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NASA NTRS2004

Handling Procedures of Vegetable Crops

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is working towards future long duration manned space flights beyond low earth orbit. The duration of these missions may be as long as 2.5 years and will likely include a stay on a lunar or planetary surface. The primary goal of the Advanced Food System in these long duration exploratory missions is to provide the crew with a palatable, nutritious, and safe food system while minimizing volume, mass, and waste. Vegetable crops can provide the crew with added nutrition and variety. These crops do not require any cooking or food processing prior to consumption. The vegetable crops, unlike prepackaged foods, will provide bright colors, textures (crispy), and fresh aromas. Ten vegetable crops have been identified for possible use in long duration missions. They are lettuce, spinach, carrot, tomato, green onion, radish, bell pepper, strawberries, fresh herbs, and cabbage. Whether these crops are grown on a transit vehicle (e.g., International Space Station) or on the lunar or planetary surface, it will be necessary to determine how to safely handle the vegetables while maintaining acceptability. Since hydrogen peroxide degrades into water and oxygen and is generally recognized as safe (GRAS), hydrogen peroxide has been recommended as the sanitizer. The objective of th is research is to determine the required effective concentration of hydrogen peroxide. In addition, it will be determined whether the use of hydrogen peroxide, although a viable sanitizer, adversely affects the quality of the vegetables. Vegetables will be dipped in 1 % hydrogen peroxide, 3% hydrogen peroxide, or 5% hydrogen peroxide. Treated produce and controls will be stored in plastic bags at 5 C for up to 14 days. Sensory, color, texture, and total plate count will be measured. The effect on several vegetables including lettuce, radish, tomato and strawberries has been completed. Although each vegetable reacts to hydrogen peroxide differently, the data suggest that 5% hydrogen peroxide reduces the shelf life of the vegetable. A dip of either 1 % or 3% hydrogen peroxide helps reduce the microbial total count while not adversely affecting the quality of the vegetable.

Perchonok, Michele↗

NASA NTRS2011

Hazard Detection Software for Lunar Landing

The Autonomous Landing and Hazard Avoidance Technology (ALHAT) Project is developing a system for safe and precise manned lunar landing that involves novel sensors, but also specific algorithms. ALHAT has selected imaging LIDAR (light detection and ranging) as the sensing modality for onboard hazard detection because imaging LIDARs can rapidly generate direct measurements of the lunar surface elevation from high altitude. Then, starting with the LIDAR-based Hazard Detection and Avoidance (HDA) algorithm developed for Mars Landing, JPL has developed a mature set of HDA software for the manned lunar landing problem. Landing hazards exist everywhere on the Moon, and many of the more desirable landing sites are near the most hazardous terrain, so HDA is needed to autonomously and safely land payloads over much of the lunar surface. The HDA requirements used in the ALHAT project are to detect hazards that are 0.3 m tall or higher and slopes that are 5 or greater. Steep slopes, rocks, cliffs, and gullies are all hazards for landing and, by computing the local slope and roughness in an elevation map, all of these hazards can be detected. The algorithm in this innovation is used to measure slope and roughness hazards. In addition to detecting these hazards, the HDA capability also is able to find a safe landing site free of these hazards for a lunar lander with diameter .15 m over most of the lunar surface. This software includes an implementation of the HDA algorithm, software for generating simulated lunar terrain maps for testing, hazard detection performance analysis tools, and associated documentation. The HDA software has been deployed to Langley Research Center and integrated into the POST II Monte Carlo simulation environment. The high-fidelity Monte Carlo simulations determine the required ground spacing between LIDAR samples (ground sample distances) and the noise on the LIDAR range measurement. This simulation has also been used to determine the effect of viewing on hazard detection performance. The software has also been deployed to Johnson Space Center and integrated into the ALHAT real-time Hardware-in-the-Loop testbed.

Huertas, Andres↗

NASA NTRS2011

Development of the Sasquatch Drop Test Footprint Tool

The Crew Exploration Vehicle Parachute Assembly System (CPAS) is the parachute system for NASA s Orion spacecraft. CPAS is currently in the design and testing phase of development. The test program consists of numerous drop tests, wherein a test article rigged with parachutes is extracted or released from an aircraft. During such tests, range safety is paramount, as is the recoverability of the parachutes and test article. It is crucial to establish an aircraft release point that will ensure that the article and all items released from it will land in safe locations. Early in the CPAS project, a legacy tool (previously used on the X-38 project) was used to determine a safe release point and to predict the landing locations (the footprint) of the payload and all released objects. Due to increasing test complexity and the need for a more flexible tool, a new footprint predictor tool, called Sasquatch, was created in MATLAB. This tool takes in a simulated trajectory for the test article, information about all released objects, and atmospheric wind data (simulated or actual) to calculate the trajectories of the released objects. Dispersions are applied to the landing locations of those objects, taking into account the variability of winds, aircraft release point, and object descent rate. A safe aircraft release point is determined based on the landing locations of the payload and released objects. The release point, landing locations, and dispersions are plotted on a simple map of the drop zone for easy reference. To date, Sasquatch has been used for thirteen drop tests. Comparing the predictions with actual test results has allowed for significant improvements in the tool s predictive capabilities, especially the incorporation of a well-correlated horizontal throw model. Intended future improvements to the tool include tighter dispersions on the landing locations, Monte Carlo capability, direct input from trajectory simulations, and a graphical user interface.

Bledsoe, Kristin J.↗

NASA NTRS2005

Crane-Load Contact Sensor

An electronic instrument has been developed as a prototype of a portable crane-load contact sensor. Such a sensor could be helpful in an application in which the load rests on a base in a horizontal position determined by vertical alignment pins (see Figure 1). If the crane is not positioned to lift the load precisely vertically, then the load can be expected to swing once it has been lifted clear of the pins. If the load is especially heavy, large, and/or fragile, it could hurt workers and/or damage itself and nearby objects. By indicating whether the load remains in contact with the pins when it has been lifted a fraction of the length of the pins, the crane-load contact sensor helps the crane operator determine whether it is safe to lift the load clear of the pins: If there is contact, then the load is resting against the sides of the pins and, hence, it may not be safe to lift; if contact is occasionally broken, then the load is probably not resting against the pins, so it should be safe to lift. It is assumed that the load and base, or at least the pins and the surfaces of the alignment holes in the load, are electrically conductive, so the instrument can use electrical contact to indicate mechanical contact. However, DC resistance cannot be used as an indicator of contact for the following reasons: The load and the base are both electrically grounded through cables (the load is grounded through the lifting cable of the crane) to prevent discharge of static electricity. In other words, the DC resistance between the load and the pins is always low, as though they were always in direct contact. Therefore, instead of DC resistance, the instrument utilizes the AC electrical impedance between the pins and the load. The signal frequency used in the measurement is high enough (.1 MHz) that the impedance contributed by the cables and the electrical ground network of the building in which the crane and the base are situated is significantly greater than the contact impedance between the pins and the load. The instrument includes a signal generator and voltage-measuring circuitry, and is connected to the load and the base as shown in Figure 2. The output of the signal generator (typically having amplitude of the order of a volt) is applied to the load via a 50-resistor, and the voltage between the load and the pins is measured. When the load and the pins are not in contact, the impedance between them is relatively high, causing the measured voltage to exceed a threshold value. When the load and the pins are in contact, the impedance between them falls to a much lower value, causing the voltage to fall below the threshold value. The voltage-measuring circuitry turns on a red light-emitting diode (LED) to indicate the lower-voltage/ contact condition. Whenever the contact has been broken and the non-contact/higher-voltage condition has lasted for more than 2 ms, the voltage-measuring circuitry indicates this condition by blinking a green LED.

Youngquist, Robert↗

NASA NTRS2005

Preventing Accidental Ignition of Upper-Stage Rocket Motors

A report presents a proposal to reduce the risk of accidental ignition of certain upper-stage rocket motors or other high energy hazardous systems. At present, mechanically in-line initiators are used for initiation of many rocket motors and/or other high-energy hazardous systems. Electrical shorts and/or mechanical barriers, which are the basic safety devices in such systems, are typically removed as part of final arming or pad preparations while personnel are present. At this time, static discharge, test equipment malfunction, or incorrect arming techniques can cause premature firing. The proposal calls for a modular out-of-line ignition system incorporating detonating-cord elements, identified as the donor and the acceptor, separated by an air gap. In the safe configuration, the gap would be sealed with two shields, which would prevent an accidental firing of the donor from igniting the system. The shields would be removed to enable normal firing, in which shrapnel generated by the donor would reliably ignite the acceptor to continue the ordnance train. The acceptor would then ignite a through bulkhead initiator (or other similar device), which would ignite the motor or high-energy system. One shield would be remotely operated and would be moved to the armed position when a launch was imminent or conversely returned to the safe position if the launch were postponed. In the event of failure of the remotely operated shield, the other shield could be inserted manually to safe the system.

Hickman, John↗

NASA NTRS2004

Improved Electromagnetic Brake

A proposed design for an electromagnetic brake would increase the reliability while reducing the number of parts and the weight, relative to a prior commercially available electromagnetic brake. The reductions of weight and the number of parts could also lead to a reduction of cost. A description of the commercial brake is prerequisite to a description of the proposed electromagnetic brake. The commercial brake (see upper part of figure) includes (1) a permanent magnet and an electromagnet coil on a stator and (2) a rotor that includes a steel contact plate mounted, with tension spring loading, on an aluminum hub. The stator is mounted securely on a stationary object, which would ordinarily be the housing of a gear drive or a motor. The rotor is mounted on the shaft of the gear drive or motor. The commercial brake nominally operates in a fail-safe (in the sense of normally braking) mode: In the absence of current in the electromagnet coil, the permanent magnet pulls the contact plate, against the spring tension, into contact with the stator. To release the brake, one excites the electromagnet with a current of the magnitude and polarity chosen to cancel the magnetic flux of the permanent magnet, thereby enabling the spring tension to pull the contact plate out of contact with the stator. The fail-safe operation of the commercial brake depends on careful mounting of the rotor in relation to the stator. The rotor/stator gap must be set with a tolerance between 10 and 15 mils (between about 0.25 and about 0.38 mm). If the gap or the contact pad is thicker than the maximum allowable value, then the permanent magnetic field will not be strong enough to pull the steel plate across the gap. (For this reason, any contact pad between the contact plate and the stator must also be correspondingly thin.) If the gap exceeds the maximum allowable value because of shaft end play, it becomes impossible to set the brake by turning off the electromagnet current. Although it may still be possible to set the brake by applying an electromagnet current to aid the permanent magnetic field instead of canceling it, this action can mask an out-of-tolerance condition in the brake and it does not restore the fail-safe function of setting the brake when current is lost.

Martin, Toby B.↗

NASA NTRS2011

Human Spaceflight Safety for the Next Generation on Orbital Space Systems

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Commercial Crew Program (CCP) has been chartered to facilitate the development of a United States (U.S.) commercial crew space transportation capability with the goal of achieving safe, reliable, and cost effective access to and from low Earth orbit (LEO) and the International Space Station (ISS) as soon as possible. Once the capability is matured and is available to the Government and other customers, NASA expects to purchase commercial services to meet its ISS crew rotation and emergency return objectives. The primary role of the CCP is to enable and ensure safe human spaceflight and processes for the next generation of earth orbital space systems. The architecture of the Program delineates the process for investment performance in safe orbital systems, Crew Transportation System (CTS) certification, and CTS Flight Readiness. A series of six technical documents build up the architecture to address the top-level CTS requirements and standards. They include Design Reference Missions, with the near term focus on ISS crew services, Certification and Service Requirements, Technical Management Processes, and Technical and Operations Standards Evaluation Processes.

Mango, Edward J.↗

NASA NTRS2006

Advanced Coating Removal Techniques

An important step in the repair and protection against corrosion damage is the safe removal of the oxidation and protective coatings without further damaging the integrity of the substrate. Two such methods that are proving to be safe and effective in this task are liquid nitrogen and laser removal operations. Laser technology used for the removal of protective coatings is currently being researched and implemented in various areas of the aerospace industry. Delivering thousands of focused energy pulses, the laser ablates the coating surface by heating and dissolving the material applied to the substrate. The metal substrate will reflect the laser and redirect the energy to any remaining protective coating, thus preventing any collateral damage the substrate may suffer throughout the process. Liquid nitrogen jets are comparable to blasting with an ultra high-pressure water jet but without the residual liquid that requires collection and removal .As the liquid nitrogen reaches the surface it is transformed into gaseous nitrogen and reenters the atmosphere without any contamination to surrounding hardware. These innovative technologies simplify corrosion repair by eliminating hazardous chemicals and repetitive manual labor from the coating removal process. One very significant advantage is the reduction of particulate contamination exposure to personnel. With the removal of coatings adjacent to sensitive flight hardware, a benefit of each technique for the space program is that no contamination such as beads, water, or sanding residue is left behind when the job is finished. One primary concern is the safe removal of coatings from thin aluminum honeycomb face sheet. NASA recently conducted thermal testing on liquid nitrogen systems and found that no damage occurred on 1/6", aluminum substrates. Wright Patterson Air Force Base in conjunction with Boeing and NASA is currently testing the laser remOval technique for process qualification. Other applications of liquid nitrogen operations include cutting of both soft and hard materials. While the laser will not cut materials, it can be used to roughen surfaces and to remove other materials from the substrate including oil, grease, and mold. The space program can benefit from several of these applications with the need for precise removal of coatings and other organic compounds in areas adjacent to sensitive space flight hardware. Significant advantages are evident when comparing liquid nitrogen and laser removal operations over current techniques of media blasting and sanding.

Seibert, Jon↗

NASA NTRS2011

Six Degrees-of-Freedom Ascent Control for Small-Body Touch and Go

A document discusses a method of controlling touch and go (TAG) of a spacecraft to correct attitude, while ensuring a safe ascent. TAG is a concept whereby a spacecraft is in contact with the surface of a small body, such as a comet or asteroid, for a few seconds or less before ascending to a safe location away from the small body. The report describes a controller that corrects attitude and ensures that the spacecraft ascends to a safe state as quickly as possible. The approach allocates a certain amount of control authority to attitude control, and uses the rest to accelerate the spacecraft as quickly as possible in the ascent direction. The relative allocation to attitude and position is a parameter whose optimal value is determined using a ground software tool. This new approach makes use of the full control authority of the spacecraft to correct the errors imparted by the contact, and ascend as quickly as possible. This is in contrast to prior approaches, which do not optimize the ascent acceleration.

Blackmore, Lars James C.↗

NASA NTRS2011

Reliability and Maintainability Engineering - A Major Driver for Safety and Affordability

The United States National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is in the midst of an effort to design and build a safe and affordable heavy lift vehicle to go to the moon and beyond. To achieve that, NASA is seeking more innovative and efficient approaches to reduce cost while maintaining an acceptable level of safety and mission success. One area that has the potential to contribute significantly to achieving NASA safety and affordability goals is Reliability and Maintainability (R&M) engineering. Inadequate reliability or failure of critical safety items may directly jeopardize the safety of the user(s) and result in a loss of life. Inadequate reliability of equipment may directly jeopardize mission success. Systems designed to be more reliable (fewer failures) and maintainable (fewer resources needed) can lower the total life cycle cost. The Department of Defense (DOD) and industry experience has shown that optimized and adequate levels of R&M are critical for achieving a high level of safety and mission success, and low sustainment cost. Also, lessons learned from the Space Shuttle program clearly demonstrated the importance of R&M engineering in designing and operating safe and affordable launch systems. The Challenger and Columbia accidents are examples of the severe impact of design unreliability and process induced failures on system safety and mission success. These accidents demonstrated the criticality of reliability engineering in understanding component failure mechanisms and integrated system failures across the system elements interfaces. Experience from the shuttle program also shows that insufficient Reliability, Maintainability, and Supportability (RMS) engineering analyses upfront in the design phase can significantly increase the sustainment cost and, thereby, the total life cycle cost. Emphasis on RMS during the design phase is critical for identifying the design features and characteristics needed for time efficient processing, improved operational availability, and optimized maintenance and logistic support infrastructure. This paper discusses the role of R&M in a program acquisition phase and the potential impact of R&M on safety, mission success, operational availability, and affordability. This includes discussion of the R&M elements that need to be addressed and the R&M analyses that need to be performed in order to support a safe and affordable system design. The paper also provides some lessons learned from the Space Shuttle program on the impact of R&M on safety and affordability.

Safie, Fayssal M.↗

NASA NTRS2011

UAS Modeling of the Communication Links Study Results

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is the authority that grants access into, and operations within, the National Airspace System (NAS) for all aircraft, including Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS). The safe operation of UAS in the NAS must be assured if the full potential of UAS is to be realized and supported by the public and Congress. This report analyzed the communication systems that are needed for the safe operations of UAS in the NAS. Safe operations can be defined as the availability of the required links to carry the information to control the UAS and the return links to allow controllers to know where the UAS is at any given moment as well as how it is performing. This report is the end result of work performed jointly between the FAA and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)/Kennedy Space Center (NASA KSC). The work was done in support of the Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA) Special Committee 203 (SC-203) Control and Communications Working Group. The RTCA is a federal advisory committee to the FAA. Though the work was not under the direction of the working group, a large part of the specific values used in the simulations came from the working group. Specifically, all of the radio links were modeled based on the formulation completed by the working group. This report analyzed three scenarios from RTCA SC-203 that represent how a UAS would operate in the NAS. Each scenario was created using the Satellite Tool Kit (STK) modeling and simulation tool. The flight paths of the UAS were generated and the UAS dynamics were likewise modeled. Then each communication asset such as transmitters, receivers, and antennas were modeled and placed on the appropriate UAS, satellite, or Control Station (CS). After that, the radio links were analyzed for signal strength and antenna blockage, and the overall link performance was analyzed in detail. The goal was to obtain 99.9% availability on all of the radio communication links. In order to ensure the 99.9% availability, certain values for the telemetry transmitter will have to be increased slightly from I watt up to about 4 watts which is reasonable. The results of this analysis show that it is possible to send commands, during the airborne segment, to the Unmanned Aircraft (UA) and have the UA send back the system health and status with high availability of at least 99.9% of the time. This 99.9% availability included the condition of heavy rain at 90 mm/hr as well as interference from adjacent satellites. The link budget values used in this report were based on the work from the working group.

Birr, Richard B.↗

NASA NTRS2012

Predictive Sea State Estimation for Automated Ride Control and Handling - PSSEARCH

PSSEARCH provides predictive sea state estimation, coupled with closed-loop feedback control for automated ride control. It enables a manned or unmanned watercraft to determine the 3D map and sea state conditions in its vicinity in real time. Adaptive path-planning/ replanning software and a control surface management system will then use this information to choose the best settings and heading relative to the seas for the watercraft. PSSEARCH looks ahead and anticipates potential impact of waves on the boat and is used in a tight control loop to adjust trim tabs, course, and throttle settings. The software uses sensory inputs including IMU (Inertial Measurement Unit), stereo, radar, etc. to determine the sea state and wave conditions (wave height, frequency, wave direction) in the vicinity of a rapidly moving boat. This information can then be used to plot a safe path through the oncoming waves. The main issues in determining a safe path for sea surface navigation are: (1) deriving a 3D map of the surrounding environment, (2) extracting hazards and sea state surface state from the imaging sensors/map, and (3) planning a path and control surface settings that avoid the hazards, accomplish the mission navigation goals, and mitigate crew injuries from excessive heave, pitch, and roll accelerations while taking into account the dynamics of the sea surface state. The first part is solved using a wide baseline stereo system, where 3D structure is determined from two calibrated pairs of visual imagers. Once the 3D map is derived, anything above the sea surface is classified as a potential hazard and a surface analysis gives a static snapshot of the waves. Dynamics of the wave features are obtained from a frequency analysis of motion vectors derived from the orientation of the waves during a sequence of inputs. Fusion of the dynamic wave patterns with the 3D maps and the IMU outputs is used for efficient safe path planning.

Huntsberger, Terrance L.↗

NASA NTRS2012

SOFIA: Flying the Telescope

The primary focus of this paper is how the flight test team for the Stratospheric Observatory For Infrared Astronomy (SOFIA) re-cast an extensive developmental test program to meet key milestones while simultaneously ensuring safe certification of the airframe and delivery of an operationally relevant platform, ultimately saving the overall program from financial demise. Following a brief introduction to the observatory and what it is designed to do, SOFIAs planned developmental test program is summarized, including analysis and design philosophy, envelope expansion, model validation and airframe certification. How NASA used lessons learned from other aircraft that employed open cavities in flight is explained as well as how and why the chosen design was selected. The approach to aerodynamic analysis, including bare airframe testing, wind tunnel testing, computational fluid dynamics and finite element modeling proved absolutely critical. Despite a solid analytical foundation, many unknowns remained. History provides several examples of disastrous effects on both systems and flight safety if cavity design is not approached properly. For these reasons, an extensive test plan was developed to ensure a safe and thorough build-up for envelope expansion, airframe certification and early science missions. Unfortunately, as is often the case, because of chronic delays in overall program execution, severe schedule and funding pressures were present. If critical milestones were not met, domestic as well as international funding was in serious jeopardy, and the demise of the entire program loomed large. Concentrating on rigorous model validation, the test team challenged certification requirements, increased test efficiency and streamlined engineering analysis. This resulted in the safe reduction of test point count by 72%, meeting all program milestones and a platform that soundly satisfied all operational science requirements. Results from early science missions are shown and a proof of concept mission for which SOFIA was opportunely positioned is showcased. Success on this time-critical mission to observe a rare astronomical event proved the usefulness of an airborne observatory and the value in waiting for the capability provided by SOFIA. Finally, lessons learned in the test program are presented with emphasis on how lessons from previous aircraft and successful test programs were applied to SOFIA. Effective application of these lessons was crucial to the success of the SOFIA flight test program. SOFIA is an international cooperative program between NASA and the German Space Agency, DLR. It is a 2.5 meter (100-inch) telescope mounted in a Boeing 747SP aircraft used for astronomical observations at altitudes above 35,000 feet. SOFIA will accommodate a host of scientific instruments from the international science community and has a planned operational lifespan of more than 20 years.

Asher, Troy A.↗

NASA NTRS2012

Safety and IVHM

When we address safety in a book on the business case for IVHM, the question arises whether safety isn t inherently in conflict with the need of operators to run their systems as efficiently (and as cost effectively) as possible. The answer may be that the system needs to be just as safe as needed, but not significantly more. That begs the next question: How safe is safe enough? Several regulatory bodies provide guidelines for operational safety, but irrespective of that, operators do not want their systems to be known as lacking safety. We illuminate the role of safety within the context of IVHM.

Goebel, Kai↗

NASA NTRS2008

Analysis of Proposed 2007-2008 Revisions to the Lightning Launch Commit Criteria for United States Space Launches

Ascending space vehicles are vulnerable to both natural and triggered lightning. Launches under the jurisdiction of the United States are generally subject to a set of rules called the Lightning Launch Commit Criteria (LLCC) (Krider etal., 1999; Krider etal., 2006). The LLCC protect both the vehicle and the public by assuring that the launch does not take place in conditions posing a significant risk of a lightning strike to the ascending vehicle. Such a strike could destroy the vehicle and its payload, thus causing failure of the mission while releasing both toxic materials and debris. To assure safety, the LLCC are conservative and sometimes they may seriously limit the ability of the launch operator to fly as scheduled even when conditions are benign. In order to safely reduce the number of launch scrubs and delays attributable to the LLCC, the Airborne Field Mill (ABFM II) program was undertaken in 2000 - 2001. The effort was directed to collecting detailed high-quality data on the electrical, microphysical, radar and meteorological properties of thunderstorm-associated clouds. Details may be found in Dye et al., 2007. The expectation was that this additional knowledge would provide a better physical basis for the LLCC and allow them to be revised to be less restrictive while remaining at least as safe. That expectation was fulfilled, leading to significant revisions to the LLCC in 2003 and 2005. The 2005 revisions included the application of a new radar-derived quantity called the Volume Averaged Height Integrated Radar Reflectivity (VAHIRR) in the rules governing flight through anvil clouds. VAHIRR is the product of the volume averaged radar reflectivity times the radardetermined cloud thickness. The reflectivity average extends horizontally 5 km west, east, south and north of a point along the flight track and vertically from the 0 C isotherm to the top of the radar cloud. This region is defined as the "Specified Volume". See Dye et al., 2006 and Merceret et al., 2006 for a more thorough description of VAHIRR. The units are dBZ km (not dBZ per kilometer) and the threshold is 10 dBZ km. It is safe to fly through an anvil cloud for which VAHIRR is below this threshold everywhere along the flight track as long as (1) the entire cloud within 5 nmi. (9.26 km) of the flight track is colder than 0 C, (2) the points at which VAHIRR must be evaluated are at least 20 km from any active convective cores and recent lightning, and (3) the radar return is not being attenuated within the Specified Volume around those points.

Dye, James E.↗

NASA NTRS2008

NASA Battery Working Group - 2007-2008: Battery Task Summary Report

This presentation provides a summary of the 2007-2008 NASA Battery Working Group efforts completed in support of the NASA Engineering Safety Center (NESC). The effort covered a series of pro-active tasks that address the following: Binding Procurements -- guidelines related to requirements for the battery system that should be considered at the time of contract award Wet Life of Ni-H2 Batteries -- issues/strategies for effective storage and impact of long-term storage on performance and life Generic Guidelines for Lithium-ion Safety, Handling and Qualification -- Standardized approaches developed and risk assessments (1) Lithium-ion Performance Assessment -- survey of manufacturers and capabilities to meet mission needs. Guidelines document generated (2) Conditions Required for using Pouch Cells in Aerospace Missions -- focus on corrosion, thermal excursions and long-term performance issues. Document defining requirements to maintain performance and life (3) High Voltage Risk Assessment -- focus on safety and abuse tolerance of battery module assemblies. Recommendations of features required for safe implementation (4) Procedure for Determination of Safe Charge Rates -- evaluation of various cell chemistries and recommendation of safe operating regimes for specific cell designs

Manzo, Michelle↗

NASA NTRS2014

Characterization of Electrochemically Generated Silver

Silver biocide offers a potential advantage over iodine, the current state of the art in US spacecraft disinfection technology, in that silver can be safely consumed by the crew. Low concentrations of silver (<500 ppb) have been shown to kill bacteria in water systems and keep it safe for potability. Silver does not require hardware to remove it from a water system, and therefore can provide a simpler means for disinfecting water. The Russian segment of the International Space Station has utilized an electrochemically generated silver solution, which is colloidal in nature. To be able to reliably provide a silver biocide to drinking water by electrochemical means would reduce mass required for removing another biocide such as iodine from the water. This would also aid in crew time required to replace iodine removal cartridges. Future long term missions would benefit from electrochemically produced silver as the biocide could be produced on demand and requires only a small concentration to be effective. Since it can also be consumed safely, there is less mass in removal hardware and little consumables required for production. The goal of this project initially is to understand the nature of the electrochemically produced silver, the particle sizes produced by the electrochemical cell and the effect that voltage adjustment has on the particle size. In literature, it has been documented that dissolved oxygen and pH have an effect on the ionization of the electrochemical silver so those parameters would be measured and possibly adjusted to understand their effect on the silver.

Adam, Niklas↗

NASA NTRS2014

NASA Unmanned Aircraft (UA) Control and Non-Payload Communication (CNPC) System Waveform Trade Studies

Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) represent a new capability that will provide a variety of services in the government (public) and commercial (civil) aviation sectors. The growth of this potential industry has not yet been realized due to the lack of a common understanding of what is required to safely operate UAS in the National Airspace System (NAS). To address this deficiency, NASA has established a project called UAS Integration in the NAS (UAS in the NAS), under the Integrated Systems Research Program (ISRP) of the Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate (ARMD). This project provides an opportunity to transition concepts, technology, algorithms, and knowledge to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and other stakeholders to help them define the requirements, regulations, and issues for routine UAS access to the NAS. The safe, routine, and efficient integration of UAS into the NAS requires new radio frequency (RF) spectrum allocations and a new data communications system which is both secure and scalable with increasing UAS traffic without adversely impacting the Air Traffic Control (ATC) communication system. These data communications, referred to as Control and Non-Payload Communications (CNPC), whose purpose is to exchange information between the unmanned aircraft and the ground control station to ensure safe, reliable, and effective unmanned aircraft flight operation. A Communications Subproject within the UAS in the NAS Project has been established to address issues related to CNPC development, certification and fielding. The focus of the Communications Subproject is on validating and allocating new RF spectrum and data link communications to enable civil UAS integration into the NAS. The goal is to validate secure, robust data links within the allocated frequency spectrum for UAS. A vision, architectural concepts, and seed requirements for the future commercial UAS CNPC system have been developed by RTCA Special Committee 203 (SC-203) in the process of determining formal recommendations to the FAA in its role provided for under the Federal Advisory Committee Act. NASA intends to conduct its research and development in keeping with this vision and associated architectural concepts. The prototype communication systems developed and tested by NASA will be used to validate and update the initial SC-203 requirements in order to provide a foundation for SC-203's Minimum Aviation System Performance Standards (MASPS).

Aircraft Communications↗