Engineering Papers⌕ Search

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “safe”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 613 records · Page 34
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2014

Initial Evaluations of LoC Prediction Algorithms Using the NASA Vertical Motion Simulator

Flying near the edge of the safe operating envelope is an inherently unsafe proposition. Edge of the envelope here implies that small changes or disturbances in system state or system dynamics can take the system out of the safe envelope in a short time and could result in loss-of-control events. This study evaluated approaches to predicting loss-of-control safety margins as the aircraft gets closer to the edge of the safe operating envelope. The goal of the approach is to provide the pilot aural, visual, and tactile cues focused on maintaining the pilot's control action within predicted loss-of-control boundaries. Our predictive architecture combines quantitative loss-of-control boundaries, an adaptive prediction method to estimate in real-time Markov model parameters and associated stability margins, and a real-time data-based predictive control margins estimation algorithm. The combined architecture is applied to a nonlinear transport class aircraft. Evaluations of various feedback cues using both test and commercial pilots in the NASA Ames Vertical Motion-base Simulator (VMS) were conducted in the summer of 2013. The paper presents results of this evaluation focused on effectiveness of these approaches and the cues in preventing the pilots from entering a loss-of-control event.

Pilot Cue↗
NASA NTRS2014

Background Error Covariance Estimation Using Information from a Single Model Trajectory with Application to Ocean Data Assimilation

An attractive property of ensemble data assimilation methods is that they provide flow dependent background error covariance estimates which can be used to update fields of observed variables as well as fields of unobserved model variables. Two methods to estimate background error covariances are introduced which share the above property with ensemble data assimilation methods but do not involve the integration of multiple model trajectories. Instead, all the necessary covariance information is obtained from a single model integration. The Space Adaptive Forecast error Estimation (SAFE) algorithm estimates error covariances from the spatial distribution of model variables within a single state vector. The Flow Adaptive error Statistics from a Time series (FAST) method constructs an ensemble sampled from a moving window along a model trajectory.SAFE and FAST are applied to the assimilation of Argo temperature profiles into version 4.1 of the Modular Ocean Model (MOM4.1) coupled to the GEOS-5 atmospheric model and to the CICE sea ice model. The results are validated against unassimilated Argo salinity data. They show that SAFE and FAST are competitive with the ensemble optimal interpolation (EnOI) used by the Global Modeling and Assimilation Office (GMAO) to produce its ocean analysis. Because of their reduced cost, SAFE and FAST hold promise for high-resolution data assimilation applications.

Error Covariance↗
NASA NTRS2014

Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) Traffic Management (UTM): Enabling Low-Altitude Airspace and UAS Operations

Many civilian applications of Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) have been imagined ranging from remote to congested urban areas, including goods delivery, infrastructure surveillance, agricultural support, and medical services delivery. Further, these UAS will have different equipage and capabilities based on considerations such as affordability, and mission needs applications. Such heterogeneous UAS mix, along with operations such as general aviation, helicopters, gliders must be safely accommodated at lower altitudes. However, key infrastructure to enable and safely manage widespread use of low-altitude airspace and UAS operations therein does not exist. Therefore, NASA is exploring functional design, concept and technology development, and a prototype UAS Traffic Management (UTM) system. UTM will support safe and efficient UAS operations for the delivery of goods and services

UAV↗
NASA NTRS2014

The Inclusion of Arbitrary Load Histories in the Strength Decay Model for Stress Rupture

Stress rupture is a failure mechanism where failures can occur after a period of time, even though the material has seen no increase in load. Carbon/epoxy composite materials have demonstrated the stress rupture failure mechanism. In a previous work, a model was proposed for stress rupture of composite overwrap pressure vessels (COPVs) and similar composite structures based on strength degradation. However, the original model was limited to constant load periods (holds) at constant load. The model was expanded in this paper to address arbitrary loading histories and specifically the inclusions of ramp loadings up to holds and back down. The broadening of the model allows for failures on loading to be treated as any other failure that may occur during testing instead of having to be treated as a special case. The inclusion of ramps can also influence the length of the "safe period" following proof loading that was previously predicted by the model. No stress rupture failures are predicted in a safe period because time is required for strength to decay from above the proof level to the lower level of loading. Although the model can predict failures during the ramp periods, no closed-form solution for the failure times could be derived. Therefore, two suggested solution techniques were proposed. Finally, the model was used to design an experiment that could detect the difference between the strength decay model and a commonly used model for stress rupture. Although these types of models are necessary to help guide experiments for stress rupture, only experimental evidence will determine how well the model may predict actual material response. If the model can be shown to be accurate, current proof loading requirements may result in predicted safe periods as long as 10(13) years. COPVs design requirements for stress rupture may then be relaxed, allowing more efficient designs, while still maintaining an acceptable level of safety.

Reeder, James R.↗
NASA NTRS2014

Service Life Extension of the Propulsion System of Long-Term Manned Orbital Stations

One of the critical non-replaceable systems of a long-term manned orbital station is the propulsion system. Since the propulsion system operates beginning with the launch of station elements into orbit, its service life determines the service life of the station overall. Weighing almost a million pounds, the International Space Station (ISS) is about four times as large as the Russian space station Mir and about five times as large as the U.S. Skylab. Constructed over a span of more than a decade with the help of over 100 space flights, elements and modules of the ISS provide more research space than any spacecraft ever built. Originally envisaged for a service life of fifteen years, this Earth orbiting laboratory has been in orbit since 1998. Some elements that have been launched later in the assembly sequence were not yet built when the first elements were placed in orbit. Hence, some of the early modules that were launched at the inception of the program were already nearing the end of their design life when the ISS was finally ready and operational. To maximize the return on global investments on ISS, it is essential for the valuable research on ISS to continue as long as the station can be sustained safely in orbit. This paper describes the work performed to extend the service life of the ISS propulsion system. A system comprises of many components with varying failure rates. Reliability of a system is the probability that it will perform its intended function under encountered operating conditions, for a specified period of time. As we are interested in finding out how reliable a system would be in the future, reliability expressed as a function of time provides valuable insight. In a hypothetical bathtub shaped failure rate curve, the failure rate, defined as the number of failures per unit time that a currently healthy component will suffer in a given future time interval, decreases during infant-mortality period, stays nearly constant during the service life and increases at the end when the design service life ends and wear-out phase begins. However, the component failure rates do not remain constant over the entire cycle life. The failure rate depends on various factors such as design complexity, current age of the component, operating conditions, severity of environmental stress factors, etc. Development, qualification and acceptance test processes provide rigorous screening of components to weed out imperfections that might otherwise cause infant mortality failures. If sufficient samples are tested to failure, the failure time versus failure quantity can be analyzed statistically to develop a failure probability distribution function (PDF), a statistical model of the probability of failure versus time. Driven by cost and schedule constraints however, spacecraft components are generally not tested in large numbers. Uncertainties in failure rate and remaining life estimates increase when fewer units are tested. To account for this, spacecraft operators prefer to limit useful operations to a period shorter than the maximum demonstrated service life of the weakest component. Running each component to its failure to determine the maximum possible service life of a system can become overly expensive and impractical. Spacecraft operators therefore, specify the required service life and an acceptable factor of safety (FOS). The designers use these requirements to limit the life test duration. Midway through the design life, when benefits justify additional investments, supplementary life test may be performed to demonstrate the capability to safely extend the service life of the system. An innovative approach is required to evaluate the entire system, without having to go through an elaborate test program of propulsion system elements. Evaluating every component through a brute force test program would be a cost prohibitive and time consuming endeavor. ISS propulsion system components were designed and built decades ago. There are no representative ground test articles for some of the components. A 'test everything' approach would require manufacturing new test articles. The paper outlines some of the techniques used for selective testing, by way of cherry picking candidate components based on failure mode effects analysis, system level impacts, hazard analysis, etc. The type of testing required for extending the service life depends on the design and criticality of the component, failure modes and failure mechanisms, life cycle margin provided by the original certification, operational and environmental stresses encountered, etc. When specific failure mechanism being considered and the underlying relationship of that mode to the stresses provided in the test can be correlated by supporting analysis, time and effort required for conducting life extension testing can be significantly reduced. Exposure to corrosive propellants over long periods of time, for instance, lead to specific failure mechanisms in several components used in the propulsion system. Using Arrhenius model, which is tied to chemically dependent failure mechanisms such as corrosion or chemical reactions, it is possible to subject carefully selected test articles to accelerated life test. Arrhenius model reflects the proportional relationship between time to failure of a component and the exponential of the inverse of absolute temperature acting on the component. The acceleration factor is used to perform tests at higher stresses that allow direct correlation between the times to failure at a high test temperature to the temperatures to be expected in actual use. As long as the temperatures are such that new failure mechanisms are not introduced, this becomes a very useful method for testing to failure a relatively small sample of items for a much shorter amount of time. In this article, based on the example of the propulsion system of the first ISS module Zarya, theoretical approaches and practical activities of extending the service life of the propulsion system are reviewed with the goal of determining the maximum duration of its safe operation.

Kamath, Ulhas↗
NASA NTRS2015

Human System Risk Management for Space Flight

This brief abstract reviews the development of the current day approach to human system risk management for space flight and the development of the critical components of this process over the past few years. The human system risk management process now provides a comprehensive assessment of each human system risk by design reference mission (DRM) and is evaluated not only for mission success but also for long‐term health impacts for the astronauts. The discipline of bioastronautics is the study of the biological and medical effects of space flight on humans. In 1997, the Space Life Sciences Directorate (SLSD) initiated the Bioastronautics Roadmap (Roadmap) as the "Critical Path Roadmap", and in 1998 participation in the roadmap was expanded to include the National Space Biomedical Research Institute (NSBRI) and the external community. A total of 55 risks and 250 questions were identified and prioritized and in 2000, the Roadmap was base-lined and put under configuration control. The Roadmap took into account several major advisory committee reviews including the Institute of Medicine (IOM) "Safe Passage: Astronaut care for Exploration Missions", 2001. Subsequently, three collaborating organizations at NASA HQ (Chief Health and Medical Officer, Office of Space Flight and Office of Biological & Physical Research), published the Bioastronautics Strategy in 2003, that identified the human as a "critical subsystem of space flight" and noted that "tolerance limits and safe operating bands must be established" to enable human space flight. These offices also requested a review by the IOM of the Roadmap and that review was published in October 2005 as "A Risk Reduction Strategy for Human Exploration of Space: A Review of NASA's Bioastronautics Roadmap", that noted several strengths and weaknesses of the Roadmap and made several recommendations. In parallel with the development of the Roadmap, the Office of the Chief Health and Medical Officer (OCHMO) began a process in 2004 of evaluating the tolerance limits and safe operating bands called for in the Bioastronautics Strategy. Over the next several years, the concept of the "operating bands" were turned into Space Flight Human System Standards (SFHSS), developed by the technical resources of the SLSD at the NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC). These standards were developed and reviewed at the SLSD and then presented to the OCHMO for acceptance. The first set of standards was published in 2007 as the NASA‐STD‐3001, Volume 1, Crew Health that elaborated standards for several physiological areas such as cardiovascular, musculoskeletal, radiation exposure and nutrition. Volume 2, Human Factors, Habitability and Human Health was published in 2011, along with development guidance in the Human Integration Design Handbook (HIDH). Taken together, the SFHSS Volumes 1 and 2, and the HIDH replaced the NASA‐STD‐3000 with new standards and revisions of the older document. Three other changes were also taking place that facilitated the development of the human system risk management approach. In 2005, the life sciences research and development portfolio underwent a comprehensive review through the Exploration Systems Architecture Study (ESAS) that resulted in the reformulation of the Bioastronautics Program into Human Research Program (HRP) that was focused on appropriate mitigation results for high priority human health risks. The baseline HRP budget was established in August 2005. In addition, the OCHMO formulated the Health and Medical Technical Authority (HMTA) in 2006 that established the position of the Chief Medical Officer (CMO) at the NASA JSC along with other key technical disciplines, and the OCHMO became the responsible office for the SFHSS as noted above. The final change was the establishment in 2008 of the Human System Risk Board (HSRB), chaired by the CMO with representation from the HRP, SLSD management and technical experts. The HSRB then began to review all human system risks, established a comprehensive risk management and configuration management plan and data sharing policy. These major developments of standards, the HRP, the HMTA and a forum for review of human system risks (HSRB) facilitated the integration of human research, medical operations, systems engineering and many other disciplines in the comprehensive review of human system risks. The HSRB began a comprehensive review of all potential inflight medical conditions and events and over the course of several reviews consolidated the number of human system risks to 30 where the greatest emphasis is placed for investing program dollars for risk mitigation. The HSRB considers all available evidence from human research, medical operations and occupational surveillance in assessing the risks for appropriate mitigation and future work. All applicable DRMs (low earth orbit 6 and 12 months, deep space sortie for 30 days and 1 year, a one year lunar mission, and a planetary mission for 3 years) are considered as human system risks are modified by the hazards associated with space flight such as microgravity, exposure to radiation, distance from the earth, isolation and a closed environment. Each risk has a summary assessment representing the state of knowledge/evidence base for that risk, the available risk mitigations, traceability to the SFHSS and program requirements, and future work required. These data then can drive coordinated budgets across the HRP, the International Space Station, Crew Health and Safety and Advanced Exploration System budgets. These risk assessments were completed for 6 DRMs in December of 2014 and serve as the baseline for which subsequent research and technology development and crew health care portfolios can be assessed. The HSRB will review each risk at least annually and especially when new information is available that must be considered for effective risk mitigation. The current status of each risk can be reported to program management for operations, budget reviews and general oversight of the human system risk management program.

Davis, Jeffrey↗
NASA NTRS2016

Identification and Reconfigurable Control of Impaired Multi-Rotor Drones

The paper presents an algorithm for control and safe landing of impaired multi-rotor drones when one or more motors fail simultaneously or in any sequence. It includes three main components: an identification block, a reconfigurable control block, and a decisions making block. The identification block monitors each motor load characteristics and the current drawn, based on which the failures are detected. The control block generates the required total thrust and three axis torques for the altitude, horizontal position and/or orientation control of the drone based on the time scale separation and nonlinear dynamic inversion. The horizontal displacement is controlled by modulating the roll and pitch angles. The decision making algorithm maps the total thrust and three torques into the individual motor thrusts based on the information provided by the identification block. The drone continues the mission execution as long as the number of functioning motors provide controllability of it. Otherwise, the controller is switched to the safe mode, which gives up the yaw control, commands a safe landing spot and descent rate while maintaining the horizontal attitude.

Unmanned aerial system↗
NASA NTRS2014

Crewed Space Vehicle Battery Safety Requirements

This requirements document is applicable to all batteries on crewed spacecraft, including vehicle, payload, and crew equipment batteries. It defines the specific provisions required to design a battery that is safe for ground personnel and crew members to handle and/or operate during all applicable phases of crewed missions, safe for use in the enclosed environment of a crewed space vehicle, and safe for use in launch vehicles, as well as in unpressurized spaces adjacent to the habitable portion of a space vehicle. The required provisions encompass hazard controls, design evaluation, and verification. The extent of the hazard controls and verification required depends on the applicability and credibility of the hazard to the specific battery design and applicable missions under review. Evaluation of the design and verification program results shall be completed prior to certification for flight and ground operations. This requirements document is geared toward the designers of battery systems to be used in crewed vehicles, crew equipment, crew suits, or batteries to be used in crewed vehicle systems and payloads (or experiments). This requirements document also applies to ground handling and testing of flight batteries. Specific design and verification requirements for a battery are dependent upon the battery chemistry, capacity, complexity, charging, environment, and application. The variety of battery chemistries available, combined with the variety of battery-powered applications, results in each battery application having specific, unique requirements pertinent to the specific battery application. However, there are basic requirements for all battery designs and applications, which are listed in section 4. Section 5 includes a description of hazards and controls and also includes requirements.

Jeevarajan, Judith A.↗
NASA NTRS2016

Landing Hazard Avoidance Display

Landing hazard avoidance displays can provide rapidly understood visual indications of where it is safe to land a vehicle and where it is unsafe to land a vehicle. Color coded maps can indicate zones in two dimensions relative to the vehicles position where it is safe to land. The map can be simply green (safe) and red (unsafe) areas with an indication of scale or can be a color coding of another map such as a surface map. The color coding can be determined in real time based on topological measurements and safety criteria to thereby adapt to dynamic, unknown, or partially known environments.

Abernathy, Michael Franklin↗
NASA NTRS2017

Minimum dV for Targeted Spacecraft Disposal

The density scale height of the Earth's atmosphere undergoes significant reduction in the final phases of a natural decay. It can be shown that for most realistic ballistic numbers, it is possible to exploit this effect to amplify available spacecraft dV by using it at the penultimate perigee to penetrate into higher drag regions at final apogee. The drag at this lower pass can more effectively propel a spacecraft towards the final target region than applying the same dV direct Hohmann transfer at that final apogee. This study analyzes the potential use of this effect-- in combination with small phasing burns--to calculate the absolute minimum delta-V that would be required to reliably guide a spacecraft to any specified safe unoccupied ocean region as a function of ballistic number, orbit inclination, and initial eccentricity. This calculation is made for controllable spacecraft in several orbit inclinations and eccentricities with arbitrary initial LAN and ArgP one week before final entry, under three-sigma atmospheric perturbations. The study analyzes the dV required under varying levels of final controllable altitude at which dV may be imparted, and various definitions of the length and location of a "safe" disposal area. The goal of such research is to improve public safety by creating assured safe disposal strategies for low-dV and/or low-thrust spacecraft that under more traditional strategies would need to be abandoned to a fully random decay.

Bacon, John↗
NASA NTRS2017

Structural Health Management of Damaged Aircraft Structures Using the Digital Twin Concept

The development of multidisciplinary integrated Structural Health Management (SHM) tools will enable accurate detection, and prognosis of damaged aircraft under normal and adverse conditions during flight. As part of the digital twin concept, methodologies are developed by using integrated multiphysics models, sensor information and input data from an in-service vehicle to mirror and predict the life of its corresponding physical twin. SHM tools are necessary for both damage diagnostics and prognostics for continued safe operation of damaged aircraft structures. The adverse conditions include loss of control caused by environmental factors, actuator and sensor faults or failures, and structural damage conditions. A major concern in these structures is the growth of undetected damage/cracks due to fatigue and low velocity foreign object impact that can reach a critical size during flight, resulting in loss of control of the aircraft. To avoid unstable, catastrophic propagation of damage during a flight, load levels must be maintained that are below a reduced load-carrying capacity for continued safe operation of an aircraft. Hence, a capability is needed for accurate real-time predictions of damage size and safe load carrying capacity for structures with complex damage configurations. In the present work, a procedure is developed that uses guided wave responses to interrogate damage. As the guided wave interacts with damage, the signal attenuates in some directions and reflects in others. This results in a difference in signal magnitude as well as phase shifts between signal responses for damaged and undamaged structures. Accurate estimation of damage size, location, and orientation is made by evaluating the cumulative signal responses at various pre-selected sensor locations using a genetic algorithm (GA) based optimization procedure. The damage size, location, and orientation is obtained by minimizing the difference between the reference responses and the responses obtained by wave propagation finite element analysis of different representative cracks, geometries, and sizes.

Seshadri, Banavara R.↗
NASA NTRS2016

Precision Landing and Hazard Avoidance Doman

The Precision Landing and Hazard Avoidance (PL&HA) domain addresses the development, integration, testing, and spaceflight infusion of sensing, processing, and GN&C functions critical to the success and safety of future human and robotic exploration missions. PL&HA sensors also have applications to other mission events, such as rendezvous and docking. Autonomous PL&HA builds upon the core GN&C capabilities developed to enable soft, controlled landings on the Moon, Mars, and other solar system bodies. Through the addition of a Terrain Relative Navigation (TRN) function, precision landing within tens of meters of a map-based target is possible. The addition of a 3-D terrain mapping lidar sensor improves the probability of a safe landing via autonomous, real-time Hazard Detection and Avoidance (HDA). PL&HA significantly improves the probability of mission success and enhances access to sites of scientific interest located in challenging terrain. PL&HA can also utilize external navigation aids, such as navigation satellites and surface beacons. Advanced Lidar Sensors High precision ranging, velocimetry, and 3-D terrain mapping Terrain Relative Navigation (TRN) TRN compares onboard reconnaissance data with real-time terrain imaging data to update the S/C position estimate Hazard Detection and Avoidance (HDA) Generates a high-resolution, 3-D terrain map in real-time during the approach trajectory to identify safe landing targets Inertial Navigation During Terminal Descent High precision surface relative sensors enable accurate inertial navigation during terminal descent and a tightly controlled touchdown within meters of the selected safe landing target.

Robertson, Edward A.↗
NASA NTRS2017

Considerations for an Integrated UAS CNS Architecture

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Glenn Research Center (GRC) is investigating revolutionary and advanced universal, reliable, always available, cyber secure and affordable Communication, Navigation, Surveillance (CNS) options for all altitudes of UAS operations. In Spring 2015, NASA issued a Call for Proposals under NASA Research Announcements (NRA) NNH15ZEA001N, Amendment 7 Subtopic 2.4. Boeing was selected to conduct a study with the objective to determine the most promising candidate technologies for Unmanned Air Systems (UAS) air-to-air and air-to-ground data exchange and analyze their suitability in a post-NextGen NAS environment. The overall objectives are to develop UAS CNS requirements and then develop architectures that satisfy the requirements for UAS in both controlled and uncontrolled air space. This contract is funded under NASAs Aeronautics Research Mission Directorates (ARMD) Aviation Operations and Safety Program (AOSP) Safe Autonomous Systems Operations (SASO) project and proposes technologies for the Unmanned Air Systems Traffic Management (UTM) service.There is a need for accommodating large-scale populations of Unmanned Air Systems (UAS) in the national air space. Scale obviously impacts capacity planning for Communication, Navitation, and Surveillance (CNS) technologies. For example, can wireless communications data links provide the necessary capacity for accommodating millions of small UASs (sUAS) nationwide? Does the communications network provide sufficient Internet Protocol (IP) address space to allow air traffic control to securely address both UAS teams as a whole as well as individual UAS within each team? Can navigation and surveillance approaches assure safe route planning and safe separation of vehicles even in crowded skies?Our objective is to identify revolutionary and advanced CNS alternatives supporting UASs operating at all altitudes and in all airspace while accurately navigating in the absence of navigational aids. These CNS alternatives must be reliable, redundant, always available, cyber-secure, and affordable for all types of vehicles including small UAS to large transport category aircraft. The approach will identify CNS technology candidates that can meet the needs of the range of UAS missions to specific air traffic management applications where they will be most beneficial and cost effective.

Templin, Fred L.↗
NASA NTRS2017

Considerations for an Integrated UAS CNS Architecture

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Glenn Research Center (GRC) is investigating revolutionary and advanced universal, reliable, always available, cyber secure and affordable Communication, Navigation, Surveillance (CNS) options for all altitudes of UAS operations. In Spring 2015, NASA issued a Call for Proposals under NASA Research Announcements (NRA) NNH15ZEA001N, Amendment 7 Subtopic 2.4. Boeing was selected to conduct a study with the objective to determine the most promising candidate technologies for Unmanned Air Systems (UAS) air-to-air and air-to-ground data exchange and analyze their suitability in a post-NextGen NAS environment. The overall objectives are to develop UAS CNS requirements and then develop architectures that satisfy the requirements for UAS in both controlled and uncontrolled air space. This contract is funded under NASAs Aeronautics Research Mission Directorates (ARMD) Aviation Operations and Safety Program (AOSP) Safe Autonomous Systems Operations (SASO) project and proposes technologies for the Unmanned Air Systems Traffic Management (UTM) service.There is a need for accommodating large-scale populations of Unmanned Air Systems (UAS) in the national air space. Scale obviously impacts capacity planning for Communication, Navigation, and Surveillance (CNS) technologies. For example, can wireless communications data links provide the necessary capacity for accommodating millions of small UASs (sUAS) nationwide? Does the communications network provide sufficient Internet Protocol (IP) address space to allow air traffic control to securely address both UAS teams as a whole as well as individual UAS within each team? Can navigation and surveillance approaches assure safe route planning and safe separation of vehicles even in crowded skies?Our objective is to identify revolutionary and advanced CNS alternatives supporting UASs operating at all altitudes and in all airspace while accurately navigating in the absence of navigational aids. These CNS alternatives must be reliable, redundant, always available, cyber-secure, and affordable for all types of vehicles including small UAS to large transport category aircraft. The approach will identify CNS technology candidates that can meet the needs of the range of UAS missions to specific air traffic management applications where they will be most beneficial and cost effective.

Templin, Fred L.↗
NASA NTRS2015

Flight Testing ALHAT Precision Landing Technologies Integrated Onboard the Morpheus Rocket Vehicle

A suite of prototype sensors, software, and avionics developed within the NASA Autonomous precision Landing and Hazard Avoidance Technology (ALHAT) project were terrestrially demonstrated onboard the NASA Morpheus rocket-propelled Vertical Testbed (VTB) in 2014. The sensors included a LIDAR-based Hazard Detection System (HDS), a Navigation Doppler LIDAR (NDL) velocimeter, and a long-range Laser Altimeter (LAlt) that enable autonomous and safe precision landing of robotic or human vehicles on solid solar system bodies under varying terrain lighting conditions. The flight test campaign with the Morpheus vehicle involved a detailed integration and functional verification process, followed by tether testing and six successful free flights, including one night flight. The ALHAT sensor measurements were integrated into a common navigation solution through a specialized ALHAT Navigation filter that was employed in closed-loop flight testing within the Morpheus Guidance, Navigation and Control (GN&C) subsystem. Flight testing on Morpheus utilized ALHAT for safe landing site identification and ranking, followed by precise surface-relative navigation to the selected landing site. The successful autonomous, closed-loop flight demonstrations of the prototype ALHAT system have laid the foundation for the infusion of safe, precision landing capabilities into future planetary exploration missions.

Carson, John M. III↗
NASA NTRS2017

Minimum dV for Targeted Spacecraft Disposal

The study analyzes the minimum capability required to dispose safely of a space object. The study considers 3- sigma environmental uncertainties, as well as spacecraft-specific constraints such as the available thrust, total impulse, the achievable increase or decrease in commandable frontal area under stable attitude (or stable tumble), and the final controllable altitude at which any such dV may be imparted. The study addresses the definition of the length and location of a 'safe' disposal area, which is a statistical manifestation of uncertainty in this process. Some general legal concerns are raised that are unique to this prospect of low dV disposals. Future work is summarized. The goal of such research is to improve public safety by creating optimally safe disposal strategies (and potentially, applicable regulations) for low-dV and/or low-thrust spacecraft that under more traditional strategies would need to be abandoned to fully-random decay with its inherent higher risk of human casualty.

Bacon, John B.↗
NASA NTRS2010

Interpreting Space-Mission LET Requirements for SEGR in Power MOSFETs

Single-event gate rupture (SEGR) is a potentially catastrophic failure mechanism of power MOSFETs biased in the off-state. In part due to the severity of-SEGR consequences and in part due to the difficulty of accurated SEGR rate estimation, SEGR mitigation me1hodologies emphasize risk avoidance, using heavy-ion accelerator testing to define safe operating conditions for a surface-incident linear energy transfer {LET). This "safe-operating area" (SOA) within which the device may be biased without experiencing SEGR is then often derated by a prescribed factor to ensure low risk of SEGR. Although research in 1996 indicated that such LET-based SEGR hardness requiremen1s could provide false assurance of safe operation unless one also considered· ion energy], most mission SEGR requirements are still specified in terms of surface-incident LET. Moreover, terrestrial SEGR tests at a given surface-incident LET are limited by the small number of ion species and energies available at heavy-ion accelerators. In comparison, the on-orbit radiation environment is composed of all of the naturally-occurring elements with peak fluxes at nearly GeV/nucleon energies. The primary objective of this study is to examine whether typical derating of high-energy heavy-ion accelerator test data bounds the risk for SEGR from higher-energy on-orbit ions with the mission LET requirement.

Lauenstein, Jean-Marie↗
NASA NTRS2018

Assessing C2 Communications for UAS Traffic Management

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Traffic Management (UTM) project works to develop tools and technologies essential for safely enabling civilian low-altitude UAS operations. Currently there is no established infrastructure to enable and safely manage the widespread use of low-altitude airspace and UAS operations, regardless of the type of UAS. The UTM technical challenge will develop comprehensive and validated airspace operations and integration requirements to safely enable large-scale persistent access to visual line of sight and autonomous beyond visual line of sight small UAS in low-altitude airspace. Within the UTM project, a number of communications technologies to support UTM command and control (C2) are under investigation. In particular, commercial networked cellular systems are being tested and assessed for their ability to meet the reliability, scalability, cybersecurity and redundancy required. NASA Glenn Research Center is studying some of the aspects of employing such networks for UTM C2 communications. This includes the development of a test platform for sensing and characterizing the airborne C2 communications environment at various altitudes and in various terrains and topologies, measuring such aspects as received signal strength and interference. System performance aspects such as latency in the link, handover performance, packet error loss rate, drop outs, coverage gaps and other aspects impacting UTM operation will also be assessed. In this paper we explore some of the C2 approaches being proposed and demonstrated in the UTM project, the reliability, availability and other general C2 performance requirements, and approaches to evaluating and analyzing UTM C2 links based on commercial cellular networks.

air traffic control↗