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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2012

OSRP Source Repatriations-Case Studies: Brazil, Ecuador, Uruguay

The Global Threat Reduction Initiative's (GTRI) Offsite Source Recovery Project (OSRP) began recovering excess and unwanted radioactive sealed sources (sources) in 1999. As of February 2012, the project had recovered over 30,000 sources totaling over 820,000 Ci. OSRP grew out of early efforts at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) to recover disused excess Plutonium- 239 (Pu-239) sources that were distributed in the 1960's and 1970's under the Atoms for Peace Program. Source recovery was initially considered a waste management activity. However, after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the interagency community began to recognize that excess and unwanted radioactive sealed sources pose a national security threat, particularly those that lack a disposition path. After OSRP's transfer to the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to be part of GTRI, its mission was expanded to include all disused sealed sources that might require national security consideration. Recognizing the transnational threat posed by porous borders and the ubiquitous nature of sources, GTRI/OSRP repatriates U.S. origin sources based on threat reduction prioritization criteria. For example, several recent challenging source repatriation missions have been conducted by GTRI/OSRP in South America. These include the repatriation of a significant amount of Cs-137 and other isotopes from Brazil; re-packaging of conditioned Ra-226 sources in Ecuador for future repatriation; and, multilateral cooperation in the consolidation and export of Canadian, US, and Indian Co-60/Cs-137 sources from Uruguay. In addition, cooperation with regulators and private source owners in other countries presents opportunities for GTRI/OSRP to exchange best practices for managing disused sources. These positive experiences often result in long-term cooperation and information sharing with key foreign counterparts. International source recovery operations are essential to the preservation of U.S. national security interests. They are also mutually beneficial for fostering positive relationships with other governments and private industry, and demonstrate that responsible end-of-life options are given to legacy U.S.-origin sources in other countries. GTRI/OSRP does not take back sources that have a viable path for commercial disposal. Most US origin sources were sold commercially and were not provided by the US government. Below is a synopsis of cooperative efforts with Brazil, Ecuador, and Uruguay. Bilateral and multilateral efforts have been successful in removing hundreds of U.S.origin sealed radioactive sources from Latin American countries to the U.S. As many disused sources remain in the region, and since repatriation is not always an option, GTRI will continue to work with those countries to ensure that these sources are stored securely for the long-term. Successful Latin America operations should serve as a model for other regional cooperation in the repatriation of sealed sources, encouraging other source exporting countries to implement similar programs. Securing and removing sources, both domestically and internationally, is crucial to strengthening the life-cycle management of radioactive sources worldwide. Such efforts not only prevent these materials from being used maliciously, but also address public health and safety concerns, and under-gird the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. (authors)

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗
DOE OSTI2016

End of Life Decisions for Sealed Radioactive Sources

Sealed radioactive sources are encountered in a wide variety of settings – from household smoke detectors and instrument check sources, through fixed industrial gauges, industrial radiography and well logging sources, to irradiators and medical teletherapy devices. In general, the higher the level of activity in the sealed source, the stricter the regulatory control that is applied to its use, control and ultimate disposition. Lower levels of attention and oversight can and do lead to sources ending up in the wrong place – as orphan sources in uncontrolled storage, disposed in a sanitary landfill, melted down in metal recycling operations and incorporated into consumer products, or handled by an unsuspecting member of the public. There are a range of issues that contribute to the problem of improper disposal of sealed sources, and, in particular, to disused source disposal. General licensed sources and devices are particularly at risk of being disposed incorrectly. Higher activity general licensed sources, although required to be registered with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) or Agreement State, receive limited regulatory oversight and are not tracked on a national scale. Users frequently do not consider the full life-cycle costs when procuring sources or devices and discover that they cannot afford to package, transport and dispose of their sources properly. The NRC requirements for decommissioning funding plans and financial assurance are not adequate to cover sealed source transport and disposal costs fully. While there are regulatory limits for storage of disused sources, enforcement is limited and there is no financial incentive for owners to dispose of the sources. In some cases, the lack of availability of approved Department of Transportation (DOT) Type B shipping casks also presents a barrier to sealed source disposal. The report of the Disused Sources Working Group does an excellent job of framing these issues. This article reviews both the issues and the report’s recommendations, which are designed to improve sealed source control and encourage proper disposal of disused sources.

disused source↗
DOE OSTI2019

Radiological Risk From Disused Radioactive Sealed Sources in Egypt - 19083

Sealed sources are radioactive nuclear substances encased in a sealed capsule or in a cover to which the substance is bonded, and are used for a variety of activities, such as medical, industrial, academic and research, as well as commercial applications. While most sources are of relatively low activity, there are many of medium or very high activity. In use radioactive sealed sources after time become disused sources according to several reasons like, if the source activity became less than the desired activity (unfit for the intended application), if the model of the instrument became old fashion and no longer uses, if the source had been damaged, and if the user company was shut down and no longer in business. In developing countries, thousands of radium needles, teletherapy sources, oil well logging neutron sources, and miscellaneous industrial radioactive gauges are annually collected as waste and stored in centralized waste facilities. Although these sources become disused, it still dangerous and the mismanagement of high activity sources is responsible for most of the radiological accidents that result in loss of life or disabling injuries. On the other hand, these sources may be a target for criminal acts in countries where final disposal options are unavailable. Egyptian Atomic Energy Authority (EAEA) represented in Hot Labs and Waste Management Center (HLWMC) is responsible by the national nuclear law (law No. 7 /2010) for management of all kinds of radioactive waste including disused radioactive sealed sources from all Egyptian territories. Categorization of disused sources is necessary to ensure that the controls and security measures that are applied to the sources are adequate with its radiological risk. The aim of this work is to use the international Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) categorization system to provide a simple, logical system for grading disused radioactive sealed sources in Egypt as well as to update the inventory of such sources which already collected as waste in Egypt. The categorizations of radioactive sealed sources are based on their potential to cause harm to human health. This study revealed that nearly 980 sources have been defined in Egypt as disused sources with a total activity of 46100 Ci according to available data in July 2018. (author)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2011

THE CHANDRA DEEP FIELD-SOUTH SURVEY: 4 Ms SOURCE CATALOGS

We present source catalogs for the 4 Ms Chandra Deep Field-South (CDF-S), which is the deepest Chandra survey to date and covers an area of 464.5 arcmin{sup 2}. We provide a main Chandra source catalog, which contains 740 X-ray sources that are detected with WAVDETECT at a false-positive probability threshold of 10{sup -5} in at least one of three X-ray bands (0.5-8 keV, full band; 0.5-2 keV, soft band; and 2-8 keV, hard band) and also satisfy a binomial-probability source-selection criterion of P < 0.004 (i.e., the probability of sources not being real is less than 0.004); this approach is designed to maximize the number of reliable sources detected. A total of 300 main-catalog sources are new compared to the previous 2 Ms CDF-S main-catalog sources. We determine X-ray source positions using centroid and matched-filter techniques and obtain a median positional uncertainty of {approx}0.''42. We also provide a supplementary catalog, which consists of 36 sources that are detected with WAVDETECT at a false-positive probability threshold of 10{sup -5}, satisfy the condition of 0.004 < P < 0.1, and have an optical counterpart with R < 24. Multiwavelength identifications, basic optical/infrared/radio photometry, and spectroscopic/photometric redshifts are provided for the X-ray sources in the main and supplementary catalogs. Seven hundred sixteen ({approx}97%) of the 740 main-catalog sources have multiwavelength counterparts, with 673 ({approx}94% of 716) having either spectroscopic or photometric redshifts. The 740 main-catalog sources span broad ranges of full-band flux and 0.5-8 keV luminosity; the 300 new main-catalog sources span similar ranges although they tend to be systematically lower. Basic analyses of the X-ray and multiwavelength properties of the sources indicate that >75% of the main-catalog sources are active galactic nuclei (AGNs); of the 300 new main-catalog sources, about 35% are likely normal and starburst galaxies, reflecting the rise of normal and starburst galaxies at the very faint flux levels uniquely accessible to the 4 Ms CDF-S. Near the center of the 4 Ms CDF-S (i.e., within an off-axis angle of 3'), the observed AGN and galaxy source densities have reached 9800{sup +1300}{sub -1100} deg{sup -2} and 6900{sup +1100}{sub -900} deg{sup -2}, respectively. Simulations show that our main catalog is highly reliable and is reasonably complete. The mean backgrounds (corrected for vignetting and exposure-time variations) are 0.063 and 0.178 counts Ms{sup -1} pixel{sup -1} (for a pixel size of 0.''492) for the soft and hard bands, respectively; the majority of the pixels have zero background counts. The 4 Ms CDF-S reaches on-axis flux limits of {approx}3.2 x 10{sup -17}, 9.1 x 10{sup -18}, and 5.5 x 10{sup -17} erg cm{sup -2} s{sup -1} for the full, soft, and hard bands, respectively. An increase in the CDF-S exposure time by a factor of {approx}2-2.5 would provide further significant gains and probe key unexplored discovery space.

79 ASTRONOMY AND ASTROPHYSICS↗