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Security-informed safety: integrating security within the safety demonstration of a smart device - 157

Safety and security engineering have, over the years, developed their own regulations, standards, cultures, and practices. However, there's a growing realisation that security is closely connected to safety. Safety must be security-informed: if a safety-critical system isn't secure, it isn't safe. A safety demonstration is incomplete and unconvincing unless it considers security. In our work for government and industry, we have used the Claims, Arguments, Evidence (CAE) framework to analyse the impact of security on a safety justification or safety case and identified the significant changes needed to address security explicitly. This will impact the design and implementation process as well as the assurance and V and V approach. In this paper we discuss the impact of integrating security when developing a safety demonstration of a smart device. A smart device is an instrument, device or component that contains a microprocessor (and therefore contains both hardware and software) and is programmed to provide specialised capabilities, often measuring or controlling a process variable. Examples of smart devices include radiation monitors, relays, turbine governors, uninterruptible power supplies and heating ventilation, and air conditioning controllers. (authors)

42 ENGINEERING↗

Interdisciplinary Approaches to Cybervulnerability Impact Assessment for Energy Critical Infrastructure

As energy infrastructure becomes more interconnected, understanding cybersecurity risks to production systems requires integrating operational and computer security knowledge. We interviewed 18 experts working in the field of energy critical infrastructure to compare what information they find necessary to assess the impact of computer vulnerabilities on energy operational technology. These experts came from two groups: 1) computer security experts and 2) energy sector operations experts. We find that both groups responded similarly for general categories of information and displayed knowledge about both domains, perhaps due to their interdisciplinary work at the same organization. Yet, their discussion of each group’s domain-specific training, motivations, and limitations, as well as their suggestions for collaboration across domains, highlighted how these two groups can work together to help each other secure the energy grid. Our findings inform the development of interdisciplinary security approaches in critical-infrastructure contexts.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Assessment of the Effects of Climate Change on Federal Hydropower

As directed by Congress in Section 9505 of the SECURE Water Act of 2009 (Public Law 111-11), the US Department of Energy (DOE), in consultation with the federal Power Marketing Administrations (PMAs) and other federal agencies, including federal dam owners, has prepared a comprehensive assessment examining the effects of climate change on water available for hydropower at federal facilities and on the marketing of power from these federal facilities. This Oak Ridge National Laboratory report, referred to as the “9505 Assessment,” describes the technical basis for the report to Congress that was called for in the SECURE Water Act.

13 HYDRO ENERGY↗

Camp Lejeune Federal Fleet Tiger Team EVSE Site Assessment

The National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) was contracted by the Department of Defense (DOD) Environmental Security Technology Certification Program (ESTCP) and the Department of Energy (DOE) Federal Energy Management Program (FEMP) to develop a web tool and complete pilot assessments for the installation of Electric Vehicle Supply Equipment (EVSE). NREL has deployed Tiger Teams comprising engineers and fleet experts to support DOD and DOE on several EVSE site assessments since 2015. However, the advancements developed in support of this report, including a cost-estimation tool and geospatial mapping tool, will enable a user-driven path to assess EVSE needs. This report details the site design recommendations for Camp Lejeune, North Carolina.

ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS,ENERGY PLANNING, POLIC↗

Soils Activity Mobility Study: Methodology and Application

This report presents a three-level approach for estimation of sediment transport to provide an assessment of potential erosion risk for sites at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) that are posted for radiological purposes and where migration is suspected or known to occur due to storm runoff. Based on the assessed risk, the appropriate level of effort can be determined for analysis of radiological surveys, field experiments to quantify erosion and transport rates, and long-term monitoring. The method is demonstrated at contaminated sites, including Plutonium Valley, Shasta, Smoky, and T-1. The Pacific Southwest Interagency Committee (PSIAC) procedure is selected as the Level 1 analysis tool. The PSIAC method provides an estimation of the total annual sediment yield based on factors derived from the climatic and physical characteristics of a watershed. If the results indicate low risk, then further analysis is not warranted. If the Level 1 analysis indicates high risk or is deemed uncertain, a Level 2 analysis using the Modified Universal Soil Loss Equation (MUSLE) is proposed. In addition, if a sediment yield for a storm event rather than an annual sediment yield is needed, then the proposed Level 2 analysis should be performed. MUSLE only provides sheet and rill erosion estimates. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Hydrologic Engineering Center-Hydrologic Modeling System (HEC-HMS) provides storm peak runoff rate and storm volumes, the inputs necessary for MUSLE. Channel Sediment Transport (CHAN-SED) I and II models are proposed for estimating sediment deposition or erosion in a channel reach from a storm event. These models require storm hydrograph associated sediment concentration and bed load particle size distribution data. When the Level 2 analysis indicates high risk for sediment yield and associated contaminant migration or when there is high uncertainty in the Level 2 results, the sites can be further evaluated with a Level 3 analysis using more complex and labor- and data-intensive methods. For the watersheds analyzed in this report using the Level 1 PSIAC method, the risk of erosion is low. The field reconnaissance surveys of these watersheds confirm the conclusion that the sediment yield of undisturbed areas at the NNSS would be low. The climate, geology, soils, ground cover, land use, and runoff potential are similar among these watersheds. There are no well-defined ephemeral channels except at the Smoky and Plutonium Valley sites. Topography seems to have the strongest influence on sediment yields, as sediment yields are higher on the steeper hill slopes. Lack of measured sediment yield data at the NNSS does not allow for a direct evaluation of the yield estimates by the PSIAC method. Level 2 MUSLE estimates in all the analyzed watersheds except Shasta are a small percentage of the estimates from PSIAC because MUSLE is not inclusive of channel erosion. This indicates that channel erosion dominates the total sediment yield in these watersheds. Annual sediment yields for these watersheds are estimated using the CHAN-SEDI and CHAN-SEDII channel sediment transport models. Both transport models give similar results and exceed the estimates obtained from PSIAC and MUSLE. It is recommended that the total watershed sediment yield of watersheds at the NNSS with flow channels be obtained by adding the washload estimate (rill and inter-rill erosion) from MUSLE to that obtained from channel transport models (bed load and suspended sediment). PSIAC will give comparable results if factor scores for channel erosion are revised towards the high erosion level. Application of the Level 3 process-based models to estimate sediment yields at the NNSS cannot be recommended at this time. Increased model complexity alone will not improve the certainty of the sediment yield estimates. Models must be calibrated against measured data before model results are accepted as certain. Because no measurements of sediment yields at the NNSS are available, model validation cannot be performed. This is also true for the models used in the Level 2 analyses presented in this study. The need to calibrate MUSLE to local conditions has been discussed. Likewise, the transport equations of CHAN-SEDI and CHAN-SEDII need to be calibrated against local data to assess their applicability under semi-arid conditions and for the ephemeral channels at the NNSS. Before these validations and calibration exercises can be undertaken, a long-term measured sediment yield data set must be developed. Development of long-term measured sediment yield data cannot be overemphasized. Long-term monitoring is essential for accurate characterization of watershed processes. It is recommended that a long-term monitoring program be set up to measure watershed erosion rates and channel sediment transport rates.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Assessing the Potential for Inadvertent Human Intrusion at the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites on the Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

This paper recommends an approach to inadvertent human intrusion (IHI) at the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites (RWMSs) on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). IHI analysis uses the consequences of an individual inadvertently contacting buried waste to set waste concentration limits for near-surface disposal of low-level radioactive waste (LLW). Regulatory agencies are increasingly applying risk-informed decision-making to LLW waste management (NRC 2006). Risk-informed decision-making combines scientific risk assessment with stakeholder values and perceptions to determine a level of acceptable risk. Risk considers not only the consequences of an event, but also its probability of occurring.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Which practices co-deliver food security, climate change mitigation and adaptation, and combat land degradation and desertification?

There is a clear need for transformative change in the land management and food production sectors to address the global land challenges of climate change mitigation, climate change adaptation, combatting land degradation and desertification, and delivering food security (referred to hereafter as “land challenges”). We assess the potential for 40 practices to address these land challenges and find that: Nine options deliver medium to large benefits for all four land challenges. A further two options have no global estimates for adaptation, but have medium to large benefits for all other land challenges. Five options have large mitigation potential (>3 Gt CO 2 eq/year) without adverse impacts on the other land challenges. Five options have moderate mitigation potential, with no adverse impacts on the other land challenges. Sixteen practices have large adaptation potential (>25 million people benefit), without adverse side effects on other land challenges. Most practices can be applied without competing for available land. However, seven options could result in competition for land. A large number of practices do not require dedicated land, including several land management options, all value chain options, and all risk management options. Four options could greatly increase competition for land if applied at a large scale, though the impact is scale and context specific, highlighting the need for safeguards to ensure that expansion of land for mitigation does not impact natural systems and food security. A number of practices, such as increased food productivity, dietary change and reduced food loss and waste, can reduce demand for land conversion, thereby potentially freeing-up land and creating opportunities for enhanced implementation of other practices, making them important components of portfolios of practices to address the combined land challenges.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Climate Vulnerability Assessment and Resilience Planning for Idaho National Laboratory

Idaho National Laboratory’s (INL’s) mission is to discover, demonstrate, and secure innovative nuclear energy solutions, other clean energy options, and critical infrastructure. This INL’s Climate Vulnerability Assessment and Resilience Plan (VARP) was developed to enable and sustain that mission while ensuring the viability of operations considering expected climate change impacts. The VARP was developed according to the narrative requirements from the “Vulnerability Assessment and Resilience Planning Guidance, Version 1.2” document issued in February 2022. A prescribed process was used to identify mission-critical systems and components, determine historical and expected climate impacts, and develop resilient solutions. Experts from across INL, including operations staff, researchers, and climate scientists supplied input to the process. Analyses of climate modeling sources revealed that under scenarios of higher and lower greenhouse gas emissions (Representative Concentration Pathway (RCP) 4.5 and RCP 8.5), INL anticipates an increase in climate hazards, including drought, heat waves, wildfire, and precipitation. Increased frequency and duration of climatic hazards forecasts high impacts on certain mission-critical asset and infrastructure types. Utilizing the VARP Risk Assessment Tool, projected high climate hazard impacts across multiple asset and infrastructure types at the INL include energy generation and distribution systems, Site buildings, specialized or mission-critical equipment, and transportation and fleet infrastructure. Some of these mission-critical asset and infrastructure types maintain high adaptive capacity to climatic changes; however, others may need additional adaptive capacity to withstand increased frequency and duration of climate hazards. INL identified close to 300 resilient solutions that were consolidated into 11 solution categories to be tracked in the Department of Energy Sustainability Dashboard. The identified solutions are a starting point for future project development and analysis. These data are intended to inform decision makers on climate issues and potential solutions across INL and associated communities. The VARP is not intended to be a budget tool or project decision document on its own, but rather one of many tools used by decision makers to establish resilient priorities. This initial document provides the framework and foundation to resilient solutions. In the coming years, each solution needs to be fully developed, costed, and prioritized based on mission-critical risk and funding priorities.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Critical Infrastructure Interdependencies Assessment

Throughout the world there is strong recognition that critical infrastructure security and resilience needs to be improved. In the United States, the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) provides the strategic vision to guide the national effort to manage risk to the Nation’s critical infrastructure.”1 The achievement of this vision is challenged by the complexity of critical infrastructure systems and their inherent interdependencies. The update to the NIPP presents an opportunity to advance the nation’s efforts to further understand and analyze interdependencies. Such an important undertaking requires the involvement of public and private sector stakeholders and the reinforcement of existing partnerships and collaborations within the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and other Federal agencies, including national laboratories; State, local, tribal, and territorial governments; and nongovernmental organizations.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Life Cycle Assessment of Methanol from Fossil, Biomass, and Waste Sources, and Its Use as a Marine Fuel in Dual-Fuel Engines

Methanol is gaining interest in the marine sector from energy security and reducing emissions perspective. This study provides a comparative life cycle assessment of methanol as a marine fuel, across GHG and criteria air pollutant emission metrics, when it is used in a dual-fuel engine. Twelve methanol pathways from four different feedstock categories were considered, including (1) cellulosic biomass forest residues and clean pine mix, corn stover, switchgrass, and miscanthus; (2) organic wastes renewable natural gas from wastewater sludge, swine manure, food waste, and landfill gas; (3) fossil resources coal and natural gas (NG); and (4) e-methanol using captured carbon dioxide. When used in a dual-fuel engine with pilot fuel, life cycle GHG emissions for woody biomass-based methanol were approximately 19 gCO 2 e MJ −1 , while emissions from waste-based sources ranged between −154 and 31 gCO 2 e MJ −1 . Methanol from renewable sources showed a GHG reduction potential between 58 and 226% compared to conventional NG-based methanol (122 gCO 2 e MJ −1 ), primarily due to the avoided emissions from conventional waste management. When carbon from process emissions were captured, the reduction could be up to 327%. All pathways exhibited lower NO X , and particulate matter emissions compared to the baseline marine fuel (MGO 0.1% sulfur), while woody biomass and coal pathways had higher SO X emissions.

09 BIOMASS FUELS↗

Field Insights: Strengthening Digital Assurance Through On-Site Network Monitoring

The accelerating deployment of digital energy infrastructure, ranging from inverter-based resources (IBRs), battery energy storage systems (BESS), to advanced grid control platforms, has brought unprecedented visibility, flexibility, and efficiency to the electric grid. However, this digital transformation also introduces new cybersecurity challenges, particularly in the form of supply chain risks and operational blind spots at the grid edge. Over the past year, the Department of Energy’s Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER), through its Rapid Risk Assessment initiative, along with the Grid Deployment Office (GDO), through its Technical Assistance for Digital Assurance (TADA) initiative, have supported a series of on-site network engagements led by Idaho National Laboratory (INL). These engagements, conducted in partnership with asset owners across the country, have focused on identifying real-world vulnerabilities and misconfigurations in operational environments, many of which are not detectable through remote assessments or traditional compliance audits. The goal of this report is to distill key findings and lessons learned during network hunt engagements from INL’s fiscal year (FY) 2024 - 2025. It is intended to help asset owners—regardless of their participation in the program—better understand the evolving threat landscape and adopt practical measures to secure their digital energy infrastructure.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Generative Vulnerability Assessment for Cyber-Physical Systems

Cyber-physical systems (CPS) are highly susceptible to malicious attacks due to their complex dynamics and interconnectivity. A comprehensive understanding of their vulnerabilities is essential for designing effective resilience measures. This paper presents a data-driven attack generative system for evaluating the vulnerability of CPS. The proposed approach formulates the vulnerability assessment problem as determining the feasibility of a specific attack set based on two boundary functions that represent the effectiveness and stealthiness of attacks. The attack generative model is trained using a custom loss function, with two universal approximators designed to learn the effectiveness and stealthiness functions simultaneously. Theoretical results for successful generation and asymptotic convergence of the resulting training algorithm are given. As a result, the proposed approach is evaluated via numerical simulation of an IEEE 14-bus system and gas pipeline systems, demonstrating its viability in learning how to attack nonlinear CPS and identify potential vulnerabilities.

Computer systems organization↗

Response to External Peer Review Team Report for Corrective Action Unit 97: Yucca Flat/Climax Mine, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada, Revision 1

The Underground Test Area (UGTA) Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 97, Yucca Flat/Climax Mine (YF/CM), in the northeast part of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) requires environmental corrective action activities to assess contamination resulting from underground nuclear testing. These activities are necessary to comply with the UGTA corrective action strategy defined in Appendix VI, Revision No. 4, of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) (1996, as amended). The Phase I Flow and Transport Model Document for Corrective Action Unit 97: Yucca Flat/Climax Mine, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada (N-I, 2013a) was developed and subjected to an external peer review as required by the corrective action investigation (CAI) stage of the UGTA strategy. The YF/CM Peer Review Committee (PRC) raised a number of questions and provided recommendations for supplemental analyses (in the External Peer Review Team Report for Corrective Action Unit 97: Yucca Flat/Climax Mine, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada [N-I, 2015]). The purpose of this document is to provide responses to the PRC recommendations addressing the uncertainties identified by the PRC so that sufficient confidence in the contaminant boundary forecasts is established to advance to the Corrective Action Decision Document (CADD)/Corrective Action Plan (CAP) stage and initiate model evaluations. The PRC summarized their concerns and recommendations, and presented discussions of each of these uncertainties in their report (N-I, 2015). The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) responses are summarized in Table ES-1.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Urban Flooding Analysis Using Radar Rainfall Data and 2-D Hydrodynamic Model: A Pilot Study of Back Cover Area, Portland, Maine

This project is a part of the Regional Resiliency Assessment Program, led by the Department of Homeland Security, to address flooding hazards of regional significance for Portland, Maine. The pilot study was performed by Argonne National Laboratory to identify differences in spatial rainfall distributions between the radar-derived and rain-gauge rainfall datasets and to evaluate their impacts on urban flooding. The flooding impact analysis utilized a high-resolution 2-dimensional (2-D) hydrodynamic model (15 ft by 15 ft) incorporating the buildings, streets, stream channels, hydraulic structures, an existing city storm drain system, and assuming a storm surge along the coast coincident with a heavy rainfall event. Two historical storm events from April 16, 2007, and September 29, 2015, were selected for evaluation. The radar-derived rainfall data at a 200-m resolution provide spatially-varied rainfall patterns with a wide range of intensities for each event. The resultant maximum flood depth using data from a single rain gauge within the study area could be off (either under- or over-estimated) by more than 10% in the 2007 storm and more than 60% in the 2015 storm compared to the radar-derived rainfall data. The model results also suggest that the inundation area with a flow depth at or greater than 0.5 ft could reach 11% (2007 storm) and 17% (2015 storm) of the total study area, respectively. The lowland areas within the neighborhoods of North Deering, East Deering, East and West Baysides and northeastern Parkside, appear to be more vulnerable to the flood hazard in both storm events. The high-resolution 2-D hydrodynamic model with high-resolution radar-derived rainfall data provides an excellent tool for detailed urban flood analysis and vulnerability assessment. The model developed in this study could be potentially used to evaluate any proposed mitigation measures and optimize their effects in the future for Portland, ME.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Addressing the Need for Independence in the CSE Model

Abstract Information system security risk, defined as the product of the monetary losses associated with security incidents and the probability that they occur, is a suitable decision criterion when considering different information system architectures. Risk assessment is the widely accepted process used to understand, quantify, and document the effects of undesirable events on organizational objectives so that risk management, continuity of operations planning, and contingency planning can be performed. One technique, the Cyberspace Security Econometrics System (CSES), is a methodology for estimating security costs to stakeholders as a function of possible risk postures. In earlier works, we presented a computational infrastructure that allows an analyst to estimate the security of a system in terms of the loss that each stakeholder stands to sustain, as a result of security breakdowns. Additional work has applied CSES to specific business cases. The current state-of-the-art of CSES addresses independent events. In typical usage, analysts create matrices that capture their expert opinion, and then use those matrices to quantify costs to stakeholders. This expansion generalizes CSES to the common real-world case where events may be dependent.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Data management for geospatial vulnerability assessment of interdependencies in US power generation

Critical infrastructures maintain our society's stability, security, and quality of life. These systems are also interdependent, which means that the disruption of one infrastructure system can significantly impact the operation of other systems. Because of the heavy reliance on electricity production, it is important to assess possible vulnerabilities. Determining the source of these vulnerabilities can provide insight for risk management and emergency response efforts. This research uses data warehousing and visualization techniques to explore the interdependencies between coal mines, rail transportation, and electric power plants. By merging geospatial and nonspatial data, we are able to model the potential impacts of a disruption to one or more mines, rail lines, or power plants, and visually display the results using a geographical information system. A scenario involving a severe earthquake in the New Madrid Seismic Zone is used to demonstrate the capabilities of the model when given input in the form of a potentially impacted area. This type of interactive analysis can help decision makers to understand the vulnerabilities of the coal distribution network and the potential impact it can have on electricity production.

01 COAL, LIGNITE, AND PEAT↗

Risk Assessment Overview

Risk assessment is used in many industries to identify and manage risks. Initially developed for use on aeronautical and nuclear systems, risk assessment has been applied to transportation, chemical, computer, financial, and security systems among others. It is used to gain an understanding of the weaknesses or vulnerabilities in a system so modification can be made to increase operability, efficiency, and safety and to reduce failure and down-time. Risk assessment results are primary inputs to risk-informed decision making; where risk information including uncertainty is used along with other pertinent information to assist management in the decision-making process. Therefore, to be useful, a risk assessment must be directed at specific objectives. As the world embraces the globalization of trade and manufacturing, understanding the associated risk become important to decision making. Applying risk assessment techniques to a global system of development, manufacturing, and transportation can provide insight into how the system can fail, the likelihood of system failure and the consequences of system failure. The risk assessment can identify those elements that contribute most to risk and identify measures to prevent and mitigate failures, disruptions, and damaging outcomes. In addition, risk associated with public and environment impact can be identified. The risk insights gained can be applied to making decisions concerning suitable development and manufacturing locations, supply chains, and transportation strategies. While risk assessment has been mostly applied to mechanical and electrical systems, the concepts and techniques can be applied across other systems and activities. This paper provides a basic overview of the development of a risk assessment.

Prassinos, Peter G.↗