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At least 613 records · Page 34

Thermal Testing of Waste Packages for a Storage Environment

The Pipe Overpack Container (POC) was developed at Rocky Flats to transport plutonium residues with higher levels of plutonium than standard TRU waste to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) for disposal. The POC consists of an inner Pipe Container (PC) surrounded by organic fiber dunnage inside of a 7A drum. The PC was design to maintain separation of fissile material and to provide shielding from radiation. The POC has many design features that are similar to Type B packages that do provide protection from engulfing fires. However, it was not specifically designed to prevent release of stored material during a long-duration fire. POCs are now being used to store combustible TRU waste at Department of Energy (DOE) sites (e.g., Waste Isolation Pilot Plant). Radioactive waste storage operators would like to be able to claim some level of protection is provided by the POCs for thermal assaults that could occur within storage facilities when these POCs contain PCs with combustibles. In 1997 Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) conducted a series of tests to determine the degree of protection POCs provide during storage accident events. One of these tests exposed four of the POCs to a 30-minute engulfing pool fire, resulting in one of the 7A drums generating sufficient internal pressure to pop off its lid and expose the top of the PC to the fire environment. However, these tests are not bounding for POC/PC containing combustibles. With the addition of combustible materials in the PC, the possibility exists for generation of higher quantities of gases and much higher pressures inside the PC, which can lead to early rupture of the PC filter and higher radioactive aerosol release fractions. Therefore, a new series of tests was required to determine the temperature response of the exposed PC and determine the amount of material that could be released. DOE contacted SNL in 2015 to discuss the 1997 SNL tests and came to the conclusion that those tests were not bounding for POC/PC containing combustibles Therefore, DOE commission a new set of tests at SNL. Starting in 2015, SNL conducted fire tests to examine whether the contents of the PC would reach a temperature that would result in generation of sufficient gas to cause overpressurization of the PC, and subsequent release of its content. This paper will describe the various test conducted thus far, and present preliminary results from these tests.

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Radiolytic Gas Bubbles' Model and its Application to AHR's Transient Neutronics Analysis

Aqueous Homogeneous Reactor (AHR) receives much attention recently because its advantages in medical isotopes production. Fissile material and moderator is mixed in the fuel solution, leads to big negative feedback and generation of radiolytic gas bubbles; the fluidity of fuel and movement of bubbles bring out big challenge of the neutronics analysis methods. This paper aims to establish a reliable and effective gas bubbles' model, firstly a coupled Neutronics-CFD method is introduced to recognize gas bubbles' behavior characteristics, then it is simplified into mathematical expression and applied to Transient Calculation Code of Aqueous Homogeneous Reactor (TCCAHR), finally a typical AHR's transient process is simulated and compared with the experiment.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Rossi and Feynman-alpha formulas including prompt neutron decay and detector die away time constants - 25396

A simple Rossi-alpha formula and the corresponding Feynman-alpha formula have been derived that take into account two time constants; one characterizing the prompt neutron decay in the fissile source domain and the other the detector die-away time. The derivation of the formula is an extension of the classic heuristic method. A test problem is defined and simulated using the Monte Carlo MCNPX code in order to illustrate the applicability of the formulas. (authors)

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The criticality incident detection system omission cases for the fuel routes at EDF energy power stations - 14280

Criticality safety cases have been produced to justify the omission of criticality alarms from the fuel routes of EDF Energy's UK power stations. This work has addressed the UK regulator's expectations that adequate criticality warning systems should be provided wherever fissile material is present, unless a safety case shows that no criticality excursion could give any individual a whole body dose exceeding the annual whole body dose limit of 20 mSv, or that the predicted frequency of such excursions is acceptably low. In the UK, EDF Energy operates eight nuclear power stations; one Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) and seven Advanced Gas-cooled Reactor stations (AGRs). At these stations, the term 'fuel route' is used to encompass all of the ex-reactor arrangements for the handling and storage of both new fuel and discharged irradiated fuel. These fuel routes were all designed in the 1980's (or earlier), using sound deterministic criticality safety principles, from which it was concluded that criticality alarms were not required in any of these areas. Subsequent changes to UK regulations have resulted in the need for the stations' criticality safety cases to be updated to include formal justifications for the omission of criticality alarms from these fuel routes. The EDF Energy Criticality Incident Detection System (CIDS) omission cases have been produced using the principles originally developed for UKAEA in the early 1960's by Aspinall and Daniels. These principles continue to be regarded as a best-practice approach by UK industry. Modern UK regulations also incorporate the ALARP principle, which requires operators to minimize and balance all of the safety risks from power station operations, so that the risks to both the public and to workers are As Low As is Reasonably Practicable. This paper describes how the work undertaken used the so-called Aspinall and Daniels criteria in conjunction with the requirements of the ALARP principle. The fuel storage pond at the Sizewell B PWR was addressed by dose calculations to show that, from the shielding effects of the concrete structure and the pond water, the potential consequences of a criticality accident could not result in a radiation dose in excess of 20 mSv. All of the other fuel route areas were addressed on the basis that, even if all of the active engineered and administrative criticality controls were to fail, a criticality accident would still not be reasonably expected, i.e. the predicted frequencies of all such excursions are acceptably low. (authors)

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The unforeseen component of risk when considering the need for a criticality accident alarm system - 14281

This paper sets out a concept for estimating the size of the contribution of the unforeseen component of criticality accident risk to that of the totality of criticality risks for a process involving fissile materials. By performing this, and considering this estimate alongside those risks known and evaluated as part of the safety justification for the process, a more informed and justifiable basis to the arguments for installing, or not installing a CAAS may be made. This works in in development, further work to identify the detailed means of estimation will be made and presented in a future paper provided the concept as set out is considered reasonable. (author)

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Criticality hazard identification technique for development of safe operating limits and restrictions - 14367

Canadian Nuclear Laboratories' (CNL) National Research Universal (NRU) reactor located at Chalk River Laboratories (CRL) first attained criticality in 1957. Outside of the reactor core, the safe handling and storage of fissile material including experimental fuel components is required to support NRU's ongoing missions of research and medical isotope production [1]. Management of this fissionable material relies heavily on experienced operating staff, who perform work in accordance with a defined set of limits and restrictions as laid out in a Criticality Safety Document (CSD). Historically, the development of CSDs has relied heavily upon criticality safety analysts to gain sufficient knowledge about the facility. This has resulted in significant labor costs due to heavy use of computational methods. This paper describes a new approach for CNL to identify potential criticality scenarios, a 'Criticality Hazard Identification' (CHI) technique, developed from traditional process-oriented hazard and operability analysis, to identify and define operating conditions, identify limits and restrictions for the handling of fissionable materials outside of the core. The approach permits thorough evaluation of potential criticality hazards, for both well-understood historical and proposed future activities, by better leveraging the knowledge of operations personnel as well as other subject matter experts. The resulting document provides a detailed record of the various scenarios that were considered. These improvements to the CSD development and documentation process provide an additional benefit in terms of ease of modification to include new or changed activities within the limits and conditions. (authors)

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Development of criticality risk evaluation method for fuel debris in Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS - 14373

After the accident of Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station, there has been still damaged nuclear fuel in the reactor buildings, which is called 'fuel debris' and contains an amount of fissile materials show that it is currently subcritical, which must be kept until finishing retrieval work. In the latest plan, retrieving fuel debris is to start in 2025. The International Research Institute for Nuclear Decommissioning, IRID, has been developing the technology for decontamination in reactor building. A developed method will be reviewed and granted by the Nuclear Regulatory Authority in Japan, NRA, before the start of the retrieving. Criticality risk information will be needed for decision making on following two subcriticality issues, -Criticality control of fuel debris to keep is subcritical until the end of retrieval work. -Safe operation for retrieving fuel debris to keep it subcritical. Because fuel debris has been out of criticality control and the key condition for its current subcriticality is unknown, it is important to obtain criticality risk information as soon as possible. Applying conventional Probabilistic Safety Assessment, PSA, to fuel debris is difficult, because it is based on the probability of becoming out of criticality control due to troubles such as equipment failure, operation mistake and so on. A new method, which has been developed by Japan Atomic Energy Agency to technically support the NRA, is designed to estimate criticality risk based on a probability distribution of k{sub eff} due to uncertainty of composition and geometry of fuel debris, which method will provide risk information for the two subcriticality issues as well as for the tolerance level of criticality risk if it is unavoidable. Developed method contains four steps: two steps of analysis of criticality risk and two steps of quantification of the risk. A procedure of risk quantification has been defined, in which systematic analysis of criticality risk can be done by making 'status matrix'. A trial analysis by using the procedure shows that some events which can initiate criticality are able to be supposed to happen during maintenance period until the beginning of retrieving fuel debris, and that analysis also indicates countermeasures should be considered as soon as possible in order to reduce criticality risk for public and workers. (authors)

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Criticality characteristics of MCCI products possibly produced in reactors of Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station - 14408

The damaged Unit 1-3 reactors of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station may contain fuel debris of a significant amount that is in a form of molten-core-concrete-interaction (MCCI) product with porous structure. Such low density MCCI product including fissile material is a great concern for its criticality control, especially under submerged condition, due to its fairly good neutron moderation. This report shows computation results of basic criticality characteristics of the MCCI product, which will facilitate criticality risk assessments during decommissioning of the reactors. The results imply that water bound in concrete may raise the risk from the viewpoints of possibility of criticality events and of effectiveness of mitigation measures such as neutron poison injection into coolant water. (authors)

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Awe Bonner sphere measurements of the neutron leakage spectrum from the GODIVIA-IV critical assembly at NCERC - 14413

The US National Criticality Experiments Research Centre (NCERC) is home to several critical assembly machines that were relocated from Los Alamos National Laboratory in the last decade. The centre is sponsored by the Department of Energy's Nuclear Criticality Safety Program (NCSP), which has the mission to ensure the safe handling of fissile materials from a criticality perspective. Under the auspices of the NCSP, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) is planning to host an international inter-comparison of nuclear accident dosimetry (NAD) using the Godiva-IV assembly at NCERC. The inter-comparison is motivated by a decline in the frequency of performance testing of NADs (both in the US, the UK and France) and the desire to modernize and harmonize dosimetry systems. A pre-requisite for the inter-comparison is the characterisation of the neutron and gamma-ray leakage spectra associated with the Godiva-IV assembly at NCERC. AWE provided its Bonner-sphere spectrometry capability to LLNL for two experimental campaigns, in November 2013 and May 2014, to measure the neutron leakage spectrum of the assembly in both a sub-critical 'steady-state' and a super-prompt-critical 'burst'. Nine points, at distances from 2 to 4 meters from the machine were measured with the Bonner-sphere spectrometer using both an active He-3 detector and a passive technique employing gold foils. This paper presents the spectra unfolded from the data and integral dose values, and compares these to previously published data. The limitations of the work and future plans are also discussed. (authors)

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Development of criticality safety awareness training for front line workers at AWE - 14422

This paper provides an overview of the current criticality safety training given to front line workers at the UK Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE). This 'Criticality Awareness' training has been developed to provide front line workers with adequate instruction to ensure that they are aware of the hazards and risks associated with the plant and its operations. Additionally, this training details the actions to be taken in the event of an accident or emergency. When the current Criticality Awareness training course was initially created in 2008, it was considered beneficial to use both criticality safety specialists and criticality trainers to deliver the course. The format chosen was a classroom style of teaching, to help facilitate open questions/answers between the training staff and course participants. Experience gained through previous methods of delivering the course found that it was more effective to include both the criticality and training specialists in the development and delivery of the course, as each supplements the other with respect to their fields of expertise. This paper provides an overview of the course content and structure and discusses the development of the course over time. This development has arisen based on feedback from the participants and accredited professional training staff. The benefits to the participants from the style of delivery of the course is discussed, together with the wider benefits to criticality safety across site from direct interaction between the criticality safety specialists and the operators who have the practical experience and knowledge of actual work with fissile material. Future developments to the course are also discussed, and potential improvements highlighted. (authors)

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Recovery from feeding unconditioned feed to part of the solvent extraction process in Thorp - 14430

A recent event in the Thorp Reprocessing Plant involved unconditioned feed being sent to one of the main process solvent extraction vessels. As the feed was unconditioned the fissile material was lost to the aqueous raffinate stream. The plant was tripped and shutdown in line with the baseline criticality safety case. This paper describes the recovery option that was taken to remove the Pu from the raffinate tank and safely consign it to the downstream effluent vessels. Key assumptions that were fundamental to maintaining criticality safety throughout these operations were clearly highlighted in the supporting criticality safety assessment. Key learning points that are of relevance to the wider criticality safety assessment community are pulled out at the end of this paper. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Criticality safety analysis of spent fuel storage or handling disposals using burnup credit - loading curve calculation - 14445

MILLENNIUM and REEL SAS Companies have shared their own experience to develop a neutron and criticality calculations chain in order to perform isotopic composition predictions of spent fuel after irradiation in a reactor and criticality analysis of fuel storages taking into account burnup credit. The whole calculation sequence is divided into three steps, all calling SCALE 6.1.2 modules. The first two steps are dedicated to the evaluation of isotopic compositions of burnt fuel. As transport and depletion calculations in three dimensions appears to be way too long for the whole core (about several months), dealing with each fuel assembly one by one is the alternative solution MILLENNIUM and REEL SAS commonly chose to study. Therefore, the first step aims at determining the axial burnup profile of a given fuel assembly using a 3-D model with infinite reflections on lateral axes. The T6-depl sequence of TRITON module coupling KENO-VI and ORIGEN-S was used in this step. Sensitivity studies confirmed that addition of the 8 closest neighbors of the studied fuel assembly in the model has an insignificant impact on the axial burnup profile. However, fuel assemblies in the peripheral zone of the core must be treated separately with a model including the nearest fuel assemblies and the effect of peripheral water. Then, the second phase evaluates the isotopic compositions of each fuel assemblies at the center of the active height with a 2-D model under conservative core conditions. The T-depl sequence of the TRITON module coupling NEWT to ORIGEN-S is called in this step. Each fuel assembly must be studied separately to consider loading pattern changes occurring at each cycle. An infinite model with reflections on lateral axes is used and the closest neighbors of the fuel assembly are limited to 2 pins - which is around the size of the neutrons mean free path in the core. This is an innovative physical trick aiming at compensating for a limited computing power. Finally, isotopic compositions calculated are combined with the axial burnup profile of the first step to extrapolate the concentrations along the whole active length. Data can then be added in any criticality model, such as a spent fuel pit or any disposal handling fuel assemblies. Criticality analyses of burnt fissile material using burnup credit can be managed within a reasonable amount of time, on condition that sufficient proofs of code qualification for the studied range of parameters are provided, especially on fission products isotopic compositions calculation. (authors)

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UK Regulatory experience with the criticality safety of transport package applications - 14519

The UK Government has created the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) as an independent public body to ensure effective and efficient regulation of the nuclear industry in the UK. ONR brings together for the first time in the UK the regulation of nuclear safety, civil nuclear security, nuclear safeguards and the transport of radioactive substances within a single organization. Applications requesting approval to transport packages containing fissile material through the UK have been received for many decades from numerous organisations across the world. Each application is treated equally with the judgement of safety based on the information provided in the design safety report. In recent years, the ONR has questioned a number of criticality safety related assumptions; some of which have been held for many decades. The outcome from these discussions will be examined. Uranium hexafluoride (UF{sub 6}) has been transported across the world for many years, carried in 30B steel cylinders within a variety of overpacks. For simplicity, some criticality safety cases have not claimed for the presence of the overpack. However, it shall be shown that these safety cases will have difficulty in justifying the criticality safety of transporting uranium hexafluoride if credit for the overpack is not claimed. In addition, the applications that have been submitted for Competent Authority approval have made various assumptions regarding the shell thickness of the 30B cylinder, the distribution of the hydrogen fluoride (HF) impurity and the potential for the uranium hexafluoride residues to hydrolyse. The adequacy of these assumptions will be discussed in turn along with the need for the applicant to demonstrate compliance with any certificate restriction on the mass of heel (residue) allowed within the package. Uranium oxide (UO{sub 2}) powder is regularly transported around the world. For most designs, it is assumed that water will enter the package under accident conditions of transport. Under these conditions, a common assumption is that the grains of uranium oxide powder will evenly distribute within the water and internal volume of the package. The validity of this assumption from a realistic and pessimistic perspective will be challenged. It will then be shown that if instead the powder grains of uranium oxide are agglomerated together into larger sized groups, an increase in the k{sub eff} of the system of up to 2,000 pcm can occur. As packages are commonly loaded up to the criticality safety limit, an increase in k{sub eff} such as this is likely to be problematic. (authors)

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Calculating uncertainty on K-effective with MONK10 - 14583

Criticality safety assessments require a demonstration that a particular configuration of fissile material has an adequate sub-critical margin (k-effective sufficiently below unity) to ensure that the risk of criticality under normal operation and accident conditions is acceptable. The required sub-critical margin depends upon the uncertainty in the estimated value of k-effective. The uncertainty in the calculated value of k-effective arises from a number of sources, including: manufacturing tolerances on input data to the code (affecting geometry, compositions and densities), uncertainty in the nuclear data used by the code, stochastic uncertainty resulting from Monte Carlo simulation and modelling approximations/errors, including the inevitable bugs in the software. The ANSWERS Software Service, in collaboration with industrial partners, is developing a number of techniques to better understand and quantify uncertainty on predicted values of k-effective, using MONK. The SPRUCE utility code has been developed to allow uncertainty to be estimated using sampling methods. This can include the sampling of input parameters (including dimensions, compositions and densities) from statistical distributions. It can also include sampling different nuclear data libraries. A set of nuclear data libraries has been generated for this purpose by sampling from statistical distributions that represent the uncertainties in the published nuclear data evaluated files; a set of libraries has been produced for Latin Hypercube Sampling. By varying the input data and nuclear data, separate and combined uncertainties due to manufacturing tolerances and nuclear data can be derived. By performing least squares fitting on the results it is also possible to estimate the contribution of each of the uncertain inputs and a sensitivity method in MONK can break down the nuclear data uncertainty. (authors)

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CRISTAL V2.0: A New-generation criticality package - 14597

A new release of the CRISTAL French criticality calculation package, named CRISTAL V2.0, has been developed and intensively validated by IRSN and CEA, in collaboration with AREVA. This package was designed to cover the needs of criticality practitioners in the fields of nuclear fuel cycle facilities and transportation of fissile materials. Based on an optimized modular architecture in an updated software development environment, the design of CRISTAL package V2.0 integrates new generation of cross section libraries, new calculation schemes consistent with new applications, and up-to-date calculation codes capabilities. Four calculation routes are currently available allowing multi-group and continuous energy calculations. The validation database is composed of more than 3000 critical experiments, in order to cover a wide range of configurations. The CRISTAL V2.0 package also comprises customer services covering a range of areas of activity like documentation, hotline, maintenance and training courses. A wide promotion and an increased recognition referred both nationally and internationally are foreseen, including the provision of the CRISTAL V2.0 package to the OECD / NEA Data Bank. (authors)

42 ENGINEERING↗

Back-and-forth approximation as a simple neutron transport model - 14607

The back-and-forth approximation is a very simple neutron transport model that helps get a number of exact solutions which qualitatively describe the actual characteristics of planar, cylindrical and spherical systems with fissile material. The model allows its absolutely accurate implementation in Monte Carlo codes and can be used to test the algorithms which do not treat geometry or interaction data. (author)

42 ENGINEERING↗

Criticality safety administration in legacy waste management - 14613

Canadian Nuclear Laboratories (CNL) is Canada's largest nuclear science and technology laboratory, with a long history in developing and progressing in the field of nuclear science. In the early years of nuclear science and technology development, there were practices used for nuclear material storage and management that have led to recent challenges in meeting current regulatory (Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission) safety requirements. There are over 900 storage locations where significant amounts of experimental fuel and operations fuel are stored, with varying degrees of administrative rigor being applied over the last 60+ years. To determine the safety of the stored materials, it was impracticable to examine every location to determine the status of fissile material composition. A risk graded approach was developed to first administratively determine the locations that were at risk, followed by comparison to upper subcritical limits. This narrowed the area of concern from >900 locations to approximately >70 locations. Locations of concern were then modeled with more accurate geometry, reflection and moderation conditions to further narrow down the selection area. This further narrowed the locations of concern to 32. Reducing overall risk, this small selection of locations have been selected for non-destructive imaging/examination and further analysis to confirm geometry to ensure criticality safety in all the storage locations. (authors)

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THERMAL EVALUATION OF DRUM TYPE RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL PACKAGING ARRAYS IN STORAGE

Drum type packages are routinely used to transport radioactive material (RAM) in the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) complex. These packages are designed to meet the federal regulations described in 10 CFR 71.[1] In recent years, there has been a greater need to use these packagings to store the excess fissile material, especially plutonium for long term storage. While the design requirements for safe transportation of these packagings are well defined, the requirements for safe long term storage are not well established. Since the RAM contents in the packagings produce decay heat, it is important that they are stored carefully to prevent overheating of the containment vessel (CV) seals to prevent any leakage and the impact limiter to maintain the package structural integrity. This paper analyzes different storage arrays for a typical 9977 packaging for thermal considerations and makes recommendations for their safe storage under normal operating conditions.

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