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Analysis of Exposure during Transportation of Waste to the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) - 20445

Safety is a priority for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Environmental Management (EM) Nevada Program. This commitment to safety is integrated into requirements and work procedures at DOE sites across the U.S. that generate low-level radioactive waste, mixed low-level radioactive waste, and classified waste that is transported to the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) for permanent disposal. Generators of this waste are responsible for ensuring it is packaged and transported in a safe and compliant manner. These generators and their contracted commercial carriers must comply with U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations; the Nevada National Security Site Waste Acceptance Criteria (NNSSWAC); and other applicable federal, state, and local regulations and requirements. This includes packaging and shipping the waste to meet DOT regulatory radiation dose limits to ensure public safety during transportation. NNSS waste generators have a solid safety record for complying with these stringent regulations as demonstrated by the fact that no shipments exceeding DOT dose rate limits were received at the NNSS Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC) during FY 2014 through FY 2018. A 2005 study conducted by the Desert Research Institute validated shipments to the NNSS comply with DOT radiation dose limits. In response to recent Nevada stakeholder requests for an updated study, an analysis was conducted to verify and provide evidence that the public continues to be safe from exposure to radioactive waste shipment to the NNSS. Radiation exposure from radioactive waste shipments in transit to the NNSS was evaluated. Three studies were performed: 1. Confirm compliance of waste shipments to the DOT radiation limits using dose rate surveys taken at the generator site and at the disposal site. 2. Estimate the dose to the public from waste shipments using the dosimetry results for disposal site personnel by comparing time of exposure for various individuals/scenarios. 3. Estimate the truck driver dose using the receipt dose rate surveys and time of exposure, and from dosimetry results. Study 1 confirmed compliance with the DOT dose rate limits for a sample of waste shipments (123 of 1,038) received during fiscal year (FY) 2017. Study 2 showed that the average annual radiation equivalent dose for disposal site personnel during FY 2017 was approximately 6.7% [0.415 mSv (41.5 millirem)] of the annual average dose that a person living in the U.S. receives from all sources [6.2 mSv (620 mrem)]. Maximum dose to a member of the public, a person resting/sleeping in an adjacent truck at a rest area to a waste shipment, was 0.0166 mSv (1.66 mrem), which is less than the dose received from a person taking a round trip from the east coast to the west coast of the continental U.S. on an airplane [0.07 mSv (7 mrem) per round trip]. Study 3 showed that the truck driver who made the most shipments of radioactive waste to the NNSS, who drove the most hours (estimated time of exposure 2,520 hours), during FY 2017 had a total dose of 0.15 mSv (15 mrem), which was obtained from their personal dosimeter. The annual dose recorded for disposal site personnel, the dose estimates for the public, and the truck driver dose were all a small percentage of the average radiation dose a person receives from all sources (e.g., background and medical radiation). At these levels, risk should only be described qualitatively. Radiation exposure from radioactive waste shipments to the NNSS were shown to be compliant with the DOT dose rate limits, safe, and very low (i.e., within background levels). (authors)

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Analysis of Material Properties of Aged Rigid Polyurethane Foam

Foams are classified as either rigid or flexible and are commonly used in applications such as pipe insulation, carpet fibers, and chair foam cushions. Polyurethane foams are excellent thermal insulators, have excellent mechanical properties, and are chemically inert. With the addition of fire protective additives, polyurethane foams have the ability to intumescence when exposed to high temperatures. For the future storage of the 9977 nuclear shipping packages, the material properties of the General Plastics 3716 rigid polyurethane foam were evaluated for long term performance by comparing aged samples to unaged samples. General Plastics 3716 rigid polyurethane foam was aged from November 2014 to June 2019 at varying temperatures of: 160 deg. F, 160 deg. F + 50% relative humidity (RH), 185 deg. F, 215 deg. F, and 250 deg. F. The foam was then analyzed via Fourier Transform Infrared Spectroscopy (FTIR), 3D Optical Microscope, Thermal Gravimetric Analysis (TGA), Differential Scanning Calorimetry (DSC). FTIR and Optical Microscope: No significant change to chemical or physical structure was evident by FTIR or optical microscope analysis. DSC: Decrease of heat capacity over time for all oven temperatures except a slight increase for the 185 deg. F conditioned foams. Largest decrease evident with foams conditioned at 250 deg. F. A slight increase in heat capacity for humid samples. Similar trends in heat capacities at 71 deg. C and 102 deg. C. TGA: As conditioning temperature increased, a decline was evident in the average percent weight loss, onset temperature, and first derivative peak temperature. No significant effect due to humidity except for a decrease in first derivative peak temperature. Unaged samples exhibited strong intumescence. Foams conditioned at 160 deg. F exhibited slight intumescence. Results suggest fire protective additives decomposed at higher temperatures, which contributed to a lower average percent mass loss in higher temperature conditioning. Further thermal degradation testing would be beneficial to evaluate the ability of the conditioned foams to intumesce. Evaluate irradiation dose rate effects on conditioned foam. Possible conditioning in an environment with a known humidity or analyzing a new aliquot of sample for each trial to achieve a more representative heat capacity calculation.

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When Every Drum is a Win - Tackling a Thirty-Five Thousand Drum Legacy - 20064

Cameco Corporation's (Cameco) Port Hope Conversion Facility (PHCF) was previously owned by the federal Crown Corporation, Eldorado Nuclear, which held a significant inventory of legacy waste material at the time Cameco was formed in 1988. As a result, Cameco was granted an allocation of 150,000 cubic metres of space in the Long-Term Waste Management Facility (LTWMF) located in the Municipality of Port Hope (MPH), which opened to the receipt of Cameco material in June 2018. Cameco is currently undertaking a major site cleanup and renewal of its Port Hope Conversion Facility (PHCF) which is known as the Vision in Motion (VIM) project. Over its operating history, Eldorado accumulated an inventory of over 35,000 drums of accumulated waste that was primarily stored at two offside warehouse locations. In 2017 and 2018, the project focused on repackaging two well characterized legacy wastes (magnesium fluoride slag and depleted uranium titanium oxide) from one of the two offsite locations. At the conclusion of this work, approximately 15,000 drums of these wastes had been repackaged and disposed of at the LTWMF. There remained approximately 1000 drums from this location that either could not be repackaged safely or were different waste types and required further verification and/or processing. The buildings at this location were scheduled for demolition in early 2019, which triggered the development of a process for triaging legacy drums in August 2018, which allowed for preparation and shipment of approximately half of these drums to the LTWMF by March 2019, with the remainder moved to the second offsite warehouse location in February 2019 for further characterization which is ongoing. This paper will discuss key lessons learned as the drummed legacy waste disposal inventory has been reduced to approximately half of the initial inventory. This will include the development of an alternate packaging process; prioritization of characterization activities and selection of techniques where minimal inventory information is available; determination of next step(s) for each drum as it is assessed; key safety considerations; and how to make inroads into an overwhelming task while under public and regulatory scrutiny. In a relatively short period of time, significant progress has been made to organize and gather information about the legacy waste, update the inventory records and determine the most appropriate pathways (i.e. LTWMF disposal, disposal at another appropriate facility, site storage until future processing and/or disposal). Since 2017 the volume of the decades-old legacy waste inventory has decreased significantly. With the majority of the known materials safely disposed of at the LTWMF, every drum removed from the endless rows of 20,000 pyramidally-stacked waste drums with limited history that is safely characterized, prepared and shipped is considered a win. (authors)

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DOE Hanford Tank Side Cesium Removal System (TSCR) Update: Fabrication and Factory Acceptance Testing - 20300

The Tank Side Cesium Removal (TSCR) System is a modular, quickly-deployable, and passively safe system for efficiently removing solids and cesium from alkaline liquid waste raffinate created by fuel processing on the Hanford site. This paper provides an overview of the project with particular emphasis on completion of fabrication and factory acceptance testing (FAT). All TSCR System components are inside three enclosures known as the Process Enclosure, Ancillary Enclosure, and Control Enclosure. The Process Enclosure is seismic design category II (SDC-II) and built to withstand the rigors of transportation and lifting, high winds, volcanic ash fall, and heavy precipitation (snow) over a temperature range of -25 to 115 deg. F. The Process Enclosure and Control Enclosure were fabricated in AVANTech's Columbia, SC facility, while the Ancillary Enclosure was fabricated in AVANTech's Richland, WA facility. The design and preliminary documented safety analysis were completed in December 2019, with all work being performed in accordance with ASME NQA-1 quality assurance requirements. The Process Enclosure, Ion Exchange Columns (IXCs), and several other TSCR components have a nuclear safety function and are designated as safety significant structures, systems, and components (SS-SSCs). The NQA-1 Commercial Grade Dedication (CGD) process was used to identify critical characteristics in order to accept materials and items used for fabrication of several safety significant TSCR components. This paper also addresses unique aspects and challenges of implementing CGD in DOE facilities and systems. After fabrication and preliminary testing, the Process and Control Enclosures were shipped to AVANTech's Richland facility where the complete TSCR System was setup and connected in a represented layout and configuration that will be used on the Hanford site. Test tanks and pumps were put in place and connected to the TSCR Process Enclosure in a manner that mimicked interfacing Double Shell Tanks in the 241-AP Tank Farm. The TSCR System was then tested/operated under conditions equivalent to those planned for onsite operation. Testing was separated into five separate phases as defined below: - Phase 1: Confirmation of TSCR System readiness for the FAT; - Phase 2: Verification of TSCR System operation under standard conditions; - Phase 3: Demonstration of TSCR System operation under non-standard conditions; - Phase 4: Demonstration of ion exchange media removal from an IXC; and - Phase 5: Completion of TSCR System lift plans and site mobilization. The Hanford Tank Operations Contractor, Washington River Protection Solutions (WRPS), participated in all phases of testing. Testing at AVANTech's Richland Facility allowed WRPS personnel to familiarize themselves with TSCR operations in a radiologically clean facility prior to onsite mobilization. Engineering and operations personnel gained valuable experience that allowed them to better refine onsite operational protocols and procedures - including handling and movement of IXCs with a forklift. This paper describes the technologies used by the TSCR System as well as how these technologies are deployed and operated to advance the Hanford mission of safely, efficiently, and effectively treating tank waste. It also provides detailed information on fabrication and FAT, including operational data from simulated tank waste runs. A project schedule for WRPS' planned construction acceptance testing, operational acceptance testing, and actual tank waste treatment is provided. This presentation should be of great interest to parties responsible for the design, testing, and mobilization of modular NQA-1 technologies for the treatment of raffinate and similar liquid wastes containing high concentrations of radioactive cesium. (authors)

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Advanced Retrieval and Disposition Techniques for Remote Handled Mixed Low-Level Waste - 20319

Legacy waste generated by the sodium-cooled fast reactor, EBR-II, program at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) (owned by the U.S. Department of Energy and managed and operated by Battelle Energy Alliance, LLC) is challenging to treat and disposition using conventional methods. As a result, Veolia Nuclear Solutions is under contract with the Idaho National Laboratory to demonstrate an integrated retrieval and disposition solution for Remote-Handled Mixed Low-Level Waste currently stored in underground liners at INL. Delivery of the integrated solution builds on the expertise and successes of Veolia Nuclear Solutions under its Problematic Waste Treatment Initiative with INL. This initiative focuses solely on the treatment of problematic (reactive metal containing) waste streams using the Veolia Nuclear Solutions GeoMelt{sup R} In-Container Vitrification (ICV{sup TM}) technology. Under the contract, Veolia Nuclear Solutions will provide a fully commissioned prototype remote retrieval system to semi-remotely retrieve and size-reduce problematic waste liners into a safe and consolidated package for transport. The consolidated package will be shipped to Richland, Washington for demonstration treatment using the robust GeoMelt Richland system at Perma-Fix Northwest. The treated waste will ultimately be disposed of as a vitrified Low-Level Waste glass monolith. Veolia Nuclear Solutions has delivered countless remotely operated systems globally to solve some of the industry's most challenging problems. To ensure risk is mitigated in the best possible manner, a methodical phased approach is being utilized to validate the integrated solution. This contract focuses on the delivery and deployment of the prototype retrieval system onsite and the treatment of a single liner. Following successful demonstration treatment using GeoMelt ICV, the project is planning to make prototype enhancements before retrieving and treating another liner. Establishing a new integrated approach for retrieval and disposition of waste offers many benefits to INL and the U.S. Department of Energy. It is anticipated that the integrated solution will provide significant cost and schedule savings by increasing the number of liners dispositioned per year. In addition, the complexity of the overall waste disposition process will be reduced. Remotely retrieving and size-reducing waste in the field will provide additional safety to operational personnel and allow critical resources, such as hot cells, to focus on the primary missions at hand. Vitrification (using the GeoMelt ICV technology) allows for the direct processing of metal clad waste thereby significantly reducing pretreatment steps while providing a robust waste form for long-term disposal. The results from this ongoing contract are presented in this paper. (authors)

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The Use of Long-wave Infrared Cameras for Hazardous Waste Remediation - 20457

For over fifty years, infrared cameras have been used in military applications, nondestructive testing, condition monitoring, and predictive maintenance. As infrared cameras continue to become more sophisticated and less expensive, they are providing value in an ever-increasing variety of unique applications, including hazardous waste remediation. This paper describes several instances of how infrared cameras have been used within the US Department of Defense and the US Department of Energy in support of waste remediation projects, including the author's recent use of an infrared camera in support of the Calcine Retrieval Project at the Idaho National Laboratory. Infrared cameras provide images of infrared radiation, or heat energy, which is otherwise invisible to the unaided eye. Infrared radiation is part of the electromagnetic spectrum, which includes visible light. But unlike visible light, infrared has wavelengths longer than the human eye can detect. Infrared is emitted by everything with a temperature above absolute zero (-273 deg. C, or -459 deg. F); the higher the temperature, the greater the infrared thermal radiation, or heat, that is emitted. Even objects that feel cold to us, like ice, emit thermal radiation and can be imaged by infrared cameras. These cameras are typically used to look for abnormally hot or cold spots on a component or target area under normal operating conditions. The method provides a rapid, wide-area, noncontact technique for identifying problems associated with a temperature differential. All infrared cameras can provide qualitative thermal information by displaying relative differences in temperatures within a two-dimensional image. More expensive infrared cameras can also provide quantitative information where an absolute temperature value is assigned to each pixel associated with the displayed two-dimensional image. Proper camera calibration and a solid understanding of heat transfer and thermography techniques are required when using an infrared camera to obtain quantitative information. Case studies outlined in this paper include the rapid, non-intrusive detection of hazardous decontamination solution within one-ton shipping containers at Pine Bluff Arsenal, the non-intrusive identification of residual elemental sodium within the cooling loops of the Experimental Breeder Reactor II (EBR-II) reactor at the Idaho National Laboratory, process monitoring of heat exchanger melt-and-drain efforts during EBR-II decommissioning, and the remote detection of internal steel supports within calcine storage bins prior to bin penetration. For each use of thermography, the author describes a summary of the waste remediation effort, the infrared camera used, the thermal imaging technique employed, and the results obtained. The paper concludes with a discussion on common mistakes to avoid for similar applications of thermography. (authors)

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Transporting Non-Compliant TRU Wastes in the OPTIMUS{sup TM} Packages - 20493

The OPTIMUS{sup TM} product line of packages was developed with the purpose of providing a versatile and modular packaging option for shipping problematic wastes and fissile material contents. The product line includes a high-activity design in the OPTIMUS-H and a low activity design in the OPTIMUS-L. The two variants utilize a singular containment vessel design, that is enclosed in different protective components that offer different levels of shielding along with thermal and impact protection. The thick shielding provided by the OPTIMUS-H packaging allows for higher activity contents than the OPTIMUS-L to be transported. But the lightweight design of the OPTIMUS-L packaging allows for more packages to be transported in a single shipment. The containment vessel design shared between the two packages provides leak-tight containment of all radioactive contents along with the capabilities to easily leak test and the option to inert and backfill the contents, as necessary, prior to each shipment of the package. Together the OPTIMUS package designs offer significant flexibility and are capable of handling a wide variety of waste materials and other radioactive contents. One of the primary contents covered in the initial design effort for these packages is TRU waste contents beyond the standard waste materials that are compliant with the WIPP Waste Acceptance Criteria. More specifically, the initial content of interest is TRU Waste drums containing sealed containers with potentially flammable gases. While there are multiple other packaging options available for transporting standard WIPP compliant TRU wastes, the goal of the OPTIMUS packages is to offer a superior option for transporting both standard TRU wastes as well as the more problematic non-compliant wastes, among other contents. The non-compliant TRU waste contents explicitly included for the OPTIMUS packages are standard aerosol cans and DOT 3E lecture bottles. However, the methods applied for the package containment can be easily adjusted to cover other sealed container types with potentially flammable gases. The primary challenges with including these items are both the obvious issue of potential for flammable gases (e.g. aerosol propellants) in the package, but also the uncertainty in the exact state of the contents. Because these desired contents are waste materials, the characterization of the materials present in the waste may include some uncertainties. For example, though it may be known that there are one or more aerosol cans in a TRU waste drum, it may not be known if this can is full, spent, or anywhere in between. Also there may be equal uncertainty in the contents of the aerosol can, specifically in the potentially flammable propellant remaining in the can. To include these types of non-compliant items as acceptable contents for the package, the methods utilized in the safety analyses of the OPTIMUS packages must consider all of the uncertainties in the characterization of the waste. The methods utilized cover a range of concerns with transporting contents of this nature including pressure buildup, gas generation, and gaseous combustion for demonstrating the containment of the package. The ability to transport these problematic contents in the OPTIMUS packages gives TRU waste generating sites the option to relocate these drums to an offsite location where the non-compliant items can be properly managed through removal or destruction. (authors)

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Combined Effort to De-Inventory the New Brunswick Laboratory of Plutonium Certified Reference Materials - 20504

To de-inventory plutonium Certified Reference Materials standards (CRMs) from the New Brunswick National Laboratory (NBL), the Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) and Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) formed a unique team. This teaming arrangement leveraged the different capabilities and expertise of both laboratories, helping to ensure the effort would be performed both safely and cost-effectively. With the NBL then physically housed on the ANL site, ANL served as the host-site, providing the necessary facilities and support services (e.g., supplying everything from hoods, loading equipment, and scales to Health Physics supports). From a packaging perspective, ANL's responsibilities focused mainly on characterizing and preparing the contents for shipment, followed by performing the Shipper of Record activities. With SRNL being the Package Design Authority of the 9978, the Type B packaging used for this effort, SRNL's scope included developing a Safety Analysis Report in Packaging (SARP) Letter Amendment to add the CRMs as authorized contents to the 9978. Recognizing competency, ANL prodigiously tasked SRNL to perform the actual loading of the CRMs into the 9978s, while physically on the ANL site. This paper details five different aspects of this effort. They are: 1. Characterization/validation of the CRM contents. 2. Development of the 9978 SARP Letter Amendment for the content change. 3. Development of the nitrogen inerting method to address SARP identified potential flammability concerns. 4. Renewal of the SRNL 9978 loading procedure. 5. Performance of the actual work execution activities. In 2017, the first nine packages were successfully loaded and shipped from NBL, while in 2019, the last ten were successfully loaded and planned for shipment. Without ANL leveraging SRNL's strengths, the de-inventorying of NBL of its plutonium CRMs would have likely taken many years longer. (authors)

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Options, Initial Design Requirements, Estimated Costs, Reactor Commitments, and Potential Uses of a Graphite Leadout Type Experiment Supporting Various Commercial HTR Vendors

Multiple commercial High Temperature Reactor (HTR) vendors and nuclear graphite suppliers would benefit by collaborating on a new irradiation capsule(s) that would include graphite grades not included within the AGC Experiment. This new irradiation capsule(s) would provide data to answer vendor graphite licensing issues. Rather than spending money (and especially) time in designing separate irradiation capsules for each designer, the capsule(s) would be used for multiple graphite and composite designs to maximize efficiency and promote multiple HTR designs. However, the primary motivation for assisting vendors with this new irradiation capsule(s) is lack of availability in the existing Material Test Reactors (MTRs). Cost reduction is a secondary goal. A common, collaborative, capsule design can be achieved for graphite and composites due to the similarity of different grades. Irradiation, disassembly, shipping, and PIE costs would be cost-shared by all users. It is anticipated that interest would extend across all DOE campaigns (micro-Rx, SMR, GCR, MSR, etc.) due to the similar requirements for all graphite grades.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

A Comparison of As-loaded Dose Calculations to Measured Dose Rates

Demonstrating that the radiation dose fields surrounding spent nuclear fuel (SNF) storage and transportation systems meet the applicable limits set forth in 10 CFR 72 for storage and 10 CFR 71 for transportation is essential for the safe handling of radioactive material. The Used Nuclear Fuel-Storage, Transportation, and Disposal Analysis Resource and Data System (UNF-ST&DARDS) [2] is used to provide realistic estimates of SNF-related safety margins. The UNF-ST&DARDS dose rate analysis approach differs from that used in typical licensing approaches, which use design-basis assemblies with bounding source term characteristics to demonstrate the packaging design complies with the regulations. These bounding licensing approaches can increase the time needed to qualify fuel for loading into dry storage and the time a loaded system must wait prior to transportation. UNF-ST&DARDS dose rate assessments allow quantification of realistic, uncredited safety margins associated with actual fuel loading compared with the regulatory limits. While realistic estimation of the dose field surrounding SNF systems may allow for additional flexibility in operations, it is essential to understand how these predictions compare to measured doses. The U.S. Department of Energy Office of Integrated Waste Management and the Prairie Island Indian Community conducted a transportation dose assessment to estimate the site-specific incident-free radiation doses from shipping SNF by rail from the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (PINGP) through the Prairie Island Indian Community Reservation and Trust Land [5,6]. For that effort, the dose rates were obtained for 50 TN-40 and TN-40HT systems in storage configurations. This work compares the predicted dose rates from UNF-ST&DARDS as-loaded calculations with dose rates measured from 50 SNF storage systems at PINGP. The remainder of this paper discusses the data obtained for the evaluation, the modeling methods, and the results of the calculations.

spent nuclear fuel (SNF), UNF-ST&DARDS, Validation↗

Development of Shielding Benchmarks Using the Godiva IV Assembly

The Nuclear Criticality Safety Program (NCSP) is developing a shielding benchmark using the Godiva IV assembly as a source. Its present status is reviewed herein. Even eight decades into the nuclear era, substantial work remains to develop a database of shielding benchmarks to support future nuclear development. A nuclear simulation is only as good as its supporting data, inputs, and validation basis. Uncertainty in these areas is addressed using conservatism, which adds margin and, occasionally, cost. In many shielding situations, high accuracy is not necessary because additional material is not particularly expensive. After all, 1–2 cm of lead often reduces the gamma ray dose substantially. However, in certain areas, conservatism can add unnecessary cost. These areas include mobile shielding applications such as casks, ships, microreactors, and spacecraft, where weight and, thus, margin is expensive. Although these characteristics are side benefits for NCSP shielding benchmark development, the main driver is enabling more reliable placement of criticality accident alarm systems (CAASs) in nuclear material facilities, such as those dedicated to the production of advanced reactor fuels. CAAS placement relies on more than accurate data and code validation. It also relies on sufficiently accurate materials specifications, geometry specifications, and a well-defined, alarm-producing baseline accident. All these things require tacit knowledge and understanding of the problem being evaluated. Benchmarks can help ensure this understanding.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

01-22 HFEF-15 Cask

Technical Description – Upgrading the HFEF-15 shipping cask to allow larger format experiments includes designing, fabricating, and installing new components, updating procedures, and performing an INL-internal informal readiness assessment. Location – INL: Materials and Fuels Complex (TREAT & HFEF)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Fuel Storage Requirements

2023 No fuel storage plan had been developed 2024 The shipping & receiving requirements are understood A storage location has been selected and designated The storage limitations are known and incorporated The INL coordination & approval groups have been determined

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

MODULARITY-AT-SCALE FOR COST COMPETITIVE DEPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR ENERGY

Modularity options have been limited for traditional nuclear energy deployment due to the conventional light water reactor (LWR) safety requirements, such as high pressure retaining heavy and robust containment structures. However, a relatively new regulatory approach called ‘Functional Containment’ has potential to allow less expensive and more flexible designs for non LWRs. Functional containment provides flexibility in design and deployment based on risk informed and performance-based criteria, so that reactors are not over-designed. Non-nuclear industry has successfully used modular design approaches in automotive, aerospace, chemical processing, building construction, and ship building. These industries have shown that modular construction reduces construction time by around 30% - 50% compared to the conventional stick built approach. The nuclear industry can use similar approaches to reduce construction time and costs, balanced with safety requirements, using the functional containment approach. This paper discussing the background of modularity in nuclear energy, examples of less learned, modularity approaches in non-nuclear industries and the potential of cost and schedule savings through the emerging regulatory design flexibilities potentially enabling combination of modular deployment at different scales.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Successful International Validation Test Shipment of the PIP-II HB650 Cryomodule Transportation System

The PIP-II Project will receive fully assembled cryomodules from CEA and STFC-UKRI as in-kind contributions. Damage to these cryomodules during transport is understood to be a significant risk to the project, so an extensive testing and validation program has been executed to mitigate this risk. The centerpiece of this effort was the successful shipment, from FNAL to STFC-UKRI and back, of a prototype HB650 cryomodule with cold testing before and after shipment to verify no functionality changes from shipment. Building on an escalating test transport program, the prototype cryomodule was shipped to the UK and back using realistic logistics, handling, instrumentation, and planning. The process of executing this shipment, lessons learned, and plan moving forward will be presented here.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗

FUEL PERFORMANCE STUDIES AT IDAHO NATIONAL LABORATORY MAKING USE OF THE BYRON FUEL SHIPMENT

In December of 2023 a shipment of commercially irradiated fuel rods from the Byron Generating Station in Illinois was successfully shipped to the Materials and Fuels Complex (MFC) at Idaho National Laboratory (INL). The make-up of the rods includes a mix of cladding types from traditional ZirloTM, advanced zirconium alloys, and chrome coated ZirloTM. Burnups range from regular end of life values to over 70 GWd/MTU rod average. The R&D plan for the rods involves multiple projects from developing licensing data for new claddings to integral transient tests to support burnup extension efforts in the United States. The R&D began in early 2024 with the nondestructive examinations of the rods after which they will be sectioned for microscopy, mechanical testing, and analytical chemistry. Additionally, many rod segments will be refabricated into new test pins and inserted into a static water capsule for integral Reactivity Initiated Accident (RIA) and Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) testing at the TREAT reactor.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Update on Parallel Process Execution in the Next Generation System Analysis Model

As of the end of 2021, 88,880 metric tons of heavy metal (MTHM) (44,741 MTHM in dry storage; 44,139 MTHM in wet storage) of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) were stored at various reactor sites across the United States [1]. The Office of Storage and Transportation in the Department of Energy is planning for the transportation, storage, and eventual disposal of SNF and high-level radioactive waste (HLW). To aid in this effort and inform decision-makers about the backend of the spent fuel cycle, systems analysis tools capable of analyzing the various options with respect to SNF and HLW management are being used as well as continuously improved to meet the evolving needs of the program. System analysts typically use these tools to vary underlying assumptions (shipping rates, allocation priority, available facilities, start dates, etc.) and study the implications of these changes on site clearance schedules, campaign costs, transportation infrastructure acquisition, etc.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Update on Parallel Process Execution in the Next Generation System Analysis Model (NGSAM)

As of the end of 2022, it is estimated that over 90,000 metric tons of heavy metal (MTHM) of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) were stored at various commercial nuclear power reactor sites (both operating and shutdown) across the United States [1]. The Office of Storage and Transportation within the U.S. Department of Energy’s Office of Nuclear Energy is planning for the transportation, storage, and eventual disposal of SNF and high-level radioactive waste (HLW). To aid in this effort and inform decision-makers about the backend of the spent fuel cycle, systems analysis tools capable of analyzing the various options with respect to SNF and HLW management are being used as well as continuously improved to meet the evolving needs of the program. System analysts typically use these tools to vary underlying assumptions (shipping rates, available facilities, start dates, interim storage capacity, etc.) and study the associated system implications such as timing for clearing sites of SNF, various cost elements, transportation infrastructure acquisition needs, etc.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗