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At least 613 records · Page 34

Closure Plan for the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site at the Nevada Test Site

The Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RMWS) at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) is managed and operated by National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec), for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO). This document is the first update of the preliminary closure plan for the Area 5 RWMS at the NTS that was presented in the Integrated Closure and Monitoring Plan (DOE, 2005a). The major updates to the plan include a new closure schedule, updated closure inventory, updated site and facility characterization data, the Title II engineering cover design, and the closure process for the 92-Acre Area of the RWMS. The format and content of this site-specific plan follows the Format and Content Guide for U.S. Department of Energy Low-Level Waste Disposal Facility Closure Plans (DOE, 1999a). This interim closure plan meets closure and post-closure monitoring requirements of the order DOE O 435.1, manual DOE M 435.1-1, Title 40 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 191, 40 CFR 265, Nevada Administrative Code (NAC) 444.743, and Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) requirements as incorporated into NAC 444.8632. The Area 5 RWMS accepts primarily packaged low-level waste (LLW), low-level mixed waste (LLMW), and asbestiform low-level waste (ALLW) for disposal in excavated disposal cells.

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Application for Permit to Operate a Class II Solid Waste Disposal Site at the Nevada Test Site - U10c Disposal Site

The Nevada Test Site (NTS) is located approximately 105 km (65 mi) northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO) is the federal lands management authority for the NTS and National Security Technologies LLC (NSTec) is the Management and Operations contractor. Access on and off the NTS is tightly controlled, restricted, and guarded on a 24-hour basis. The NTS is posted with signs along its entire perimeter. NSTec is the operator of all solid waste disposal sites on the NTS. The site will be used for the disposal of refuse, rubbish, garbage, sewage sludge, pathological waste, Asbestos-Containing Material (ACM), industrial solid waste, hydrocarbon-burdened soil, hydrocarbon-burdened demolition and construction waste, and other inert waste (hereafter called permissible waste). Waste containing free liquids or regulated under Subtitle C of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) will not be accepted for disposal at the site. Waste regulated under the Toxic Substance Control Act (TSCA), excluding Polychlorinated Biphenyl [PCB], Bulk Product Waste (see Section 6.2.5) and ACM (see Section 6.2.2.2) will not be accepted for disposal at the site. The disposal site will be used as the sole depository of permissible waste which is: (1) Generated by entities covered under the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Hazardous Waste Generator Identification Number for the NTS; (2) Generated at sites identified in the Federal Facilities Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO); (3) Sensitive records and media, including documents, vugraphs, computer disks, typewriter ribbons, magnetic tapes, etc., generated by NNSA/NSO or its contractors; (4) ACM generated by NNSA/NSO or its contractors according to Section 6.2.2.2, as necessary; (5) Hydrocarbon-burdened soil and solid waste from areas covered under the EPA Hazardous Waste Generator Identification Number for the NTS; (6) Other waste on a case-by-case concurrence by NDEP/BFF. The generator of permissible waste is responsible for preparing documentation related to waste acceptance criteria, waste characterization, and load verification. Waste and Water (WW) personnel are responsible for operating the disposal site and reviewing documentation to determine if the waste is acceptable.

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Application for Permit to Operate a Class III Solid Waste Disposal Site at the Nevada Test Site - U10c Disposal Site

The NTS is located approximately 105 km (65 mi) northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. NNSA/NSO is the federal lands management authority for the NTS and NSTec is the Management & Operations contractor. Access on and off the NTS is tightly controlled, restricted, and guarded on a 24-hour basis. The NTS is posted with signs along its entire perimeter. NSTec is the operator of all solid waste disposal sites on the NTS. The U10C Disposal Site is located in the northwest corner of Area 9 at the NTS (Figure 1) and is located in a subsidence crater created by two underground nuclear events, one in October 1962 and another in April 1964. The disposal site opened in 1971 for the disposal of rubbish, refuse, pathological waste, asbestos-containing material, and industrial solid waste. A Notice of Intent form to operate the disposal site as a Class II site was submitted to the state of Nevada on January 26, 1994, and was acknowledged in a letter to the DOE on February 8, 1994. It operated as a state of Nevada Class II Solid Waste Disposal Site (SWDS) until it closed on October 5, 1995, for retrofit as a Class III SWDS. The retrofit consisted of the installation of a minimum four-foot compacted soil layer to segregate the different waste types and function as a liner to inhibit leachate and water flow into the lower waste zone. Five neutron monitoring tubes were installed in this layer to monitor possible leachate production and water activity. Upon acceptance of the installed barrier and approval of an Operating Plan by NDEP/BFF, the site reopened in January 1996 as a Class III SWDS for the disposal of industrial solid waste and other inert waste.

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Carbon stored in live ponderosa pines in the Sierra Nevada will not return to pre-drought (2012) levels during the 21st century due to bark beetle outbreaks

Outbreaks of several bark beetle species can develop rapidly in response to drought and may result in large transfers of carbon (C) stored in live trees to C stored in dead trees (10s of Tg C yr -1 in the western U.S. alone), which over time will be released back to the atmosphere. The western pine beetle (WPB) outbreak incited by the 2012–2015 mega-drought in the Sierra Nevada, California, U.S., could portend more frequent and/or severe bark beetle outbreaks as the temperature warms and drought frequency and intensity increase in the future. However, changes in the frequency and/or severity (resultant levels of host tree mortality) of beetle outbreaks are difficult to predict as outbreaks are complex with non-linear and eruptive processes primarily driven by interactions among beetle populations, the demography of hosts and other tree species, and climate and weather. Using an insect phenology and tree defense model, we projected the future likelihood of WPB outbreaks in the Sierra Nevada with climate drivers from different Earth System Models. Our goal was to understand how host (ponderosa pine, PIPO) recovery and future warming and drought affect the frequency and severity of WPB outbreaks and their C consequences. Our projections suggested that by 2100 the C stored in live PIPO (mean: 1.98 kg C m -2 , 95% CI: 1.74–2.21 kg C m -2 ) will not return to levels that occurred before the 2012–2015 drought (2012: ~2.30 kg C m –2 ) due to future WPB outbreaks. However, differences in climate models indicate a wide range of possible WPB outbreak frequencies and severities. Our results suggest that total plot basal area is the most significant factor in the mortality rate of PIPO by WPB in any given year, followed by drought severity and temperature. High levels of host basal area, higher temperature, and extreme drought all contribute to the frequency and severity of future WPB outbreaks. While PIPO basal area may decline under increased drought and warming, limiting high-stand basal area (>60 m 2 ha -1 ) may reduce the severity of future WPB outbreaks in the Sierra Nevada.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Nuclear Operations Application to Environmental Restoration at Corrective Action Unit 547, Miscellaneous Contaminated Waste Sites, at the Nevada National Security Site

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office has responsibility for environmental restoration at the Nevada National Security Site (formerly the Nevada Test Site). This includes remediation at locations where past testing activities have resulted in the release of plutonium to the environment. One of the current remediation efforts involves a site where an underground subcritical nuclear safety test was conducted in 1964. The underground test was vented through a steel pipe to the surface in a closed system where gas samples were obtained. The piping downstream of the gas-sampling apparatus was routed belowground to a location where it was allowed to vent into an existing radioactively contaminated borehole. The length of the pipe above the ground surface is approximately 200 meters. This pipe remained in place until remediation efforts began in 2007, at which time internal plutonium contamination was discovered. Following this discovery, an assessment was conducted to determine the quantity of plutonium present in the pipe. This site has been identified as Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 547, Miscellaneous Contaminated Waste Sites. The quantity of plutonium identified at CAU 547 exceeded the Hazard Category 3 threshold but was below the Hazard Category 2 threshold specified in DOE Standard DOE-STD-1027-92. This CAU, therefore, was initially categorized as a Hazard Category 3 environmental restoration site. A contaminated facility or site that is initially categorized as Hazard Category 3, however, may be downgraded to below Hazard Category 3 if it can be demonstrated through further analysis that the form of the material and the energy available for release support reducing the hazard category. This is an important consideration when performing hazard categorization of environmental restoration sites because energy sources available for release of material are generally fewer at an environmental restoration site than at an operating facility and environmental restoration activities may result in the complete removal of source material.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

RCRA Part A Permit Application for Waste Management Activities at the Nevada National Security Site Hazardous Waste Storage Unit (HWSU), Explosive Ordnance Disposal Unit (EODU), Mixed Waste Storage Unit (MWSU), and Mixed Waste Disposal Unit (MWDU)

This document is the first volume in a Resource Conservation Recovery Act (RCRA) Permit Application to the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection for continued operation of certain facilities on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), owned by the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO). This RCRA permit application pertains to the Hazardous Waste Storage Unit (HWSU), the Explosive Ordnance Disposal Unit (EODU), the Mixed Waste Storage Unit (MWSU), and the Mixed Waste Disposal Unit (MWDU). This volume lists the relevant permits for each of these facilities and provides maps and drawings of many aspects of them. The companion volumes, which provide descriptive text and discussion and additional graphics, are jointly considered Part B of the permit application. Those volumes are identified by the following document numbers: DOE/NV/25946--2442, DOE/NV/25946--2448, DOE/NV/25946--2425, and DOE/NV/25946--2429.

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RCRA Part B Permit Application Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) for Waste Management Activities at the NNSS Mixed Waste Storage Unit (MWSU)

This volume of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) permit application to the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection focuses on continued operation of the Mixed Waste Storage Unit at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), under the auspices of DOE’s National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO). Low-level mixed waste (LLMW) accepted at the NNSS contains both radioactive and hazardous material components as defined by various laws and regulations. The Mixed Waste Storage Unit (MWSU) is located at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC). Existing facilities at the RWMC are used to store LLMW generated at or shipped to the NNSS prior to disposal at the Mixed Waste Disposal Unit (MWDU). The document describes the MWSU, its general design, its operation, the materials it stores, and relevant health and safety regulations with which NNSS complies. The currently permitted MWSU has been operated since December 2010. Each of the four designated storage areas is RCRA-compliant for the storage of hazardous waste. This application represents a renewal request by DOE for the permitted MWSU. For security reasons, some of the contents of the full application are not available for public viewing. This version of the application contains most but not all of the contents as submitted to the regulatory agencies.

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Commodity Flow Study - Clark County, Nevada, USA

The United States Department of Energy has designated Clark County, Nevada as an 'Affected Unit of Local Government' due to the potential for impacts by activities associated with the Yucca Mountain High Level Nuclear Waste Repository project. Urban Transit, LLC has led a project team of transportation including experts from the University of Nevada Las Vegas Transportation Research Center to conduct a hazardous materials community flow study along Clark County's rail and truck corridors. In addition, a critical infrastructure analysis has also been carried out in order to assess the potential impacts of transportation within Clark County of high level nuclear waste and spent nuclear fuel to a proposed repository 90 miles away in an adjacent county on the critical infrastructure in Clark County. These studies were designed to obtain information relating to the transportation, identification and routing of hazardous materials through Clark County. Coordinating with the United States Department of Energy, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the U. S. Federal Highway Administration, the Nevada Department of Transportation, and various other stakeholders, these studies and future research will examine the risk factors along the entire transportation corridor within Clark County and provide a context for understanding the additional vulnerability associated with shipping spent fuel through Clark County. (authors)

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Post-closure program streamlining at the Nevada national security site - 15290

More than 200 sites on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR), and Tonopah Test Range (TTR) have been closed in place. At these sites, contamination has been left in place, and protection of human health, safety, and the environment is ensured through the establishment of use restrictions (URs). Post-closure requirements were initially established in the Closure Report (CR) for each site and include a variety of inspection, monitoring, maintenance, and reporting commitments. Post-closure requirements and site controls (fences, monuments, soil covers, and postings) may vary depending on site location, accessibility, land use scenario, and the nature of contaminants left in place. Corrective Action Sites (CASs) on the NNSS, NTTR, and TTR have been identified for closure under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO), which was signed in 1996. Over 1,900 CASs have been closed under the framework of the FFACO, and more than 200 of those have URs. Many post-closure requirements have been modified over time. In addition, because the scope of the program has spanned almost 20 years, the post-closure requirements have varied due to changing strategies and expectations. Because of the number of sites closed over the course of the program, post-closure requirements are found in hundreds of closure documents, addendums, errata sheets, Records of Technical Change, inspection reports, permit modifications, and correspondence. Furthermore, resources such as personnel and funding necessary to conduct the post-closure program have diminished, while computer capabilities and configuration control principles have improved since closure activities under the FFACO began. Because of these factors, to effectively manage the post-closure program, ensure that all commitments are being met, and improve the ease of identifying the most current post-closure requirements for each UR, the current requirements for every use-restricted site under the purview of the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office will be consolidated into a single Post-Closure Plan. The Consolidated Post-Closure Plan will also outline a strategy and present possible criteria that may be used for future evaluation of post-closure requirements. Continual assessment of the post-closure program will ensure that the post-closure requirements for URs across the NNSS, NTTR, and TTR are consistently justifiable and sufficient to protect site workers, the public, and the environment while increasing efficiency. Future changes to post-closure requirements and justification for those changes will be recorded in revisions to the Consolidated Post-Closure Plan. This process will provide a comprehensive, consistent, and streamlined method for evaluation of post-closure requirements and implementation of changes. (authors)

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) Environmental Remediation Using EPA's Model Evaluation Guidance to Move to Closure - 15588

The National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) has adapted the Environmental Protection Agency's guidance on environmental model evaluation as a framework for evaluating corrective action investigation models. Model evaluation is an important confidence building activity, which is needed to support closure of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) Corrective Action Units (CAUs) associated with underground nuclear testing. Through this process, site-investigation models of groundwater flow and contaminant transport are reviewed and compared to new site-specific data to determine if the results can be used to support regulatory decisions required for closure and to achieve NNSA/NFO site management objectives. The regulatory decisions include identifying and establishing CAU regulatory boundaries; identifying institutional controls, including use-restriction boundaries; and developing a long-term closure monitoring program. A successful case study from Frenchman Flat, Nevada is used to illustrate the model evaluation process. Groundwater flow and transport from two of the 10 underground nuclear tests in Frenchman Flat had the largest potential for contaminating groundwater, and were selected for evaluation. Wells were drilled, logged, hydraulically tested, sampled, and analyzed for radionuclides and the data was evaluated with respect to previous site conceptualization and numerical model results. The approach and results of this process as applied to the PIN STRIPE test and how it helped build confidence to close the Frenchman Flat CAU is described in this case study. (authors)

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Resource Characterization to Estimate Potential for Electricity Co-Production at Blackburn Oil Field, Nevada

The U.S. Department of Energy estimates that an annual average of 25 billion barrels of hot water are produced from oil and gas wells within the United States. The thermal energy available in the co-produced water stream is usually discarded, as the produced waters are considered an inconvenience by the operators and are disposed of using injection wells. However, utilizing organic Rankine cycle (ORC) generators, a vast amount of thermal energy can be captured and converted into electricity (albeit at relatively low efficiency due to the low temperatures). The National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL), in collaboration with Transitional Energy and Grant Canyon Oil & Gas, evaluated the feasibility of geothermal co-production of electricity by utilizing existing oil wells in Blackburn oil field in Nevada. The once prolific Blackburn oil field is located in Pine Valley, approximately 45 miles east-southeast of Elko, Nevada. Currently, the wells targeting the highly fractured Devonian Nevada dolomite reservoir are operating at a water cut ratio of more than 99%, with individual fluid (oil and water) production rates reaching 7.4 L/s (4,021 BBL/day). Analysis of publicly available data showed that the combination of the suitable wells' maximum historical production rates reached 22.90 L/s. The production from these wells occurs naturally and the wells are choked (and even shut down) by the operator to mitigate excessive water production, indicating a strong reservoir recharge and future opportunity to increase the water production for geothermal electricity generation. The main goal of this study was to evaluate the productivity of the existing wells, the performance of the reservoir, the surface network, and the operational constraints in order to achieve 1 MWe of electricity production from the field's water production. Utilizing the GEOPHIRES tool, we have determined that a twofold to threefold increase in the total fluid production, compared to the historical production under artificial restraint (choke), is required to reach a 1-MWe net target output for a low-temperature ORC system with air-cooled condensers. Lower flow rates would be required when utilizing water-based condensers instead of air-cooled condensers. However, that would require a constant supply of cold water, which may be challenging given the arid environment of the project site.

Blackburn↗

Path to Subsurface Closure: When Real and Predicted Data Don't Match, Central Nevada Test Area (CNTA) - 19560

The Central Nevada Test Area, Nevada, was the site of an underground nuclear test in 1968, which resulted in residual contamination at and near the detonation depth of 975 meters (3200 feet). The environmental corrective action strategy for the site was conducted in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order and all applicable Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) policies and regulations. The corrective action strategy initiated in 1999 included developing a conceptual site model, preparing a numerical flow and transport model, calculating contaminant boundaries, negotiating compliance boundaries with NDEP, performing model validation, and monitoring groundwater. This strategy was executed through the Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan phase, when it was determined that the flow and transport model could not be validated because it failed to adequately predict groundwater elevations in the monitoring/validation (MV) wells (MV-1, MV-2, and MV-3) drilled subsequent to the modeling effort. This led to a change in the corrective action strategy that is now designed to validate the compliance boundary through monitoring and institutional controls, rather than relying predominantly on a numerical flow and transport model. This new approach included enhancements to the monitoring well network and additional monitoring to confirm that data were sufficient to proceed to closure. The corrective action activities were completed in 2015, and the Closure Report, which established the long-term postclosure monitoring program, was approved in 2016. The postclosure monitoring program is designed to (1) assess the effectiveness of the compliance boundary by monitoring for the radionuclides of interest and (2) evaluate the effectiveness of monitoring locations within the groundwater flow system by monitoring water elevations to ensure that monitoring wells are located along the potential migration pathways. (authors)

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Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report 2024 with Attachment A Site Description

The Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report 2024 Attachment A report expands on the general description of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) presented in the Introduction to the Nevada National Security Site Environmental Report 2024. Included are subsections that summarize the site’s geological, hydrological, climatological, and ecological settings and the cultural resources of the NNSS.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Restoring Historic Forest Disturbance Frequency Would Partially Mitigate Droughts in the Central Sierra Nevada Mountains

Forest thinning and prescribed fire are expected to improve the climate resilience and water security of forests in the western U.S., but few studies have directly modeled the hydrological effects of multi-decadal landscape-scale forest disturbance. By updating a distributed process-based hydrological model (DHSVM) with vegetation maps from a distributed forest ecosystem model (LANDIS-II), we simulate the water resource impacts of forest management scenarios targeting partial or full restoration of the pre-colonial disturbance return interval in the central Sierra Nevada mountains. In a fully restored disturbance regime that includes fire, thinning, and insect mortality, reservoir inflow increases by 4%–9% total and 8%–14% in dry years. At sub-watershed scales (10–100 km2), thinning dense forests can increase streamflow by >20% in dry years. In a thinner forest, increased understory transpiration compensates for decreased overstory transpiration. Consequentially, 73% of streamflow gains are attributable to decreased overstory rain and snow interception loss. Thinner forests can increase headwater peak flows, but reservoir-scale peak flows are almost exclusively influenced by climate. Uncertainty in future precipitation causes high uncertainty in future water yield, but the additional water yield attributable to forest disturbance is about five times less sensitive to annual precipitation uncertainty. This partial decoupling of the streamflow disturbance response from annual precipitation makes disturbance especially valuable for water supply during dry years. Our study can increase confidence in the water resource benefits of restoring historic forest disturbance frequencies in the central Sierra Nevada mountains, and our modeling framework is widely applicable to other forested mountain landscapes.

Boardman, Eli N. [University of Nevada, Reno, NV (↗

Snow Albedo Feedbacks Enhance Snow Impurity-Induced Radiative Forcing in the Sierra Nevada

This study employs a fully coupled meteorology-chemistry-snow model to investigate the impacts of light-absorbing particles (LAPs) on snow darkening in the Sierra Nevada. After comprehensive evaluation with spatially and temporally complete satellite retrievals, the model shows that LAPs in snow reduce snow albedo by 0.013 (0-0.045) in the Sierra Nevada during the ablation season (April-July), producing a midday mean radiative forcing (RF) of 4.5 W m -2 which increases to 15-22 W m -2 in July. LAPs in snow accelerate snow aging processes and reduce snow cover fraction, which doubles the albedo change and radiative forcing caused by LAPs. The impurity-induced snow darkening effects decrease snow water equivalent and snow depth by 20 mm and 70 mm in June in Sierra Nevada bighorn sheep habitat. The earlier snowmelt reduces root zone soil moisture by 20%, deteriorating the forage productivity and playing a negative role in the survival of bighorn sheep.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Hydrogen Mitigation Process Installation at Nevada Solar One

The National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) and Acciona Solar Power (ASP) have developed and are implementing a process that addresses the issue of hydrogen buildup in parabolic trough power plants. Our method selectively removes hydrogen from the expansion tanks of the power plant to control hydrogen levels in the circulating heat-transfer fluid (HTF). During previous work, we developed a sensor that measures hydrogen partial pressure in the expansion-tank headspace gas. We demonstrated that our sensor measures hydrogen levels over a wide range of partial pressure—from 1.33 mbar down to 0.003 mbar. More recently, we conceived and developed an integrated process module that performs both hydrogen sensing and separating functions. The sensor/separator measures hydrogen partial pressure in the headspace gas in the same way as our original sensor design. Additionally, the integrated module separates hydrogen from the headspace gas to reduce hydrogen to the level needed to maintain the performance of receivers in the collector field. We demonstrated the performance of a laboratory-scale version of this module. Testing showed that the module performed as expected: the accuracy of the sensing function was ±7%, and the hydrogen extraction rate for the separating mode was consistent with our modeling predictions. The primary benefit of this module is its simple design, both in terms of function and incorporation into the HTF subsystem of the power plant. Most recently, NREL and ASP planned, specified, and designed a mitigation process that is based on the integrated module. We are currently completing installation of this process at ASP's Nevada Solar One power plant in Boulder City, Nevada, USA. The mitigation process is being installed at ground level below the HTF expansion tanks, where it draws headspace gas from the tanks, removes hydrogen, and returns the treated gas back to the tanks. In this paper, we report progress on the installation and describe some of the many design details and challenges that we addressed during the past year. We will generate initial performance data from the Nevada Solar One mitigation process in early 2020.

41 EE - Solar Energy Technologies Office (EE-4S)↗

Hydrogen Mitigation Process Testing at Nevada Solar One

The National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) and Acciona Solar Power (ASP) developed and installed a process that addresses the issue of hydrogen buildup in Acciona's Nevada Solar One power plant. Our method selectively removes hydrogen from the expansion tanks of the power plant to control hydrogen levels in the circulating heat-transfer fluid (HTF). During previous work, we developed a sensor that measures hydrogen partial pressure in the expansion-tank headspace gas. We demonstrated that our sensor measures hydrogen levels over a wide range of partial pressure from 10 mbar down to 0.003 mbar. More recently, we conceived and developed an integrated process module that performs both hydrogen sensing and separating functions. The sensor/separator measures hydrogen partial pressure in the headspace gas in the same way as our original sensor design. Additionally, the integrated module separates hydrogen from the headspace gas to reduce hydrogen to the level needed to maintain the performance of receivers in the collector field. Laboratory testing at NREL showed that the sensor function had an accuracy of +/-7%, and the hydrogen extraction rate for separator function was consistent with our modeling predictions. The primary benefit of this module is its simple design, both in terms of function and incorporation into the HTF subsystem of the power plant. Most recently, NREL and ASP completed installation and initial testing of a mitigation process at ASP's Nevada Solar One power plant in Boulder City, Nevada. In this paper, we report on the completed installation, initial testing, and plans to bring the process to full automation, so that it can be operated unattended on a daily schedule.

chemical elements↗

Glaciers in California’s Sierra Nevada are likely disappearing for the first time in the Holocene

Mountain glaciers are sensitive climate indicators. Glaciers in the western United States are projected to disappear by 2100 CE, but whether they were previously absent in the current interglacial (past 11,700 years) remains debated. Here, we present evidence that two of the largest glaciers in California’s Sierra Nevada near Yosemite National Park persisted throughout the Holocene. Cosmogenic in situ carbon-14 and beryllium-10 exposure dating in newly exposed proglacial bedrock indicates continuous Holocene cover, likely by ice. At a nearby smaller glacier, bedrock exposure-burial ages suggest glacier expansion at ~7 thousand years ago, earlier than previously recognized. Moraine exposure ages at these sites and the Sierra Nevada’s largest glacier are distributed across the past several thousand years, suggesting that glaciers were near their preindustrial extent for much of the late Holocene. These findings imply that a glacier-free Sierra Nevada is unprecedented since before the Holocene. Future alpine glacial environments in California are thereby likely a no-analog scenario within the current interglacial.

Jones, Andrew G. [University of Wisconsin, Madison↗