Collision Avoidance↗