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Waste Shipments to and from the Nevada National Security Site, Radioactive Waste Management Complex. This report satisfies the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) commitment to prepare a quarterly summary of waste shipments to the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC) in Area 5.
This Unreviewed Disposal Question Evaluation (UDQE) assesses whether the Transuranic Waste Processing Center (TWPC) Low-Level Waste (LLW), FWORCHLLW0102, Revision 12 (TWPC 2021), is suitable for shallow land burial (SLB) at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Disposal of the TWPC LLW meets all performance objectives of DOE Manual DOE M 435.1-1, Radioactive Waste Management Manual, Chapter IV, Section P (DOE 1999). The TWPC LLW waste stream is recommended for acceptance without conditions.
Milestone report produced for the NNSA, NA-113 Office of Experimental Science by the Advanced Diagnostics program in the NNSS Stockpile Experimentation and Operations group with the Radiography and Advanced Imaging Development project.
This presentation describes experimental measurements with thin scCVD diamond detectors and their DD and DT neutron sources. This presentation will be given at the NNSS Prompt Radiation Detection and Imaging Workshop April 25-28, 2022.
Presentation to be presented during the first annual Prompt Radiation Detection and Imaging Workshop, hosted by the NNSS Dynamic Instruments Team, April 25–28, 2022, at NLV C-01 Auditorium and via Webex.
MSIPP-NSSTC Course Part II, Scintillators and Semiconductors NNSS-UNLV Sponsored Seminar Series Fall 2022
Please have this STIP assigned, documented, and recorded in OSTI as Report Number DOE/NV/03624--0257 Revision 1 and Author as Radiological Control Managers' Council. This manual contains the radiological control requirements to be used for all radiological activities conducted by programs under the purview of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO). (Activities conducted under the purview of the U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Environmental Management Nevada[(EM Nevada] may require additional approval authorities as described in the EM Nevada Prime Contractor’s implementation plan.) Compliance with these requirements will ensure compliance with Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 835, “Occupational Radiation Protection.” This manual represents policies, guidelines, and best practices for implementing the DOE/NV/03624--0082, “Nevada National Security Site Radiation Protection Program,” (NNSS RPP) according to the requirements of 10 CFR 835.
Environmental monitoring data are collected at and around the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites (RWMSs) within the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). This report summarizes the 2021 environmental data to provide an overall evaluation of RWMS performance and to support environmental compliance and performance assessment (PA) activities.
Seminar presentation regarding work in progress on the Scorpius accelerator from the NNSS side.
To be presented at the 2023 NNSS Prompt Radiation Detection and Imaging Workshop, which occurs from 5/16 to 5/18. I am the presenter. It will be about a 20-30 minute talk. I give it on 5/16 at 10:45 if the schedule stays the same.
The Department of Energy (DOE) is working to de-inventory sites and consolidate hazardous materials for processing and disposal. The DOE administers a wide range of certified shipping packages for the transport of hazardous materials to include Special Nuclear Material (SNM), radioactive materials, sealed sources and radioactive wastes. A critical element to successful and safe transportation of these materials is the availability of certified shipping packages. There are over seven thousand certified packagings (i.e., Type B/Type AF) utilized within the DOE for current missions. The synergistic effects of consolidated maintenance, refurbishment, testing, certification, and costing of these services would allow for efficient management of the packagings inventory and to support anticipated future in-commerce shipping needs. The Savannah River Site (SRS) receives and ships radioactive materials (including SNM) and waste on a regular basis for critical missions such as consolidated storage, stabilization, purification, or disposition using H-Canyon and HB-Line. The Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) has the technical capability and equipment for all aspects of packaging management. SRS has the only active material processing facility in the DOE complex and is one of the sites of choice for nuclear material consolidation. SRS is a logical location to perform maintenance and periodic testing of the DOE fleet of certified packagings. This initiative envisions a DOE Eastern Packaging Staging and Maintenance Center (PSMC) at the SRS and a western hub at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), an active DOE Regional Disposal Site. The PSMC's would be the first place DOE would go to meet their radioactive packaging needs and the primary locations projects would go to disposition excess packaging for beneficial reuse. These two hubs would provide the centralized management of a packaging fleet rather than the current approach to design, procure, maintain and dispose of packagings on a project-by-project basis. This initiative provides significant savings in packaging costs and acceleration of project schedules. In addition to certified packaging, the PSMC would be well suited for select designs of 7A Type A packaging and Industrial Packaging. (authors)
Empty 55-gallon drums that formerly held transuranic (TRU) waste (often over-packed in 85- gallon drums) are generated at LANL and require radiological characterization for disposition. These drums are typically measured and analyzed individually using high purity germanium (HPGe) gamma detectors. This approach can be resource and time intensive. For a project requiring several hundred drums to be characterized in a short time frame, an alternative approach was developed. The approach utilizes a combination of field screening and spectral summing that was required to be technically defensible and meet the Nevada Nuclear Security Site (NNSS) Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC). In the screening phase of the operation, the drums were counted for 300 seconds (compared to 600 seconds for the typical approach) and checked against Low Level (LL)/TRU thresholds established for each drum configuration and detector. Multiple TRU nuclides and multiple gamma rays for each nuclide were evaluated using an automated spreadsheet utility that can process data from up to 42 drums at a time. Screening results were reviewed by an expert analyst to confirm the field LL/TRU determination. The spectral summing analysis technique combines spectral data (channel-by-channel) associated with a group of individual waste containers producing a composite spectrum. The grouped drums must meet specific similarity criteria. Another automated spreadsheet utility was used to spectral sum data from an unlimited number of similar drums grouped together. The composite spectrum represents a virtual combined drum for the group of drums and was analyzed using the SNAP{sup TM}/Radioassay Data Sheet (RDS)/Batch Data Report (BDR) method. The activity results for a composite virtual drum were divided equally amongst the individual drums to generate characterization results for each individual drum in the group. An initial batch of approximately 500 drums were measured and analyzed in less than 2 months in 2011. A second batch of approximately 500 more drums were measured and analyzed during the following 2 1/2 months. Four different HPGe detectors were employed for the operation. The screening and spectral summing approach can reduce the overall measurement and analysis time required. However, developing the technical details and automation spreadsheets requires a significant amount of expert time prior to beginning field operations and must be considered in the overall project schedule. This approach has continued to be used for characterizing several hundred more empty drums in 2012 and is planned to continue in 2013. (authors)
Low-level tritium was unexpectedly detected in 2010 in a monitoring well located more than three kilometers (km) down-gradient of an area formerly used for underground nuclear testing. The approach used by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) to investigate potential sources for the tritium is an exemplary case study of corrective action investigation at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Multiple challenges presented themselves during the course of the investigation, ranging from difficulties associated with confirming the presence tritium within the well to a field site characterized by remote, rugged terrain, high elevation, inclement weather, great depths to groundwater, complex geology, and residual surficial contamination originating from the near-surface detonations of two large-scale nuclear plowshare tests. Limited resources required a judicious process for evaluating competing conceptual models. Timely communication of monitoring results to stakeholders and early involvement of regulatory authorities in the planning process were critical components of the overall investigation. (authors)
The strategy to close the Rainier Mesa/Shoshone Mountain (RMSM) Corrective Action Unit (CAU) of the Underground Test Area (UGTA) Project at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) is defined under a joint agreement between the State of Nevada, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the Department of Defense (DoD). That strategy required a corrective action investigation (CAI) to define the evolution of contaminated volumes of groundwater under uncertainty as a means to define a surface-projected contaminant boundary and serve as a basis for longer term monitoring. As the initial phase of the CAI was nearing completion in 2012, concerns were raised as to whether the original Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) strategy was achievable. This was evident when the complexity of the system and the additional costs required to sufficiently characterize it were judged to be out of balance with the overall perceived risks (low) associated with this particular CAU. As a result, an Alternative Modeling Strategy (AMS) and New FFACO Strategy Decision Process for UGTA RM/SM CAU were approved in November 2013. The AMS removes the requirement for developing ensembles of 3D contaminant transport simulations and replaces it with a simpler one requiring the generation of multiple 1D streamline models. These are meant to encompass a range of alternative, yet plausible release and transport scenarios as a means to bound the overall lateral extent of contaminant transport. The new Decision Process is streamlined and progresses from the revised CAI stage, to an external peer review, and then, upon favorable evaluation, directly to a closure stage. Although the project has suffered some delays from implementation of the new strategy, the new process of achieving closure is expected to save several years in time and several million dollars over the original process while still protecting human health and the environment over the 1,000-year compliance period stipulated in the FFACO. (authors)
Two lysimeter facilities continuously monitor the vadose zone at the radioactive waste disposal sites at the Nevada National Security Site. The time-series data collected at these facilities support the performance assessments of the radioactive waste disposal sites, the closure cover designs, and the long-term monitoring decisions for these sites. The Weighing Lysimeter Facility at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) consists of a bare-soil weighing lysimeter and a vegetated weighing lysimeter. The upper surfaces of both weighing lysimeters are exposed to precipitation. The Drainage Lysimeter Facility at the Area 3 RWMS includes bare-soil lysimeters that receive precipitation or precipitation supplemented with irrigation equal to double precipitation and vegetated lysimeters that have the same upper boundary conditions as the bare-soil lysimeters. Lysimeter sensors are connected to data-loggers that are accessed remotely for data acquisition. Lysimeter water balance measurements show the arid climate and native vegetation at the NNSS provide a natural sustainable system to effectively prevent transport of contaminants from the RWMSs through the vadose zone to groundwater. Transport by infiltration and percolation of present day precipitation at the RWMSs is prevented. The native desert vegetation is adapted to extract moisture from very dry soils and maintains negative matric potentials at the base of the root zone effectively buffering the deep vadose zone from episodic precipitation events at the surface. The very negative matric potential at the base of the root zone effectively intercepts all infiltration from precipitation and draws moisture upward from the vadose zone below the root zone. This system is sustainable because it does not rely on engineered features and mimics the stable landscapes and no groundwater recharge of the current condition surrounding the RWMSs. The system depends on establishing native vegetation in the covers above the waste cells and a stable climate. (authors)
The demolition of the final section of the gaseous diffusion plant (GDP) facility formerly known as K-25 at the East Tennessee Technology Park was completed in December of 2013, with the final shipment of waste completed only six months later in June 2014. While most of the radioactive waste shipments would be considered 'routine' by today's standards (lower activity waste was disposed onsite at the Environmental Management Waste Management Facility [EMWMF] and at some offsite commercial disposal facilities with higher activity waste making its way across country to the Nevada National Security Site [NNSS] disposal facility) the final section of K-25, consisting of six cascade 'units', presented some unique technical and stakeholder challenges. Portions of this final section of K-25 were presumed to be heavily contaminated with Technetium-99 (Tc-99) based on sampling and analysis activities conducted during facility deactivation. Tc-99 is known to be highly mobile under a variety of environmental conditions, and is suspected to be potentially mobile in unmitigated landfill conditions, resulting in the need to implement additional engineered controls during facility demolition as well as throughout the management of the resultant waste. A variety of controls were implemented to ensure Tc-99 mobility was controlled and possible consequences mitigated, including isolation and offsite shipment of highest Tc-99 concentration components, as well as construction of a 'cell within a cell' at the EMWMF. This paper will examine the process utilized to develop the controls for management of Tc-99 contaminated waste and will describe those controls. Additionally, it will describe the stakeholder involvement and approval process as well as examining and documenting the efficacy of the controls that were implemented. Finally, this paper will discuss lessons learned from this first of a kind demolition effort and how this experience can be utilized to further refine the Tc-99 waste management approach for the remaining GDPs at ETTP. (authors)
As part of the Soils Activity of the Environmental Management Operations at the NNSA, Nevada Field Office, radionuclide-contaminated Soils sites will undergo regulatory closure in accordance with the 1996 Nevada Federal Facilities Agreement and Consent Order. One closure alternative that has been evaluated for each Soils site has been -closure-in-place- with fencing and posting, along with administrative controls. However, potential disturbance agents for radionuclide-contaminated soils left in place are possible erosion and transport by wind and water. Previous work with radionuclide-contaminated soils has indicated that the highest activity levels of Pu tend to be found in the fine sands, silts, or clays, which are the most likely particle sizes to be transported by wind re-suspension, and by runoff flow events. Monitoring and sampling stations have been deployed at specific Soils sites to collect meteorological data, airborne particulate filter samples, and both suspended and bed-load sediment transport samples during and after runoff flow events, as needed. The primary objective of the air monitoring and sampling stations is to evaluate whether there is wind transport of radionuclide-contaminated soils from Soils sites. The primary objective of the precipitation and runoff flow data collection, as well as both suspended and bed-load sediment sampling, is to determine during which rainfall events (i.e., precipitation return interval, duration, and intensity) radionuclide-contaminated soils are likely to be transported. The NNSS continues to demonstrate compliance with US DOE Order 458.1 for the Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environment, as reported in annual environmental reports. (authors)
Over the past 5 years, 10 new groundwater wells have been drilled and hydraulically tested on Pahute Mesa Corrective Action Unit (CAU) under the Underground Test Area (UGTA) Activity at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). The new wells were drilled as part of a Phase II Corrective Action Investigation to gain a better understanding of the geology and hydrology of the system and to support development of a groundwater flow and transport model used for forecasting contaminant boundaries. Multi-well aquifer testing provides the most integrated assessment of hydraulic properties and connectivity within complex geologic systems. By providing hydraulic connectivity, these tests can be used to generate insight on potential contaminant flow paths and provide constraint on overall groundwater flow pathways. Drawdown in observation wells provides direct evidence of a hydraulic connection. During well drilling and testing activities, a total of 20 aquifer tests were conducted with as many as 36 individual completion zones. A signal-processing method developed by the U.S. Geological Survey was used to improve pumping drawdown detection. Using this approach, drawdown as far away as 3-4 kilometers has been detected. In addition to the typical analysis for hydraulic property values, the observed hydraulic connectivity are qualitatively and quantitatively used to inform the hydrogeologic framework model which is updated using other permissible geologic interpretations, when necessary, to incorporate the aquifer-testing results. These results will be used for developing and building confidence in the conceptual and numerical models for the Pahute Mesa CAU. (authors)