Combinatorial Auction-Based Strategic Deconfliction of Federated UTM Airspace
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) have become commonly used to perform a wide range of commercial activities such as cinematography and medical supply delivery. Consequently, regulators have become interested in designing UAV Traffic Management systems (UTMs) to coordinate UAV traffic among a collection of UAV operators. One framework which has been recently proposed for a UTM system is a combinatorial auction. In this framework, airspace is modelled as a 4D grid of space-time cells. UAV operators bid on cells which collectively form paths for their UAVs. Ideally, an airspace auction should reveal information about the current price of flight paths to bidders, allowing bidders to identify and bid on a select number of paths instead of placing as many bids as possible in the hopes of stumbling on a cheap path. Revealing too much information, however, can allow bad actors to place bids which are intended not to win but to raise the price that a rival bidder must pay. We address these twin challenges with a new information revelation framework which provides bidders with wide-ranging pricing information while suppressing bad actors. We evaluate our framework on scenarios based on a Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) case study and find that it can scale to thousands of bids.