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At least 613 records · Page 34
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2012

Dynamic Communication Resource Negotiations

Today's advanced network management systems can automate many aspects of the tactical networking operations within a military domain. However, automation of joint and coalition tactical networking across multiple domains remains challenging. Due to potentially conflicting goals and priorities, human agreement is often required before implementation into the network operations. This is further complicated by incompatible network management systems and security policies, rendering it difficult to implement automatic network management, thus requiring manual human intervention to the communication protocols used at various network routers and endpoints. This process of manual human intervention is tedious, error-prone, and slow. In order to facilitate a better solution, we are pursuing a technology which makes network management automated, reliable, and fast. Automating the negotiation of the common network communication parameters between different parties is the subject of this paper. We present the technology that enables inter-force dynamic communication resource negotiations to enable ad-hoc inter-operation in the field between force domains, without pre-planning. It also will enable a dynamic response to changing conditions within the area of operations. Our solution enables the rapid blending of intra-domain policies so that the forces involved are able to inter-operate effectively without overwhelming each other's networks with in-appropriate or un-warranted traffic. It will evaluate the policy rules and configuration data for each of the domains, then generate a compatible inter-domain policy and configuration that will update the gateway systems between the two domains.

policy negotiation↗
NASA NTRS2000

NASA Information Technology Implementation Plan

NASA's Information Technology (IT) resources and IT support continue to be a growing and integral part of all NASA missions. Furthermore, the growing IT support requirements are becoming more complex and diverse. The following are a few examples of the growing complexity and diversity of NASA's IT environment. NASA is conducting basic IT research in the Intelligent Synthesis Environment (ISE) and Intelligent Systems (IS) Initiatives. IT security, infrastructure protection, and privacy of data are requiring more and more management attention and an increasing share of the NASA IT budget. Outsourcing of IT support is becoming a key element of NASA's IT strategy as exemplified by Outsourcing Desktop Initiative for NASA (ODIN) and the outsourcing of NASA Integrated Services Network (NISN) support. Finally, technology refresh is helping to provide improved support at lower cost. Recently the NASA Automated Data Processing (ADP) Consolidation Center (NACC) upgraded its bipolar technology computer systems with Complementary Metal Oxide Semiconductor (CMOS) technology systems. This NACC upgrade substantially reduced the hardware maintenance and software licensing costs, significantly increased system speed and capacity, and reduced customer processing costs by 11 percent.

Source record↗
DOE OSTI2013

Communication Simulations for Power System Applications

New smart grid technologies and concepts, such as dynamic pricing, demand response, dynamic state estimation, and wide area monitoring, protection, and control, are expected to require considerable communication resources. As the cost of retrofit can be high, future power grids will require the integration of high-speed, secure connections with legacy communication systems, while still providing adequate system control and security. While considerable work has been performed to create co-simulators for the power domain with load models and market operations, limited work has been performed in integrating communications directly into a power domain solver. The simulation of communication and power systems will become more important as the two systems become more inter-related. This paper will discuss ongoing work at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory to create a flexible, high-speed power and communication system co-simulator for smart grid applications. The framework for the software will be described, including architecture considerations for modular, high performance computing and large-scale scalability (serialization, load balancing, partitioning, cross-platform support, etc.). The current simulator supports the ns-3 (telecommunications) and GridLAB-D (distribution systems) simulators. Ongoing and future work will be described, including planned future expansions for a traditional transmission solver. A test case using the co-simulator, utilizing a transactive demand response system created for the Olympic Peninsula and AEP gridSMART demonstrations, requiring two-way communication between distributed and centralized market devices, will be used to demonstrate the value and intended purpose of the co-simulation environment.

co-simulation↗
DOE OSTI2011

Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 566: EMAD Compound, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada with ROTCs 1-2, Revision 0

This Closure Report (CR) presents information supporting the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 566: EMAD Compound, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada. Corrective Action Unit 566 comprises Corrective Action Site (CAS) 25-99-20, EMAD Compound, located within Area 25 of the Nevada National Security Site. The purpose of this CR is to provide documentation supporting the completed corrective actions and provide data confirming that the closure objectives for CAU 566 were met. To achieve this, the following actions were performed: • Review the current site conditions, including the concentration and extent of contamination. • Implement any corrective actions necessary to protect human health and the environment. • Properly dispose of corrective action and investigation wastes. • Document Notice of Completion and closure of CAU 566 issued by the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection. From October 2010 through May 2011, closure activities were performed as set forth in the Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration Plan for CAU 566: EMAD Compound, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada. The purposes of the activities as defined during the data quality objectives process were as follows: • Determine whether contaminants of concern (COCs) are present. • If COCs are present, determine their nature and extent, implement appropriate corrective actions, and properly dispose of wastes. Analytes detected during the closure activities were evaluated against final action levels (FALs) to determine COCs for CAU 566. Assessment of the data from collected soil samples, and from radiological and visual surveys of the site, indicates the FALs were exceeded for polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), semivolatile organic compounds (SVOCs), and radioactivity. Corrective actions were implemented to remove the following: • Radiologically contaminated soil assumed greater than FAL at two locations • Radiologically contaminated soil assumed greater than FAL with lead shot • PCB-contaminated soil • Radiologically contaminated filters and equipment • Fuels, lubricants, engine coolants, and oils • Lead debris • Electrical and lighting components assumed to be potential source materials, including - fluorescent light bulbs - mercury switches (thermostats) - circuit boards - PCB-containing ballasts Closure of CAU 566 was achieved through a combination of removal activities and closure in place. Corrective actions to remove COCs, and known and assumed potential source materials, were implemented as was practical. The PCBs remaining at the site are bounded laterally, but not vertically, within CAS 25-99-20 based upon step-out sampling; the sources (e.g., PCB transformer oils, diesel fuel from locomotive reservoirs) have been removed; the practice of the application of PCB-containing oils for soil stabilization has ceased; and the COCs are not readily mobile in the environment. Closure in place is necessary, and future land use of the site will be restricted from intrusive activities. This will effectively eliminate inadvertent contact by humans with the contaminated media. The DOE, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office, provides the following recommendations: • No further corrective action is required at CAS 25-99-20. • Closure in place of CAS 25-99-20. • A use restriction is required at CAU 566. • A Notice of Completion to the DOE, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office, is requested from the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection for closure of CAU 566. • Corrective Action Unit 566 should be moved from Appendix III to Appendix IV of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2012

Electronic Medical Business Operations System

Electronic Management of medical records has taken a back seat both in private industry and in the government. Record volumes continue to rise every day and management of these paper records is inefficient and very expensive. In 2005, the White House announced support for the development of electronic medical records across the federal government. In 2006, the DOE issued 10 CFR 851 requiring all medical records be electronically available by 2015. The Y-12 National Security Complex is currently investing funds to develop a comprehensive EMR to incorporate the requirements of an occupational health facility which are common across the Nuclear Weapons Complex (NWC). Scheduling, workflow, and data capture from medical surveillance, certification, and qualification examinations are core pieces of the system. The Electronic Medical Business Operations System (EMBOS) will provide a comprehensive health tool solution to 10 CFR 851 for Y-12 and can be leveraged to the Nuclear Weapon Complex (NWC); all site in the NWC must meet the requirements of 10 CFR 851 which states that all medical records must be electronically available by 2015. There is also potential to leverage EMBOS to the private4 sector. EMBOS is being developed and deployed in phases. When fully deployed the EMBOS will be a state-of-the-art web-enabled integrated electronic solution providing a complete electronic medical record (EMR). EMBOS has been deployed and provides a dynamic electronic medical history and surveillance program (e.g., Asbestos, Hearing Conservation, and Respirator Wearer) questionnaire. Table 1 below lists EMBOS capabilities and data to be tracked. Data to be tracked: Patient Demographics – Current/Historical; Physical Examination Data; Employee Medical Health History; Medical Surveillance Programs; Patient and Provider Schedules; Medical Qualification/Certifications; Laboratory Data; Standardized Abnormal Lab Notifications; Prescription Medication Tracking and Dispensing; Allergies; Non-Occupational Illness and Injury Visits; Occupational Recommendations/Restrictions; Diagnosis/Vital Signs/Blood Pressures; Immunizations; Return to Work Visits Capabilities: Targeted Health Assessments; Patient Input Capabilities for Questionnaires; Medical Health History; Surveillance Programs; Human Reliability Program; Scheduling; Automated Patient Check-in/Check-out; Provider & Patient Workflow; Laboratory Interface & Device Integration; Human Reliability Program Processing; Interoperability with SAP, IH, IS, RADCON; Coding: ICED-9/10; Desktop Integration; Interface/Storage of Digital X-Rays (PACS)

Cannon, D. T.↗
DOE OSTI2017

Computer security approach for Rolls-Royce spinline{sup R} safety platform - 227

The number of digital assets at commercial nuclear power plants is significant and will likely continue to increase with time. As a consequence, these plants have become potential targets for cyber-attacks. Around the world, nuclear safety authorities and national Computer and Information Security Agencies are implementing stricter regulations and inspections for critical systems in nuclear plants. There is a particular focus on instrumentation and control systems as they implement key nuclear safety functions. Rolls-Royce follows a strict computer and information security program based on general and nuclear specific norms, Rolls-Royce group processes, and proven technologies. The Spinline digital safety platform has been designed specifically for nuclear applications and features a secure development and operational environment that provides barriers against unauthorized modifications and implements design requirements promoting integrity and reliability during operation and maintenance. The Rolls-Royce secure development environment provides layers of protection utilizing physical and environmental security, human resource security, and information technology systems access control. The Spinline platform strengthens security functions by providing protection against unauthorized, unintended, and unsafe modifications to the system. The Spinline platform has design features promote integrity and reliability during operation and maintenance in the event of inadvertent operator actions or undesirable behavior of connected equipment. The Spinline technology and these computer security processes are based in a wide spectrum of international standards that were accepted as providing a secure development and operating environment by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission in 2014. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2013

Resilience Measurement Index: An Indicator of Critical Infrastructure Resilience

The world faces numerous threats from both natural and man-made sources. Since the beginning of the 21 st century, in the United States alone, we have experienced several devastating events. Incidents such as the attacks on the World Trade Center in 2001, the Northeast blackout in 2003, Hurricane Katrina in 2005, and Superstorm Sandy in 2012 have had far-reaching impacts that have directly affected our society’s well-being. Although current efforts that have focused on preventing or mitigating the impact of incidents have achieved admirable results, a more comprehensive approach is needed to improve the nation’s overall resilience. An all-hazards methodology that emphasizes not only protection but also preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery programs and capabilities is desired. Presidential Policy Directive 21 defines 16 critical infrastructure sectors that are essential to the nation’s security, public health and safety, economic vitality, and general quality of life (White House, 2013). If the operations of these critical infrastructure sectors are essential, their protection and resilience is paramount. As stated by President Obama, “Our goal is to ensure a more resilient Nation—one in which individuals, communities, and our economy can adapt to changing conditions as well as withstand and rapidly recover from disruption due to emergencies” (Department of Homeland Security, 2010a). Enhancing the resilience of critical infrastructure requires its owners/operators to determine the ability of the system to withstand specific threats, minimize or mitigate potential impacts, and to return to normal operations if degradation occurs. Thus, a resilience methodology requires the comprehensive assessment of critical infrastructure systems/assets—from threat to consequence. The methodology needs to support decision-making for risk management, disaster response, and business continuity. Considering these issues, the Infrastructure Assurance Center at Argonne National Laboratory, in partnership with the Protective Security Coordination Division of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), has developed an index, the Resilience Measurement Index (RMI), to characterize the resilience of critical infrastructure.

Petit, F. D. P.↗
DOE OSTI2019

Factors Influencing the Evaluation of Spent Fuel Rail Routes - 19010

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is considering use of rail transport for future shipments of commercial spent nuclear fuel (SNF) from where it currently resides to storage or disposal facilities. Rail carriers transporting in commerce certain quantities of 'rail security sensitive materials,' including SNF, face a regulatory requirement from the U.S. Department of Transportation to perform route risk assessments on an annual basis. In performing these assessments, each affected rail carrier must take into consideration twenty-seven different route factors, and document its rationale for selecting preferred and alternative routes on the basis of the safety and security risk analysis results. The major freight rail carriers operating in the U.S. have invested in the development of a proprietary tool, for rail carrier use only, to assist them in making route selections. This tool utilizes operations data input by each affected rail carrier in conjunction with geographic information systems (GIS) data to represent proximate risk factors, to be integrated and assigned to individual points and segments on the railroad network. Separate safety and security risk values are generated for each rail route under consideration. These values are then placed on an equivalent scoring basis and summed together to allow direct comparison between different route options and to rank order each route in terms of its relative attractiveness. Each affected rail carrier files an annual report for evaluation by the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) that documents its route risk assessment approach and analysis results. DOE has developed its own decision-support tool, Stakeholder Tool for Assessing Radioactive Transportation (START), which is capable of generating and analyzing routing options for transporting SNF by rail in addition to other freight modes. To better understand how affected rail carriers are likely to route SNF shipments in accordance with regulatory requirements and those route factors likely to be most influential in impacting DoE's evaluation of alternative SNF rail routes, a study was undertaken by DOE with the following objectives: - Review the shipment routes that have been historically used by rail carriers to move high hazard materials, including SNF; - Identify the physical, operational and proximate characteristics (attributes) associated with the rail segments that comprise these routes; - Evaluate the relationships between these attributes; - Make suggestions for how to streamline the factors used in DoE's rail route evaluations; - Contrast these relationships with how the factors are used by the rail carriers in applying their tool This paper describes the study approach, analysis results, and implications for rail route selection methodology. Differences between this evaluation and railroad industry information about rail route assessments are also discussed. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2011

Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 539: Areas 25 and 26 Railroad Tracks Nevada National Security Site, Nevada with ROTCs 1-2, Revision 0

This Closure Report (CR) presents information supporting the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 539: Areas 25 and 26 Railroad Tracks, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada. This CR complies with the requirements of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) that was agreed to by the State of Nevada; U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Management; U.S. Department of Defense; and DOE, Legacy Management. The corrective action sites (CASs) within CAU 539 are located within Areas 25 and 26 of the Nevada National Security Site. Corrective Action Unit 539 comprises the following CASs: • 25-99-21, Area 25 Railroad Tracks • 26-99-05, Area 26 Railroad Tracks The purpose of this CR is to provide documentation supporting the completed corrective actions and provide data confirming that the closure objectives for CASs within CAU 539 were met. To achieve this, the following actions were performed: • Reviewed documentation on historical and current site conditions, including the concentration and extent of contamination. • Conducted radiological walkover surveys of railroad tracks in both Areas 25 and 26. • Collected ballast and soil samples and calculated internal dose estimates for radiological releases. • Collected in situ thermoluminescent dosimeter measurements and calculated external dose estimates for radiological releases. • Removed lead bricks as potential source material (PSM) and collected verification samples. • Implemented corrective actions as necessary to protect human health and the environment. • Properly disposed of corrective action and investigation wastes. • Implemented an FFACO use restriction (UR) for radiological contamination at CAS 25-99-21. The approved UR form and map are provided in Appendix F and will be filed in the DOE, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO), Facility Information Management System; the FFACO database; and the NNSA/NSO CAU/CAS files. From November 29, 2010, through May 2, 2011, closure activities were performed as set forth in the Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration (SAFER) Plan for Corrective Action Unit 539: Areas 25 and 26 Railroad Tracks, Nevada Test Site, Nevada. The purposes of the activities as defined during the data quality objectives process were as follows: • Determine whether contaminants of concern (COCs) are present. • If COCs are present, determine their nature and extent, implement appropriate corrective actions, and properly dispose of wastes. Analytes detected during the closure activities were evaluated against final action levels (FALs) to determine COCs for CAU 539. Assessment of the data generated from closure activities revealed the following: • At CAS 26-99-05, the total effective dose for radiological releases did not exceed the FAL of 25 millirem per Industrial Area year. Potential source material in the form of lead bricks was found at three locations. A corrective action of clean closure was implemented at these locations, and verification samples indicated that no further action is necessary. • At CAS 25-99-21, the total effective dose for radiological releases exceeds the FAL of 25 millirem per Industrial Area year. Potential source material in the form of lead bricks was found at eight locations. A corrective action was implemented by removing the lead bricks and soil above FALs at these locations, and verification samples indicated that no further action is necessary. Pieces of debris with high radioactivity were identified as PSM and remain within the CAS boundary. A corrective action of closure in place with a UR was implemented at this CAS because closure activities showed evidence of remaining soil contamination and radioactive PSM. Future land use will be restricted from surface and intrusive activities. Closure activities generated waste streams consisting of industrial solid waste, recyclable materials, low-level radioactive waste, and mixed low-level radioactive waste. Wastes were disposed of in the appropriate onsite landfills. The NNSA/NSO provides the following recommendations: • Clean closure is required at CAS 26-99-05. • Closure in place is required at CAS 25-99-21. • A UR is required at CAS 25-99-21. • A Notice of Completion to the NNSA/NSO is requested from the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection for closure of CAU 539. • Corrective Action Unit 539 should be moved from Appendix III to Appendix IV of the FFACO.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2025

Emerging Threats in Transportation Security Related to Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS)

Transport of high-consequence shipments requires a resilient and robust systems of systems to guarantee cargo arrival. Furthermore, rising adoption of technologies such as connected and automated vehicles (CAVs), intelligent infrastructure, and vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication presents unique challenges for securing transportation systems. Within these Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS), several additional vulnerabilities exist that create pathways for adversarial attacks and cargo interception. For example, connectivity provides cyber pathways directly into vehicle systems and infrastructure for malicious actors. Furthermore, advanced vehicle automation exposes additional vehicle control necessary for shipment interception otherwise unavailable to adversaries. Within this paper, we will discuss the specific threats introduced by ITS-enabled technologies currently deployed and in development. These include those mentioned related to connectivity and automation, but will be expanded into grid, infrastructure, and vehicle specific threats. In addition, we will discuss how to potentially mitigate these emerging challenges as well as how to safeguard transportation systems from next generation attacks.

Cook, Adian [ORNL] (ORCID:0000000160825395)↗
DOE OSTI2023

Experiences of Member States in Building a Nuclear Security Infrastructure for New Nuclear Power Programmes

A nuclear power programme has many benefits, but it is a major undertaking that requires careful planning and preparation as well as a substantial investment in time. It also necessitates the establishment of a sustainable national infrastructure with committed and sustained financial and human resources. While nuclear power is not unique in this respect, it is different from other sources of energy because of the risks associated with the use of nuclear material, as well as the need for compliance with international legal instruments, internationally accepted nuclear safety standards, nuclear security guidance, and safeguards requirements. The IAEA’s Milestones in the Development of a National Infrastructure for Nuclear Power, IAEA Nuclear Energy Series No. NG-G-3.1 (Rev. 1), defines a phased approach that identifies 19 infrastructure issues that should be addressed in each of the three phases of the development of a nuclear infrastructure for a nuclear power programme. The publication Evaluation of the Status of National Nuclear Infrastructure Development IAEA Nuclear Energy Series NG-T-3.2 (Rev. 2) provides a methodology to determine the status of the infrastructure conditions covering all 19 issues identified in the Milestones Approach. A companion IAEA Implementing Guide, Establishing the Nuclear Security Infrastructure for a Nuclear Power Programme, IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 19, provides guidance on the recommended actions to be taken by a State to establish an effective national nuclear security infrastructure for a nuclear power programme using the Milestones Approach. This publication is intended to provide guidance based on the experiences and good practices of Member States with embarking nuclear power programmes as well as Member States that are expanding their nuclear power programmes. The guidance is in the form of case studies, which highlight challenges, issues, and solutions identified by Member States as lessons learned for new nuclear power programmes. This TECDOC is designed to present the experiences of Member States to assist other Member States in developing a nuclear security programme. It addresses the key actions necessary to establish an effective national nuclear security infrastructure for a nuclear power programme consistent with the three phases of the IAEA Milestones Approach. The Member States that provided case studies in this document are at different stages in the development of a nuclear power programme.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2026

Virtual Power Plant Architecture and Resilient Design

Virtual Power Plants (VPPs) represent a fundamental shift in electric grid operations, aggregating distributed energy resources (DERs) such as solar panels and battery storage to deliver utility-scale grid services traditionally provided by centralized power plants. This report examines the unique architectural, operational, and digital assurance considerations that distinguish VPPs from conventional utility infrastructure as they scale from pilot projects to mainstream deployment across the United States. While VPPs offer significant opportunities for grid modernization and enhanced flexibility, their distributed, multi-stakeholder architecture introduces distinct security challenges that differ fundamentally from traditional generation facilities. The analysis identifies risks in VPP operations, including device-level security gaps, platform vulnerabilities, and communication protocol weaknesses that create expanded attack surfaces compared to centralized power plants. Through examination of real-world incidents and emerging threat patterns, the report demonstrates how some VPPs' reliance on consumer-owned devices, public internet infrastructure, and complex vendor ecosystems require new approaches to digital assurance and operational security. The findings provide practical guidance for utilities, regulators, and aggregators to implement robust security frameworks and operational best practices essential for maintaining grid reliability as VPP deployment accelerates under the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) Order 2222 and related regulatory initiatives.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2016

Towards a Scalable Group Vehicle-based Security System

In August 2014, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) proposed new rulemaking to require V2V communication in light vehicles. To establish trust in the basic safety messages (BSMs) that are exchanged by vehicles to improve driver safety, a vehicle public key infrastructure (VPKI) is required. We outline a system where a group or groups of vehicles manage and generate their own BSM signing keys and authenticating certificates -- a Vehicle-Based Security System (VBSS). Based on our preliminary examination, we assert the mechanisms exist to implement a VBSS that supports V2V communications; however, maintaining uniform trust throughout the system while protecting individual privacy does require reliance on nascent group signature technology which may require a significant amount of communication overhead for trust maintenance. To better evaluate the VBSS approach, we compare it to the proposed Security Credential Management System (SCMS) in four major areas including bootstrapping, pseudonym provisioning, BSM signing and authentication, and revocation. System scale, driver privacy, and the distribution and dynamics of participants make designing an effective VPKI an interesting and challenging problem; no clear-cut strategy exists to satisfy the security and privacy expectations in a highly efficient way. More work is needed in VPKI research, so the life-saving promise of V2V technology can be achieved.

Carter, Jason M↗
DOE OSTI2018

EISA (Energy Independence and Security Act) compliant ethanol fuel from corn stover in a depot-based decentralized system

Cellulosic biofuels face significant problems of feedstock aggregation and logistics leading to poor economies of scale. The current model is based on relatively small biorefineries using locally-gathered feedstocks. Here, we examine the potential capacity of a hypothetically distributed, depot-based, biorefinery system to produce cellulosic ethanol from corn stover in the United States Midwest. The local depots serve to aggregate, pretreat and densify biomass (via pellets), which are collected, transported, and fed to a few very large, cellulosic ethanol biorefineries. We found that a corn stover-based depot system would help establish one or two very large-scale biorefineries capable of processing about 8-12% of total corn stover available in the United States Midwest. About 55-153 depots could supply the pretreated pellets to each distributed biorefinery leading to an annual production of 1.02 - 2.91 billion liters of cellulosic ethanol. Most of the participating depots would be located in Illinois and Iowa. The ethanol selling price in this depot-based biorefinery system would varys between U$S 0.67 and U$S 0.72 liter-1. The estimated range of GHG savings from cellulosic ethanol in the depot system compared to gasoline was 3.35-4.84 Tg CO2 year-1. In addition of being economically competitive, a distributed, depot-based, biorefinery system could meet the 60% GHG reduction requirement of the U.S. Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA).

Biorefinery, Cellulosic biofuel, Corn stover, Dist↗
DOE OSTI2023

Pits 101: The four types of nuclear weapons modernization activities

We learned why we don’t need plutonium to make new pits in an earlier edition of Pits 101, but why do we need new pits from a national security standpoint? A plutonium pit, or the core of a nuclear weapon, is like a weapon’s battery. The pits that Los Alamos will make in coming years will be like new batteries for nuclear weapons in the existing stockpile. Pit production is mandated in order to meet Department of Defense (DOD) requirements by our primary customer, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), which is a semi-autonomous agency within the Department of Energy. NNSA’s mission is to “deliver safe, secure, reliable warheads for an effective nuclear deterrent.” As Marv Adams, head of NNSA Defense Programs, describes, it’s a mission that is simple to state, but challenging to deliver.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
NASA NTRS2015

Security-Enhanced Autonomous Network Management

Ensuring reliable communication in next-generation space networks requires a novel network management system to support greater levels of autonomy and greater awareness of the environment and assets. Intelligent Automation, Inc., has developed a security-enhanced autonomous network management (SEANM) approach for space networks through cross-layer negotiation and network monitoring, analysis, and adaptation. The underlying technology is bundle-based delay/disruption-tolerant networking (DTN). The SEANM scheme allows a system to adaptively reconfigure its network elements based on awareness of network conditions, policies, and mission requirements. Although SEANM is generically applicable to any radio network, for validation purposes it has been prototyped and evaluated on two specific networks: a commercial off-the-shelf hardware test-bed using Institute of Electrical Engineers (IEEE) 802.11 Wi-Fi devices and a military hardware test-bed using AN/PRC-154 Rifleman Radio platforms. Testing has demonstrated that SEANM provides autonomous network management resulting in reliable communications in delay/disruptive-prone environments.

Zeng, Hui↗
DOE OSTI2026

Surveillance LANL-ASMT-2026-0059 Procurement – NNSS Supplier Review

The Institutional Quality and Performance Assurance Division's Quality Support Services Group conducted a surveillance of IQPA-IQ Supplier Evaluation group's required assessments of suppliers providing items and services relevant to the Nevada National Security Site. Based upon records examined, the surveillance team has determined that all supplier evaluation/oversight requirements are being met, and no Findings or Opportunities for Improvement are noted.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2025

Ku-band electron linac for battery-powered hand-portable 2-MeV X-ray generator

X-ray generators, producing radiation in MeV range, are a critical tool for radiography, non-destructive testing and security applications. Field operation of such source requires them to be hand-portable, autonomous and allow parameter adjustability. RF linear accelerators can serve as a flexible, reliable, and robust radiation generator alternative to dangerous radioisotopes and bulky betatrons that are currently used for field radiography if their size, weight, cost, and imaging performance are matched to these sources. Here, in this paper, we present the design and test results of a 2 MeV Ku-band electron linac for a hand-portable X-ray generator system for field radiography being developed by RadiaBeam. The dramatic scale of miniaturization and cost-reduction is achieved thanks to the implementation of innovative technologies such as air-cooled Ku-band air-traffic control magnetrons, a split accelerating structure fabrication technique, and solid-state Marx modulators. This paper presents the design of the first prototype of the accelerator, its operation from Li-Ion batteries, as well as high-power and beam measurements.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗