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Vacuum Sealable Container (VSC) and Astronaut Lunar Drill (ALD) for Artemis

Introduction: NASA’s Artemis Program is under development to send first woman and next man to the Moon. Artemis will utilize a suite of new technology for Lunar exploration, including new space vehicles, new space suits, and new Astronaut Tools. Honeybee Robotics has been working with NASA JSC to develop a new Vacuum Sealable Container (VSC) and new Astronaut Lunar Drill (ALD) for the upcoming Artemis missions. Vacuum Sealable Container: Sample return continues to be the “Holy Grail” of space exploration, allowing for the analysis of materials using Earth-based laboratories instead of needing to miniaturize and ruggedize instrumentation for space. The Apollo missions to the Moon had several kinds of Sealable Containers which brought back Lunar samples for analysis [1]. These samples are still being analyzed, fifty years later. The VSC requirements are different from that for Apollo containers and as such, new development was required. One major difference between Artemis samples and those from Apollo is the desire to bring back volatiles which may be part of lunar regolith. The VSC is designed to withstand a high-pressure differential caused by sublimating volatiles. Because of the new, stricter sealing requirements, additional features have been added to the VSC. For example, the seal on the container is required to be more robust, thus required more force to actuate, and the seal must be locked in place with a secondary mechanism. Astronaut Lunar Drill: The ALD is designed to be a multi-functional platform for Lunar sample acquisition. The drill builds on lessons learned from the Apollo Lunar Surface Drill (ALSD), as well as Honeybee’s long history of mechanized sample acquisition devices for space [2]. The main functionality of the ALD is Deep Core Regolith Drilling. Additional functionality includes Surface Rock Coring (SRC), and GeoTech Tools (GTT). The ALD is a rotary-percussive drill designed with deep drilling in mind. The ALD is currently designed to have decoupled rotary and percussion subsystems to allow for maximum battery life and reduced fatigue on the crewmember. Honeybee drill technology will automatically engage the percussion when needed to drill at maximum efficiency. The mechanized drill stand helps improve drilling efficiency; the system utilizes advanced drilling algorithms which only require the crewmember to hold a single switch. Additionally, the stand aids in extraction of deep cores, something which was a problem on Apollo. The SRC functionality of the ALD utilizes Honeybee’s Eccentric Tube Core Breakoff technology to collect and retain rock core samples. This technology has also been infused into the Perseverance rover mission. The ALD is removable from the stand to allow crewmembers to collect samples from large boulders. Bringing back rock cores samples instead of full rocks allows for a wider variety of samples to be returned to Earth for study and puts them in a uniform form-factor for effective sealing and analysis. SRC bits will utilize the power of the drill’s percussion system to drill hard Lunar rocks and expedite sample acquisition. The mechanized stand on the ALD allows for additional attachments for taking geotechnical measurements with a Static Cone Penetrometer (SCP) and a Shear Vane (SV). With the stand, the ALD can take SCP measurements with the touch of a button, storing data for return to Earth. SV measurements utilize the ALD’s Rotary motor to spin the vanes in a controlled manner, getting clean data untampered by human error. References: [1] Bar Cohen and Zacny (2009), Drilling in Extreme Environments - Penetration and Sampling on Earth and Other Planets, Wiley. [2] Bar-Cohen and Zacny, Advances in Terrestrial and Extraterrestrial Drilling, CRC Press. [3] Myrick (2003), Core Break-off Mechanism. US Patent No. 6,550,549 Acknowledgements: This work has been supported by NASA via SBIR Phase 3.

Artemis↗
DOE OSTI2020

Initial Efforts Organizing WPNCS SG-8: Preservation of Expert Knowledge and Judgement Applied to Criticality Benchmarks

The Working Party on Nuclear Criticality Safety (WPNCS) under the guidance of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) has over 20 years of experience addressing concerns related to static and transient configurations encountered within the nuclear fuel cycle: fuel fabrication, transportation, reprocessing, storage, and geological disposal. One of the cornerstone activities of the WPNCS is the International Criticality Safety Benchmark Evaluation Project (ICSBEP), which was established to identify a comprehensive set of criticality benchmark data, evaluate the data, including quantification of overall uncertainties; compile the data into a standardized format, perform sample calculations utilizing modern nuclear data sets and codes utilized in nuclear criticality safety, and formally document the work into a single source of verified benchmark data. Annually, members of the ICSBEP Technical Review Group (TRG) contribute evaluated benchmark data that undergoes comprehensive technical review prior to publication in the ICSBEP Handbook. In the years since the ICSBEP was established, there has been much work to prepare benchmark data to support validation activities in nuclear criticality safety. The 2020 edition of the ICSBEP Handbook contains acceptable benchmark specifications for 5,053 critical, subcritical, or near-critical configurations in 582 benchmark evaluations. Modern benchmark development benefits from decades of experienced international participants, a well-established handbook format, supplementary guides to deal with uncertainty quantification, and a comprehensive review process based upon independent reviews from international experts. The ICSBEP Handbook also contains 838 configurations deemed unacceptable to support criticality safety efforts. They are recorded, with the reasoning for their rejection, to preserve the experimental data, prevent reevaluation of data that are incomplete or contain known errors, and/or to potentially allow future reevaluation of the experiment pending the identification of sufficient data to resolve identified inconsistencies and errors. Users of the ICSBEP Handbook today might notice that the rigor and quality of modern criticality safety benchmarks is much greater than those prepared within the initial decade of the project. Benchmarks with 1s uncertainties in k eff greater than 1% were traditionally rejected unless they were identified as unique experiment types that encompassed materials, fuels, or designs not available from other benchmark experiments. However, benchmarks developed using modern experimental techniques and practices typically have uncertainties on the order of a few tenths of a percent. There have been ongoing efforts to improve the overall quality of previously published benchmark evaluations. Seventy-eight evaluations, containing approximately 600 configurations, have been revised just within the past decade. An additional eleven benchmarks are under revision for updated release in the 2020 edition of the ICSBEP Handbook. If some of the historic benchmarks were resubmitted in their current form to the TRG today, they would be rejected due to lack of data, missing components in the uncertainty analysis, or incomplete benchmark model development. The use of historic criticality safety benchmarks that underestimate the total uncertainty, lack properly quantified biases, or provide inadequate benchmark specifications do not sufficiently support modern criticality safety and nuclear data efforts. Although the ICSBEP Handbook is recognized by regulating bodies to support criticality safety, users are required to justify their reasons to ignore historic benchmark data and include additional safety margins within their designs. Discussions were held at the WPNCS 23rd Annual Meeting in September 2019 regarding the aforementioned issues. The resultant decision was to establish Subgroup 8 (SG-8): Preservation of Expert Knowledge and Judgement Applied to Criticality Benchmarks. The current activities of SG-8 are discussed herein.

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