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Module-OT: A Hardware Security Module for Operational Technology

Increased penetration levels of renewable energy and other types of distributed energy resources (DERs) on the modern electric grid-combined with technological advancements for electric system monitoring and control-introduce new cyberattack vectors and increase the cyberattack surface of energy systems. According to the IEEE Std. 1547-2018, DERs must use Modbus, Distributed Network Protocol 3 (DNP3), or Smart Energy Profile 2.0 (SEP2) as their communication protocol. Previous research identified several vulnerabilities and security breaches in each one of these communication protocols; despite this, existing standards for DERs do not recommend cybersecurity measures. In order to reduce vulnerabilities in power distribution systems, this paper presents a novel open-source hardware security module that improves both information and operational security to better protect data and communications on the distribution grid. The security hardware is called “module for operational technology,” or simply Module-OT, and it has been validated and tested in an emulated distribution system application. Module-OT is integrated within a communication system in the transport layer of the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model. It improves system security through encryption, authentication, authorization, certificate management, and user access control. The main advancement of Module-OT is the addition of hardware cryptographic acceleration that improves the overall communication performance in terms of end-to-end latency.

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗

Introduction to Special Issue on the Early History of Nuclear Fusion

This introductory paper to the special issue of Fusion Science and Technology commemorates early research on fusion conducted at Los Alamos (the singular entity denoted Los Alamos Laboratory/Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory/Los Alamos National Laboratory at different times is designated “Los Alamos” in this paper) in support of the eventual H-bomb program. We survey the historical origins of the thermonuclear program, what was known of fusion reactions at the outbreak of the war, and the remarkable breakthroughs involving particularly the prospect of deuterium-tritium (DT) reactions conducted during the war, and we summarize the papers in this volume. Much of the nuclear fusion technical history presented herein has not been previously reported. Papers describe aspects of fusion science during these days, on shock hydrodynamics and on electron-radiation coupling, and on nuclear physics including the discoveries of resonances in both the DT cross section and in the lithium tritium-breeding cross section. Three papers follow our colleague Mark Paris’s finding Arthur Ruhlig’s 1938 paper on the first observation of DT fusion: one on how it influenced subsequent Manhattan Project research, another on a modern calculation of that historic experiment, and a third that has repeated the experiment using modern experimental capabilities. Other papers discuss how the first H-bomb test, Ivy Mike, led to the discovery of the new elements einsteinium and fermium and how the DT fusion processes played a key role in our universe’s development after the Big Bang. We also present a paper that analyzes the pioneering Cambridge University 1934 experiment by Marcus Oliphant, Paul Harteck, and Ernest Rutherford where deuterium-deuterium fusion was first observed and that describes how Ernest Lawrence missed identifying fusion in 1933. Finally, we present a summary of early concepts for controlled fusion energy that grew out of wartime discussions at Los Alamos. The papers show how J. Robert Oppenheimer played a leading technical role in the early developments of the H-bomb, before his later opposition—our first paper in this issue addresses the U.S. Department of Energy’s 2022 vacation of the earlier 1954 decision to revoke his security clearance.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Assessing the Accuracy of a Borehole-Controlled Velocity Model of Yucca Flat, Nevada, Using Large-N Seismic Data

The Source Physics Experiment (SPE) aims to improve nuclear test monitoring capabilities through a series of chemical explosions in Yucca Flat within the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) (Snelson et al., 2013). With geologic data from over 950 boreholes, Yucca Flat has excellent borehole control on stratigraphy. These data were used to create a Geologic Framework Model (GFM) of the basin to aid in the study of seismic wave propagation through the Earth. However, the seismic velocities of the geologic units in the GFM are less well-defined. With the acquisition of five new active source Large-N datasets, we can now quantitatively assess the accuracy of the seismic model previously controlled by borehole data alone.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

Smart Contract-Defined Secondary Control and Co-Simulation for Smart Solar Inverters using Blockchain Technology

This paper proposes a cooperative control approach using blockchain technology for solar inverters in a photovoltaic system. Moreover, a co-simulation method for smart inverters and a blockchain network is studied. The blockchain assisted-smart inverter (BASI) consists of a solar inverter and an internet of things device as a client node of a blockchain network, which can fully utilize emerging blockchain technologies such as distributed ledger, security functions, and smart contract. The control includes a primary-level droop control in a BASI and smart contract-defined secondary-level supervisory control in a secured blockchain network. The concept of the proposed smart contract-defined control approach is validated by simulation studies using the cyber-physical co-simulation testbed built-in MATLAB/Simulink in a PC interfacing with a Hyperledger-Fabric blockchain software implemented in a PC.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

Nu Tools: Exploring Practical Roles for Neutrinos in Nuclear Energy and Security

For decades, physicists have used neutrinos from nuclear reactors to advance basic science. These pursuits have inspired many ideas for application of neutrino detectors in nuclear energy and security. While developments in neutrino detectors are now making some of these ideas technically feasible, their value in the context of real needs and constraints has been unclear. This report seeks to help focus the picture of where neutrino technology may find practical roles in nuclear energy and security. This report is the final product of the Nu Tools study, commissioned in 2019 by the DOE National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and Development (DNN R&D). The study was conducted over two years by a group of neutrino physicists and nuclear engineers. A central theme of the study and this report is that useful application of neutrinos will depend not only on advancing physics and technology but also on understanding the needs and constraints of potential end-users. The Study Approach emphasized broad end-user engagement. The major effort, undertaken from May to December 2020, was a series of engagements with the wider nuclear energy and security communities. Interviews with 41 experts revealed points of common understanding, which this report captures in three Cross-Cutting Findings, a Framework for Evaluating Utility, and seven Use Case Findings. The report concludes with two Recommendations. The findings and recommendations are summarized below. The respective ordering within each category does not represent a prioritization or implied value judgement.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Risk of theft and malicious use of radiation sources in transit

Remote radioactive source applications require frequent transportation of sources from storage locations to remote sites. This introduces risk of theft of a source during the transportation process, with the level of risk proportional to the radioactivity of the source. To that end, theft of smaller sources, such as microcurie-level moisture density gauges, are of minor concern, but larger sources, such as those used for radiography and well logging, present more risk. Radiography sources include 192 Ir, 75 Se, or 60 Co radionuclides with radioactivity amounts at or exceeding IAEA Category 2. Well-logging sources, primarily 241 Am/Be, are used for their neutron-emission properties. 137 Cs is also used in well-logging at lower activities than in radiography but at levels that still present some risk. The vulnerability for malicious use of such sources to cause contamination and associated economic effects is dependent on the elemental chemical and physical properties, especially melting point and bulk modulus. Theft of radiography sources is somewhat common, well-logging sources less so. Theft of sources commonly occurs in concert with theft of the vehicle, with the source subsequently abandoned. There have been some instances where a source appears to have been specifically targeted. There are a variety of security measures and protocols, available and under development, to mitigate the risk of theft and assist in source recovery.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

A PROVEN APPROACH FOR EFFECTIVE COMPUTER SECURITY SELF-ASSESSMENTS AT NUCLEAR FACILITIES

A proven method for conducting cybersecurity self-assessments at nuclear power plants is now available for international use. This method was originally developed by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, under the sponsorship of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), for use at U.S. nuclear power plants. The “Method,” described in NUREG/CR-6847 “Cyber Security Self-Assessment Method for U.S. Nuclear Power Plants,” was originally a limited release document that was withheld from public disclosure but is now publicly available. The Method provides a systematic, phased, and risk-informed approach to help decision makers and security specialists understand their relative cybersecurity posture. Completed Method assessments may be used to support or validate selection of computer security controls to mitigate cyber threats as well as demonstrate compliance with regulations or statutes enacted by competent authorities. The Method assesses the cybersecurity posture of key systems at a nuclear facility with a focus on protection of design base functions. It considers both physical and digital elements of system vulnerabilities and the resulting potential consequences from exploitation. It is well-suited for addressing blended cyberattacks. A semi-quantitative analytical approach is used in the evaluation of potential vulnerabilities, consequences, and risks and provides a technical basis for the selection of security controls to mitigate cyberattacks. The Method’s application at U.S. nuclear power plants has been very encouraging. The only nuclear plant in the United States that did not have adverse findings during its initial NRC computer security inspection prepared for inspection through the diligent application of this self-assessment method and the implementation of recommendations that came out of that self-assessment. Nuclear facilities around the world might find application of the Method extremely helpful for making cost-effective, risk-based decisions regarding computer security and for preparing to pass computer security inspections by their competent authorities.

Cyber security, Nuclear security, Self-assessment↗

Cyber Physical Grid-Interactive Distributed Energy Resources Control for VPP Dispatch and Regulation

This paper presents a cyber-physical algorithm for grid-interactive Distributed Energy Resource (DER) control to enable two features of Virtual Power Plants (VPPs) dispatch and grid voltage regulation, considering the communication and security impacts. We first formulate the DER dispatch problem as a real-time, iterative, and grid-interactive DER control problem. Thereafter, we consider a probabilistic traffic model to characterize packet delays and loss in a communication network, and study how the delays enter the process of information exchange among the grid measurement units, local DER controllers and the grid control center that coordinately execute this dispatch algorithm. Finally, a strategy combining delay threshold and modified message update rules is proposed to immune the asynchrony resulting from the communications network traffic and it avoids possible numerical instabilities and sensitivities of the tracking and regulation capabilities of this DER control algorithm. By implementing the proposed cyber-physical algorithm on the modified IEEE 37-node system, our preliminary results exhibit that the uncertainties of the underlying communications infrastructure must be considered for the VPP tracking and regulation capabilities of any DER in a generic Cyber-Physical System (CPS), because the delayed voltage measurements in the uplink/bi-link cases result in the off-track in VPP dispatch and jittery in voltage regulation.

cyber-physical algorithm↗

The research challenges in security and safeguards for nuclear fission batteries

This paper discusses the nuclear security and safeguards research challenges presented by the development and deployment of nuclear fission batteries. These are defined as easily transportable and deployable nuclear systems which are designed to operate either unattended or autonomously. We start by defining the current landscape of domestic and international safeguards and security and discuss how it can be affected by the introduction these new nuclear systems. We then specifically discuss the technology gaps and technologies to be developed to facilitate their practical deployment. We find that, as expected, we can leverage conclusions from existing security and safeguards studies for small modular rectors and develop bespoke target set analyses to inform security postures based on probabilistic risk assessment. We find also that specific fission battery security economic analysis tools are needed and security by design must be applied early. However, the most important finding is that these new systems will require a new comprehensive set of cyber tools covering transportation, installation, operation, maintenance security of the fission battery systems. Altogether, we find that the development of the necessary security and safeguards requirements at the design phase of such a technology will be of great benefit in the smooth deployment of this modern nuclear energy system.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Resilient Hierarchical Networked Control Systems: Secure Controls for Critical Locations and at Edge

Integration of information and communication technology (ICT) offers new opportunities in improving the management and operation of critical infrastructures such as power systems as it allows connection of different sensors and control components via a communication network, leading to the so-called networked control systems (NCS). However, the use of open and pervasive ICT such as the Internet or wireless communication technologies comes at a price of making NCS vulnerable to cyber intrusions/attacks which may cause physical damage. Here, this chapter presents control algorithms to ensure resilient and safe operation of NCS under unknown cyberattacks. Specifically, a variant of dynamic watermarking strategies is presented by embedding encoding/decoding components of chaotic signals into the NCS for secure control for critical locations where the measurement/control signals are transmitted to/from the control center via a communication network. In addition, resilient cooperative control algorithms are discussed to ensure safe operation at edge of the NCS which consists of a large number of distributed controllable devices. Several numerical examples are provided to illustrate the proposed control strategies.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗

Introducing the Journal of Chemical Education’s Special Issue on Chemical Security

Chemical security can be described as the practice of protecting chemicals from people. This editorial introduces the Special Issue on Chemical Security. In this article, we present a concise history of the use of chemicals as weapons and briefly describe consolidated global approaches needed to decrease the security risks from chemicals. We briefly introduce the contributions to this Special Issue from scientists and educators around the world on the topic of chemical security. Given recent high-profile global events that involved chemicals as weapons, improving chemical security awareness and competency is a critical need. We hope this Special Issue continues to generate conversation and collaboration on this important topic and enables educators to teach chemical security principles in their classrooms and laboratories.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

The Chemical Management System (CMS): A Useful Tool for Inventory Management

Comprehensive inventory management is central to the efficient operation of any facility that uses and stores chemicals. There are numerous software packages available that perform this function satisfactorily. Most commercially available inventory management software is regulatory or procurement focused and usually comes with upfront or monthly fees. Finally, this report describes freely downloadable software developed at Sandia National Laboratories that delivers an effective inventory management system with an additional focus on chemical security.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Massively scalable workflows for quantum chemistry: BigChem and ChemCloud

Electronic structure theory, i.e., quantum chemistry, is the fundamental building block for many problems in computational chemistry. Here we present a new distributed computing framework (BigChem), which allows for an efficient solution of many quantum chemistry problems in parallel. BigChem is designed to be easily composable and leverages industry-standard middleware (e.g., Celery, RabbitMQ, and Redis) for distributed approaches to large scale problems. BigChem can harness any collection of worker nodes, including ones on cloud providers (such as AWS or Azure), local clusters, or supercomputer centers (and any mixture of these). BigChem builds upon MolSSI packages, such as QCEngine to standardize the operation of numerous computational chemistry programs, demonstrated here with Psi4, xtb, geomeTRIC, and TeraChem. BigChem delivers full utilization of compute resources at scale, offers a programable canvas for designing sophisticated quantum chemistry workflows, and is fault tolerant to node failures and network disruptions. We demonstrate linear scalability of BigChem running computational chemistry workloads on up to 125 GPUs. Finally, we present ChemCloud, a web API to BigChem and successor to TeraChem Cloud. ChemCloud delivers scalable and secure access to BigChem over the Internet.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Flexible visualization of a 3rd party Intrusion Prevention (Security) tool: A use case with the ELK stack

A difficult aspect of cyber security is the ability to achieve automated real time intrusion prevention across various sets of systems. To this extent, several companies are offering comprehensive solutions that leverage an "accuracy of scale" and moving much of the intelligence and detection on the Cloud, relying on an ever-growing set of data and analytics to increase decision accuracy. Often, they provide tools to visualize the decision workflows in attack prevention (as well as tune the algorithm) but those solutions are not always practical as companies see the problem as "global" that is, from a unified Cyber-security standpoint. However, a key to a successful Cyber-security program is transparency and trust: from an experimental team viewpoint, this specifically means having the ability to immediately see what and from where, who has been blocked and being able to inform the community in case of a revoked access without the need for filing a "ticket" (that may eventually be answered) – in other words, rapid response to their user-base is essential but solutions targeting "sub-groups" in an organization are not often available. We have come up with a versatile solution leveraging the ELK stack (Elasticsearch, Logstash, & Kibana) and an IPS (Intrusion Prevention System) based WAF (Web Application Firewall) from Signal Sciences. Signal Science allows the streaming of detailed logs in a Logstash format suitable for custom solutions for visualization. By combining these two tools, we have strengthened our security posture and enabled individual experiments to monitor their own traffic. Specifically, the IPS WAF provides unique data such as country of origin, protocol, response code, source IP, and paths accessed. In this contribution, we will show how we engineered a visualization solution so experiment groups could access a dashboard with predefined graphs but also, where they can create individual customizable dashboards used to display blocked traffic and troubleshoot latency issues. We will discuss the details and procedures for developing and configuring these tools and how it benefits cyber security postures across our scientific based environment.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Establishing a sustainable regulatory framework for the security of radioactive sources through harmonization with a safety regulatory framework

In order to establish and maintain sustainable nuclear security regulatory infrastructures for radioactive sources, it is important for States to develop nuclear security regulations with regulatory requirements and relevant criteria for security, which are consistent and well integrated with those for radiation safety. In establishing national regulations, experts worldwide follow the international recommendations on safety and security of radioactive sources published by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Within the IAEA publications on safety and security of radioactive sources, some international recommendations are identical or very similar for both safety and security, for example, the requirement for the establishment of a national registry of radioactive sources. However, some other international recommendations are unique to the security area, such as the recommendation to examine the trustworthiness of employees, or to the safety area, such as the need to establish public exposure controls. Additionally, many international recommendations fall somewhere in between, such as the need for effective authorization of facilities and activities, a regulatory inspection and enforcement regime and the graded approach to establish and apply regulatory requirements. This paper examines how the IAEA international recommendations for establishing regulatory frameworks for safety and security relate to one another.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Portal Monitoring Considerations for Treaty Verification Applications

Portal monitoring is one method in a suite of options for treaty verification and can assist in verification of treaty accountable items (TAIs). Portal monitor technology spans a wide range of sensors, including radiation detectors, break-beams, or weight sensors. For radiation-detecting portal monitors, they are able to confirm absence / presence of a radiological signature and to track TAI direction of motion. Portal monitoring uses measurements from strategically placed sensors (e.g., radiation detectors) to record the entry or egress of TAIs. The implementation of portal monitoring relies on three key elements: perimeter definition, portal locations, and sensor technology, and can be implemented in either time-bound or continuous operations depending on what is permitted by the Treaty.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Capability Building Progression of an Insider Threat Mitigation Program at an International Nuclear Power Plant (Rev. 1)

With threats to nuclear facilities continuously evolving, the development and implementation of insider threat mitigation programs (ITMPs) are increasingly important. The Office of International Nuclear Security (INS) within the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA’s) developed Capability Building Progression of an Insider Threat Mitigation Program at an International Nuclear Power Plant to assist newcomers and existing nuclear power plant (NPP) operators in addressing insider threats and establishing effective response measures for insider activities.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗