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Progress and Goals for INMM ASC N15 Consensus Standard "Administrative Practices for the Determination and Reporting of Results of Non-Destructive Assay Measurements of Nuclear Material in Situ for Safeguards Nuclear Criticality Safety and Other Purposes"

This paper will discuss the goals and progress to date on the development of INMM Accredited Standard Committee (ASC) N15 consensus standard Administrative Practices for the Determination and Reporting of Results of Non-Destructive Assay Measurements of Nuclear Material in situ for Safeguards, Nuclear Criticality Safety, and Other Purposes. This standard will define administrative practices in the areas of data generation and reporting of NDA assay of holdup deposits with consideration of the stakeholders of the reported results. These stakeholders may include nuclear material accounting and safeguards, nuclear criticality safety, waste management, health physics, facility characterization, authorization basis, radiation safety, and site licensing authorities. Stakeholder input will be solicited from interested parties and incorporated during the development of the document. Currently only one consensus standard exists that explicitly deals with NDA holdup measurements: ASTM C1455 Standard Test Method for Nondestructive Assay of Special Nuclear Material Holdup Using Gamma-Ray Spectroscopic Methods. The ASTM International standard emphasizes the activities involved in actually making measurements and was developed by safeguards and NDA experts. This new INMM ASC N15 standard will complement the existing ASTM international standard. One of the largest driving factors for writing this new standard was the recent emphasis on in situ NDA measurements by the safeguards community due to the Defense Nuclear Facility Safety Board (DNFSB) recommendation 2007-1 on in situ NDA measurements. Specifically, DNFSB recommendation 2007-1 referenced the lack of programmatic requirements for accurate in situ measurements and the use of measurement results for compliance with safety-based requirements. That being the case, this paper will also discuss the progress made on the Implementation Plan for Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 2007-1 Safety-Related In Situ Nondestructive Assay of Radioactive Materials. Some of the information that will be presented includes observations made during site visits, how information useful to all facilities using nondestructive assay to determine holdup material quantities will be disseminated, and preliminary results of a gap analysis performed on current in situ nondestructive assay holdup measurements.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Estimating Public Dose Along Hypothetical Spent Nuclear Fuel Transportation Routes

In the future, it will be necessary to transport large quantities of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) from nuclear power plant sites to an interim storage facility (ISF) or a repository when such a facility is available. Because it is impossible to shield all of the radiation from this material, the general public will receive a very small, but quantifiable, dose from this transportation campaign. This paper describes the estimated collective effective radiation dose to the public due to SNF shipments under routine conditions and compares the estimated dose figures to the natural background radiation dose. To determine the estimated collective effective dose to the public, this analysis uses the US Department of Energy's (DOE) Stakeholder Tool for Assessing Radioactive Transportation (START), a geographic information system (GIS) routing tool, and a set of unit dose factors (UDFs) which were developed to calculate the estimated dose to the public along transportation routes. The estimated doses of radiation to which the public would be exposed during shipments of SNF is expected to be a consideration, along with many other factors, when making routing decisions. In all cases studied in this paper, estimated doses to the public will be orders of magnitude lower than the natural background radiation dose and will meet all US federal regulatory requirements for radiation dose/exposure to members of the public. The sample routes analyzed in this paper are expected to be representative of future SNF shipment routes in terms of length and mode of transportation, although they do not represent actual routes or destinations. This paper considers four routes from two shutdown reactor sites to two destinations. It must be noted that the specified origin sites are not necessarily the first sites under consideration for a de-inventory process. Further, the destination sites reviewed in this report are only to illustrate estimated dose figures along different routes and should not be taken as potential sites for an ISF or repository. For illustrative purposes only, the shortest distance rail route was found between each origin and destination point, and the collective effective dose to the public from the SNF cask was estimated along each route. This paper is not intended to make recommendations for routing decisions, but rather is intended to inform further discussion about the transportation of SNF and other radioactive materials.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

On-Site Oxy-Lance Size Reduction of South Texas Project Reactor Vessel Heads - 12324

On-Site Oxy-Lance size reduction of mildly radioactive large components has been accomplished at other operating plants. On-Site Oxy-Lance size reduction of more radioactive components like Reactor Vessel Heads had previously been limited to decommissioning projects. Building on past decommissioning and site experience, subcontractors for South Texas Project Nuclear Operating Company (STPNOC) developed an innovative integrated system to control smoke, radioactive contamination, worker dose, and worker safety. STP's innovative, easy to use CEDM containment that provided oxy lance access, smoke control, and spatter/contamination control was the key to successful segmentation for cost-effective and ALARA packaging and transport for disposal. Relative to CEDM milling, STP oxy-lance segmentation saved approximately 40 person- REM accrued during 9,000 hours logged into the radiological controlled area (RCA) during more than 3,800 separate entries. Furthermore there were no personnel contamination events or respiratory uptakes of radioactive material during the course of the entire project. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Initial Evaluation of Processing Methods for an Epsilon Metal Waste Form

During irradiation of nuclear fuel in a reactor, the five metals, Mo, Pd, Rh, Ru, and Tc, migrate to the fuel grain boundaries and form small metal particles of an alloy known as epsilon metal (ε-metal). When the fuel is dissolved in a reprocessing plant, these metal particles remain behind with a residue - the undissolved solids (UDS). Some of these same metals that comprise this alloy that have not formed the alloy are dissolved into the aqueous stream. These metals limit the waste loading for a borosilicate glass that is being developed for the reprocessing wastes. Epsilon metal is being developed as a waste form for the noble metals from a number of waste streams in the aqueous reprocessing of used nuclear fuel (UNF) - (1) the ε-metal from the UDS, (2) soluble Tc (ion-exchanged), and (3) soluble noble metals (TRUEX raffinate). Separate immobilization of these metals has benefits other than allowing an increase in the glass waste loading. These materials are quite resistant to dissolution (corrosion) as evidenced by the fact that they survive the chemically aggressive conditions in the fuel dissolver. Remnants of ε-metal particles have survived in the geologically natural reactors found in Gabon, Africa, indicating that they have sufficient durability to survive for ≈ 2.5 billion years in a reducing geologic environment. Additionally, the ε-metal can be made without additives and incorporate sufficient foreign material (oxides) that are also present in the UDS. Although ε-metal is found in fuel and Gabon as small particles (≈10 µm in diameter) and has survived intact, an ideal waste form is one in which the surface area is minimized. Therefore, the main effort in developing ε-metal as a waste form is to develop a process to consolidate the particles into a monolith. Individually, these metals have high melting points (2617°C for Mo to 1552°C for Pd) and the alloy is expected to have a high melting point as well, perhaps exceeding 1500°C. The purpose of the work reported here is to find a potential commercial process with which ε-metal plus other components of UDS can be consolidated into a solid with minimum surface area and high strength Here, we report the results from the preliminary evaluation of spark-plasma sintering (SPS), hot-isostatic pressing (HIP), and microwave sintering (MS). Since bulk ε-metal is not available and companies could not handle radioactive materials, we prepared mixtures of the five individual metal powders (Mo, Ru, Rh, Pd, and Re) and baddeleyite (ZrO 2 ) to send the vendors of SPS, HIP, and MS. The processed samples were then evaluated at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) for bulk density and phase assemblage with X-ray diffraction (XRD) and phase composition with scanning electron microscopy (SEM). Physical strength was evaluated qualitatively. Results of these scoping tests showed that fully dense cermet (ceramic-metal composite) materials with up to 35 mass% of ZrO 2 were produced with SPS and HIP. Bulk density of the SPS samples ranged from 87 to 98% of theoretical density, while HIP samples ranged from 96 to 100% of theoretical density. Microwave sintered samples containing ZrO 2 had low densities of 55 to 60% of theoretical density. Structurally, the cermet samples showed that the individual metals alloyed in to ε-phase - hexagonal-close-packed (HCP) alloy (4-95 mass %), the α-phase - face-centered-cubic (FCC) alloy structure (3-86 mass %), while ZrO 2 remained in the monoclinic structure of baddeleyite. Elementally, the samples appeared to have nearly uniform composition, but with some areas rich in Mo and Re, the two components with the highest melting points. The homogeneity in distribution of the elements in the alloy is significantly improved in the presence of ZrO 2 . However, ZrO 2 does not appear to react with the alloy, nor was Zr found in the alloy.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Bond Strength of Plasma Sprayed Zr Diffusion Barrier on U-Mo Fuels

The United States government is continually committed to strengthening nuclear security and nonproliferation for reducing the threat of radioactive materials acquisition by terrorists. To meet this important mission, the US Department of Energy and National Nuclear Security Agency's (NNSA) Office of Material Management and Minimization (M{sup 3}) Reactor Conversion Program (CONVERT) seeks to minimize the use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) in civilian applications through work with governments and facilities around the world to convert research reactors to the use of non-weapons-usable low enriched uranium (LEU) fuels. Each reactor converted not only eliminates the need for HEU at civilian sites, but also reduces the amount of HEU being manufactured, stored, and transported, where the nuclear material is most vulnerable. In instances where suitable LEU fuels do not exist for the conversion of particular reactors, CONVERT contributes to development of new LEU fuels. Currently, the CONVERT Program is committed to development of a high-density U-Mo fuel that will be able to convert high performance research reactors, while establishing an efficient and economic fabrication capability to manufacture the fuel. To that end, Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) has been tasked with development of a method to affix zirconium (Zr) metal fuel diffusion barrier via plasma spraying, which will prevent a reaction between the U-Mo fuel and the 6061 aluminum cladding. A successful diffusion barrier requires adequate Zr layer thickness, uniform coverage, sufficient bonding at the Zr/fuel and Zr/aluminum cladding interface, and maintenance of the original nuclear fuel properties i.e. physical dimensions, alloy composition and dispersion, crystallographic phase concentration, neutronics, etc. This work outlines development of the Zr plasma spray processing techniques, parameters affecting the diffusion barrier/nuclear fuel bond strength, and characterization of the Zr diffusion barrier. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Intrinsic Radiation Source Generation with the ISC Package: Data Comparisons and Benchmarking

The characterization of radioactive emissions from unstable isotopes (intrinsic radiation) is necessary for shielding and radiological-dose calculations from radioactive materials. While most radiation transport codes, e.g., MCNP [X-5 Monte Carlo Team, 2003], provide the capability to input user prescribed source definitions, such as radioactive emissions, they do not provide the capability to calculate the correct radioactive-source definition given the material compositions. Special modifications to MCNP have been developed in the past to allow the user to specify an intrinsic source, but these modification have not been implemented into the primary source base [Estes et al., 1988]. To facilitate the description of the intrinsic radiation source from a material with a specific composition, the Intrinsic Source Constructor library (LIBISC) and MCNP Intrinsic Source Constructor (MISC) utility have been written. The combination of LIBISC and MISC will be herein referred to as the ISC package. LIBISC is a statically linkable C++ library that provides the necessary functionality to construct the intrinsic-radiation source generated by a material. Furthermore, LIBISC provides the ability use different particle-emission databases, radioactive-decay databases, and natural-abundance databases allowing the user flexibility in the specification of the source, if one database is preferred over others. LIBISC also provides functionality for aging materials and producing a thick-target bremsstrahlung photon source approximation from the electron emissions. The MISC utility links to LIBISC and facilitates the description of intrinsic-radiation sources into a format directly usable with the MCNP transport code. Through a series of input keywords and arguments the MISC user can specify the material, age the material if desired, and produce a source description of the radioactive emissions from the material in an MCNP readable format. Further details of using the MISC utility can be obtained from the user guide [Solomon, 2012]. The remainder of this report presents a discussion of the databases available to LIBISC and MISC, a discussion of the models employed by LIBISC, a comparison of the thick-target bremsstrahlung model employed, a benchmark comparison to plutonium and depleted-uranium spheres, and a comparison of the available particle-emission databases.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Occurrence of Radiological Contamination in Urban Parks Established over Former Landfill Sites - 19433

In 2005, the National Park Service was notified that elevated radiation levels were detected at Great Kills Park during a baseline radiological mapping effort conducted by the Counter Terrorism Bureau of the New York City Police Department and the United States Department of Energy. Great Kills Park is in the Staten Island Unit of Gateway National Recreation Area. A records search determined that approximately 1.1 x 10{sup 6} square meters (280 acres) of the park was established over an area in which the New York City Department of Sanitation placed approximately 1.2 x 10{sup 7} cubic meters (15.1 million cubic yards) of waste fill from 1944 to 1948. Since 2005, a series of response actions and investigations were conducted on behalf of the National Park Service to mitigate risk to human health and the environment and to determine the nature of radiological contamination at Great Kills Park. The findings support that radiological contamination is related to certain components of waste fill, including incinerator residue from both on and offsite incinerators, coal ash from the historical use of coal-fired boilers for heating, and incidental radiological artifacts in the waste fill due to their historical use and subsequent disposal. A majority of the radiological artifacts were determined to contain Ra-226 and included radioluminescent markers, radium buttons, radium paint containers, and brachytherapy devices. The National Park Service is currently performing a Remedial Investigation for the waste-filled area of Great Kills Park under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act. Several other Parks in Gateway National Recreation Area were established in areas with a similar history to Great Kills Park, and overlie waste fill historically placed during landfilling operations. Recently, radiological surveys were performed over limited portions of Spring Creek Park in the Jamaica Bay Unit of Gateway National Recreation Area. These surveys identified several locations with gamma radiation levels above the ambient level, several of which were attributable to radiological artifacts similar in nature to those recovered at Great Kills Park. Ongoing investigations at Great Kills Park and the recent findings at Spring Creek Park suggest that radiological contamination may be associated with historical landfilling practices that were common prior to the regulation and control of radioactive materials. (authors)

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ADAPTING A CERTIFIED SHIPPING PACKAGE FOR STORAGE APPLICATIONS

For years shipping packages have been used to store radioactive materials at many DOE sites. Recently, the K-Area Material Storage facility at the Savannah River Site became interested in and approved the Model 9977 Shipping Package for use as a storage package. In order to allow the 9977 to be stored in the facility, there were a number of evaluations and modifications that were required. There were additional suggested modifications to improve the performance of the package as a storage container that were discussed but not incorporated in the design that is currently in use. This paper will discuss the design being utilized for shipping and storage, suggested modifications that have improved the storage configuration but were not used, as well as modifications that have merit for future adaptations for both the 9977 and for other shipping packages to be used as storage packages.

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Introduction to Pits and Weapons Systems (U) [Slides]

A Nuclear Explosive Package includes the Primary, Secondary, Radiation Case and related components. This is the part of the weapon that produces nuclear yield and it converts mechanical energy into nuclear energy. The pit is composed of materials that allow mechanical energy to be converted to electromagnetic energy. Fabrication processes used are typical of any metal fabrication facility: casting, forming, machining and welding. Some of the materials used in pits include: Plutonium, Uranium, Stainless Steel, Beryllium, Titanium, and Aluminum. Gloveboxes are used for three reasons: (1) Protect workers and public from easily transported, finely divided plutonium oxides - (a) Plutonium is very reactive and produces very fine particulate oxides, (b) While not the 'Most dangerous material in the world' of Manhattan Project lore, plutonium is hazardous to health of workers if not properly controlled; (2) Protect plutonium from reactive materials - (a) Plutonium is extremely reactive at ambient conditions with several components found in air: oxygen, water, hydrogen, (b) As with most reactive metals, reactions with these materials may be violent and difficult to control, (c) As with most fabricated metal products, corrosion may significantly affect the mechanical, chemical, and physical properties of the product; and (3) Provide shielding from radioactive decay products: α, γ, and η are commonly associated with plutonium decay, as well as highly radioactive materials such as 241 Am and 238 Pu.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Surface Mediated Processes in the Interaction of Spent Fuel or {alpha}-doped UO{sub 2} with H{sub 2}

In most deep disposal concepts, large amounts of hydrogen are expected to be produced by the anoxic corrosion of massive iron containers. At repository temperatures, hydrogen is quite inert and is not expected to contribute to the redox capacity of the deep groundwaters. In several recent works, a large impact of dissolved hydrogen on the dissolution of the LWR or MOX fuel and UO{sub 2}(s) doped with {sup 233}U or {sup 238}Pu has been observed. For hydrogen concentrations above a certain limit, the dissolution rates of these highly radioactive materials drop to very low values. A discussion of the results obtained with spent fuel or {alpha}-doped UO{sub 2} in the presence of a range of hydrogen concentrations is presented. Typical for all measurements under such conditions are the very low long term concentrations of uranium and other redox-sensitive radionuclides, such as Tc and the minor actinides. The concentrations of U are systematically lower than the values measured during UO{sub 2}(s) solubility measurements carried out in the presence of strong reducing agents. Measurements of the radiolytic oxygen after long leaching periods result in values below detection limit. The investigation of the surface of spent fuel or UO{sub 2}(s) pellets doped with {sup 233}U by XPS after long periods of testing shows absence of oxidation. The kinetics of the release of non-redox sensitive elements such as Sr and Cs, used to estimate fuel matrix dissolution rates, is also discussed. An attempt is made to propose potential mechanisms responsible for the observed behaviour, based mainly on data from studies on the interaction of water adsorbed on the surfaces of metal oxides or actinide oxides with radiation. Another important effect observed in recent studies is the existence of a threshold for the specific alpha activity below which no measurable influence of the alpha radiolysis on the uranium release from UO{sub 2} is observed. The importance of such a threshold for the behaviour of spent fuel under repository conditions encompassing very long time scales will be discussed, as well as the necessity to better investigate the mechanisms of recombination reactions in a thin water layer on the surface of actinide oxides affected by {alpha}- radiolysis. (authors)

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Development of an Air Transport Type A Fissile Package

This paper presents the summary of testing by the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) to support development of a light weight (<140 lbs) air transport qualified Type A Fissile Packaging. The package design incorporates features and materials specifically designed to minimize packaging weight. The light weight package is being designed to provide confinement to the contents when subjected to the normal and hypothetical conditions required of an air transportable Type A Fissile radioactive material shipping package. The objective of these tests was to provide design input to the final design for the LORX Type A Fissile Air Transport Packaging when subjected to the performance requirements of the drop, crush and puncture probe test of 10CFR71. The post test evaluation of the prototype packages indicates that all of the tested designs would satisfactorily confine the content within the packaging. The differences in the performance of the prototypes varied significantly depending on the core materials and their relative densities. Information gathered from these tests is being used to develop the final design for the Department of Homeland Security.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗

Impact Tensile Testing of Stainless Steels at Various Temperatures

Stainless steels are used for the construction of numerous spent nuclear fuel or radioactive material containers that may be subjected to high strains and moderate strain rates during accidental drop events. Mechanical characteristics of these base materials and their welds under dynamic loads in the strain rate range of concern (1 to 300 per second) are not well documented. However, research is being performed at the Idaho National Laboratory to quantify these characteristics. The work presented herein discusses tensile impact testing of dual-marked 304/304L and 316/316L stainless steel material specimens. Both base material and welded material specimens were tested at -20 oF, room temperature, 300 oF, and 600 oF conditions. Utilizing a drop weight impact test machine and 1/4-inch and 1/2-inch thick dog bone-shaped test specimens, a strain rate range of approximately 4 to 40 per second (depending on initial temperature conditions) was achieved. Factors were determined that reflect the amount of increased strain energy the material can absorb due to strain rate effects. Using the factors, elevated true stress-strain curves for these materials at various strain rates and temperatures were generated. By incorporating the strain rate elevated true stress-strain material curves into an inelastic finite element computer program as the defined material input, significant improvement in the accuracy of the computer analyses was attained. However, additional impact testing is necessary to achieve higher strain rates (up to 300 per second) before complete definition of strain rate effects can be made for accidental drop events and other similar energy-limited impulsive loads. This research approach, using impact testing and a total energy analysis methodology to quantify strain rate effects, can be applied to many other materials used in government and industry.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

The MacArthur Maze Fire and Roadway Collapse: Consequences for SNF Transportation - 12476

In 2007, a severe transportation accident occurred near Oakland, California, on a section of Interstate 880 known as the 'MacArthur Maze', involving a tractor trailer carrying gasoline which impacted an overpass support column and burst into flames. The subsequent fire caused the collapse of portions of the Interstate 580 overpass onto the remains of the tractor-trailer in less than 20 minutes, due to a reduction of strength in the structural steel exposed to the fire. The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission is in the process of examining the impacts of this accident on the performance of a spent nuclear fuel transportation package, using detailed analysis models, in order to determine the potential regulatory implications related to the safe transport of spent nuclear fuel in the United States. This paper will provide a summary of this effort and present results and conclusions. The detailed thermal models of the MacArthur Maze fire scenario with ANSYS and COBRASFS have produced preliminary results indicating that in a fire of this severity, the peak fuel cladding temperature would almost certainly exceed the short-term limit of 570 deg. C (1058 deg. F), and would likely exceed the Zircaloy burst temperature limit of 750 deg. C (1382 deg. F) assumed in previous transportation studies. Additional work is needed to refine and verify some of the details of these complex models, but the overall results are consistent with previous fire analyses with similar models, and with the results obtained for the HAC fire evaluations with these models. These results as well as future results produced by these models can therefore be considered as reliable estimates of the temperatures that would be experienced in fire conditions of the severity of the MacArthur Maze fire scenario. The structural analyses show that the GA-4 package is robust enough to withstand the impact of the overhead span without suffering major damage or deformation to the containment boundary. The greatest potential for local package damage in this scenario appears to be at the bolted closure end. The thermal expansion response of the closure bolts and impact limiter attachment bolts were evaluated in a separate analysis, and it was determined that both the lid and impact limiters are expected to remain in place. The response of the closure seal is currently being evaluated separately in the context of the accident's overall potential to release radioactive material in the environment. (authors)

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Safety Oversight of Decommissioning Activities at DOE Nuclear Sites

The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board) is an independent federal agency established by Congress in 1988 to provide nuclear safety oversight of activities at U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) defense nuclear facilities. The activities under the Board's jurisdiction include the design, construction, startup, operation, and decommissioning of defense nuclear facilities at DOE sites. This paper reviews the Board's safety oversight of decommissioning activities at DOE sites, identifies the safety problems observed, and discusses Board initiatives to improve the safety of decommissioning activities at DOE sites. The decommissioning of former defense nuclear facilities has reduced the risk of radioactive material contamination and exposure to the public and site workers. In general, efforts to perform decommissioning work at DOE defense nuclear sites have been successful, and contractors performing decommissioning work have a good safety record. Decommissioning activities have recently been completed at sites identified for closure, including the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site, the Fernald Closure Project, and the Miamisburg Closure Project (the Mound site). The Rocky Flats and Fernald sites, which produced plutonium parts and uranium materials for defense needs (respectively), have been turned into wildlife refuges. The Mound site, which performed R and D activities on nuclear materials, has been converted into an industrial and technology park called the Mound Advanced Technology Center. The DOE Office of Legacy Management is responsible for the long term stewardship of these former EM sites. The Board has reviewed many decommissioning activities, and noted that there are valuable lessons learned that can benefit both DOE and the contractor. As part of its ongoing safety oversight responsibilities, the Board and its staff will continue to review the safety of DOE and contractor decommissioning activities at DOE defense nuclear sites.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DECONTAMINATION OF ZIRCALOY CLADDING HULLS FROM SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL

The feasibility of decontaminating spent fuel cladding hulls using hydrofluoric acid (HF) was investigated as part of the Global Energy Nuclear Partnership (GNEP) Separations Campaign. The concentrations of the fission product and transuranic (TRU) isotopes in the decontaminated hulls were compared to the limits for determining the low level waste (LLW) classification in the United States (US). The {sup 90}Sr and {sup 137}Cs concentrations met the disposal criteria for a Class C LLW; although, in a number of experiments the criteria for disposal as a Class B LLW were met. The TRU concentration in the hulls generally exceeded the Class C LLW limit by at least an order of magnitude. The concentration decreased sharply as the initial 30-40 {micro}m of the cladding hull surface were removed. At depths beyond this point, the TRU activity remained relatively constant, well above the Class C limit. Reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel generates a cladding waste which would likely require disposal as a Greater than Class C LLW in the US. If the cladding hulls could be treated to remove a majority of the actinide and fission product contamination, the hulls could potentially meet acceptance criteria for disposal as a LLW or allow recycle of the Zr metal. Discard of the hulls as a LLW would result in significant cost savings compared to disposal as a Greater than Class C waste which currently has no disposition path. During fuel irradiation and reprocessing, radioactive materials are produced and deposited in the Zircaloy cladding. Due to short depths of penetration, the majority of the fission products and actinide elements are located in the ZrO{sub 2} layer which forms on the surface of the cladding during fuel irradiation. Therefore, if the oxide layer is removed, the majority of the contamination should also be removed. It is very difficult, if not impossible to remove all of the activity from spent fuel cladding since traces of U and Th in the unirradiated Zircaloy adsorb neutrons generating higher actinides in the bulk material. During fuel irradiation, {sup 92}Zr is also converted to radioactive {sup 93}Zr by neutron adsorption. Methods for decontaminating and conditioning irradiated Zircaloy cladding hulls have been investigated in Europe, Japan, and the US during the last 35 years; however, a method to decontaminate the hulls to an activity level which meets US acceptance criteria for disposal as a LLW was not deployed on a commercial scale. The feasibility of decontaminating spent fuel cladding hulls was investigated as part of the GNEP Separations Campaign. Small-scale experiments were used to demonstrate the removal of the ZrO{sub 2} layer from Zircaloy coupons using dilute solutions ({le}1.0 M) of HF. The most effective conditions resulted in dissolution rates which were less than approximately 2 mg/cm{sup 2}-min. With dissolution rates in this range, uniform removal of the oxide layer was obtained and a minimal amount of Zircaloy metal was dissolved. To test the HF decontamination process, experiments were subsequently performed using actual spent fuel cladding hulls. Decontamination experiments were performed to measure the fission product and actinide concentrations as a function of the depth of the surface removed from the cladding hull. The experimental methods used to perform these experiments and a discussion of the results and observations are presented in the following sections.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

USE OF CEMENTITIOUS MATERIALS FOR SRS REACTOR FACILITY IN-SITU DECOMMISSIONING - 11620

The United States Department of Energy (US DOE) concept for facility in-situ decommissioning (ISD) is to physically stabilize and isolate in tact, structurally sound facilities that are no longer needed for their original purpose of, i.e., producing (reactor facilities), processing (isotope separation facilities) or storing radioactive materials. The Savannah River Site 105-P and 105-R Reactor Facility ISD requires about 250,000 cubic yards of grout to fill the below grade structure. The fills are designed to prevent subsidence, reduce water infiltration, and isolate contaminated materials. This work is being performed as a Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensations and Liability Act (CERCLA) action and is part of the overall soil and groundwater completion projects for P- and R-Areas. Cementitious materials were designed for the following applications: (1) Below grade massive voids/rooms: Portland cement-based structural flowable fills for - Bulk filling, Restricted placement and Underwater placement. (2) Special below grade applications for reduced load bearing capacity needs: Cellular portland cement lightweight fill (3) Reactor vessel fills that are compatible with reactive metal (aluminum metal) components in the reactor vessels: Calcium sulfoaluminate flowable fill, and Magnesium potassium phosphate flowable fill. (4) Caps to prevent water infiltration and intrusion into areas with the highest levels of radionuclides: Portland cement based shrinkage compensating concrete. A system engineering approach was used to identify functions and requirements of the fill and capping materials. Laboratory testing was performed to identify candidate formulations and develop final design mixes. Scale-up testing was performed to verify material production and placement as well as fresh and cured properties. The 105-P and 105-R ISD projects are currently in progress and are expected to be complete in 2012. The focus of this paper is to describe the (1) grout mixes for filling the reactor vessels, and (2) a specialty grout mix to fill a selected portion of the P-Reactor Disassembly Basin. Details of the grout mixes designed for ISD of he SRS Reactor Disassembly Basins and below grade portions of the 105-Buildings was described elsewhere. Material property test results, placement strategies, full-scale production and delivery systems will also be described.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

RCUT: A Non-Invasive Method for Detection, Location, and Quantification of Radiological Contaminants in Pipes and Ducts - 12514

Radiological Characterization Using Tracers (RCUT) is a minimally invasive method for detection and location of residual radiological contamination in pipes and ducts. The RCUT technology utilizes reactive gaseous tracers that dissociate when exposed to gamma and/or beta radiation emitting from a radiological contaminant in a pipe or duct. Sulfur hexafluoride (SF{sub 6}) was selected as a tracer for this radiological application, because it is a chemically inert gas that is both nonflammable, nontoxic, and breaks down when exposed to gamma radiation. Laboratory tests demonstrated that the tracer pair of SF{sub 6} and O{sub 2} formed SO{sub 2}F{sub 2} when exposed to a gamma or beta radioactive field, which indicated the presence of radiological contamination. Field application of RCUT involves first injecting the reactive tracers into the pipe to fill the pipe being inspected and allowing sufficient time for the tracer to interact with any contaminants present. This is followed by the injection of an inert gas at one end of the pipe to push the reactive tracer at a known or constant flow velocity along the pipe and then out the exit and sampling port at the end of the pipeline where its concentration is measured by a gas chromatograph. If a radiological contaminant is present in the pipe being tested, the presence of SO{sub 2}F{sub 2} will be detected. The time of arrival of the SO{sub 2}F{sub 2} can be used to locate the contaminant. If the pipe is free of radiological contamination, no SO{sub 2}F{sub 2} will be detected. RCUT and PCUT are both effective technologies that can be used to detect contamination within pipelines without the need for mechanical or human inspection. These methods can be used to detect, locate, and/or estimate the volume of a variety of radioactive materials and hazardous chemicals such as chlorinated solvents, petroleum products, and heavy metals. While further optimization is needed for RCUT, the key first step of identification of a tracer compound appropriate for the application of detecting radioactive pipeline contamination through the detection of decomposition products of SF{sub 6} has been demonstrated. Other tracer gases that will also undergo radiolysis will be considered in the future. The next step for the RCUT development process is conducting laboratory scale tests using short pipelines to define analytical requirements, establish performance boundaries, and develop strategies for lower exposure levels. Studies to identify additional analytical techniques using equipment that is more field rugged than a GC/MS would also be beneficial. (authors)

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