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At least 613 records · Page 34
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DOE OSTI2022

Defensive Islanding to Enhance the Resilience of Distribution Systems Against Cyber-Induced Failures

The extensive integration of communication, computation, and control technologies into cyber-physical power systems (CPPSs) has increased the vulnerabilities of CPPSs to cyberattacks. This calls for developing solutions that assess and reduce the impacts of cyber-induced failures on CPPSs. This paper proposes a defensive islanding strategy to isolate impacted parts of the CPPS and form self-sufficient islanded grids with an objective of minimum load curtailment. The defensive islanding aims to split a power system into smaller grids to improve its resilience against a potential extreme event. A clustering approach that leverages the hierarchical spectral clustering method is utilized for the optimal defensive islanding. The proposed approach captures the fragility behavior and loading conditions of power system components due to cyber-induced failures. A graphical-based coupling framework is used to map the impacts of cyber failures into operation of power system components. The proposed method is demonstrated on a modified 33-node distribution feeder system integrated with distributed energy resources. The amount of load curtailment and radiality constraints have been used to evaluate the performance of the proposed clustering strategies. The results show the capability of the proposed algorithm to create islands considering the cyber-induced failures for enhanced resilience.

cyber-induced failures↗
DOE OSTI2026

SuperLab 2.0 Showcase: Connecting Five Labs to Tackle Grid Complexity and Unlock Unique Grid Asset Potential

SuperLab 2.0 (5-Lab Demo) is a collaborative, national-scale experiment showcasing the coordination of geographically distributed energy assets in real time. The demonstration integrates 25 physical and digital assets, spanning wind, PV, batteries, electrolyzers, DC fast chargers, microgrid controllers, building automation systems, small modular reactor (SMR), control centers, and gas turbines, across five DOE national laboratories-NLR, INL, NETL, LBNL, and SNL. These assets are unified using Energy Sciences Network (ESnet), a low-latency, high-performance U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) network, and controlled via a centralized energy controller hosted at NLR's ARIES facility. The demonstration validates the ability to stress-test hybrid energy systems under dynamic scenarios to de-risk advanced control strategies for greater resilience and flexibility. SuperLab 2.0 (5-Lab Demo) showcased a major advancement in federated national laboratory collaboration, enabling real-time, cross-laboratory experimentation to coordinate geographically dispersed distributed energy resources (DERs) using various communication protocols and networks. SuperLab 2.0 (5-Lab Demo) built on previous demonstrations conducted between NLR-PNNL and NLR-INL connecting diverse assets including distant protection devices, a SMR simulator, and a high temperature electrolyzer (HTE). Previous demos were based on a single connection between two labs with minimal coordination challenges. The 5-Lab demo with a centralized controller, distributed testbeds across different geographical locations, and use of protocols-based communication represents a scenario closer to real-world grid operations that coordinate resources across a region to meet system needs. This experiment studied how local DER controllers interact with a centralized energy controller during normal and abnormal events to maintain reliability. The SuperLab team across the five labs implemented a notional power system model equivalent of transmission and distribution lines, represented by the data networks interconnecting the labs. Each lab continuously exchanged local parameters (such as P and Q) from its Hardware-In-Loop (CHIL) and Power Hardware-In-Loop (PHIL) assets through centralized energy controller at NLR, enabling real-time interaction and coordination across sites. By leveraging ESnet as the communication backbone, the team successfully operated the distributed assets as a unified power system, with each bus represented by a different laboratory. This setup mirrors how assets interact in real-world power systems across dispersed locations with various protocols and latencies. At each lab site, assets were operated using their own local controllers which were coordinated through an overarching operation and control layer of centralized energy controller, equivalent to how an energy management system (EMS) orchestrates assets across a regional or national grid. SuperLab's federated connectivity utilized a Digital Real-Time Simulators (DRTS)-type gateway to connect Controller Hardware-In-Loop (CHIL) and PHIL assets between labs. To enable this federated connection through ESnet, a deterministic network was established where latency variations were consistent. This consistency allowed the development of digital filters for the power system assets across CHIL and PHIL interfaces to avoid unstable and unreliable grid conditions. This report provides an overview of the cross-laboratory configuration and offers insights into interconnecting geographically distributed research assets to test them as if they were co-located. This experiment represents a step toward linking nine DOE national laboratories, enabling nation-wide simulations that can address utility-driven challenges with grid resilience, flexibility, and modernization.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2025

Introduction to Microgrids

A microgrid is simply a typical power system that has distributed energy resources (DERs), like small diesel generators, with loads in the network. The resiliency offered by microgrids to retain service during system events makes them a suitable support for the electric grid during natural disasters. One key factor that differentiates microgrids from a typical distribution grid is its ability to disconnect itself in the event of a blackout and sustain its loads through DERs. Microgrid systems will reconnect to the main grid when the grid comes back up. The resiliency offered by microgrids to retain service during system events makes them a suitable support for the electric grid during natural disasters. This presentation discusses the typical key steps involved in microgrid planning, installation, operation in a interoperable and interconnectable fashion.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2021

Safe Reinforcement Learning for Emergency Load Shedding of Power Systems

The paradigm shift in the electric power grid necessitates a revisit of existing control methods to ensure the grid’s security and resilience. In particular, the increased uncertainties and rapidly changing operational conditions in power systems have revealed outstanding issues in terms of either speed, adaptiveness, or scalability of the existing control methods for power systems. On the other hand, the availability of massive real-time data can provide a clearer picture of what is happening in the grid. Recently, deep reinforcement learning (RL) has been regarded and adopted as a promising approach leveraging massive data for fast and adaptive grid control. However, like most existing machine learning (ML)- based control techniques, RL control usually cannot guarantee the safety of the power systems. In this paper, we introduce a novel method for safe RL-based load shedding of power systems that can enhance the safe voltage recovery of the electric power grid after experiencing faults. Numerical simulation on the IEEE 39-bus testcase is performed to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed safe RL emergency control, as well as its adaptive capability to faults not seen in the training.

reinforcement learning, emergency control, power g↗
DOE OSTI2024

Overview and Commentary on Applying the Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure Process to Photovoltaic System Devices

The rapid expansion of photovoltaic (PV) systems, particularly inverters, has introduced new cybersecurity challenges that threaten both local operations as well as the broader electrical grid’s stability. PV inverters, integrated into critical energy infrastructure are potential targets for cyber attacks due to vulnerabilities in firmware, remote access systems, and communication protocols. The Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure (CVD) process, as defined by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), provides a framework for identifying, reporting, and addressing these vulnerabilities in a transparent and collaborative manner. This report outlines the CVD process as it applies to PV systems, detailing the roles of key stakeholders, such as manufacturers, grid operators, and security researchers. The report also highlights specific challenges in managing vulnerabilities for new and legacy PV systems, which includes those introduced by insecure communications and third-party supply chain components. By adhering to the CVD process, the PV industry can mitigate cybersecurity risks, ensure regulatory compliance, and maintain consumer trust, while safeguarding the operational resilience of the energy grid. Ultimately, the effective coordination of vulnerability management is crucial for securing the future of PV systems within the critical electric grid infrastructure landscape.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2022

Advancing Federal Infrastructure Through Innovation: Customer Damage Function Calculator

Provides an overview of the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) Customer Damage Function (CDF) Calculator web tool, developed with funding and support from the Federal Energy Management Program (FEMP). The CDF Calculator is a screening tool that provides justification to site and/or headquarters leadership for resilience investments. It generates monetary values to justify investments in resilience solutions to prevent or lessen the impact of a grid outage at a facility.

CDF calculator↗
DOE OSTI2024

Hydropower Black Start: A Guidebook for Retrofitting Grid Dependent Hydropower

Not all United States (US) hydropower plants were designed to provide black start, but they are increasingly needed to uphold resilience in the evolving electric grid. This guidance is designed to help understand the minimal retrofits required for grid dependent hydropower (GDH) plants behind the point of interconnection (POI). For distribution connected hydropower plants or those with dedicated cranking paths, such upgrades can be sufficient for the plant to provide black start. For others, more coordination with the transmission system operator will be needed. This guidebook answers a number of questions relevant to retrofitting hydropower plants with black start capabilities. For example, the guidebook answers: • How flexible do the wicket gate controls need to be? • Who needs to do hydro governor model validation, why, and how? • How robust and flexible do the excitation and AVR controls need to be? • What protection settings need to be adjusted? • What relay(s) will need to be bypassed or overridden and at what risk? • What is the electrical energy demand of the station load or auxiliary power systems? • What should the strategy to energize transformer(s) along cranking path to address inrush currents be? • How should the critical load restoration be sequenced? In addition to outlining the specifications that hydropower plants need to meet for each component to be able to perform black start, this guidebook provides a set of case studies for specific upgrades needed at actual plants. Between the case studies of plants that have already performed black start retrofits and the examples of how this guidebook can be applied to scope future retrofits, five key themes have been identified for retrofit needs. 1. Protection needs “black start” mode: hydropower plants that are not designed with black start capabilities will have protections that prevent them from interconnecting to a “dead bus.” These protections will need to be overridden in every retrofit case and a separate black start mode should be established so that operators can safely switch between black start and grid connected modes, minimizing the risk to the plant. 2. Wicket gates need modern controls: digital governors accelerate the parameter tuning process and gate position sensors improve controllability, so plants with mechanical governors should be upgraded. Furthermore, a black start and islanding mode should be established for controls to maximize plant performance. 3. Robust excitation support: the DC system or excitation generator needs to be reliable enough to form and sustain the rotor electromagnetic field. These systems are typically undersized in plants that were not designed for black start, so they will need to be upgraded. 4. Turbine-governor model validation and operator training: validation of a standard hydro governor model is needed to characterize the dynamic response (i.e., inertial and primary frequency response) of the GDH. This is required for control development and old hydropower plants often have outdated or incorrect models. Operator training is also typically required to ensure the hardware retrofits are utilized correctly during the black start process. 5. Transformer and cranking path energization: any upgradation and control adjustment in front of the POI will depend upon the existing interconnection. Coordination with the transmission or distribution operator may be required.

13 HYDRO ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2021

Extracting Resilience Metrics From Distribution Utility Data Using Outage and Restore Process Statistics

Resilience curves track the accumulation and restoration of outages during an event on an electric distribution grid. We show that a resilience curve generated from utility data can always be decomposed into an outage process and a restore process and that these processes generally overlap in time. We use many events in real utility data to characterize the statistics of these processes, and derive formulas based on these statistics for resilience metrics such as restore duration, customer hours not served, and outage and restore rates. The formulas express the mean value of these metrics as a function of the number of outages in the event. We also give a formula for the variability of restore duration, which allows us to predict a maximum restore duration with 95% confidence. Overall, we give a simple and general way to decompose resilience curves into outage and restore processes and then show how to use these processes to extract resilience metrics from standard distribution system data.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2021

GMLC 1.5.03: Increasing Distribution System Resiliency using Flexible DER and Microgrid Assets Enabled by OpenFMB (Duke-RDS Final Report)

This is the final project report for the Grid Modernization Laboratory Consortium (GMLC) Resilient Distribution System (RDS) project titled “Increasing Distribution System Resiliency using Flexible DER and Microgrid Assets Enabled by OpenFMB”. The primary goal of this project was to increase the resiliency of distribution systems at utilities around the nation by deploying flexible operating strategies that engage end-use assets as a resource.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2024

The Best of Both Worlds: Combined Thermal and Battery Storage for Widespread Building Decarbonization

To meet 2050 decarbonization targets, widespread building electrification is a critical complement to clean power generation. Behind-the-meter storage (BTMS) (e.g., battery electric energy storage [EES] and thermal energy storage [TES]) integrated with buildings or building end uses to store and supply energy at optimal times can minimize burdens associated with operation, planning, and upgrades to the electrical grid sometimes triggered by building electrification. Such BTMS systems can serve the dual purpose of providing enhanced resilience at the building and grid level, and support the deployment of renewable generation needed for wide-scale decarbonization. While TES can cost-effectively shed and shift thermal loads, it cannot generally backup or shift non-thermal building end uses. EES, by contrast, is more expensive, but applicable to all end uses (i.e., thermal and electrical loads). Combined together, these storage systems can be traded off against one another to perform optimally in meeting demand flexibility, decarbonization goals, and energy resilience of the buildings at a lower total system cost. This paper proposes a framework to define BTMS benefits, provides four illustrative electrification scenarios using TES and EES, and discusses the combined TES/EES benefits with building energy modeling results. The paper also highlights potential barriers to adoption of BTMS and a path forward.

buildings↗
DOE OSTI2020

Dragonstone Strategy Kickoff Report [Slides]

The oil & natural gas (ONG) system like any other heavy industrial process, relies on a complex system of information technology (IT) and operational technology (OT) devices. Cyber-preparedness varies across the ONG industry from organization to organization. Common challenges include remote locations, long-lived field assets, and insufficient capabilities to find and track malware. ONG companies tend to be concerned with lack of cyber-awareness from employees, risk stemming from remote access for operations & maintenance, and software vulnerabilities within third-party equipment. For a variety of reasons, the general consensus from stakeholders interviewed by LLNL is that the state of cybersecurity within the electric grid is currently outpacing its ONG cousin. Existing strategies for the resilience and cybersecurity of the electric grid can and should be leveraged to provide immediate benefits to the ONG system. In LLNL’s view, there are two key factors currently limiting the development of necessary cyber-practices within the ONG industry: regulatory overlap and inefficiencies, and lack of industry awareness of potentially useful technologies for solving known issues. In the months following this report, LLNL will develop a cyber-resilience roadmap for the oil & gas pipeline sector, coupling threat intelligence, industry knowledge base, and ongoing outreach

02 PETROLEUM↗
DOE OSTI2024

Quantifying Energy Justice Goals in the Power Sector: Developing and Using Metrics

New policy goals are explicitly guiding the future grid toward greater energy equity. At the same time, policy goals also guide the grid toward decarbonization and resilience, while maintaining cost, security, and reliability cornerstone requirements. In conclusion, these pressures create a dilemma: moving urgently to address climate change and respond to energy disruptions, but also slowly to engage communities on the climate frontlines in earnest.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2025

A distributed voltage inference framework for cyber-physical attacks detection and localization in active distribution grids

The transition to active distribution grids with real-time monitoring and control depends on the proliferation of advanced communication networks and devices. This paradigm shift towards a cyber-physical architecture also introduces new vulnerabilities for adversaries to exploit and launch sophisticated cyber-physical attacks targeting grid observability. Current research highlights the challenges in distinguishing attacks on voltage phasor or nodal injection measurements and isolating multi-source attack locations in a multiphase distribution grid. The attack detection and localization methods in literature face accuracy issues, applications across diverse attack scenarios, or scalability limits. Here, to bridge these gaps, this paper proposes a distributed Voltage Inference framework for real-time detection and localization of cyber-physical attacks, addressing scalability, adaptability, and accuracy challenges in state-of-the-art methods. The proposed methodology leverages the distributed nature of the Voltage Inference framework through a two-step process of prediction and correction, together with a tractable graph partitioning approach, providing a reliable solution to identify compromised measurement sources and facilitate isolation. Extensive testing on IEEE 13 and 123-node distribution feeders underscores the algorithm’s efficacy, enhancing the security and resilience of active distribution grids against evolving cyber threats. Additionally, Hardware-in-the-Loop (HIL) implementation validates the proposed strategy’s practical applicability in real-world scenarios.

active distribution grids↗
DOE OSTI2020

A Generalized Framework for Service Restoration in a Resilient Power Distribution System

An electric power grid is one of the complex infrastructures, and because of its complex nature, there is simply no way that outages can be completely avoided. Thus, a modern society that depends on reliable electric supply requires a resilient electric system that can recover from disruptions while integrating emerging smart grid technologies. Here, this article presents a novel approach for service restoration in a modern power distribution system with controllable switches and distributed generation (DG) resources for any kind of outage. The proposed framework supports both the traditional service restoration using feeder reconfiguration and the grid-forming DG-assisted intentional islands that are dynamically sized using algorithms based on the fault scenario, available resources, and priority of loads. The problem is formulated as a mixed-integer linear program that incorporates critical system connectivity and operating constraints. Simulations are performed to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed approach using a large-scale four-feeder 1069-bus three-phase unbalanced distribution test system. It is demonstrated that the framework is effective in utilizing all available resources in quickly restoring the power supply to improve resiliency during extreme events and is scalable for a large-scale unbalanced power distribution system.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2026

Solar Energy CommUnity Resiliency (Final Technical Report)

Final Technical Report for DE-EE0009336 Solar Energy CommUnity Resiliency (SECURE) The Solar Energy CommUnity Resiliency (SECURE) project aimed to support development of resilient community microgrids to improve grid reliability and maintain power during times of crisis. The SECURE project approached this objective by addressing key technical and business challenges impeding implementation of resilient community microgrids. To achieve the goals of this project, we pursued several specific objectives through comprehensive design and requirements development.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2024

Guide de base pour l'energie solaire hors reseau en Haiti: 11. Adaptation et resilience au climat

Cette formation donne un apercu des informations et des concepts cles de l'energie solaire hors reseau en Haiti, renforcant ainsi les connaissances fondamentales et la capacite de catalyser l'interet pour l'energie solaire hors reseau pour l'electrification rurale en Haiti. Ce cours a rythme libre est offert en anglais et en francais et couvre une variete de sujets lies a l'acces a l'energie en Haiti, notamment les produits solaires hors reseau, le potentiel du marche en Haiti, les considerations liees a l'offre et a la demande, la conception, l'installation et la maintenance du systeme, -modeles commerciaux solaires en reseau, modelisation financiere, genre et acces a l'energie, utilisation productive de l'energie et adaptation au climat. La formation est destinee aux etudiants universitaires, aux partenaires gouvernementaux, aux ONG, aux bailleurs de fonds, aux partenaires de developpement, aux professionnels, etc. Aucune connaissance prealable du solaire hors reseau ou d'Haiti n'est requise pour beneficier de cette formation. See NREL/PR-7A40-89254 for the English translation of this document.

adaptation↗
DOE OSTI2025

SolarSTARTS: Solar-Assisted State-Aware and ResilienT infrastructure System

This final technical report provides a description and results of the design, development, testing, and validation of the Automated Resilience Management System (ARMS) solution, which integrates different systems to collect, store and process relevant information from the power distribution system to automatically manage the operation of multiple energy assets to enhance the resilience of the power grid against high-impact physical incidents (e.g., hurricanes) and cyber threats. The developed solution comprises a suite of novel AI-based algorithms designed to first detect, locate, and classify anomalies by collecting and analyzing data from multiple monitoring and control devices

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2022

Bad River Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians Solar Project

The Bad River Band of Lake Superior Chippewa (the Tribe) implemented its first phase of energy independence through the installation of approximately 520 kW DC of solar photovoltaic (PV) at three tribal buildings: 200kW DC at the Wastewater Treatment Plant (WWTP), 300 kW DC at the Health & Wellness Center (Health Clinic), and 20 kW AC at the Chief Blackbird Administration Building (Administration Building). The solar PV systems were integrated with the existing utility grid and can operate independent of the grid using Battery Energy Storage Systems (BESS) in combination with solar and existing back-up gas generators. The BESS also creates resiliency, providing power when the grid is down. All three buildings are essential Tribal buildings.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗