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At least 613 records · Page 34

Learning from Past Experiences

Space flight is a risky business. This truism has been bandied about since the earliest days of the space program. When asked by the young daughter of a coworker, one of the Mercury astronauts likened launching into space to "riding a Roman candle" -- it was both exciting and dangerous. Even in these more technologically advanced days, the solid rocket boosters and external tanks of the space shuttle provide a no less exciting, or dangerous, ride into space. However much the phrase "risk mitigation" is bandied about within the U.S. space program, there is still the history of the Apollo 1 fire during a ground test at Cape Canaveral, Fla., the loss of the shuttle Challenger during liftoff, and the loss of the shuttle Columbia when returning to Earth to remind us that while we give lip-service to risk management, we have not learned to manage risk as well as we ought. Moreover, there are many more less dramatic, but equally critical, incidents that have occurred in association with the space program that also highlight our inability to accurately gauge and manage risk. Why do we seem caught in a senseless spiral in which we focus most on risk only after a tragedy? Why do we repeat serious mishaps and not learn from our mistakes? This paper reviews some possible explanations for our risk-taking behavior and provides examples of interest to the NASA centers, while also discussing inter center and intra-center opportunities for sharing information to mitigate risk.

Hulet, Michael W.↗

Lessons Learned From Atomic Oxygen Interaction With Spacecraft Materials in Low Earth Orbit

There have been five Materials International Space Station Experiment (MISSE) passive experiment carriers (PECs) (MISSE 1-5) to date that have been launched, exposed in space on the exterior of International Space Station (ISS) and then returned to Earth for analysis. An additional four MISSE PECs (MISSE 6A, 6B, 7A, and 7B) are in various stages of completion. The PECs are two-sided suitcase to size sample carriers that are intended to provide information on the effects of the low Earth orbital environment on a wide variety of materials and components. As a result of post retrieval analyses of the retrieved MISSE 2 experiments and numerous prior space experiments, there have been valuable lessons learned and needs identified that are worthy of being documented so that planning, design, and analysis of future space environment experiments can benefit from the experience in order to maximize the knowledge gained. Some of the lessons learned involve the techniques, concepts, and issues associated with measuring atomic oxygen erosion yields. These are presented along with several issues to be considered when designing experiments, such as the uncertainty in mission duration, scattering and contamination effects on results, and the accuracy of measuring atomic oxygen erosion.

Banks, Bruce A.↗

Orbit Determination During Spacecraft Emergencies with Sparse Tracking Data - THEMIS and TDRS-3 Lessons Learned

This paper provides an overview of the lessons learned from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Goddard Space Flight Center s (GSFC) Flight Dynamics Facility s (FDF) support of the Time History of Events and Macroscale Interactions during Substorms (THEMIS) spacecraft emergency in February 2007, and the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite-3 (TDRS-3) spacecraft emergency in March 2006. A successful and timely recovery from both of these spacecraft emergencies depended on accurate knowledge of the orbit. Unfortunately, the combination of each spacecraft emergency with very little tracking data contributed to difficulties in estimating and predicting the orbit and delayed recovery efforts in both cases. In both the THEMIS and TDRS-3 spacecraft emergencies, numerous factors contributed to problems with obtaining nominal tracking data measurements. This paper details the various causative factors and challenges. This paper further enumerates lessons learned from FDF s recovery efforts involving the THEMIS and TDRS-3 spacecraft emergencies and scant tracking data, as well as recommendations for improvements and corrective actions. In addition, this paper describes the broad range of resources and complex navigation methods employed within the FDF for supporting critical navigation activities during all mission phases, including launch, early orbit, and on-orbit operations.

Morinelli, Patrick J.↗

Bio-Inspired Neural Model for Learning Dynamic Models

A neural-network mathematical model that, relative to prior such models, places greater emphasis on some of the temporal aspects of real neural physical processes, has been proposed as a basis for massively parallel, distributed algorithms that learn dynamic models of possibly complex external processes by means of learning rules that are local in space and time. The algorithms could be made to perform such functions as recognition and prediction of words in speech and of objects depicted in video images. The approach embodied in this model is said to be "hardware-friendly" in the following sense: The algorithms would be amenable to execution by special-purpose computers implemented as very-large-scale integrated (VLSI) circuits that would operate at relatively high speeds and low power demands.

Duong, Tuan↗

Turning Operational Lessons Learned into Design Reality

The capabilities and limitations of a particular system design are well known by the people who operate it. Operational workarounds, operational notes and lessons learned are traditional methods for dealing with and documenting design shortcomings. The beginning of each new program brings the hope that hard-learned lessons will be incorporated into the next new system. But often operations personnel find their well-intentioned efforts frustrated by an inability to have their inputs considered by design personnel who have strictly-scoped requirements that are coupled with ambitious cost and schedule targets. There is a way for operational inputs to make it into the design, but the solution involves a combination of organizational culture and technical data. Any organization that utilizes this approach can realize significant benefits over the life cycle of their project.

Brady, David A.↗

Apollo: Learning From the Past, For the Future

This paper shares an interesting and unique case study of knowledge capture by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), an ongoing project to recapture and make available the lessons learned from the Apollo lunar landing project so that those working on future projects do not have to "reinvent the wheel". NASA's new Constellation program, the successor to the Space Shuttle program, proposes a return to the Moon using a new generation of vehicles. The Orion Crew Vehicle and the Altair Lunar Lander will use hardware, practices, and techniques descended and derived from Apollo, Shuttle and the International Space Station. However, the new generation of engineers and managers who will be working with Orion and Altair are largely from the decades following Apollo, and are likely not well aware of what was developed in the 1960s. In 2006 a project at NASA's Johnson Space Center was begun to find pertinent Apollo-era documentation and gather it, format it, and present it using modern tools for today's engineers and managers. This "Apollo Mission Familiarization for Constellation Personnel" project is accessible via the web from any NASA center for those interested in learning "how did we do this during Apollo?"

Grabois, Michael R.↗

Automata learning algorithms and processes for providing more complete systems requirements specification by scenario generation, CSP-based syntax-oriented model construction, and R2D2C system requirements transformation

Systems, methods and apparatus are provided through which in some embodiments, automata learning algorithms and techniques are implemented to generate a more complete set of scenarios for requirements based programming. More specifically, a CSP-based, syntax-oriented model construction, which requires the support of a theorem prover, is complemented by model extrapolation, via automata learning. This may support the systematic completion of the requirements, the nature of the requirement being partial, which provides focus on the most prominent scenarios. This may generalize requirement skeletons by extrapolation and may indicate by way of automatically generated traces where the requirement specification is too loose and additional information is required.

Hinchey, Michael G.↗

LDCM Ground System. Network Lesson Learned

This slide presentation reviews the Landsat Data Continuity Mission (LDCM) and the lessons learned in implementing the network that was assembled to allow for the acquisition, archiving and distribution of the data from the Landsat mission. The objective of the LDCM is to continue the acquisition, archiving, and distribution of moderate-resolution multispectral imagery affording global, synoptic, and repetitive coverage of the earth's land surface at a scale where natural and human-induced changes can be detected, differentiated, characterized, and monitored over time. It includes a review of the ground network, including a block diagram of the ground network elements (GNE) and a review of the RF design and testing. Also included is a listing of the lessons learned.

Gal-Edd, Jonathan↗

Operational Lessons Learned from the Ares I-X Flight Test

The Ares I-X flight test, launched in 2009, is the first test of the Ares I crew launch vehicle. This development flight test evaluated the flight dynamics, roll control, and separation events, but also provided early insights into logistical, stacking, launch, and recovery operations for Ares I. Operational lessons will be especially important for NASA as the agency makes the transition from the Space Shuttle to the Constellation Program, which is designed to be less labor-intensive. The mission team itself comprised only 700 individuals over the life of the project compared to the thousands involved in Shuttle and Apollo missions; while missions to and beyond low-Earth orbit obviously will require additional personnel, this lean approach will serve as a model for future Constellation missions. To prepare for Ares I-X, vehicle stacking and launch infrastructure had to be modified at Kennedy Space Center's Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) as well as Launch Complex (LC) 39B. In the VAB, several platforms and other structures designed for the Shuttle s configuration had to be removed to accommodate the in-line, much taller Ares I-X. Vehicle preparation activities resulted in delays, but also in lessons learned for ground operations personnel, including hardware deliveries, cable routing, transferred work and custodial paperwork. Ares I-X also proved to be a resource challenge, as individuals and ground service equipment (GSE) supporting the mission also were required for Shuttle or Atlas V operations at LC 40/41 at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station. At LC 39B, several Shuttle-specific access arms were removed and others were added to accommodate the in-line Ares vehicle. Ground command, control, and communication (GC3) hardware was incorporated into the Mobile Launcher Platform (MLP). The lightning protection system at LC 39B was replaced by a trio of 600-foot-tall towers connected by a catenary wire to account for the much greater height of the vehicle. Like Shuttle, Ares I-X will be stacked on a MLP and rolled out to the pad on a Saturn-era crawler-transporter. While Ares I-X was only held in place by the four hold-down posts on its aft skirt during rollout, a new vehicle stabilization system (VSS) attached to the vertical service structure kept the vehicle from undue swaying prior to launch at the pad, LC 39B. Following the launch, the flight test vehicle first stage was recovered with the aid of new parachutes resized to accommodate the five-segment-long first stage, which had a much greater length and mass than the Shuttle s reusable solid rocket boosters. After splashdown, recovery divers exercised extra care when handling the first stage to ensure that the flight data recorders in the fifth segment simulator were not damaged by exposure to sea water. The data recovered from the Ares I-X flight test will be very valuable in verifying the predicted environments and models used to design the vehicle. Lessons learned from Ares I-X will be shared with the Ares Projects through written and verbal reports and through integration of mission team members into the Project workforce.

Davis, Stephan R.↗

Space Station Control Moment Gyroscope Lessons Learned

Four 4760 Nms (3510 ft-lbf-s) Double Gimbal Control Moment Gyroscopes (DGCMG) with unlimited gimbal freedom about each axis were adopted by the International Space Station (ISS) Program as the non-propulsive solution for continuous attitude control. These CMGs with a life expectancy of approximately 10 years contain a flywheel spinning at 691 rad/s (6600 rpm) and can produce an output torque of 258 Nm (190 ft-lbf)1. One CMG unexpectedly failed after approximately 1.3 years and one developed anomalous behavior after approximately six years. Both units were returned to earth for failure investigation. This paper describes the Space Station Double Gimbal Control Moment Gyroscope design, on-orbit telemetry signatures and a summary of the results of both failure investigations. The lessons learned from these combined sources have lead to improvements in the design that will provide CMGs with greater reliability to assure the success of the Space Station. These lessons learned and design improvements are not only applicable to CMGs but can be applied to spacecraft mechanisms in general.

Gurrisi, Charles↗

Lessons Learned in Building the Ares Projects

Since being established in 2005, the Ares Projects at Marshall Space Flight Center have been making steady progress designing, building, testing, and flying the next generation of exploration launch vehicles. Ares is committed to rebuilding crucial capabilities from the Apollo era that made the first human flights to the Moon possible, as well as incorporating the latest in computer technology and changes in management philosophy. One example of an Apollo-era practice has been giving NASA overall authority over vehicle integration activities, giving civil service engineers hands-on experience in developing rocket hardware. This knowledge and experience help make the agency a "smart buyer" of products and services. More modern practices have been added to the management tool belt to improve efficiency, cost effectiveness, and institutional knowledge, including knowledge management/capture to gain better insight into design and decision making; earned value management, where Ares won a NASA award for its practice and implementation; designing for operability; and Lean Six Sigma applications to identify and eliminate wasted time and effort. While it is important to learn technical lessons like how to fly and control unique rockets like the Ares I-X flight test vehicle, the Ares management team also has been learning important lessons about how to manage large, long-term projects.

Sumrall, John Phil↗

Apollo: Learning From the Past, For the Future

This paper shares an interesting and unique case study of knowledge capture by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), an ongoing project to recapture and make available the lessons learned from the Apollo lunar landing project so that those working on future projects do not have to "reinvent the wheel". NASA's new Constellation program, the successor to the Space Shuttle program, proposes a return to the Moon using a new generation of vehicles. The Orion Crew Vehicle and the Altair Lunar Lander will use hardware, practices, and techniques descended and derived from Apollo, Shuttle and the International Space Station. However, the new generation of engineers and managers who will be working with Orion and Altair are largely from the decades following Apollo, and are likely not well aware of what was developed in the 1960s. In 2006 a project at NASA's Johnson Space Center was begun to find pertinent Apollo-era documentation and gather it, format it, and present it using modern tools for today's engineers and managers. This "Apollo Mission Familiarization for Constellation Personnel" project is accessible via the web from any NASA center for those interested in learning "how did we do this during Apollo?"

Grabois, Michael R.↗

LCROSS Lunar Impactor - Lessons Learned from a Small Satellite Mission

The Lunar CRater Observation and Sensing Satellite (LCROSS) launched with the Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO) on June 18, 2009. While the science function of the LCROSS mission was to determine the presence of water-ice in a permanently-shadowed crater on the moon, the operational purpose was to be a pioneer for future low-cost, risk-tolerant small satellite NASA missions. Recent strategic changes at the Agency level have only furthered the importance of small satellite missions. NASA Ames Research Center and its industry partner, Northrop-Grumman, initiated this spacecraft project two-years after its co-manifest mission had started, with less than one-fifth the budget. With a $79M total cost cap (including operations and reserves) and 31-months until launch, LCROSS needed a game-changing approach to be successful. At the LCROSS Confirmation Review, the ESMD Associate Administrator asked the Project team to keep a close record of lessons learned through the course of the mission and share their findings with the Agency at the end of the mission. This paper summarizes the Project, the mission, its risk position, and some of the more notable lessons learned.

Andrews, Daniel R.↗

Ares I-X Thermal Model Correlation and Lessons Learned

The Ares I-X vehicle launched and flew successfully on October 28, 2009. This paper will describe the correlation of the vehicle thermal model to both ground testing and flight data. A main purpose of the vehicle model and ground testing was to ensure that the avionics within the vehicle were held within their thermal limits prior to launch and during flight. The correlation of the avionics box temperatures will be shown. Also, the lessons learned in the thermal discipline during the modeling, test, correlation to test, and flight of the Ares I-X flight test vehicle will be described. Lessons learned will cover thermal modeling, as well as management of the thermal discipline, thermal team, and thermal-related actions in design, testing, and flight.

Amundsen, Ruth M.↗

Human Spaceflight Conjunction Assessment: Lessons Learned

This viewgraph presentation reviews the process of a human space flight conjunction assessment and lessons learned from the more than twelve years of International Space Station (ISS) operations. Also, the application of these lessons learned to a recent ISS conjunction assessment with object 84180 on July 16, 2009 is also presented.

Smith, Jason T.↗

Flight Dynamics Operations: Methods and Lessons Learned from Space Shuttle Orbit Operations

The Flight Dynamics Officer is responsible for trajectory maintenance of the Space Shuttle. This paper will cover high level operational considerations, methodology, procedures, and lessons learned involved in performing the functions of orbit and rendezvous Flight Dynamics Officer and leading the team of flight dynamics specialists during different phases of flight. The primary functions that will be address are: onboard state vector maintenance, ground ephemeris maintenance, calculation of ground and spacecraft acquisitions, collision avoidance, burn targeting for the primary mission, rendezvous, deorbit and contingencies, separation sequences, emergency deorbit preparation, mass properties coordination, payload deployment planning, coordination with the International Space Station, and coordination with worldwide trajectory customers. Each of these tasks require the Flight Dynamics Officer to have cognizance of the current trajectory state as well as the impact of future events on the trajectory plan in order to properly analyze and react to real-time changes. Additionally, considerations are made to prepare flexible alternative trajectory plans in the case timeline changes or a systems failure impact the primary plan. The evolution of the methodology, procedures, and techniques used by the Flight Dynamics Officer to perform these tasks will be discussed. Particular attention will be given to how specific Space Shuttle mission and training simulation experiences, particularly off-nominal or unexpected events such as shortened mission durations, tank failures, contingency deorbit, navigation errors, conjunctions, and unexpected payload deployments, have influenced the operational procedures and training for performing Space Shuttle flight dynamics operations over the history of the program. These lessons learned can then be extended to future vehicle trajectory operations.

Cutri-Kohart, Rebecca M.↗

MODIS Science Algorithms and Data Systems Lessons Learned

For almost 10 years, standard global products from NASA's Earth Observing System s (EOS) two Moderate Resolution Imaging Spectroradiometer (MODIS) sensors are being used world-wide for earth science research and applications. This paper discusses the lessons learned in developing the science algorithms and the data systems needed to produce these high quality data products for the earth sciences community. Strong science team leadership and communication, an evolvable and scalable data system, and central coordination of QA and validation activities enabled the data system to grow by two orders of magnitude from the initial at-launch system to the current system able to reprocess data from both the Terra and Aqua missions in less than a year. Many of the lessons learned from MODIS are already being applied to follow-on missions.

Wolfe, Robert E.↗

Lcross Lunar Impactor - Lessons Learned from a Small Satellite Mission

The Lunar CRater Observation and Sensing Satellite (LCROSS) launched with the Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO) on June 18, 2009. While the science purpose of the LCROSS mission was to determine the presence of water-ice in a permanently-shadowed crater on the moon, the functional purpose was to be a pioneer for future low-cost, risk-tolerant small satellite NASA missions. Recent strategic changes at the Agency level have only furthered the importance of small satellite missions. NASA Ames Research Center and its industry partner, Northrop-Grumman, initiated this spacecraft project two-years after its co-manifest mission had started, with less than one-fifth the budget. With a $79M total cost cap (including operations and reserves) and 31-months until launch, LCROSS needed a game-changing approach to be successful. At the LCROSS Confirmation Review, the ESMD Associate Administrator asked the Project team to keep a close record of lessons learned through the course of the mission and share their findings with the Agency at the end of the mission. This paper summarizes the Project, the mission, its risk position, and some of the more notable lessons learned.

Andrews, Daniel↗