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Nuclear decisionmaking, complexity and emerging and disruptive technologies: A comprehensive assessment

The complex interactions of emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs) could significantly impact nuclear decision-making, particular in an escalating regional conventional conflict. Such conflicts may present governments with a range of nuclear decisions: whether to introduce a nuclear dimension to a crisis, whether to cross the nuclear threshold through limited nuclear use, how to respond to a limited nuclear attack, whether to expand the scope and intensity of initial limited attacks, and whether to escalate to an all-out nuclear war. At each decision point, EDTs create potential risks as well as rewards. EDTs are likely to influence the context for nuclear decision-making and the choices between different courses of action. EDTs could impact the context of nuclear decision-making by improving or degrading situational assessment, the ability to deliberate, and the ability to manage one’s nuclear forces. EDTs could influence the choice between nuclear restraint or escalation by affecting the perceived strategic benefits, escalatory risks, and operational requirements associated with different courses of action. Even though particular combinations of EDTs could precipitate nuclear use in some scenarios, they could encourage restraint in others. The impact and relevance of the same combinations of EDTs might be different at various nuclear decision points. The availability of specific combinations of EDTs at different stages of a conflict would also vary because of the attrition and one-time-use nature of some capabilities. In later stages of a conflict, the decision maker’s confidence in different combinations of EDTs would depend on their previous experience in using them. While the interactions of EDTs are likely to bring additional complexity to a nuclear decision-making process, EDTs are also not the only source of complexity. Broader strategic, military, operational, legal, moral, and emotional factors are also likely to play an important role. These factors may dominate decision-making in a range of potential cases.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

The Eight Levers of Coercive Conflict: No More, No Less

Few concepts are more important to our nation than the principle of deterrence. It is at the very core of our national security strategy. Despite its lasting import to our nation, and the rest of the world, we still lack a complete and explicit formulation of the calculus of deterrence. This has, at times, resulted in failed policies costing the Nation lives and wealth. With the ultimate objective of making the Nation more secure, we establish a complete and explicit formulation of deterrence calculus, which consists of eight levers. As it turns out this formulation also applies to the calculus of compellence, and is thus a unifying model of coercive conflict.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

US Nuclear Testing: Health Consequences and Policy Decisions

With the approval of President Franklin D. Roosevelt to begin the research on a nuclear bomb in 1941 to the last test conducted by the U.S. in 1992, the fifty-year history of the nuclear weapons testing program has been an expansive topic of research. The program's growth is credited to the race to build the first atomic weapon for war. The termination of the Soviet Union and many other factors, including concerns about the adverse health effects of radioactive fallout, influenced the decline of the need for the program. The discovery of the negative health effects caused by low-level radiation and the subsequent studies influenced sitting U.S. presidents in passing policies that significantly impacted the nuclear weapons testing program.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

US Perspectives on the Conventional/Nuclear Interactions and the Impacts on Nuclear Escalation Risks and Future Arms Control Prospects

This short paper is organized around a few discrete questions. How have U.S. perspectives on conventional and nuclear interactions evolved in recent years? How have these changing perspectives shaped U.S. thinking on perceived nuclear escalation risks with Russia, both long standing and newly emerged? And finally, what do these U.S. perceptions of interactions and risks mean for future potential arms control either in the conventional or nuclear arena? The answers to these questions appear to show some promise for future work in this area. Conventional and nuclear interactions are increasing, and thus the two domains cannot be kept as deliberately or artificially separated as in the past. There is a growing mutual recognition regarding the interplay between conventional and nuclear capabilities in the strategic stability equation. There is also an increasingly shared recognition in the United States and Russia that nuclear escalation risks are likely to originate in conventional crises or conflict, placing an imperative on some form of conflict prevention procedures at the lower end of the spectrum. This requirement suggests some potential areas for risk reduction measures outside of those traditionally considered in conventional and nuclear arms control over the past several decades.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Perspectives on Next Steps in Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

Much has happened in arms control over the last year as this chapter has been in development. The prospects for arms control as a viable national security tool have, if anything, grown darker. Russia has falsely equated tearing down the remaining arms control edifice with creating potential leverage vis-à-vis its actions in Ukraine. China has failed to update its talking points on being a responsible arms control actor with its massive nuclear force expansion. The United States has stated clearly that it is open for business on arms control and risk reduction, but it unfortunately has no customers in Russia and China. It remains unclear what specifically the United States is selling in terms of what it wants in a potential agreement. Competitive dynamics and an atmosphere of great power competition are driving all parties further away from the table.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

S&TR Jan-Feb 2024 (Wind Tunnel - EMIT Issue)

At Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, we focus on science and technology research to ensure our nation’s security. We also apply that expertise to solve other important national problems in energy, bioscience, and the environment. Science & Technology Review is published eight times a year to communicate, to a broad audience, the Laboratory’s scientific and technological accomplishments in fulfilling its primary missions. The publication’s goal is to help readers understand these accomplishments and appreciate their value to the individual citizen, the nation, and the world.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

On Theories of Change: Rethinking the Ban Treaty and Disarmament Strategies

A week before Israel bombed Iran’s nuclear facilities, the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Rafael Grossi had lunch with the Financial Times. In the interview, Grossi expressed both optimism and pessimism about the nuclear landscape: he was hopeful about prospects for diplomacy, including with Iran. But he also expressed longer-term concerns about a proliferation cascade and rising nuclear risks, in particular, Russia’s nuclear threats amidst the war in Ukraine. “In the past, this was quite taboo,” he said, “but now people talk about tactical nuclear weapons like something which could be contained or permissible.” Given subsequent events in Iran, along with the expiration of New START in 2026 and expanding nuclear arsenals in Russia and China, pessimism would seem to trump hope for prospects for nuclear disarmament.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

The Dynamic Tripolar Strategic Balance: A Net Assessment (Workshop Summary)

On December 9-10, the Center for Global Security Research (CGSR) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) hosted a workshop titled “The Dynamic Tripolar Strategic Balance: A Net Assessment.” The discussion was guided by the following key questions: • By what metrics should the strategic balance be assessed? • How dynamic is the balance? How fragile? • Is the United States gaining strategic advantage, losing it, or holding steady, overall? • In order to gain new advantages or re-gain advantages lost, can or should the United States prioritize some domains and accept more risk in others? If so, which ones?

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

In Search of Strategic Advantage: Understanding the Landscape of Technology Competition

In an era of seemingly ever-increasing global tensions, technology competition is often mentioned as a pathway for U.S. and allied success. The opening arguments are often very simple. “This is the most important struggle of the 21st century.” “We cannot afford to lose this competition.” “The United States must not fall behind in this race.” “We must be faster, more agile, more committed, more thoughtful than our competitors.” Competition around a particular technology is described as a once in a generational struggle with immense stakes. “This is a Sputnik moment” is a common analogy. The solutions proposed are fairly straightforward – more of everything. We should spend more money. We should build more widgets or more factories. We should innovate more. We should focus more. We should attract more talent. We should file more patents. We should produce more PhDs. If we do more of everything, we will have more technology than our opponents, they will see our technological advantage, they will not challenge us, and therefore we will win. If we fail to do these things, we will lose. To paraphrase Homer Simpson, in national security policy discussions technology competition has become the cause of, and solution to, all of life’s problems. And yet, beyond doing more across the board technology competition is not at all simple. First, it is a concept increasingly muddled together with other big issues such as innovation policy, national defense strategy, great power competition, allied cooperation, public-private partnerships, and a host of other issues. Certain policies, systems, coalitions, and so on may be excellent for tackling one challenge, but far less optional for others. Second, it is inherently dynamic, an action-reaction cycle between multiple players. A brilliant opening move can be squandered or successfully countered in subsequent moves. Third, there are limits to what you can do - limited time, limited financial resources, limited human capital, and limited knowledge of what lies ahead. One is forced to choose.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Atmospheric emissions photometric imaging experiment /AEPT/ for Spacelab 1

The atmospheric emissions photometric imaging experiment (AEPI) to be flown on Spacelab 1 is designed to study faint natural and artificial atmospheric emission phenomena. Optical emissions are imaged in the region 2150 A to 7320 A using a television system consisting of two optical channels, one wide-angle and one telephoto. The detection system is an image-enhanced SEC vidicon. A third optical channel images onto the photocathode of a microchannel plate photomultiplier tube that has 100 discrete anodes. Photons are counted for each discrete anode, providing a direct measure of the luminosity of an object viewed by the TV telephoto lens, albeit with low spatial resolution. The AEPI detector is mounted on a two-axis gimbal comprised of a Modified Apollo Telescope Mount Star Tracker (MAST), which provides experiment pointing over a 40-deg x 80-deg range, exclusive of restrictions due to the proximity of other experiments. The pointing stability is 1 arcmin with respect to the spacecraft coordinate system for an exposure of 1 second. The tracking capability is 3.5 deg/s with a stability of 1 arcmin. The detector and pointing system are located on the Spacelab pallet. The experiment is controlled by stored programs resident in the Dedicated Experiment Processor located in the Spacelab module.

Sandie, W. G.↗

A study into the loss of lock of the space telescope fine guidance sensor

The results of a study into the loss of lock phenomenon associated with the Space Telescope Fine Guidance Sensor (FGS) are documented. The primary cause of loss of lock has been found to be a combination of cosmic ray spikes and photon noise due to a 14.5 Mv star. The probability of maintaining lock versus time is estimated both for the baseline FGS design and with parameter changes in the FGS firmware which will improve the probability of maintaining lock. The parameters varied are changeable in-flight from the ground and hence do not impact the design of the FGS hardware.

Polites, M. E.↗

Modeling digital control systems with MA-prefiltered measurements

Three discrete state variable representations are derived for a continuous-time plant driven by a zero-order-hold with a combination of instantaneous measurements and measurements prefiltered by moving-average (MA) digital filters. These representations allow the control system engineer to accurately model plants of this type in a form which permits him to use standard techniques to design digital feedback controllers for them. An example is presented which illustrates how to obtain the coefficient matrices in each representation. Guidelines are presented for choosing the best representation to use for any given point.

Polites, Michael E.↗

A new approach to state estimation in deterministic digital control systems

The paper presents a new approach to state estimation in deterministic digital control systems. The scheme is based on sampling the output of the plant at a high rate and prefiltering the discrete measurements in a multi-input/multi-output moving average (MA) process. The coefficient matrices in the MA prefilter are selected so the estimated state equals the true state. An example is presented which illustrates the procedure to follow to completely design the estimator.

Polites, Michael E.↗