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NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Protecting Crew and Surface Systems with a Long-Duration Lunar Safe Haven

NASA’s Artemis program will send astronauts to the lunar surface for extended mission durations throughout the 2030s, with a focus on sustainability and extensibility for Mars exploration, as described in NASA’s “Artemis Plan”. However, NASA must place more emphasis on protecting both the crew and the exploration surface systems if they hope to achieve long-duration sustainability on the lunar surface. It is now reasonably achievable with excavation, construction, and autonomy technologies to achieve a significant level of protection that architectures have been unable to achieve to date. The Lunar Safe Haven (LSH) was proposed to protect astronauts, electronics, and other surface exploration systems from the hazards of the lunar environment, including radiation, micrometeoroid strikes, lunar dust, thermal vacuum, etc. During the study, Level Zero Requirements were developed for the LSH, and a decision analysis framework was baselined to evaluate concepts. The LSH Study also performed a comprehensive trade study, during which it identified numerous alternatives for establishing and maintaining a safe haven shelter on the lunar surface. This paper reviews the products developed during the study and presents the final recommendations.

radiation shielding↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

The Planetary Protection Strategy of the Earth Return Orbiter–Capture, Containment & Return System in the Context of the Mars Sample Return Campaign

The Mars Sample Return Campaign aims at bringing back to Earth the rock and atmospheric samples that the rover Perseverance has started to collect on the surface of Mars with the goal of analyzing them in a facility built specifically for this purpose to answer questions about the habitability of Mars. The Campaign consists of several missions, including the Earth Return Orbiter–Capture, Containment & Return System (ERO-CCRS), which will capture the samples previously put in Martian orbit, contain them in redundant containers to ensure that no unsterilized particles are released, and return them to Earth through a parachute-less entry vehicle. Both NASA and ESA policies address the United Nations’ Outer Space Treaty by addressing potential harm from material returned from solar system bodies beyond the Earth-Moon system. In the conduct of Mars Sample Return, the two agencies have agreed to apply approaches consistent with their own standards to campaign elements each provides. This work presents the overall strategy for both forward and backward planetary protection for the ERO-CCRS mission. Specifically, for forward planetary protection, CCRS is not required to meet specific bioburden requirements as a Category III mission provided the ERO (1) meets orbital lifetime requirements during orbiter operations and (2) any elements jettisoned at Mars meet orbital lifetime requirements. CCRS is required to be built in ISO-8 or better cleanrooms and, by agreement with ERO, be compatible with direct bioburden verification methods. For backward planetary protection, the overall approach includes building robust, highly reliable systems to prevent inadvertent release of unsterilized Mars material through redundant containment vessels and particle transport analyses. Ongoing work to define verification approaches and quantify containment assurance levels for specific sample return systems will also be discussed, along with how those data will inform launch approval for ERO-CCRS.

Giuseppe Cataldo↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Adopting an Objectives-Driven Assurance Case Approach for Achieving Space Flight Mission Planetary Protection Objectives

Traditionally, NASA has utilized prescriptive technical and process requirements to ensure safety and mission assurance performance objectives for space flight missions are achieved. While prescriptive re-quirements may be easier to communicate and manage throughout the systems engineering process, the highly-constrained nature of prescriptive requirements can limit the ability to take advantage of cost-saving opportunities and offer limited ability to explore other options or alternative designs, processes, and methods. It can also be difficult to develop prescriptive requirements for objectives that are prob-abilistic in nature or that cannot be satisfied by direct verification. In contrast, the development of an assurance case allows for a compelling, comprehensible, and valid argument to be developed with support-ing evidence that shows safety and mission assurance objectives have been satisfied. Analogous to how patent applications are constructed for inventions, an assurance case has a high-level claim of meeting a safety and mission assurance objective, followed by a more specific set of sub-claims and technical evidence which supports the claims. The objectives-driven assurance case approach allows for a better understand-ing and exploration of the trade space, more flexibility to balance trades, and the ability to realize and implement technical and process innovations for resource, time, and cost savings. The assurance case is a living case that evolves over the entire program life cycle. Recently, NASA’s Office of Planetary Pro-tection (OPP) has adopted the assurance case approach as an acceptable methodology for demonstrating avoidance of contamination of target solar system bodies explored by NASA space flight missions. This methodology has been incorporated into NASA’s new technical standard for planetary protection and is currently being utilized by the Mars Sample Return campaign for safe sample containment during sample return. This presentation will explore the development and implementation of an assurance case approach in the context of planetary protection, the shift from prescriptive requirements and the ongoing culture change in the technical community, and the support and guidance from NASA’s OPP in adopting the assurance case approach for achieving planetary protection objectives on NASA’s space flight missions.

Elaine Seasly↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

COSPAR Workshop Series on Refining Planetary Protection Requirements for Human Missions to Mars

COSPAR and its space agency partners are supporting a multi-year stepwise process devel-oping needed approaches to address planetary protection requirements for human missions beyond Earth orbit. The objective is to support incremental development from the current qualitative COSPAR planetary protection “Principles and Guidelines for Human Missions to Mars” to quantitative implementable planetary protection requirements for such future mis-sions. The workshops and meetings in this series have involved participants from NASA, ESA, JAXA and other national space agencies, as well as the scientific/technical community, and commercial/private enterprise stakeholders, based around three main topic areas: Microbial and Human Health Monitoring; Spacecraft Technology and Operations, and; Natural Trans-port of Contamination at Mars. This presentation provides a status update on the findings of the COSPAR Meetings on this topic to date. First, the identification and prioritization of knowledge gaps will be summarized. Next, where a knowledge gap is to be addressed by new measurements, example descriptions of measurements needed to close the knowledge gaps (and instruments necessary to make those measurements) will be discussed. Where the knowledge gaps closure is based on Agency policy decisions, the scope of the decision-making parameters and process will be described. Lastly, the presentation will consider how the findings of the study series can be integrated into current and future space agency and COSPAR activities.

J. Andy Spry↗
NASA NTRS2022

Planetary protection assessment of radioisotope thermoelectric generator (RTG)-powered landed missions to ocean worlds: application to Enceladus

Landed missions to icy worlds with a subsurface liquid water ocean must meet planetary protection requirements, and ensure a sufficiently small likelihood of any microorganism-bearing part of the landed element reaching the ocean. A higher bound on this likelihood is set by the potential for radioisotope thermoelectric generator (RTG) power sources, the hottest possible landed element, to melt through the ice shell and reach the ocean. Here, we quantify this potential as a function of three key parameters: surface temperature, ice shell thickness (i.e., heat flux through the shell), and thickness of a porous (insulating) snow or regolith cover. Although the model we describe can be applied to any ocean world, we present results in the context of a landed mission concept to the south polar terrain of Saturn’s moon Enceladus. In this particular context, we discuss planetary protection considerations for landing site selection. The likelihood of forward microbial contamination of Enceladus’ ocean by an RTG-powered landed mission can be made sufficiently low to not undermine compliance with planetary protection policy.

Marc Neveu↗
NASA NTRS2022

Validation of the Mars 2020 Fault Protection Design: Navigating the Infinity of the Off-Nominal

On July 30th 2020, the Mars 2020 mission successfully launched out of Cape Canaveral, Florida, passed through the Earth’s shadow, and began its short cruise to Mars. Less than seven months later, the Perseverance rover touched down safely in Jezero Crater to begin its ambitious mission that includes looking for signs of ancient life and collecting samples for future return to Earth. Getting to the successful landing, or “Tango Delta Nominal,” could not have been achieved without also considering the off-nominal. One of the teams supporting this ambitious mission is the fault protection (FP) team. This team is tasked with assessing the various failures, or faults, that could prevent mission success and with ensuring that the autonomous behaviors built into the software and hardware can detect faults and recover the vehicle to a safe state. As part of its charter, the FP team designed a test campaign to provide confidence in the system’s robustness to off-nominal scenarios across all of Mars 2020’s mission phases. The greatest challenge associated with designing such a validation campaign was reducing the infinite number of anomalous scenarios into a finite test suite. In addition, the tests needed to be executed efficiently in order to utilize the team’s limited test venue access, but still needed to maintain a level of rigor that guaranteed confidence in the test outcomes. Given that each test scenario generated massive amounts of data, the team also developed methods for quickly ascertaining whether the autonomous fault protection behaviors maintained vehicle safety in the presence of an anomaly. This paper summarizes the processes that the Mars 2020 fault protection team employed to execute its off-nominal validation campaign. It captures both the methods of generating a suite of off-nominal tests, as well as reducing it to a subset that can be realistically executed within schedule and resource constraints. It also describes the various processes and philosophies that the team utilized to execute the tests efficiently, including creating a standardized procedure template, keeping the test cases modular so that they could be easily interchanged, and capturing common fault injections in a change-controlled database. Finally, it will describe the tools and processes for assessing the test data, focusing in particular on a tool that evaluated vehicle state using “secondary” sources of data to validate that the software had truly configured the spacecraft to the expected safe state.

Morantz, Chaz↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Final Report of the COSPAR Meeting Series on Knowledge Gaps in Planetary Protection for Crewed Missions to Mars

The international scientific community has, through a Committee on Space Research (COSPAR) meeting series, participated in a seven-year review of knowledge gaps in planetary protection for crewed missions to Mars. This meeting series first identified a prioritized list of knowledge gaps that, if addressed, would permit development of an implementable planetary protection policy for the initial crewed Mars mission. Next, a consideration of the available venues (ground, LEO, deep space, planetary surfaces) yielded a roadmap of potential future investigations needed to close the knowledge gaps. Finally, the meeting series evaluated topic-specific measurements that are essential to establishing the figures of merit needed for hardware engineering design requirements. The three main topic threads considered within the meeting series were: microbial and human health monitoring; natural transport of terrestrial biological contamination on Mars, and; technologies and operations for contamination control (of spacecraft systems). Participants at the meeting series included engineers, scientists, managers and various subject matter experts from space agencies, academic and research institutions, commercial companies, and other government departments. This paper provides a detailed summary review of the findings of the meeting series, including descriptions of the basis for each of the figures of merit (where they were identified), and considerations of how planetary protection implementation and policy for crewed missions may progress from the current state of the art.

J Andy Spry↗
NASA NTRS2022

Snapping Shrimp Have Helmets That Protect Their Brains By Dampening Shock Waves

Shock waves are supersonic high-amplitude pressure waves that cause barotrauma when they transfer kinetic energy to the tissues of animals.1–4 Snapping shrimp (Alpheidae) produce shock waves and are exposed to them frequently, so we asked if these animals have evolved mechanisms of physical protection against them. Snapping shrimp generate shock waves by closing their snapping claws rapidly enough to form cavitation bubbles that release energy as an audible ‘‘snap’’ and a shock wave when they collapse.5–8 We tested if snapping shrimp are protected from shock waves by a helmet-like extension of their exoskeleton termed the orbital hood. Using behavioral trials, we found shock wave exposure slowed shelterseeking and caused a loss of motor control in Alpheus heterochaelis from which we had removed orbital hoods but did not significantly affect behavior in shrimp with unaltered orbital hoods. Shock waves thus have the potential to harm snapping shrimp but may not do so under natural conditions because of protection provided to shrimp by their orbital hoods. Using pressure recordings, we discovered the orbital hoods of A. heterochaelis dampen shock waves. Sealing the anterior openings of orbital hoods diminished how much they altered the magnitudes of shock waves, which suggests these helmet-like structures dampen shock waves by trapping and expelling water so that kinetic energy is redirected and released away from the heads of shrimp. Our results indicate orbital hoods mitigate blast-induced neurotrauma in snapping shrimp by dampening shock waves, making them the first biological armor system known to have such a function.

Alexandra C.N. Kingston↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

FATE: The drifting Fish Aggregating Device (dFAD) TrajEctory Modeling Tool for Marine Protected Area Management

Drifting fish aggregating devices (dFADs) routinely enter marine protected areas (MPAs) and may undermine MPA protections by drifting out of the MPA with the aggregated fish biomass, or grounding and damaging sensitive coral reef habitats. MPA managers must decide whether to deploy resources in response to dFAD intrusions. To address this issue, we propose to quantify dFAD activity in relation to ocean currents, fish biomass, and animal telemetry at Palmyra Atoll, part of the Pacific Remote Islands Marine National Monument in the central Pacific Ocean. Specifically, we propose to develop the dFAD TrajEctory Tool (FATE). FATE is an innovative decision support tool that will use NASA observations and numerical models to predict future dFAD trajectories and inform TNC and USFWS whether they should deploy tactical resources (boats, personnel) to monitor, intercept, or retrieve dFADs that have entered the Refuge. The objectives are to use NASA observational constraints on ocean winds and currents to assist with the ecological management of the Palmyra Atoll NWR and MPA. Specifically, we will deliver an operational software tool that quantifies the grounding risk associated with each tracked dFAD and decision support for grounding risk mitigation via intercept at sea. This project addresses Element 3.3: Protected area management of the 2022 Ecological Conservation Solicitation by developing a tool needed by MPA managers to make tactical and strategic decisions focused on improving the effectiveness of MPAs. By quantifying the riskof dFADs, this project will help monitor and better inform the deployment of tactical (ships/personnel) and strategic (legislative) resources to better manage MPAs. This project is a collaboration between The Nature Conservancy, who operate long-term projects within the Palmyra MPA, and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, who have the authority to make decisions related to its management. We expect that the results of our proposal will benefit marine resources within the Palmyra MPA and could be transferred to other remote MPAs within the US and other island nations within the Pacific Ocean.

TrajEctory↗
NASA NTRS2024

Platte River Basin Water Resources II: Predicting Land Cover Change in the Platte River Basin to Select Wetland Protection Sites Vulnerable to Urban Encroachment

The Platte River Basin (PRB) represents a critical dynamic ecosystem where wetlands play a pivotal role as essential habitats for local and migratory birds, as well as various flora and fauna. It also provides many crucial ecosystem services that directly and indirectly benefit human welfare. However, it is threatened by anthropogenic activity, climate change, and urbanization. Our team partnered with Audubon Great Plains, the regional office of a national non-profit organization (NGO), to analyze the future potential development of the region and its potential impact on the wetlands. We utilized remotely sensed data, such as Landsat 8 Operational Land Imager (OLI) and Suomi National Polar Orbiting Partnership (NPP) Visible Infrared Imaging Radiometer Suite (VIIRS), as well as NASA Socioeconomic Data and Application Center (SEDAC) data, to simulate urban growth potential up to 2050 using the open-source model FUTure Urban-Regional Environment Simulation (FUTURES) model. Our results for two proposed scenarios (all wetlands are protected, and no wetlands are protected) revealed that at least 56 counties out of 81 in the PRB would experience growth by the year 2050. The results for the first scenario show that there will be no loss of wetlands in the future. However, the results for the second scenario indicate a basin-wide reduction of 43.22 square kilometers (0.58%) in wetland areas, leading to a significant loss of bird habitat, critical for conservation. The results will help Audubon Great Plains' Urban Woods and Prairies Initiative to lead awareness workshops for communities about wetland protection and to form impactful conservation strategies.

FUTURES↗
DOE OSTI2021

Protective coating for lithium-containing electrode and methods of making the same

A lithium-containing electrode with a protective coating and lithium-containing electrochemical cells including the same are provided herein. The protective coating has a first layer including a first fluoropolymeric matrix and Li—F compounds and a second layer including a second fluoropolymeric matrix. Methods of preparing the protective coating on the lithium-containing electrode by applying a first fluoropolymer and/or a first fluoropolymer precursor and a second fluoropolymer and/or a second fluoropolymer precursor are also provided herein.

Xiao, Xingcheng↗
DOE OSTI2021

Electrically Conductive and Protective Coating Compatibility with LSCF Cathodes

Ferritic stainless-steel interconnect materials are used in intermediate or high-temperature SOFCs because of their oxidation resistance, high formability, and low cost. Their corrosion resistance is due to the formation of a protective chromium oxide scale during operation. However, the protective oxide layer produces Cr-containing volatile species at SOFC operating temperatures and conditions, which can cause cathode poisoning. Spinel coatings have been developed to prevent cathode poisoning while maintaining an electrically conductive pathway through SOFC stacks. Generally, Mn-Co-O spinel has been the material of choice, but PNNL has developed an Mn-Cu-O spinel protective coating to remove the costly Co and enhance the electrical conductivity. This paper will focus on the electrically conductive coating’s compatibility with LSCF in high-temperature operating environments.

Choi, Jung-Pyung↗
DOE OSTI2021

Deposition of integrated protective material into zirconium cladding for nuclear reactors by high-velocity thermal application

A zirconium alloy nuclear reactor cylindrical cladding has an inner Zr substrate surface, an outer volume of protective material, and an integrated middle volume of zirconium oxide, zirconium and protective material, where the protective material is applied by impaction at a velocity greater than 340 meters/second to provide the integrated middle volume resulting in structural integrity for the cladding.

Mazzoccoli, Jason P.↗
DOE OSTI2022

Protective coatings for lithium metal electrodes

Double-layered protective coatings for lithium metal electrodes, as well as methods of formation relating thereto, are provided. The negative electrode assembly includes an electroactive material layer including lithium metal and a protective dual-layered coating. The protective dual-layered coating includes a polymeric layer disposed on a surface of the electroactive material layer and an inorganic layer disposed on an exposed surface of the polymeric layer. The polymeric layer has an elastic modulus of greater than or equal to about 0.01 GPa to less than or equal to about 410 GPa. The inorganic layer has an elastic modulus of greater than or equal to about 10 GPa to less than or equal to about 1000 GPa.

Xiao, Xingcheng↗
DOE OSTI2022

Systems and Implementation: Integrating Unmanned Aircraft Systems into Physical Protection Systems at Fixed Sites and During Transportation

Physical protection systems, and response forces in particular, are designed to prevent an adversary from successfully completing a malevolent act against a facility or transport operations. Timely detection and assessment of any potential adversary action against a target is an essential element of materials security. The timely detection and assessment must then be followed-up by a capable and timely response that might be enhanced with the additional situational awareness provided by unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). The United States Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration Office of International Nuclear Security has been exploring capabilities provided by UAS to support response force operations within the physical protection system. UAS have the potential to provide response force commanders and operators with situational awareness in assessing adversary locations and actions as well as the locations of responders. UAS may be utilized for area searches ahead of responder pathways to identify potential threats and to provide situational awareness of areas not normally covered by cameras (such as areas outside the fence line outside at fixed facilities). In addition, UAS can provide real-time information to transportation convoy teams that pass through constantly changing public access environments. This paper will provide operational recommendations to be addressed when integrating UAS into existing physical protection systems at fixed sites and during transport. Recommendations will include aspects of the following: needs analysis; tactics and techniques to support detection and assessment as well as response force deployment; remote pilot selection, qualifications, training, and currency; UAS selection criteria; UAS laws and regulations; possible cost sharing with other facility operations; and on-scene emergency management.

Stockwell, Brandon↗
DOE OSTI2023

Methods and materials for protection of sulfide glass solid electrolytes

A sulfide glass solid electrolyte sheet can be protected from reaction with moisture by a thin metal layer coating converted to a thin electrochemically functional and protective compound layer. The converted protective compound layer is electrochemically functional in that it allows for through transport of lithium ions.

Visco, Steven J.↗
DOE OSTI2023

Protective layers for metal electrode batteries

Hybrid electrodes for batteries are disclosed having a protective electrochemically active layer on a metal layer. Other hybrid electrodes include a silicon salt on a metal electrode. The protective layer can be formed directly from the reaction between the metal electrode and a metal salt in a pre-treatment solution and/or from a reaction of the metal salt added in an electrolyte so that the protective layer can be formed in situ during battery formation cycles.

Archer, Lynden A.↗
DOE OSTI2024

Feasibility Study for Cathodic Protection of Waste Tanks at Hanford

The Hanford Nuclear Reservation site contains approximately 211 million liters of radioactive and chemically hazardous waste arising from nuclear weapons production, beginning with World War II, and continuing through the Cold War. The waste is stored in 177 carbon-steel underground storage tanks, of which 149 are single-shell tanks (SSTs) and the remaining are double-shell tanks (DSTs). The mission of an ongoing River Protection Project is to retrieve the waste from the underground storage tanks and then treat and immobilize (i.e., vitrify) it for disposal. Waste from the older SSTs is being progressively retrieved into the newer DSTs for storage pending treatment, immobilization, and disposal. Waste chemistry controls are in place to mitigate general corrosion, pitting corrosion, and stress corrosion cracking (SCC) and minimize corrosion risks to the carbon steel tank liners of DST at the Hanford Site. The chemistry control program focuses on preserving liner integrity while balancing the need for caustic/nitrite additions that have large downstream impacts on vitrification. Some of the DSTs store salt cake or sludge waste layers contain out-of-specification interstitial liquids that contact the primary tank bottom or sidewall. Remediation of such layers through chemical additions is not practical. At the present time, the most significant leak integrity concern at Hanford is for corrosion of the tank bottoms of DSTs where the solids layer is out of specification because of hydroxide ion depletion and consequently, pH values that are less than 12. Cathodic protection (CP) has been proposed as a possible way to protect the liners of such tanks against corrosion. The objective of this project was to investigate the feasibility of applying CP to Hanford DSTs to mitigate internal corrosion of the carbon steel tank primary liners. The scope of the project included (1) a literature review on the application of CP to storage tank systems, in general, and to waste tanks at the Savannah River Site (SRS) and Hanford, (2) a review of the finite element analysis (FEA) model recently developed to evaluate potentials for a DST, and (3) the development of a boundary element analysis (BEA) model for CP for a DST. Tank AN-107, one of the Hanford DSTs, was selected for this work because (1) the bottommost waste layer in the tank is out-of-specification, and (2) electrochemical and resistivity data, based on recent waste sampling and testing, are available for this tank. The overarching conclusion of this study is that, based on the available information, it is feasible to apply CP to mitigate internal corrosion of the primary liners of the Hanford DSTs. However, significant additional information and work are required before a CP system can be designed. Recommendations for next steps in the design of the CP system will be presented.

WIERSMA, BRUCE↗