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At least 613 records · Page 34

Test and Evaluation for Enhanced Security: A Quantitative Method to Incorporate Expert Knowledge into Test Planning Decisions.

Complex systems are comprised of technical, social, political and environmental factors as well as the programmatic factors of cost, schedule and risk. Testing these systems for enhanced security requires expert knowledge in many different fields. It is important to test these systems to ensure effectiveness, but testing is limited to due cost, schedule, safety, feasibility and a myriad of other reasons. Without an effective decision framework for Test and Evaluation (T&E) planning that can take into consideration technical as well as programmatic factors and leverage expert knowledge, security in complex systems may not be assessed effectively. Therefore, this paper covers the identification of the current T&E planning problem and an approach to include the full variety of factors and leverage expert knowledge in T&E planning through the use of Bayesian Networks (BN).

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗

Modeling for Existing Nuclear Power Plant Security Regime

This document details the development of modeling and simulations for existing plant security regimes using identified target sets to link dynamic assessment methodologies by leveraging reactor system level modeling with force-on-force modeling and 3D visualization for developing table-top scenarios. This work leverages an existing hypothetical example used for international physical security training, the Lone Pine nuclear power plant facility for target sets and modeling.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Modeling for Existing Nuclear Power Plant Security Regime

This document details the development of modeling and simulations for existing plant security regimes using identified target sets to link dynamic assessment methodologies by leveraging reactor system level modeling with force-on-force modeling and 3D visualization for developing table-top scenarios. This work leverages an existing hypothetical example used for international physical security training, the Lone Pine nuclear power plant facility for target sets and modeling.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

EFCOG, IOSC Best Practices Guide

Members of the Energy Facility Contractors Group (EFCOG), Safeguards and Security Working Group, Information Security Sub-Working Group Incidents of Security Concern (IOSC) Team prepared this best practice guide. For the purposes of this guide, “best practices” are “positive examples of work processes, procedures, good ideas, or effective solutions. The team made up of IOSC Subject Matter Experts (SME) identified these best practices as a result of actual operational experience and training. The guide describes best practices for categorizing incidents and managing inquiries. These practices may serve as guidelines for developing program plans, policy and procedures. These practices are suggestions for Department sites to consider while working in the IOSC subject area. The authors acknowledge that there may be alternatives to the practices identified in this guide. Subject matter Experts from the IOSC program across the Department developed this guide. Extensive discussion and document reviews were conducted to identify best practices relating to security inquiries. It was not within the scope of this study to assess individual site performance or evaluate compliance. Department of Energy’s (DOE), Order 470.4B, Chg.2, Safeguards and Security Program, July-21-2011, Chg 2, January-17-2017, Attachment 5, Incidents of Security Concern, contains the requirements for the IOSC program. In accordance with DOE directives and requirements established by DOE/National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) oversight, the working group evaluated elements of the IOSC program at each of the working group member’s sites such as categorizing events, conducting inquiries, and reporting events. Inconsistencies in categorization across the sites may be due to various factors, including each local field office having different reporting expectations, subjectivity in making determinations, and potential inherent deficiencies in the categorization tables and category descriptions. Many sites have adopted a sub reportable category for a security anomaly event that it believes does not meet the criteria as a reportable IOSC. The sites typically establish a local standardized process for reporting, analyzing, and trending sub-reportable events. Security incident program managers may need to discuss inconsistent categorization with other Inquiry Officials (IO) and suggest standardized solutions (ie…through policy changes or a forum attended by incident program managers and inquiry officials to discuss standardization solutions. At least one EFCOG IOSC team member’s site is currently using the best practices identified in this guide.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗

Employing the radiological and nuclear risk assessment methods (RNRAM) for assessing radiological and nuclear detection architectures

The United States Department of Homeland Security’s Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) is charged with implementing domestic nuclear detection efforts to protect the U.S. from radiological and nuclear threats. DNDO is also responsible for coordinating the development of the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture (GNDA). DNDO utilizes a unique risk analysis tool to conduct a holistic risk assessment of the GNDA known as the Radiological and Nuclear Risk Assessment Methods (RNRAM). The capabilities of this tool will be used to support internal DNDO analyses and has also been used for other entities such as the International Atomic Energy Agency. The model uses a probabilistic risk assessment methodology and includes the ability to conduct a risk assessment of the effectiveness of layered architectures in the GNDA against an attack by an intelligent, adaptive adversary. This paper overviews the basic structure, capabilities, and use of RNRAM as used to assess different architectures and how various risk components are calculated through a series of interconnected modules. Also highlighted is flexible structure of RNRAM which can accommodate new modules in order to examine a variety of threat detection architectures and concepts.

Brigantic, Robert T.↗

IRAD-MPE Radiological and Nuclear Security Threats (Day 1) [Slides]

This module is designed to enhance awareness regarding radiological and nuclear security threats and the types of radioactive materials that can be used for criminal purposes or terrorist acts. The goals are to: (1) Review the Threat Assessment Process for MPEs, (2) Recognize Potential Radiological and Nuclear Security Threats, (3) Understand the basics of Radiological Dispersal Devices (RDD) and Radiological Exposure Devices (RED), (4) Learn about Medical, Commercial, and Naturally Occurring Radioactive Materials (NORM) sources, and (5) Understand the term Material Out of Regulatory Control (MORC).

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Reconciling food security and bioenergy: priorities for action

Abstract Understanding the complex interactions among food security, bioenergy sustainability, and resource management requires a focus on specific contextual problems and opportunities. The United Nations’ 2030 Sustainable Development Goals place a high priority on food and energy security; bioenergy plays an important role in achieving both goals. Effective food security programs begin by clearly defining the problem and asking, ‘What can be done to assist people at high risk?’ Simplistic global analyses, headlines, and cartoons that blame biofuels for food insecurity may reflect good intentions but mislead the public and policymakers because they obscure the main drivers of local food insecurity and ignore opportunities for bioenergy to contribute to solutions. Applying sustainability guidelines to bioenergy will help achieve near‐ and long‐term goals to eradicate hunger. Priorities for achieving successful synergies between bioenergy and food security include the following: (1) clarifying communications with clear and consistent terms, (2) recognizing that food and bioenergy need not compete for land and, instead, should be integrated to improve resource management, (3) investing in technology, rural extension, and innovations to build capacity and infrastructure, (4) promoting stable prices that incentivize local production, (5) adopting flex crops that can provide food along with other products and services to society, and (6) engaging stakeholders to identify and assess specific opportunities for biofuels to improve food security. Systematic monitoring and analysis to support adaptive management and continual improvement are essential elements to build synergies and help society equitably meet growing demands for both food and energy.

09 BIOMASS FUELS↗

Preliminary Analysis of Facility Design for Pyro-processing Safeguardability

The deployment of advanced nuclear energy systems can assure sustainable energy use worldwide. For some of these systems, nuclear fuel will be fabricated in remotely-handled facilities in which batch-type processing will occur in heavily-shielded hot cells. Because special nuclear material is in both different physical and chemical form than that of the contemporary fuel cycle, new challenges have arisen in terms of safeguards, safety, and security, integrated with facility design; i.e., safeguardability. There is a need to develop models that can quantitatively assess safeguardability from a design-driven perspective. Previously, the first build of a material throughput model was established using discrete event simulation (DES) for the fuel fabrication process. Results showed that the DES model potentially can detect diversion attempts. This paper continues the study by further developing the the model. We test the use of the probability of the false alarm; i.e., the Type I error, as a metric for safeguardability assessment. Initiating events leading to a false alarm arise from aspects of safeguards, safety, and security. Different conceptual facility designs could exhibit different frequencies for the Type I error, and this could provide a measure of the safeguardability of each design. A quantitative assessment for safeguardable facility designs has not been developed in this manner. Much of the research into safeguardability has been qualitative. Engineering design approaches for a safeguardable facility are now needed. As there are not accepted metrics for safeguardability assessment, our motivation is to develop this design facet of safeguardability further.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Interdisciplinary Approaches to Cyber-vulnerability Impact Assessment for Energy Critical Infrastructure

As energy infrastructure becomes more interconnected, understanding cybersecurity risks to production systems requires integrating operational and computer security knowledge. We interviewed 18 experts working in the field of energy critical infrastructure to compare what information they find necessary to assess the impact of computer vulnerabilities on energy operational technology. These experts came from two groups: 1) computer security experts and 2) energy sector operations experts. We find that both groups responded similarly for general categories of information and displayed knowledge about both domains, perhaps due to their interdisciplinary work at the same organization. Yet, we found notable differences in the details of their responses and in their stated perceptions of each group’s approaches to impact assessment. Their suggestions for collaboration across domains highlighted how these two groups can work together to help each other secure the energy grid. Our findings inform the development of interdisciplinary security approaches in critical-infrastructure contexts.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Biofuels and Food Security. A report by the High Level Panel of Experts on Food Security and Nutrition

In October 2011, the UN Committee on World Food Security (CFS) recommended a ''review of biofuels policies -- where applicable and if necessary -- according to balanced science-based assessments of the opportunities and challenges that they may represent for food security so that biofuels can be produced where it is socially, economically and environmentally feasible to do so''. In line with this, the CFS requested the HLPE (High Level Panel of Experts) to ''conduct a science-based comparative literature analysis taking into consideration the work produced by the FAO and Global Bioenergy Partnership (GBEP) of the positive and negative effects of biofuels on food security''. Recommendations from the report include the following. Food security policies and biofuel policies cannot be separated because they mutually interact. Food security and the right to food should be priority concerns in the design of any biofuel policy. Governments should adopt the principle: biofuels shall not compromise food security and therefore should be managed so that food access or the resources necessary for the production of food, principally land, biodiversity, water and labour are not put at risk. The CFS should undertake action to ensure that this principle is operable in the very varied contexts in which all countries find themselves. Given the trend to the emergence of a global biofuels market, and a context moving from policy-driven to market-driven biofuels, there is an urgent need for close and pro-active coordination of food security, biofuel/bioenergy policies and energy policies, at national and international levels, as well as rapid response mechanisms in case of crisis. There is also an urgent need to create an enabling, responsible climate for food and non-food investments compatible with food security. The HLPE recommends that governments adopt a coordinated food security and energy security strategy, which would require articulation around the following five axes/dimensions: Adapt to the change to global, market-driven dynamics; Address the land, water and resource implications of biofuel policies; Foster the transition from biofuels to comprehensive food-energy policies; Promote research and development; and, Develop methods and guidelines for coordinated food, Biofuels, and bio-energy policies at national and international levels.

09 BIOMASS FUELS↗

UNREVIEWED COMPOSITE ANALYSIS QUESTION EVALUATION: Update of Composite Analysis Sources Potentially Interacting with the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

This unreviewed composite analysis question evaluation (UCAQE) assesses the impacts of the FFACO corrective actions on the Area 5 RWMS CA and the need to revise or update the CA Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO). The FFACO, a legal agreement among the NNSA/NFO, the state of Nevada, and the U.S. Department of Defense, establishes a process to identify, characterize, and implement corrective actions for historical sites on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) contaminated with hazardous or radioactive materials. Review of FFACO corrective actions involving sources of residual radioactive contamination potentially interacting with the Area 5 RWMS indicates that no significant changes affecting CA results and conclusions have occurred. Doses from the Area 5 RWMS, Industrial Sites, and Soils sites are a small fraction of the 0.3 mSv CA dose constraint, and significant interactions with releases from the Area 5 RWMS are unlikely. Doses from FFACO CASs, including UGTA sites, can be controlled by FFACO URs and institutional controls that have been implemented since the CA was prepared. As the interactions between the Area 5 RWMS and the FFACO CASs are negligible, the sites can be managed independently. The Area 5 RWMS CA reached the same conclusions about the interaction of the Area 5 RWMS with other sources of residual contamination. Therefore, there is no need to revise or update the Area 5 RWMS CA.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Implication of stratospheric aerosol geoengineering on compound precipitation and temperature extremes in Africa

Three Coupled Model Intercomparison Project 5 (CMIP5) models that simulated the G4 experiment of the Geoengineering Model Intercomparison Project (GeoMIP) were used to investigate the impact of stratospheric aerosol injection (SAI) on combined temperature and precipitation extremes in Africa that can have greater negative impacts on human and the environment than individual rainfall or temperature extremes. The examined compound extremes included the dry (R warm|dry and R cold|dry ) and wet (R warm|wet and R cold|wet ) modes assessed during the injection (SAI, 2050-2069) and post-injection (postSAI, 2070-2089) periods compared with the historical period (1986-2005). We found a significant projected change in the occurrence of both wet and dry modes during SAI and postSAI related to the historical period. The magnitude and sign of this change depend on the season and the geographical location. During the SAI and postSAI, the wet (R warm|wet and R cold|wet ) modes are projected to be significantly lower while the dry modes are noted to increase in a large part of African continent depending on the season and the geographical location and may consequently leads to an increase of the droughts prone areas. Furthermore, the termination effect is noted to re duce the occurrence of dry modes, which may reduce the potential negative effects of the injection after halting. As the effect may vary from one region to another and according to the season, it suggested assessing the key sector impacts of SAI. Thus, this change in dry modes due to SAI could affect all activities which depend on water resources such as water supply, agriculture and food production, energy demand, and production with adverse effects on health, security, and sustainable development, but this needs to be assessed and quantified at regional scales.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Anatomy of a Security Operations Center

Many agencies and corporations are either contemplating or in the process of building a cyber Security Operations Center (SOC). Those Agencies that have established SOCs are most likely working on major revisions or enhancements to existing capabilities. As principle developers of the NASA SOC; this Presenters' goals are to provide the GFIRST community with examples of some of the key building blocks of an Agency scale cyber Security Operations Center. This presentation viII include the inputs and outputs, the facilities or shell, as well as the internal components and the processes necessary to maintain the SOC's subsistence - in other words, the anatomy of a SOC. Details to be presented include the SOC architecture and its key components: Tier 1 Call Center, data entry, and incident triage; Tier 2 monitoring, incident handling and tracking; Tier 3 computer forensics, malware analysis, and reverse engineering; Incident Management System; Threat Management System; SOC Portal; Log Aggregation and Security Incident Management (SIM) systems; flow monitoring; IDS; etc. Specific processes and methodologies discussed include Incident States and associated Work Elements; the Incident Management Workflow Process; Cyber Threat Risk Assessment methodology; and Incident Taxonomy. The Evolution of the Cyber Security Operations Center viII be discussed; starting from reactive, to proactive, and finally to proactive. Finally, the resources necessary to establish an Agency scale SOC as well as the lessons learned in the process of standing up a SOC viII be presented.

Wang, John↗

Status of Educational Efforts in National Security Workforce

This report documents the status of educational efforts for the preparation of a national security workforce as part of the National Security Preparedness Project, being performed by the Arrowhead Center of New Mexico State University under a DOE/NNSA grant. The need to adequately train and educate a national security workforce is at a critical juncture. Even though there are an increasing number of college graduates in the appropriate fields, many of these graduates choose to work in the private sector because of more desirable salary and benefit packages. This report includes an assessment of the current educational situation for the national security workforce.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Quantifying Food Security and Mitigation Risks Consequential to Climate Change Impacts on Crop Yields

Climate change is expected to impact crop yields globally, with some regions benefiting from favorable conditions and CO2 fertilization, while others face adverse effects from altered precipitation and higher temperatures. Changes in crop yields can destabilize the global food system and pose challenges to food security. Moreover, crop production is crucial, as biofuels are becoming increasingly important contributors to climate change mitigation measures aimed at limiting global warming. This study uses the Integrated Model to Assess the Global Environment integrated assessment model framework to analyze different indicators related to food security and climate change mitigation under varying climate change impacts on crop yields. Twelve spatially explicit crop productivity projections were taken from the full archive of the Global Gridded Crop Model Intercomparison of 120 climate-crop model combinations, forced by CMIP6-based climate scenarios. The selection includes two average-performing climate-crop model combinations, two pessimistic combinations that perform one standard deviation below the mean, and two optimistic model combinations that perform one standard deviation above the mean. To single out the effect of climate change on productivity changes, we drew samples from two representative concentration pathways (RCP2.6 and RCP8.5). These productivity projections were applied within an otherwise uniform scenario (SSP2) and analyzed for their effect on total calorie demand, crop prices, and number of people at risk of undernourishment to quantify food security. Risks to climate change mitigation targets were explored by modeling the total bioenergy supply, emissions, and global mean temperature. The results revealed significant differences in the risk of food security and mitigation potential between different regions and climate change scenarios. Across scenarios, the crop area extent can vary up to 2 million km2 due to changing crop yields. The projected change in global hunger ranges from 60 to 160 million undernourished people, indicating uncertainty between climate and crop model combinations. Low-income regions are especially impacted because of their high sensitivity to changes in food prices. Global climate change mitigation ambitions can also deviate by the latter part of the 21st century, as changes in yields will impact biofuel production as well as agriculture, forestry and other land use emissions. The quantitative insights generated by this study highlight the need for global policy efforts to make the agricultural system more adaptive to climate change to handle potential negative impacts.

crop yields↗

Statement of Work. Y-12 National Security Complex Security Infrastructure Revitalization Program Project - Combination Inspector

The Y-12 SIRP Quadrant 1, Quadrant 2, and Vehicle Barrier project involves the following summary elements. The perimeter intrusion detection and assessment system (PIDAS) is an existing system at the Y-12 National Security Complex, which is a government-owned facility located in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, and managed by Consolidated Nuclear Security, LLC (CNS) for the Department of Energy (DOE). National Technology and Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC (NTESS) is the engineering design agent and construction manager (CM) for the Y-12 SIRP effort. The Quadrants 1 and 2 portion of the project involves the replacement of the PIDAS, and the vehicle barrier portion of the project involves the installation of a continuous passive vehicle barrier alongside the inner PIDAS fence.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Water Security Toolkit User Manual Version 1.2.

The Water Security Toolkit (WST) is a suite of open source software tools that can be used by water utilities to create response strategies to reduce the impact of contamination in a water distribution network . WST includes hydraulic and water quality modeling software , optimizati on methodologies , and visualization tools to identify: (1) sensor locations to detect contamination, (2) locations in the network in which the contamination was introduced, (3) hydrants to remove contaminated water from the distribution system, (4) locations in the network to inject decontamination agents to inactivate, remove, or destroy contaminants, (5) locations in the network to take grab sample s to help identify the source of contamination and (6) valves to close in order to isolate contaminate d areas of the network. This user manual describes the different components of WST , along w ith examples and case studies. License Notice The Water Security Toolkit (WST) v.1.2 Copyright c 2012 Sandia Corporation. Under the terms of Contract DE-AC04-94AL85000, there is a non-exclusive license for use of this work by or on behalf of the U.S. government. This software is distributed under the Revised BSD License (see below). In addition, WST leverages a variety of third-party software packages, which have separate licensing policies: Acro Revised BSD License argparse Python Software Foundation License Boost Boost Software License Coopr Revised BSD License Coverage BSD License Distribute Python Software Foundation License / Zope Public License EPANET Public Domain EPANET-ERD Revised BSD License EPANET-MSX GNU Lesser General Public License (LGPL) v.3 gcovr Revised BSD License GRASP AT&T Commercial License for noncommercial use; includes randomsample and sideconstraints executable files LZMA SDK Public Domain nose GNU Lesser General Public License (LGPL) v.2.1 ordereddict MIT License pip MIT License PLY BSD License PyEPANET Revised BSD License Pyro MIT License PyUtilib Revised BSD License PyYAML MIT License runpy2 Python Software Foundation License setuptools Python Software Foundation License / Zope Public License six MIT License TinyXML zlib License unittest2 BSD License Utilib Revised BSD License virtualenv MIT License Vol Common Public License vpykit Revised BSD License Additionally, some precompiled WST binary distributions might bundle other third-party executables files: Coliny Revised BSD License (part of Acro project) Dakota GNU Lesser General Public License (LGPL) v.2.1 PICO Revised BSD License (part of Acro project) i Revised BSD License Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * Neither the name of Sandia National Laboratories nor Sandia Corporation nor the names of its con- tributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without specific prior written permission. THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IM- PLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL SANDIA CORPORATION BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUD- ING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. ii Acknowledgements This work was supported by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency through its Office of Research and Development (Interagency Agreement # DW8992192801). The material in this document has been subject to technical and policy review by the U.S. EPA, and approved for publication. The views expressed by individual authors, however, are their own, and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Mention of trade names, products, or services does not convey official U.S. EPA approval, endorsement, or recommendation. The Water Security Toolkit is an extension of the Threat Ensemble Vulnerability Assessment-Sensor Place- ment Optimization Tool (TEVA-SPOT), which was also developed with funding from the U.S. Environ- mental Protection Agency through its Office of Research and Development (Interagency Agreement # DW8992192801). The authors acknowledge the following individuals for their contributions to the devel- opment of TEVA-SPOT: Jonathan Berry (Sandia National Laboratories), Erik Boman (Sandia National Laboratories), Lee Ann Riesen (Sandia National Laboratories), James Uber (University of Cincinnati), and Jean-Paul Watson (Sandia National Laboratories). iii Acronyms ATUS American Time-Use Survey BLAS Basic linear algebra sub-routines CFU Colony-forming unit CVAR Conditional value at risk CWS Contamination warning system EA Evolutionary algorithm EDS Event detection system EPA U.S. Environmental Protection Agency EC Extent of Contamination ERD EPANET results database file GLPK GNU Linear Programming Kit GRASP Greedy randomized adaptive sampling process HEX Hexadecimal HTML HyperText markup language INP EPANET input file LP Linear program MC Mass consumed MILP Mixed integer linear program MIP Mixed integer program MSX Multi-species extension for EPANET NFD Number of failed detections NS Number of sensors NZD Non-zero demand PD Population dosed PE Population exposed PK Population killed TAI Threat assessment input file TCE Tailed-conditioned expectation TD Time to detection TEC Timed extent of contamination TEVA Threat ensemble vulnerability assessment TSB Tryptic soy broth TSG Threat scenario generation file TSI Threat simulation input file VAR Value at risk VC Volume consumed WST Water Security Toolkit YML YAML configuration file format for WST iv Symbols Notation Definition Example { , } set brackets { 1,2,3 } means a set containing the values 1,2, and 3. [?] is an element of s [?] S means that s is an element of the set S . [?] for all s = 1 [?] s [?] S means that the statement s = 1 is true for all s in set S . P summation P n i =1 s i means s 1 + s 2 + * * * + s n . \ set minus S \ T means the set that contains all those elements of S that are not in set T . %7C given %7C is used to define conditional probability. P ( s %7C t ) means the prob- ability of s occurring given that t occurs. %7C ... %7C cardinality Cardinality of a set is the number of elements of the set. If set S = { 2,4,6 } , then %7C S %7C = 3. v

Klise, Katherine A.↗

OpenCV and TYZX : video surveillance for tracking.

As part of the National Security Engineering Institute (NSEI) project, several sensors were developed in conjunction with an assessment algorithm. A camera system was developed in-house to track the locations of personnel within a secure room. In addition, a commercial, off-the-shelf (COTS) tracking system developed by TYZX was examined. TYZX is a Bay Area start-up that has developed its own tracking hardware and software which we use as COTS support for robust tracking. This report discusses the pros and cons of each camera system, how they work, a proposed data fusion method, and some visual results. Distributed, embedded image processing solutions show the most promise in their ability to track multiple targets in complex environments and in real-time. Future work on the camera system may include three-dimensional volumetric tracking by using multiple simple cameras, Kalman or particle filtering, automated camera calibration and registration, and gesture or path recognition.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗