Correlated Signal Analysis for Nuclear Emergency Response [Slides]
Abstract not provided.
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
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ANS-8.3 Criteria and the Use of Electronic Personal Detectors as a Criticality Accident Alarm System [Slides]
Motivations for EPDs as a CAAS: Key features of the 2022 revision of ANS 8.3; Review of the relevant criteria in ANS-8.3 2022–How does (or could) an EPD based CAAS comply; Advantages & Disadvantages of Permanently Installed CAAS; Advantages & Disadvantages of EPD Based CAAS; Suggested Decision Criteria; Conclusions & Recommendations.
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Experiences of Member States in Building a Nuclear Security Infrastructure for New Nuclear Power Programmes
A nuclear power programme has many benefits, but it is a major undertaking that requires careful planning and preparation as well as a substantial investment in time. It also necessitates the establishment of a sustainable national infrastructure with committed and sustained financial and human resources. While nuclear power is not unique in this respect, it is different from other sources of energy because of the risks associated with the use of nuclear material, as well as the need for compliance with international legal instruments, internationally accepted nuclear safety standards, nuclear security guidance, and safeguards requirements. The IAEA’s Milestones in the Development of a National Infrastructure for Nuclear Power, IAEA Nuclear Energy Series No. NG-G-3.1 (Rev. 1), defines a phased approach that identifies 19 infrastructure issues that should be addressed in each of the three phases of the development of a nuclear infrastructure for a nuclear power programme. The publication Evaluation of the Status of National Nuclear Infrastructure Development IAEA Nuclear Energy Series NG-T-3.2 (Rev. 2) provides a methodology to determine the status of the infrastructure conditions covering all 19 issues identified in the Milestones Approach. A companion IAEA Implementing Guide, Establishing the Nuclear Security Infrastructure for a Nuclear Power Programme, IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 19, provides guidance on the recommended actions to be taken by a State to establish an effective national nuclear security infrastructure for a nuclear power programme using the Milestones Approach. This publication is intended to provide guidance based on the experiences and good practices of Member States with embarking nuclear power programmes as well as Member States that are expanding their nuclear power programmes. The guidance is in the form of case studies, which highlight challenges, issues, and solutions identified by Member States as lessons learned for new nuclear power programmes. This TECDOC is designed to present the experiences of Member States to assist other Member States in developing a nuclear security programme. It addresses the key actions necessary to establish an effective national nuclear security infrastructure for a nuclear power programme consistent with the three phases of the IAEA Milestones Approach. The Member States that provided case studies in this document are at different stages in the development of a nuclear power programme.
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An Evaluation of Three Dimensional Scene Reconstruction Tools for Safeguards Applications
Over the past 5 years, advances in digital imaging and image processing have enabled everyday computing hardware, such as that found on laptops and even phones, to easily create 3D models of scenes from a series of still images. This field is broadly known as photogrammetry. For safeguards applications, a safeguards inspector could evaluate a 3D model of a facility (such as an enrichment plant or the top of a reactor) constructed from multiple photos instead of reviewing each photo individually. This report compares the detailed capabilities of a particular commercial offering (Quidient) that Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) has investigated in depth with the general capabilities provided in the industry and recommends areas where the general technology could be pursued for potential safeguards applications.
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Beating the Auditors: Comparing Doping in Sport to Nuclear Proliferators
The Berlinger Bottle (Figure 1, below) is the central part of the BEREG-Kit that has been used by anti-doping agencies worldwide for over 25 years. As documented in the World Anti-Doping Agency’s investigative report [Ref 1], in 2014, Russian state-level actors found ways to defeat these bottles and was able to secretly replace an athlete’s drug-laced urine with clean urine samples that had been collected earlier. This cheating scheme allowed rampant performance enhancing drug use by its athletes, and (before disqualifications) earned Russia 33 medals in the 2014 Sochi Olympics – more than double its haul of 15 medals at the 2010 Winter Olympics in Vancouver. All this activity was conducted despite the watchful eye of the World Anti-Doping Agency. Similarly, Lance Armstrong and the US Postal Team infamously used performance enhancing drugs and blood transfusions to win 7 Tour de France titles (again, before disqualification) in a row, all under the supervision of L’Union Cycliste Internationale (UCI) and the US Anti Doping Agency. The inspection role of anti-doping agencies is similar in scope to the role of a Safeguards Inspector with the International Atomic Energy Agency: detect the misuse of facilities, and conduct scheduled and randomized testing to detect and deter would-be cheaters. This paper will explore the motivation, the means, and the mistakes which led to discovery – and will draw out commonalities between those who seek to cheat in sports, and those who seek to undermine international nuclear safeguards as Iraq tried in the 1980s.
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Advanced Algorithms for Scrutiny of Mandatory State Reports Declarations to the IAEA (Final Project Report)
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA, or Agency) has an interest in applying machine learning to safeguards problems. However, the lack of machine training data for outside researchers is a significant impediment for progress in including advanced algorithms in safeguards practices. Information about a State’s inventory and movements of nuclear material is highly sensitive, both from a commercial perspective and from a security perspective. States (and commercial entities) do not freely divulge this information, and the IAEA–which receives detailed information from States as accounting reports–considers all information concerning nuclear materials location and composition to be Safeguards Confidential. Even within the Agency, information marked as safeguards confidential can be accessed only on a direct need-to-know basis by those who analyze and summarize the information for that particular State.
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Formality of Operations and Nuclear Criticality Safety Standards [Slides]
This presentation is on the formality of operations and nuclear criticality safety standards. This lecture starts with an Introduction then leads into a conversation on the dependencies of formality of operations. Secondly the presentation includes a review of past issues. Included is a Discussion about “credible” and “unlikely” – variables for process analysis in ANS-8.1, Section 4.1.2, and the double contingency principle, Section 4.2.2, respectively. The presentation finishes with some conclusions.
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Digital Engineering and Cybersecurity Decision Analysis in Early Phases of SMR-Driven IES Projects
Considerable efforts are underway to ensure cybersecurity is integrated into the systems engineering lifecycle. Cyber-informed engineering and security-by-design frameworks are intended to identify and engineer out cybersecurity risks throughout the lifecycle. While these approaches are valuable for promoting the need to include cybersecurity considerations in early design phases to create more secure systems, they may not consider the entirety of digital risks. Digital risks in a digital instrumentation and control system include adversarial and unintentional risks from internal and external factors, such as human performance errors, design flaws, environmental conditions, and equipment degradation or failure. This report provides a detailed discussion on digital risk prior to describing the background and concept of operations for a small modular reactor-driven integrated energy system connected to industrial applications. The challenges of competing objectives and competing stakeholder requirements are discussed and the impacts on digital engineering, security considerations, and interdependencies are evaluated for mission-level, facility-level, and system-level decisions.
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Airport Risk Assessment Model Stakeholder Symposium Event Report
On June 22-23, 2021, the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory hosted a two-day virtual stakeholder symposium to share how the Airport Risk Assessment Model (ARAM) is putting security resource allocation planning into the hands of our airport’s front lines of defense. This report highlights the key takeaways from the discussions.
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FY 2024 Annual Full-Participation Exercise SIGMA MESA EX Initial Planning Meeting [Slides]
The purpose of this briefing is to provide Planning Team members and other SMEs with key/high-level information on the Laboratory’s Annual Full-Participation Exercise for FY24.
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US Perspectives on the Conventional/Nuclear Interactions and the Impacts on Nuclear Escalation Risks and Future Arms Control Prospects
This short paper is organized around a few discrete questions. How have U.S. perspectives on conventional and nuclear interactions evolved in recent years? How have these changing perspectives shaped U.S. thinking on perceived nuclear escalation risks with Russia, both long standing and newly emerged? And finally, what do these U.S. perceptions of interactions and risks mean for future potential arms control either in the conventional or nuclear arena? The answers to these questions appear to show some promise for future work in this area. Conventional and nuclear interactions are increasing, and thus the two domains cannot be kept as deliberately or artificially separated as in the past. There is a growing mutual recognition regarding the interplay between conventional and nuclear capabilities in the strategic stability equation. There is also an increasingly shared recognition in the United States and Russia that nuclear escalation risks are likely to originate in conventional crises or conflict, placing an imperative on some form of conflict prevention procedures at the lower end of the spectrum. This requirement suggests some potential areas for risk reduction measures outside of those traditionally considered in conventional and nuclear arms control over the past several decades.
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Evaluation of Naturally Occurring Be-7 Activity on LANL Stack Filter Clumps
Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) is responsible for providing solutions to challenging issues through multidisciplinary science, engineering, and technology that impact national security. As part of the Radioactive Air Emissions Management (RAEM) Team, it is our responsibility to ensure LANL operates within the requirements of the Code of Federal Regulations 40 CFR 61, Subpart H, National Emission Standards for Emissions of Radionuclides Other Than Radon From Department of Energy Facilities (Rad-NESHAP). The standard states, “Emissions of radionuclides to the ambient air from Department of Energy facilities shall not exceed those amounts that would cause any member of the public to receive in any year an effective dose equivalent of 10 mrem/yr” (EPA, 2002) During a routine assessment of LANL’s Rad-NESHAP compliance program, an opportunity for improvement was identified that addresses the evaluation of routine stack samples which potentially have naturally occurring radioactive materials (NORM) on the filter media. In the past and based on professional judgment, detections of NORM such as K-40 and Be-7 typically were rejected from the analytical results. The assessment finding suggested developing a technical criterion to ensure that such rejections were justified, comparing actual measured values with anticipated NORM concentrations for various stacks located at LANL. The significance of accepting or rejecting samples as “true” or “NORM” and its impact on the RAEM’s mission and compliance to the regulations is explained later in the document. Additionally, this document will describe the process and calculations for how such results are to be accepted as actual samples “true positive” or rejected as NORM.
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Nuclear Safety at Los Alamos National Laboratory
Abstract not provided.
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Nuclear Forensics: Science and Policy for a Safer World [Slides]
Nuclear forensics is the collection and analysis of nuclear or radiological material to support investigations into the diversion, trafficking, or illicit activities involving materials.
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Advanced Error Modeling for Prompt Yield Estimation [Slides]
Multi-Phenomenology Explosion Monitoring (MultiPEM) Toolbox provides a capability for post-detonation characterization focusing on yield estimation; Synthesize information from multiple sensor types; Leverage historical databases to inform statistical models; Allows for rapid or comprehensive analysis; Implemented in R code.
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Perspectives on Next Steps in Arms Control and Non-Proliferation
Much has happened in arms control over the last year as this chapter has been in development. The prospects for arms control as a viable national security tool have, if anything, grown darker. Russia has falsely equated tearing down the remaining arms control edifice with creating potential leverage vis-à-vis its actions in Ukraine. China has failed to update its talking points on being a responsible arms control actor with its massive nuclear force expansion. The United States has stated clearly that it is open for business on arms control and risk reduction, but it unfortunately has no customers in Russia and China. It remains unclear what specifically the United States is selling in terms of what it wants in a potential agreement. Competitive dynamics and an atmosphere of great power competition are driving all parties further away from the table.
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Solving National Security Challenges [Slides]
Abstract not provided.
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Safety Basis Fundamentals [Slides]
Abstract not provided.
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