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At least 595 records · Page 33
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2014

Modeling and Quantification of Team Performance in Human Reliability Analysis for Probabilistic Risk Assessment

Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) and Human Reliability Assessment (HRA) are important technical contributors to the United States (U.S.) Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC) risk-informed and performance based approach to regulating U.S. commercial nuclear activities. Furthermore, all currently operating commercial NPPs in the U.S. are required by federal regulation to be staffed with crews of operators. Yet, aspects of team performance are underspecified in most HRA methods that are widely used in the nuclear industry. There are a variety of "emergent" team cognition and teamwork errors (e.g., communication errors) that are 1) distinct from individual human errors, and 2) important to understand from a PRA perspective. The lack of robust models or quantification of team performance is an issue that affects the accuracy and validity of HRA methods and models, leading to significant uncertainty in estimating HEPs. This paper describes research that has the objective to model and quantify team dynamics and teamwork within NPP control room crews for risk informed applications, thereby improving the technical basis of HRA, which improves the risk-informed approach the NRC uses to regulate the U.S. commercial nuclear industry.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2017

Development/Modernization of an Advanced Non-Light Water Reactor Probabilistic Risk Assessment

In 2015, GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy (GEH) teamed with Argonne National Laboratory (Argonne) to perform Research and Development (R&D) of next-generation Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) methodologies for the modernization of an advanced non-Light Water Reactor (non-LWR) PRA. This effort built upon a PRA developed in the early 1990s for GEH’s Power Reactor Inherently Safe Module (PRISM) Sodium Fast Reactor (SFR). The work had four main tasks: internal events development modeling the risk from the reactor for hazards occurring at-power internal to the plant; an all hazards scoping review to analyze the risk at a high level from external hazards such as earthquakes and high winds; an all modes scoping review to understand the risk at a high level from operating modes other than at-power; and risk insights to integrate the results from each of the three phases above. To achieve these objectives, GEH and Argonne used and adapted proven PRA methodologies and techniques to build a modern non-LWR all hazards/all modes PRA. The teams also advanced non-LWR PRA methodologies, which is an important outcome from this work. This report summarizes the project outcomes in two major phases. The first phase presents the methodologies developed for non-LWR PRAs. The methodologies are grouped by scope, from Internal Events At-Power (IEAP) to hazards analysis to modes analysis. The second phase presents details of the PRISM PRA model which was developed as a validation of the non-LWR methodologies. The PRISM PRA was performed in detail for IEAP, and at a broader level for hazards and modes. In addition to contributing methodologies, this project developed risk insights applicable to non-LWR PRA, including focus-areas for future R&D, and conclusions about the PRISM design.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2019

Probabilistic Risk Assessment of Flexible Power Operation of a Nuclear Power Plant

Nuclear power plants (NPPs) are becoming cost prohibitive to operate. This is due to historically low natural gas prices and wind and solar prices often being less than the marginal cost of operating baseload coal and NPPs, which sometimes forces NPPs to pay for the electricity they create. Thus, the feasibility of using part of the heat from an NPP to create other commodities such as hydrogen is being evaluated; operating in this way is called flexible power operation (FPO). To change the NPP design and operation, a license review must happen. Part of the review is the Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) which proves the safety of the design and operation by identifying sequences of events that result in plant failure and estimating their likelihood of occurrence. A Level 1 PRA model that evaluates the risk of removing heat from the secondary side of NPP was created. The model was developed using Systems Analysis Program for Hands-On Integrated Reliability Evaluations (SAPHIRE 8) software to calculate core damage frequency (CDF). It is a fault tree that represents the possible pathways that could lead to a loss of steam inventory in the secondary loop. A loss of steam inventory can induce steam generator tube rupture or other events that activates response systems to avoid core damage. This is the main concern for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the group in the United States that licenses NPPs. This model will calculate a total CDF of any of these pathways occurring which will be compared to the baseline CDF in a generic NPP PRA for licensing support.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2019

Coupling RAVEN to SAPHIRE for Performing Time Dependent Probabilistic Risk Assessment

Cost Risk Analysis Framework Tool (CRAFT) was recently developed by Idaho National Laboratory (INL) to perform economical risk analysis by combining physics, risk and cost information of components in a Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) that can be quickly deployable through the nuclear industry to evaluate the risk associated to capital projects and asset management [1]. In this framework, RAVEN is coupled with SAPHIRE to perform the time dependent risk/safety assessment of NPPs. Traditionally, the risk associated to the NPPs can be determined by classical Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) tools, such as SAPHIRE, under the assumption that all failure rates are constant over time. In some circumstances, however, the assumption is rendered invalid since that the failure rate of a component may gradually change in a systematic way, for example, because of aging and degradation. In addition, recent data analysis in [2] has suggested decreasing values of failure rates for several important components of NPPs. A PRA that includes these components should employ the time-dependent failure rates in order to accurately estimate the risk at any given time. This time-dependent PRA is achieved by the coupling between RAVEN and SAPHIRE.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2019

Coupling RAVEN to SAPHIRE for Performing Time Dependent Probabilistic Risk Assessment

Cost Risk Analysis Framework Tool (CRAFT) was recently developed by Idaho National Laboratory (INL) to perform economical risk analysis by combining physics, risk and cost information of components in a Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) that can be quickly deployable through the nuclear industry to evaluate the risk associated to capital projects and asset management [1]. In this framework, RAVEN is coupled with SAPHIRE to perform the time dependent risk/safety assessment of NPPs. Traditionally, the risk associated to the NPPs can be determined by classical Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) tools, such as SAPHIRE, under the assumption that all failure rates are constant over time. In some circumstances, however, the assumption is rendered invalid since that the failure rate of a component may gradually change in a systematic way, for example, because of aging and degradation. In addition, recent data analysis in [2] has suggested decreasing values of failure rates for several important components of NPPs. A PRA that includes these components should employ the time-dependent failure rates in order to accurately estimate the risk at any given time. This time-dependent PRA is achieved by the coupling between RAVEN and SAPHIRE.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2021

Probabilistic Risk Assessment Research Needs and Activities

Probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs) have benefitted the safe operation of the U.S. reactor fleet over many decades. Risk insights from these PRAs have provided information from many different perspectives, from what is most important to maintain at a facility to a better understanding of how to address new information regarding safety issues. The methods and tools that have supported the creation and enhancement of PRA models were established through multiple decades of research, from the 1970s starting with the WASH-1400 Reactor Safety Study through comprehensive plant-specific models in use today. Because PRA models are being used to support such a diverse array of plant decisions, they are now being applied to analyze an increasing number and diverse set of aspects of the plant, which are well beyond the initial efforts envisioned in the 1970s. These demands on PRA methods and tools have led to challenges in terms of further expansion of the use of PRA and raised the potential for future research into how to address these challenges to ensure continued nuclear safety. In addition to the PRA needs, the domain of computer science has led to advances in computational approaches that may serve to help nuclear power plant PRA applications. These newer technologies have great potential to improve the effectiveness and economics of PRA and are being considered for exploration of potential benefits to the PRA and nuclear-power communities.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2013

Probabilistic Modeling of Landfill Subsidence Introduced by Buried Structure Collapse - 13229

The long-term reliability of land disposal facility final cover systems - and therefore the overall waste containment - depends on the distortions imposed on these systems by differential settlement/subsidence. The evaluation of differential settlement is challenging because of the heterogeneity of the waste mass and buried structure placement. Deterministic approaches to long-term final cover settlement prediction are not able to capture the spatial variability in the waste mass and sub-grade properties, especially discontinuous inclusions, which control differential settlement. An alternative is to use a probabilistic model to capture the non-uniform collapse of cover soils and buried structures and the subsequent effect of that collapse on the final cover system. Both techniques are applied to the problem of two side-by-side waste trenches with collapsible voids. The results show how this analytical technique can be used to connect a metric of final cover performance (inundation area) to the susceptibility of the sub-grade to collapse and the effective thickness of the cover soils. This approach allows designers to specify cover thickness, reinforcement, and slope to meet the demands imposed by the settlement of the underlying waste trenches. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2017

Probabilistic Performance Assessment for Deep Borehole Disposal of Cs/Sr Capsules - 17143

The US Department of Energy (DOE) performed an assessment of disposal options for spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level radioactive waste (HLW) that recommended the consideration of deep borehole disposal (DBD) of smaller DOE-managed waste forms, such as cesium (Cs) and strontium (Sr) capsules. To further assess the safety and viability of the DBD concept, post-closure performance assessment (PA) analyses were performed for DBD of Cs/Sr capsules. The post-closure PA included a reference design concept for Cs/Sr capsule disposal, feature, event, and process (FEP) analysis, scenario development, and modeling using the PFLOTRAN code. PA simulations were run for both nominal and disturbed scenarios for long-term radionuclide transport away from the deep disposal borehole. The nominal (expected) post-closure release scenario included FEPs for short-duration (a few hundred years) thermally-induced upward fluid flux through the borehole seals and/or disturbed rock zone (DRZ) followed by longer-term slow diffusive transport. Simulations included a baseline deterministic run and a set of probabilistic realizations (using Latin Hypercube Sampling (LHS) from parameter distributions) to examine the sensitivity and importance of the long-term radionuclide transport to processes and parameters such as: waste package durability; seal porosity and permeability, disturbed rock zone (DRZ) porosity and permeability; and radionuclide sorption in the seal materials, DRZ, and crystalline host rock. The disturbed scenario included a waste package 'stuck' in the crystalline basement above the emplacement zone near a hypothetical borehole-intersecting fracture. Simulations included two deterministic runs to examine the sensitivity to the regional head gradient. The nominal and disturbed scenario PA results suggest that a favorable safety case can be developed for DBD of Cs/Sr capsules and helped to identify key areas of uncertainty, which in turn can inform future DBD research and development (R and D) activities, including a field demonstration project. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2018

A Decision-Based Iterative Modeling Framework for Probabilistic Performance Assessments - 18441

Radiological probabilistic performance assessments (PPAs) employ highly complex computer models to simulate the release of radionuclides from wastes in an engineered disposal facility, migration of these radionuclides over time, and resulting radiological dose to potentially exposed individuals. An iterative approach to PPA modeling is described to help define the appropriate complexity of the computer model. An initial model is developed that addresses all relevant processes and media, but that employs preliminary statistical parameter distributions to minimize the initial effort expended. Where appropriate, transport and exposure submodels with simplifying assumptions are also used in the initial model. Different assumptions and boundaries may be explored with the initial model to assess their importance in constraining model results. Exploration of the results of the initial model are used to determine the benefits of model refinements, and to guide such refinements to focus on specific areas of the model that most influence the model outputs of interest. This approach promotes efficiency and model parsimony, but does not compromise defensibility when performed in a transparent manner. Key model boundaries for a PPA include the time frame of the modeling (temporal boundaries), where future human receptors may be located (spatial boundaries), and what types of land uses and activities may exist in the future (exposure scenarios). Simplified transport and exposure models can be useful in helping decision makers and stakeholders establish such boundaries by analyzing the consequences of selecting different bounds and understanding which assumptions and boundaries have the greatest influence on the magnitude and distribution of model results. Pathway analysis and parameter sensitivity analysis performed on PPA model results are key components of the iterative modeling approach. The objective of pathway analysis is to identify the critical radionuclides and pathways contributing to radiation dose during the modeling performance period. An environmental 'pathway' is described by the connections from a waste package or cell in the disposal facility to a future human exposure event. These connections are commonly visualized using graphical means. A simple example of a potentially complete pathway for radon-222 is: radium-containing waste → radon emanation → upwards diffusion in cap material → diffusion/advection into a future building → inhalation exposure to a building occupant Parameter sensitivity analysis is conducted on the results of a PPA to identify those specific model input parameters whose distribution of values contributes the most to the distribution of target model output, such as annual radiation dose. Pathway and sensitivity analyses on initial modeling results provide information for guiding subsequent model development, and possibly interim decisions, by informing questions tied to the modeling objectives and performance criteria. For example, questions related to radiological doses from existing disposals may include: 1. Is radiation dose from radiological exposures either obviously negligible or obviously unacceptable based on initial modeling results? 2. If dose is not obviously negligible or unacceptable relative to applicable performance criteria, what model refinements would reduce uncertainty in the results to better inform decisions? (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2019

A Preliminary Probabilistic Performance Assessment Model for Radiological and Chemical Contamination at the West Valley Site, New York - 19295

The New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) is the owner of the Western New York Nuclear Service Center (WNYNSC), a 1,351-ha site located approximately 48 km south of Buffalo, New York. In 1962, Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. (NFS) entered into agreements with the Atomic Energy Commission and New York State to construct the first commercial reprocessing plant of nuclear fuel in the United States at the WNYNSC. NFS built and operated the spent fuel reprocessing plant and waste disposal facilities, processing 640 Mg (640 metric tons) of spent nuclear fuel from 1966 to 1972 under an Atomic Energy Commission license. Nuclear fuel reprocessing operations halted in 1972 and never restarted, leaving behind radioactive and chemical wastes. The reprocessing wastes include high-level waste (HLW), so U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) was compelled to complete certain waste management activities under the West Valley Demonstration Project (WVDP) Act of 1980, including decommissioning of WVDP facilities. As collaborating agencies, NYSERDA and the DOE are tasked with making decisions about decommissioning and risk reduction for the West Valley Site. Neptune and Company, Inc. (Neptune) was contracted to develop a probabilistic performance assessment (PPA) model to assist the agencies in their decision making process for decommissioning the WVDP and WNYNSC. One important tool that is needed in order to inform the decision-making process is a science-based model of the contamination at the West Valley Site and its potential implications for human health and the environment. The West Valley PPA Model (the Model), developed using the GoldSim modeling software, is a tool intended to provide support for decision making with uncertainty, in a manner that is transparent, defensible, and robust. The PPA Model includes contaminant transport and health effects components, and is organized around geographically-organized contaminated facilities. These include the waste disposal areas licensed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the State of New York, a waste tank farm for storage of HLW resulting from reprocessing operations, and several areas contaminated with radioactive and chemical constituents. The Model evaluates contaminant transport from these sources to points of exposure across the site and into receiving surface waters and sediments. Hypothetical people and wildlife are exposed to contamination at these locations, and the effects of these exposures are evaluated. Contaminant transport processes to be evaluated in the Model include groundwater and surface water transport, contaminant translocation by plants and animals, diffusion in subsurface air and water, and erosion of the Site. The evaluation of exposures to people in this preliminary model is limited to a resident farmer scenario, and ecological assessment is performed at the level of a screening analysis. The results of these preliminary evaluations inform future model developments. Model results are subjected to sensitivity analysis in order to determine those pathways and parameters that are most significant in influencing the results. This information allows analysts and decision makers to focus on those aspects of Site behavior and processes that contribute most to overall uncertainty. With this information, the Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (SEIS) can inform defensible decisions regarding remediation of the Site. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2019

Development of Waste Inventory for Probabilistic Performance Assessment Modeling - 19361

Estimation of radioactive waste inventory is a key initial step in the development of an environmental fate and transport model for performance assessment (PA) of radioactive waste sites. PA model output is often sensitive to parameters that represent inventory as a source term, yet estimation is a difficult problem. Inventory estimation for a probabilistic performance assessment (PPA) is related to, but distinct from, that performed for waste excavation, characterization, and offsite disposal. The latter appropriately focuses on obtaining the most detailed information possible on specific hazards and locations; however, these questions cannot be fully answered without intrusive site characterization efforts. This type of characterization is often not feasible when assembling information regarding a source term in a PPA model. Development of waste inventory for a PPA is one piece of a larger hierarchical model. The physical process model represented by Goldsim computer code represents one level of the hierarchy, and the second level of the hierarchy involves estimation of inputs such as inventory, transport, and risk parameters. The estimation of inputs is not a straightforward problem. The parameters of a computer model often do not have an equivalence to the physical quantities they describe, and estimation of the physical quantities themselves can be difficult due to limitations of available information. Inventory information for the West Valley Site in upstate New York is based on data from historical shipping and disposal forms. In the 1990's, the West Valley Demonstration Project (WVDP) compiled information from existing databases and historical waste records into one complete modern database. A conceptual model was then applied and used with recorded information to characterize the waste mass and radionuclide composition for each waste burial. Information was ultimately aggregated over all waste records to estimate the mass of each radionuclide within each trench, hole, or caisson. Three decades later, we revisit the master database, make updates with newly-identified information, and incorporate the conceptual model previously used for inventory estimation in the hierarchical modeling framework. We characterize uncertainty using probability distributions for waste mass and radionuclide composition at the individual shipment or individual burial level. Uncertainty incorporated at the lowest level of the hierarchy is ultimately carried through to uncertainty in PPA model endpoints. Sensitivity analysis of early model results is then applied to identify influential inputs and guide subsequent efforts towards parameters that drive risk. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Updates to a Preliminary Probabilistic Performance Assessment Model for Radiological and Chemical Contamination at the West Valley Site, New York - 20420

The New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) is the owner of the Western New York Nuclear Service Center (WNYNSC), a 1,351-ha site located approximately 48 km south of Buffalo, New York. In 1962, Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. (NFS) entered into agreements with the Atomic Energy Commission and New York State to construct the first commercial reprocessing plant of nuclear fuel in the United States at the WNYNSC. NFS built and operated the spent fuel reprocessing plant and waste disposal facilities, processing 640 Mg (640 metric tons) of spent nuclear fuel from 1966 to 1972 under an Atomic Energy Commission license. Nuclear fuel reprocessing operations halted in 1972 and never restarted, leaving behind radioactive and chemical wastes. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) was required to complete certain waste management activities under the West Valley Demonstration Project (WVDP) Act of 1980 including decommissioning of WVDP facilities. As collaborating agencies, NYSERDA and the DOE are tasked with making decisions about decommissioning and risk reduction for the West Valley Site. Neptune and Company, Inc. (Neptune) was contracted to develop a probabilistic performance assessment (PPA) model to assist the agencies in their decision making process for decommissioning the WVDP and WNYNSC. One important tool that is needed in order to inform the decision-making process is a science-based model of the West Valley Site that evaluates potential future consequences for human health and the environment. This forms the core of the spatial domain of the West Valley PPA Model. The PPA Model, developed using the GoldSim system modeling software, is a tool intended to provide support for decision making that evaluates uncertainty, in a manner that is transparent, defensible, and robust. The PPA Model includes contaminant transport and health effects components, and is organized around geographically-grouped contaminated facilities. These include the waste disposal areas licensed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the State of New York, a waste tank farm for storage of high level radioactive waste resulting from reprocessing operations, and several areas contaminated with radioactive and chemical constituents. The PPA Model evaluates contaminant transport from these sources to points of exposure across the site and into receiving surface waters and sediments. Hypothetical people and wildlife could be exposed to contamination at these locations, and the effects of these exposures are evaluated. Contaminant transport processes to be evaluated in the PPA Model include groundwater and surface water transport, contaminant translocation by plants and animals, diffusion, and erosion. The evaluation of exposures to people in this preliminary model is limited to a resident farmer scenario, and ecological assessment is performed at the level of a screening analysis. The results of these preliminary evaluations inform future model developments. PPA Model results are subjected to sensitivity analysis in order to determine those pathways and parameters that are most significant in influencing the results. This information allows analysts and decision makers to focus on those aspects of Site behavior and processes. With this information, the decision makers can drive informed, defensible decisions regarding decommissioning of the Site. This paper includes an update of the information presented at WM2019 [1]. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2016

Fire compartment partitioning approaches for fire probabilistic safety analysis of a high-temperature gas-cooled reactor - 18545

Fire compartment partitioning is the foundational task in Fire Probabilistic Safety Analysis (FPSA), that requires approaches able to balance analytical accuracy and computational burden. In this work, two fire compartment partitioning approaches are illustrated and applied to an electric building of a High-Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor (HTGR, e.g., HTR-PM), and the quantified risks of the compartments obtained with the two approaches are compared. The results show that risk is insensitive to the utilized fire compartment partitioning approach, making the FPSA tasks easier to be performed. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2017

Probabilistic risk evaluation of cyber-attacks on a nuclear power plant safety - 205.5

By adopting digital technology in nuclear power plants (NPPs), the cyber-attack has been introduced as one of the newest dangerous threats. It is required to develop efficient defense strategies against possible cyber-attacks on NPPs. However, it is difficult to expect when, where, and how the cyber-attacks will occur because they are intended attacks. Therefore, the risk of cyber-attacks on NPP is getting more and more important. Probabilistic risk assessment (PRA), which is one of the most widely used methods in NPPs to assess the risk, is introduced. However, it is difficult to evaluate the risk of NPPs by cyber-attacks from only the existing PRA method. In this research, a new PSA method, which is based on existing PRA, is used for evaluating of cyber-attacks on NPP. In addition, the case studies were performed for the feasibility study using nuclear power plant PRA model. Through this study, the risk assessment of the cyber-attacks on the NPP is tried by using a previous PRA model. Also, several scenarios are assumed to proceed the risk assessment. The risk-assessment should be performed in future work containing more specific cyber-attack scenarios, and if possible, the risk assessment model should be developed. Finally, the risk of cyber-attacks on NPPs could be evaluated quantitatively. Also, the defense strategies could be deducted by a risk assessment based on the risk assessment results which is based on the proposed method. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2017

Identification of the accident-related critical digital assets based on probabilistic safety analysis results - 225

Digital I and C systems have been developed and installed in nuclear power plants, and due to installation of the digital I and C systems, cyber security concerns are increasing in nuclear industry. However, there are too many critical digital assets (CDAs) to be inspected in digitalized NPPs. In order to reduce the inefficiency of regulation in nuclear facilities, the critical digital assets that are directly related to an accident are elicited by using the probabilistic safety assessment results. Target initial events are selected, and their heading are analyzed through event tree analysis. Among the headings, the headings that can be proceeded directly to the core damage by the cyber-attack are finally selected as the target of deriving the minimum cut-sets. Based on success criteria of each heading, we analyze the fault trees and derive the minimum set-cuts. In terms of original PSA, the value of probability for the cut-sets is important but the probability is not important in terms of cyber security of NPPs. The important factors is the number of basic events consisting of the minimal cut-sets that is proportional to vulnerability. Finally, the process for identifying accident-related CDAs is suggested based on PSA results. The results of this study are expected to be used to derive the linkage between cyber-attack and accident, and to develop the final core digital asset identification methodology and effective regulatory method. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2016

Comparison of Surrogate Models with Physical Models for Dynamic Probabilistic Risk Analysis Using the RAVEN Code

Dynamic probabilistic risk analysis (DPRA) has emerged in the nuclear industry as an effective tool to identify points of weakness in nuclear reactors and create a comprehensive approach to quantifying risk. While DPRA allows for detailed analysis, it usually requires thousands of runs due to the necessity of exploring low probability, high consequence events, which can be computationally prohibitively difficult to assess. Risk Analysis Virtual Environment (RAVEN) is a software package being developed under the Nuclear Energy Advanced Modeling and Simulation program at the Idaho National Laboratory. It is able to manage complex control logic to drive a RELAP-7 simulation and to handle sampling strategies including Monte Carlo, Latin Hypercube, Grid and Adaptive samplers. By performing a thorough investigation of the possibility space of an accident scenario with RELAP-7, RAVEN is able to identify consequences of accident scenarios that have not been encountered. The most computational resource intensive step of a RAVEN analysis is running the RELAP-7 code modeling the physical system behavior. Using surrogate models to represent the outcomes of more complex simulations rather than the full model can greatly reduce the computation effort required. In situations where the uncertainty distributions of a model are unknown, or when there are multiple sets of uncertainty distributions, DPRA generally requires rerunning the physical model for each set of uncertainty distributions used. By taking an unbiased sample of the physical model and creating a surrogate model from the results, the surrogate model can be sampled under a different set of uncertainty distributions to provide equivalent results. This paper presents an example of this approach. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2016

Probabilistic Risk Assessment of Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System Failure Considering Safety and Security Initiating Events

In order to quantify the probable risk associated with a safety system, nuclear safety risk evaluation process is applied which is generally performed in three steps. The first step is to calculate the damage frequency of a critical system. This step is followed by the radioactive source term estimation due to the potential system damage. The final step is the assessment of off-site consequences. The safety risk formula is shown by Eq. (1). P{sub F} is the probability of safety system failure (the probability used describes a random, independent event), and C is the consequence value. R{sub SAF} = P{sub F} * C (1) The security risk associated with an attack on critical infrastructure and/or special nuclear materials theft is usually evaluated using three- term risk equation (probability of attack, probability of adversary success, and consequence). A security threat and the related initiating events are not considered in a pure safety risk analysis. The vulnerability of the physical protection system is performed independently even though the consequence resulting from a security initiating event can be similar to a safety related initiating event and thus gets double counted. The security risk can be calculated using Eq. (2) R{sub SEC} = P{sub A} * P{sub S} * C (2) PA is the probability of attack, P{sub S} is the probability of adversary success (P{sub S} = 1 - P{sub I} P{sub N}). P{sub I} being the probability of interruption which accounts for the probabilities of detection of all timely detection elements along an adversary path. PN being the probability of neutralization: the result of engagement of the response force with the adversaries after the interruption has occurred. C is the consequence magnitude from a successful attack. The two security probabilities do not describe random, independent events. As a result, because of the differences in the randomness and independence of the respective safety and security probabilities, the safety and the security risks are currently calculated separately. The consequence term in nuclear safety and security risk evaluation have the same definition. An effort is made here to study the effect on the overall risk by considering security initiating events along with the subsequent failure of the intermediate safety element. The target selected is a spent fuel storage pool for analyzing the public risk arising from the interplay between nuclear security and safety initiating events. EASI (Estimate of Adversary Sequence Interruption) model is used to calculate the probability of interruption related to a security system that leads to the calculation of the security initiating event frequency. Further progression of this initiating security event to a top event is analyzed using a Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) tool, SAPHIRE (version 8) to obtain a joint pool damage frequency. For the progression of events leading to a top event, the failure of the intermediate safety elements is assumed to be external random events such as heavy load drop and fire events. The objectives of this study is to (1) determine the double accounting of frequency of failure, risk and allocated resources in the scenario of a non-random security initiating event leading to a safety random event chain (2) compare the damage frequency from pure security with the frequency of combined security-safety failure event and pure safety failure events. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗