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At least 613 records · Page 34

Twenty years of dry interim storage of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) in Germany- History and developments - 15575

According to article 6 of the German Atomic Energy Act, storage of nuclear fuel requires a license granted by the competent authority in this field, which is the Federal Office of Radiation Protection. In 1983 a license to store spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and later expanded for vitrified high level waste (HAW) for the interim storage facility in Gorleben was granted. Dry Interim storage at the NPP sites in its actual form started in 2002 in the interim storage facility next to the NPP Lingen. Since this time each NPP erected its own storage facility and three central storage facilities have been built. All of these facilities use dry storage in metallic casks. The actual storage licenses for SNF and the HAW (which is stored in Gorleben and Rubenow) are limited to 40 years starting with the first cask emplacement. As no opening of the cask is intended during the storage period the condition of the inventory and the cask before loading has to be known in detail. This requires for instance detailed knowledge of the history of the SNF loaded as well as supervision of the manufacturing process of the cask. Within the last twenty years several mishaps influenced the regulatory point of view. During a loading campaign in a boiling water reactor traces of pool water remained in the gasket slot and during the drying procedure crystalline boron salts prevented the required tightness. After that event a long-term experiment was started and is still going on which studies the effects of water and minor damages to the gasket. As well changes in the loading procedure have been introduced. The pressure switch used to monitor the pressure in the space between primary and secondary lid has a self surveillance function. This indicated a malfunction 23 times in the last twenty years. Examinations of all events indicated no systematic failure, but a weak point seems to be the plug-in connection. The manufacturer introduced some modifications to improve the system. Introduction of FEM methods in safety analysis to amend the existing methods of testing allowed a new view on and in the cask safety analysis. Progress in this field is closely connected to the available computing capacity and stipulates experts to ongoing improvement. After expiring of the storage license which will be the case for the first cask loaded in 1992 and stored in Ahaus 2032 an extension or a new license can only be granted if the at this time relevant requirements are met. This will require detailed knowledge about the happenings and accidents during the previous storage period. All experience of the periodic safety assessment (PSA) which started in 2013 and accompanying experiments conducted till now and during the licensed storage time will be needed. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Conceptual Model and Risk Assessment of Waste Package Evolution - 15643

A generic disposal facility model was created to mirror disposal of low-level radioactive waste in a humid environment. The standard waste package used is a painted and primed carbon steel box stacked four high and placed next to one another within the disposal facility, preventing outward deformations of individual boxes. Waste is placed in the facility in sections, and as each section is filled it is covered with a layer of natural soil. It was assumed that boxes are exposed to natural precipitation rates for approximately 12 months, reduced to natural background infiltration to simulate the soil cover, and dropping to 1% of background infiltration when the facility is filled and a water-shedding interim cover is installed. It was also assumed that each box retains its structural integrity at the time of disposal, with the exception of the top box, which has its lid collapse inward from the overlying soil cover. Waste packages experience different rates of corrosion, differential amounts of infiltration, and fill with liquid at different rates based on when and where they are placed in the facility. Using historical literature and DOE site reports, calculations were made to estimate a range of waste package failure outcomes. (authors)

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Remote-Controlled Removal of Bricks from a Reactor Shaft: An Unconventional Approach - 16406

The first German prototype Fast Breeder Nuclear Reactor (KNK) is currently being dismantled after being the only operating Fast Breeder-type reactor in Germany. The complete dismantling is based on 10 decommissioning permits. Package 3 of the 9. decommissioning permit, which is currently under preparation, comprises the dismantling of the biological shield. Package 2 comprised the dismantling of the Primary Shield. In preparation to lift the 14 primary shield segments on height of the reactor core, these were milled at 16 positions and equipped with a total of 26 holes. As a result of the milling and drilling process, an estimated amount of 500-600 kg cast iron swarfs accumulated at the bottom of the 12 m deep reactor shaft. The cobalt in the cast iron was activated to cobalt-60 during operation. This results in a measurable dose-rate of 30-35 mSv/h. At the conical bottom of the reactor shaft were still the remaining parts of the thermal insulation consisting of a lining with brick stones, covered with loose remnants of the thermal insulation, loose metallic residues and cut-off wheels of the angel grinder. For the next dismantling step, the removal of the activated part of the biological shield, it is necessary that the cast iron swarfs must be removed as well as the remains of the thermal insulation. Firstly, this is necessary to reduce the dose rate inside the shaft for subsequent breakthrough operations and, secondly to have a statically resilient surface for the installation of a necessary working platform for next dismantling tools. There was no access for personnel. A manual removal was also not possible due to the existing dose rate. The cast iron swarfs supposed to be removed by a remote controlled suction unit, which was installed on top of a drum and mounted in a special rack. The complete system was lowered into the reactor shaft by using a crane. After removing the major amount of swarfs, the remaining swarfs as well as the sheet metal liner should be collected with a magnetic grabber. The solution for the metal removal was easy to realize, but there was no idea how to remove the remaining bricks remote controlled out of the reactor shaft. Another boundary was that only existing facilities were supposed to be used in addition to the new suction system, i.e. the existing cranes, gripper, as well as the double lid lock of the encasing for the handling of the vacuum cleaner, the transport of the drum and the lock procedure. The design essentially consists of a suction unit and a collecting unit. Both units are connected hooked by the three single suspension chains on the rack on the traverse and connection of the suction tube. Subsequently the entire unit was drained in the 12 m deep reactor shaft. The entire unit has been lifted out of the reactor shaft and placed on a defined set-down position. At this position, now both of the units could be separated by using the Master-Slave-Manipulator in the encasing (A100). By using different suction pipes the reactor shaft bottom could be exempted from the cast iron swarfs within a few days. The suction unit worked in such a positive way that it was decided to remove the loose refractory bricks, metallic residues, cut off wheels, etc., too. Metal parts remaining on the ground were removed by a magnet. This pragmatic approach avoided additional complex design works and the need of constructing special solutions and thus, massively saved time, cost and dose rate. The duration of planning, permission including implementation amounted to approximately 3 to 4 months. The additional work could be performed directly after the actual dismantling step.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Adaptation of Commercially Available Robots for Conditioning and Packaging ILW at Sellafield - 18282

The Legacy Ponds and Silos at Sellafield site contain some of the most hazardous Intermediate Level Waste (ILW) in the UK. As part of a multi-billion pound decommissioning programme, this waste will be retrieved and transported across the site for conditioning and packaging in the Box Encapsulation Plant (BEP). Current plans are to commence plant active commissioning in 2022, which will represent a major milestone in the UK nuclear decommissioning programme. Within the plant, skips of waste will be transferred from the shielded transport package into standard 3 cubic metre ILW containers. Waste from the Pile Fuel Storage Pond and First Generation Magnox Storage Pond will be immobilised in cementitious grout before being transferred to an adjacent store. Waste from the Magnox Swarf Storage Silo will not be immobilised in grout, but will be packaged, providing multi-barrier containment. During the concept design, the project team selected commercially available robots as the most viable technology for carrying out the numerous dexterous and repetitive tasks involved in characterising, conditioning and packaging the waste within the shielded 'hot' cells. Significant technical challenges had to be overcome during the design to adapt a commercially available robot for use within a high radiation / high contamination environment, where human access is not safe even for short periods of time. These challenges included: - Designing robot assemblies that could be retrofitted into the existing cell structure that was constructed as part of an earlier project but never completed; - Designing robot assemblies that could be recovered to their 'transport' position without requiring manual intervention; - Designing robot assemblies that could be remotely removed and replaced with new ones if they failed part way through the plant operational life; - Designing through-wall service and power connections that allow maintenance and recovery; - Designing control systems and human-machine interfaces that enable both manual and automated operation of the robot, whilst avoiding collisions with the in-cell cranes and other in cell furniture; - Assessing the radiation tolerance of all items. Bespoke computer simulations and full-scale development trials have been carried out, using non-active test materials, in order to demonstrate the Technology Readiness Level (TRL) required by Sellafield Limited (SL) at each stage of the project [1]. The results of these trials have been recorded in both video and written form so that they can form part of the project's Knowledge Management database. Detailed designs and specifications for the robot assemblies have been updated to incorporate the recommendations from the development trials. Procurement and manufacture of robot assemblies has already commenced to deliver two waste handling robots, two waste container lidding / swabbing robots and associated critical spares. (authors)

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Post-irradiation Examinations of High Burnup PWR Rods - 18456

The High Burnup Spent Fuel Data Project (herein referred to as the 'project'), sponsored by the US Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Energy (NE), is focused on experimentally evaluating the effects of long-term storage and transportation on high burnup (HBU) (defined as >45 gigawatt days per metric ton uranium) pressurized water reactor (PWR) spent nuclear fuel (SNF) [1]. To support this project, in the fall of 2017, an instrumented bolted-lid cask (project cask) at the North Anna reactor site was loaded with intact, HBU PWR fuel assemblies (project assemblies) having four different kinds of cladding and will be reopened in approximately 10-years for inspection. To support pre- and post-storage SNF rod characterization, 25 'sister rods' that are similar to the rods being stored in the project cask were extracted from seven different fuel assemblies at the North Anna nuclear power plant for post-irradiation examination (PIE). The sister rod testing program has multiple objectives, including: 1) Baseline testing to provide essential information on the physical condition and properties of the cladding and the fuel in the cladding prior to the loading, drying, and long-term dry storage process (analogous to an experiment control group). Similar tests are expected to be performed at the end of the 10-year storage period on rods extracted from the cask to identify any changes in the properties of the fuel rods that may have occurred during the dry storage period; and 2) Tests to provide material property and physical data using accelerated separate effects tests (SETs) and small-scale tests (SSTs) to explore a wide range of conditions that may occur for other dry storage systems and/or while the fuel is being transported after aging. Testing will be focused on understanding overall SNF rod strength and durability, and be comprised of both composite fuel and defueled clad testing with a focus on measuring cladding material and mechanical properties. Nondestructive testing is currently underway and plans are being updated to support the initial set of destructive tests that are expected to begin by early 2018. While the data generated can be used for multiple purposes, a primary goal of the sister rod PIE data and associated measured mechanical properties are expected to support existing fuel storage licensing and relicensing activities by addressing identified knowledge gaps, and enhance the technical bases for post-storage transportation, handling, and consolidation activities [1]. This paper presents results obtained from the sister rod testing to date, and describes some of the planned measurements, equipment, and procedures that will be implemented for the initial set of destructive examinations. (authors)

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ITER Port Interspace Pressure Calculations

The ITER ('the way' in Latin) project in Cadarache, France, will operate the largest tokamak ever built to demonstrate the physical and technical feasibility of nuclear fusion as an energy source. The ITER vacuum vessel is equipped with 50 access ports. Each port has an opening in the bio-shield that communicates with a dedicated port cell. During tokamak operation, the bio-shield opening must be closed with a concrete plug to shield the radiation coming from the plasma. This port plug separates the port cell into a port interspace (between vacuum vessel closure lid and port plug) on the inner side and a port cell on the outer side. This paper presents calculations of pressures and temperatures in the ITER port interspace after a double-ended guillotine break (DEGB) of a pipe in the tokamak cooling water system (TCWS). It is assumed that the DEGB occurs during the worst possible conditions-during water baking operation, with water at 523 K (250 deg. C) and 4.4 MPa. These conditions are more severe than during normal tokamak operation with the water at 398 K (125 deg. C) and 2 MPa. Two computer codes are employed in these calculations: RELAP5-3D Version 4.2.1 to calculate blowdown releases from the pipe break, and MELCOR, Version 1.8.6 to calculate pressures and temperatures in the port interspace. A sensitivity study has been performed to optimize the maximum peak pressure in the port interspace volume of ITER. The optimum case was for a labyrinth area (FL131) of 0.5 m{sup 2} and a relief panel (FL135) kept open after the first cycle. This case keeps the pressure in the port interspace under 150 kPa and the temperatures under 385 K. (authors)

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗

Alternate Packaging Options for Remote-Handled Transuranic Waste Disposal at WIPP - 19093

Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico (Sandia) began a remote-handled (RH) transuranic (TRU) repackaging campaign two weeks before the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) shutdown in February 2014. Since a contract with Nuclear Waste Partnerships (NWP), the WIPP Management and Operation (M and O) contractor, was already in place for certified visual examination (VE) and dose-to-curie (DTC) support, repackaging continued and was completed in October 2015. Twenty-five 55-gallon drums of RH TRU waste were packaged, awaiting certification and shipment to WIPP. However, in February 2017 at the National TRU Program (NTP) Corporate Board meeting, Sandia learned that RH TRU waste normally transported in removable lid canisters (RLCs) and 72-B casks was not being accepted for disposal when WIPP re-opened after the shutdown. One option, shielded container assemblies (SCAs), was available and approved for RH TRU waste disposal at the WIPP. Sandia made the decision to pursue the use of SCAs. The use of SCAs allow RH TRU waste to be shipped as contact-handled (CH) in HalfPACTs, emplaced on the floor of the WIPP instead of in boreholes in the walls, if the dose rate is less than 200 millirem/hour on contact. The RH TRU waste remains on the WIPP inventory as RH. (authors)

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Applicability of Developed Calculation Models to Predict Long-term Behavior of Metal Seals - Necessary Scope of Tests - 19311

The long-term sealing behavior of metal seals, assembled in the lid system of casks for transportation and storage of radioactive materials, has been investigated. For that purpose, phenomenological models describing the time- and temperature dependent behavior have been introduced by BAM since 2016, e.g. by using the time-temperature superposition principle. Results have shown that these models describe the relaxation behavior adequately and are suitable for extrapolations. In this work, the applicability of these models is checked by analyzing the necessary scope of tests, which must be carried out to get sufficient information about the long-term behavior of metal seals based on short-term tests. (authors)

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Assessing the Success of Shipping High Burn-Up Sister Rods from ORNL to PNNL - 19456

The U.S. Department of Energy's (DoE's) Used Fuel Disposition Campaign (UFDC), in collaboration with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the commercial nuclear industry have initiated a group of projects to obtain data to support the enhancement of the technical bases for the extended storage and transportation of high-burnup (HBU) (>45 GWd/MTU) spent nuclear fuel (SNF). Under this overall effort, a U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission-licensed storage cask was loaded with Thirty-Two (32) HBU SNF assemblies. The cask was modified to allow radial and axial temperature profiles to be measured using thermocouple lances inserted through the lid. Twenty-five (25) rods from similar assemblies of similar claddings, in-reactor placement, and burnup histories (herein called 'sister rods') have been shipped from the North Anna Nuclear Power Plant and are currently being nondestructively tested at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). To meet UFD's research objectives, testing on ten (10) of these rods is required to be performed at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL). Although the twenty-five rods were originally received at ORNL in the 10-160B, the PNNL facility that would need to receive the ten (10) rods did not have an active history with using the 10-160B. This paper first identifies and summarizes various criteria and evaluations used in helping to select which package will be used for the shipment of the ten (10) sister rods to PNNL (i.e., Bases on why the NACLWT was chosen). With the shipment scheduled to be complete, identified potential concerns, issues, lessons learned, and transportation summary documents were studied (post-shipment). The adequacy of the criteria and evaluations used to choose the NAC-LWT were accessed to determine their adequacy. The results show the criteria were adequate. However, it was noted that DOE Order 460.2A, DOE M 460.2-1A, and DOE G 460.2-1 have differences in the terminology and scope, resulting in clarity issues and differences in regulatory interpretation. Since one-of-a kind spent fuel shipments are uncommon, the topic will be significant interest to people who work in radioactive material packaging and transportation. (authors)

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Investigation and Recovery Following the Drum Event at INL's ARP-V Facility - 19517

Contractors working under the Department of Energy's (DoE's) Idaho Field Office have been exhuming and processing buried legacy waste from early weapons development and productions operations since 1984. Since operations began, nearly 400,000 drums have passed through this process. On April 11, 2018, repackaged drums were staged in an airlock (radiological buffer area) awaiting transfer to another facility for characterization. Late in the evening after operations had ended, four of the drums over pressurized causing an energetic displacement of their lids. A significant fraction of drum contents was ejected and dispersed throughout the airlock. The event activated the fire detection system in the facility initiating an emergency response from the site fire department, radiological protection, and operations. Initial intervention by fire department personnel was unsuccessful at quenching the reaction, so the responders egressed to a safe distance and monitored the situation. After determining the event had terminated and it was safe to enter, the facility was assessed revealing significant contamination in the airlock from the ejected waste. The area surrounding the facility was surveyed and it was determined that no contamination was released outside the facility. The Fluor Idaho, LLC (Fluor Idaho) Program Manager commissioned an investigation and recovery effort, which focused on three aspects: (1) technical investigation, (2) event and causal analysis, and (3) facility recovery. A team of highly qualified individuals from around the DOE Complex was assembled to support the technical investigation. The team included representatives from several Fluor Idaho, Fluor Corporate, Battelle Energy Alliance, LLC (INL), LANL, SRNL, South West Research Institute, DOE Carlsbad Field Office, and Defense Nuclear Facility Safety Board, and DOE-Headquarters. This team addressed the reaction mechanism of the event by guiding the sampling activities and coordinating analysis and testing by the analytical laboratories. Independent and experienced investigators were brought in to conduct a rigorous event and cause analysis. The Causal Analysis Team pursued direct, root, and contributing causes. Interviews were conducted, and documents were reviewed to develop an event and causal analysis. The Accelerated Retrieval Project V Operations team mobilized to decontaminate and recover the facility. Significant progress has been made in this effort, area and airborne contamination levels have been significantly reduced allowing limited activities to resume. In addition, this group supported sample collection efforts as directed by the Technical Investigation Team. This paper reviews key findings and milestones from the technical investigation, the event and causal analysis, and facility recovery operations. From these elements of the investigation, lessons learned are identified that would benefit other organizations involved with legacy waste management and disposition. Waste management is common to all sites in the DOE Complex and the events and recovery efforts described in this paper may provide beneficial insights to these operations. (authors)

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Cradle-to-Grave: Assessment Methods for Hazardous Waste Management

The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) was passed to set up a framework for the proper management of waste. The 40CFR260-273 regulation established the regulatory framework to handle solid and hazardous waste, from the point of generation to its disposal; or cradle-to-grave management. Per these regulations, a hazardous waste generator is responsible for its waste from initial generation through its ultimate disposal and beyond. Nothing will relinquish a generator of this responsibility. There is no expiration date or time limit, and hiring a someone else to transport and dispose of waste does not transfer responsibility. If an incident occurs at any point during the life cycle of a waste, the generator can be held liable. The first step to compliance with RCRA is proper characterization of the waste. Waste may either be listed specifically or may show a characteristic as defined in the regulation: Is my waste hazardous? Why is it Hazardous? What should I do as a generator? Plan chemical use: - Create a chemical inventory for your research project. - Use existing chemicals if available instead of ordering new ones. - Brainstorm methods that will help to reduce toxicity and minimize waste. Waste Inventory: - Label all waste bottles with: ID no., What is it, Whose is it, Hazards, and Date. - Add waste containers into the inventory log. - Initiate/complete the container sheet to describe the waste. Satellite Areas: - Store waste in containers compatible with the waste with lids on tight. - Store waste containers properly and segregate them according to their specific hazards. - Use secondary containment for liquids. Store acids and bases separately; apart from cyanides or sulfides. Acids should never be put into steel containers. Water-reactive, strong acids such as organic acid halides, organic acid anhydrides, inorganic acid anhydrides, and strong acidic salts must be kept apart from both alkalis and water. Oxidizing agents must be kept apart from reducing agents and organic compounds. Water-reactive agents must be stored apart from water, aqueous solutions, and acids. Air-reactive materials must be packed in containers that are sealed off from the atmosphere. Explosive and shock-sensitive materials present risks that require special handling.

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Viability of In-Drum Treatment for Transuranic Wastes Containing Nitrates and Organics - 20406

In February of 2014, a breach in a waste drum stored at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant resulted in the release of radioactive material into the immediate surroundings and outside of the plant. The waste drum contained a mixture of an organic absorbent and nitrate salts that pressurized the drum, eventually causing the drum lid to fail, leading to the adverse event. Other waste drums with similar contents exist posing both storage and treatment risks. These drums may successfully be treated by an in-drum treatment system. This paper considers the design and operation of an in-drum treatment system and the characteristics of waste containing organics and nitrates to evaluate the viability of treatment. A description of the system, how it is operated, and a summary of previous testing performed is provided. Treatment of both liquids and absorbed liquids comprised of organics and nitrates is addressed. Viability of treatment is demonstrated by presenting operational methods and design strategies to ensure successful treatment of the waste drums. (authors)

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Flammable Gas Generation and Control at the Idaho Completion Project Legacy Combustible Gas Generation - 20191

On April 11, 2018, four drums containing transuranic waste at the Idaho National Laboratory underwent over-pressurization, ejecting their lids and spreading radiological waste within a facility. An investigation has found that waste in the drums generated methane gas, which contributed to the event. Subsequent to the investigation, the potential for drums to have methane and other flammable analytes whose concentrations could approach or exceed the lower flammability limit (LFL) and the adequacy of the controls to prevent or mitigate a possible deflagration was evaluated. An extensive review of the historical records was performed to determine how many drums exceed the LFL. The historical record identified a small quantity of drums that exceeded the LFL for xylene, hydrogen, and methane. The primary codified applicable code or standard for handling drums is 29 CFR 1910.120 (j) 'Handling Drums and Containers.' It is used throughout the commercial and government sector. This code is integrated throughout the Fluor Idaho safety management programs and procedures to control the Standard Industrial Hazards (SIHs) associated with drum and container handling. Example requirements include: - Drums and containers are inspected, and their integrity assured prior to being moved. - Site operations are organized to minimize the amount of drum or container movement. - When there is a reasonable possibility of flammable atmospheres being present, material handling equipment and hand tools are of the type to prevent sources of ignition. Drums and containers under pressure, as evidenced by bulging or swelling, are not moved until the cause for excess pressure is determined and appropriate containment procedures have been implemented to protect employees from explosive relief of the drum. Drums which exceed the WIPP FGA limit have NCRs associated with them. Once a drum fails flammable gas sampling, an NCR is initiated. The NCR drives placement into NCR dense pack rows. A standing order drives placement of the FGA failures to a single planer segregation location. These drums are not allowed for further processing or shipment until the NCR has been cleared. Once in the single planer rows, follow-up FGA testing is performed by CCP. The NCR is dispositioned by follow-up sampling occurring after adequate time has been provided for the gas to diffuse through the filter assembly, or, in some cases, the drums are repackaged into additional drums to reduce the source term. To date, the ICP project has performed approximately 1.5 million drums moves without a deflagration event due to combustible gas generation. Flammable gas generation in a transuranic waste drum is not unique to the ICP but is common across the DOE complex. Based on the experience at Idaho, application of industry standards is sufficient to control the risk of drum deflagration due to drum movements. (authors)

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Optimization of Dry Storage Canister Cutting Operations - 20534

A recent project investigated the optimal cutting method for the opening of a welded dry storage/shielded canister (DSC) or dual purpose canister (DPC) containing Used Nuclear Fuel (UNF). Due to the lack of a disposal path for UNF in the U.S., the majority of UNF is currently moved into welded DSCs and DPCs designed by Orano TN, NAC, and Holtec. As the DSCs/DPCs were neither designed nor licensed for disposal and may not be able to be emplaced in a geologic repository due to physical emplacement constraints, near-term thermal limitations, or long-term criticality issues, the UNF in these existing DSCs/DPCs may need to be repackaged into transportation, aging, and disposal canisters (TADs), generic standard TADs (STADs), transportation casks, new cask/canister systems, and/or cask/canister/package systems suitable for disposal. These DSCs/DPCs may also be opened to simply remove the UNF in preparation for recycling, re-storage, or placement into a waste package suitable for disposal. Regardless of need, the DSCs/DPCs would require to be cut open by a potentially large scale operation. This project examined the multiple means for cutting welded metal systems and considered several factors to determine an optimal approach. Issues arose around some of the cutting approaches when applied to systems with 2 or 3 lids and with pre-cutting gas testing required. The resulting preferences in cutting methods with an optimized application for the opening of DSCs/DPCs are presented. (authors)

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Simulation of Proposed Heat Treatment Methods for the Sister Rods

The High Burnup Spent Fuel Data Project (the 'project'), sponsored by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Energy (NE), is focused on experimentally evaluating the effects of long-term dry storage and transportation on high burnup (HBU) pressurized water reactor (PWR) fuel (>45 gigawatt days per metric ton uranium). The goals of the project are to provide confirmatory data for analytical model validation and potential improvement; to provide input to future dry storage cask design; to support license renewals and new licenses for Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation facilities; and to support transportation licensing for high burnup used fuel. In support of these project goals, an instrumented TN-32B bolted-lid cask (the Research Project Cask or RPC) at the North Anna reactor site will be loaded with intact, HBU PWR fuel assemblies (Project Assemblies) having four different kinds of cladding: standard Zircaloy-4, low-tin Zircaloy-4, ZIRLO{sup R}, and M5{sup R}. In approximately ten years, the instrumented cask will be opened for inspection and several fuel rods from the Project Assemblies will be characterized. The project has also removed 25 'sister rods' from assemblies at North Anna: 9 directly from the project assemblies and 16 from similarly constructed and operated HBU assemblies. The 25 sister rods are all high burnup and cover the range of domestically-used cladding alloys. The 25 sister rods were shipped to Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) in early 2016 for detailed non-destructive examinations (NDE) followed by destructive examination (DE). Examination of the sister rods will provide a baseline for comparison with the cask rods and will allow for separate effects testing. Dry storage canister loading is completed under water in a designated area of the plant's spent fuel pool. In preparation for dry storage, the fuel assemblies and canister cavity must be drained and dried. Typically, the highest temperatures experienced by the fuel during dry storage are encountered either during drying or transfer of the canister to the storage pad; therefore, as a part of the sister rod testing these temperatures will be simulated in the lab to produce samples that are representative of the peak cladding temperature the fuel experiences either during drying, transfer, or storage. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Thermal Testing of Waste Packages for a Storage Environment

The Pipe Overpack Container (POC) was developed at Rocky Flats to transport plutonium residues with higher levels of plutonium than standard TRU waste to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) for disposal. The POC consists of an inner Pipe Container (PC) surrounded by organic fiber dunnage inside of a 7A drum. The PC was design to maintain separation of fissile material and to provide shielding from radiation. The POC has many design features that are similar to Type B packages that do provide protection from engulfing fires. However, it was not specifically designed to prevent release of stored material during a long-duration fire. POCs are now being used to store combustible TRU waste at Department of Energy (DOE) sites (e.g., Waste Isolation Pilot Plant). Radioactive waste storage operators would like to be able to claim some level of protection is provided by the POCs for thermal assaults that could occur within storage facilities when these POCs contain PCs with combustibles. In 1997 Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) conducted a series of tests to determine the degree of protection POCs provide during storage accident events. One of these tests exposed four of the POCs to a 30-minute engulfing pool fire, resulting in one of the 7A drums generating sufficient internal pressure to pop off its lid and expose the top of the PC to the fire environment. However, these tests are not bounding for POC/PC containing combustibles. With the addition of combustible materials in the PC, the possibility exists for generation of higher quantities of gases and much higher pressures inside the PC, which can lead to early rupture of the PC filter and higher radioactive aerosol release fractions. Therefore, a new series of tests was required to determine the temperature response of the exposed PC and determine the amount of material that could be released. DOE contacted SNL in 2015 to discuss the 1997 SNL tests and came to the conclusion that those tests were not bounding for POC/PC containing combustibles Therefore, DOE commission a new set of tests at SNL. Starting in 2015, SNL conducted fire tests to examine whether the contents of the PC would reach a temperature that would result in generation of sufficient gas to cause overpressurization of the PC, and subsequent release of its content. This paper will describe the various test conducted thus far, and present preliminary results from these tests.

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Fabrication and Testing of DOE Standard Canister Closure Leak Test Assembly

DOE manages over 300 types of spent nuclear fuel (SNF), many of which are located at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) site. Managing this large variety of SNF for storage, transportation, and disposal poses a challenge to DOE. The Idaho Cleanup Project and INL are collaborating on the DOE SNF Road-Ready Demonstration (“Road-Ready Demonstration”), which will develop and demonstrate the designs, technology, processes, and regulatory framework for packaging DOE-managed SNF for “road-ready dry storage.” Road-ready dry storage is an SNF management concept in which SNF is packaged into dry, sealed canisters that are then placed in onsite storage in anticipation of later transport and disposition. The forward-looking goal of the Road-Ready Demonstration is to establish the foundation for a large-scale road-ready dry storage program at the INL site. In support of establishing a large-scale road-ready dry storage program at the INL site, the Road-Ready Demonstration will first package Fort St. Vrain SNF currently in dry storage at INL into several DOE Standard Canisters (DOESCs). These DOESCs will in turn be loaded into another containment similar to commercial multi-purpose canisters. This multi-purpose canister will then be compatible with a transportation or storage system, such as a storage cask for interim storage or transportation package for offsite transport. These DOESCs will remain sealed over the course of their storage, transportation, and applicable disposal functions. The closure process for the DOESC will include fuel and basket loading, welding, inspection, leak testing, and, if needed, repair. As a follow-up to previous discussions on the design of the DOE Closure Leak Test Assembly (LTA), this report describes recent fabrication and testing efforts performed at INL. DOESCs are sealed by two sequential gas tungsten arc welds, both of which are performed by remotely operated and semiautomatic welding systems. The first weld is a circumferential pipe weld that completes the assembly of the canister body and lid assembly. The second and final closure weld attaches the vent plug to the vent socket via a butt joint. After the second weld is performed, the welds are helium leak tested using an evacuated envelope technique. The LTA was designed for both remote and manual operation. This report describes the fabrication and performance testing associated with the evacuated envelope technique. INL staff designed, fabricated, and tested the LTA at INL facilities. This testing included establishing technique and system sensitivities in accordance with ASME and American National Standards Institute N14.5 requirements. Forthcoming work will cover such areas as design optimization, process and personnel qualification, and implementation in Road-Ready Demonstration operations.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Fabrication and Testing of DOE Standard Canister Closure Leak Test Assembly

DOE manages over 300 types of SNF, most of which are located at the INL site. “Road-ready dry storage” is a management concept where SNF is packaged into dry, sealed canisters, which are then placed in on-site storage in anticipation of later removal. The Idaho Cleanup Project and INL are collaborating on the Road-Ready Capability Demonstration Project, which will develop and demonstrate the designs, technology, processes, and regulatory framework for packaging DOE SNF for road-ready dry storage. In support of establishing a large-scale road-ready dry storage program at the INL site, the demonstration will package a select amount of DOE-managed SNF into DOE Standard Canisters. The closure process for the DOE Standard Canisters will include fuel and basket loading, welding, inspection, leak testing, and if needed, repair. As a follow-up to previous discussion on the design of the DOE Closure Leak Test Assembly, this report describes recent fabrication and testing efforts performed at INL. DOE Standard Canisters are sealed by two sequential gas tungsten arc welds. Both are performed by remotely operated and semi-autonomous welding systems. The first weld is a circumferential pipe weld that completes assembly of the canister body and lid assembly. The second and final closure weld connects the vent plug to the vent port with an identical butt joint to the circumferential pipe weld. After the second weld is performed on the vent port, these welds are helium leak tested using an inside-out technique. In addition to the commercially available vacuum and leak detector systems, the DOE Standard Canister Closure Leak Test Assembly was designed for both remote and manual operation. This report describes fabrication and performance testing associated with the inside-out technique. INL staff designed and tested systems to accomplish these tasks. Hardware fabrication occurred at INL facilities. Forthcoming work includes design optimization, integration to existing systems, and implementation to packaging demonstration operations.

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