Results for “Requirement and Standards” — Page 33

NASA NTRS2022

Report of the Interagency Space Reactor Standards Working Group

A U.S. governmental interagency space reactor standards working group (SWG) was convened in April 2021 with a memo from the NASA Chief Engineer to address the limited standards and regulations in place specifically for space reactor design and safety. The convening memo requested support from the Standards Executives of six other federal agencies. The Standards Executives agreed to support a 6-month study to assess the need for consensus standards and identified SWG representatives from each agency. This report summarizes the SWG’s study, their findings, and their recommendations.

Space Reactor Standards Working Group↗

NASA NTRS2023

NASA Glenn Propulsion Systems Laboratory Customer Guide

This guide describes the Propulsion Systems Laboratory (PSL) at NASA Glenn Research Center (GRC) and was written to help customers utilizing the facility understand all the components of conducting a test program within the facility. The PSL complex supports two large engine test cells that simulate altitude flight conditions for a wide range of research and experimental tests. The test cells operate at altitudes up to 90,000 ft and speeds from subsonic to above supersonic. The way the facility sets test points at the engine or test article inlet, such as pressure, temperature, and Mach number is discussed. Support systems such as the heated and cooled combustion air system, the altitude exhaust system, the hydraulic system, the nitrogen, oxygen, and hydrogen systems, hydrogen burners, the engine exhaust gas-sampling system, and single- and multiple-axis thrust stands are addressed. Facility safety procedures, pre-test requirements, test operation standards are also stated in later sections. Past PSL tests and other capabilities are also discussed.

PSL Customer Guide↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Software-Only Key Management and Cryptography (KMC) for Spacecraft Command Encryption

The Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) Advanced Multi-Mission Operations System (AMMOS) in partnership with NASA’s Katherine Johnson Independent Verification and Validation (NASA IV&V) Jon McBride Software Testing and Research (JSTAR) laboratory have jointly developed a command encryption capability that provides a software-only encryption solution utilizing the CCSDS Space Data Link Security Protocol. This solution, named Key Management and Cryptography (KMC), incorporates JPL’s encryption service with the JSTAR open-source CryptoLib library, providing a solution for spacecraft command encryption, which is required per NASA standard NASA-STD-1006-A. This paper will focus on its design, usage, and operation for two SmallSat missions, along with its future expanded functionality of end-to-end spacecraft encryption.

command encryption↗

NASA NTRS2022

Can Machine Learning Reveal Precursors of Reversals of the Geomagnetic Axial Dipole Field?

It is well known that the axial dipole part of Earth’s magnetic field reverses polarity, so that the magnetic North Pole becomes the South Pole and vice versa. The timing of reversals is well documented for the past 160 Myr, but the conditions that lead to a reversal are still not well understood. It is not known if there are reliable ‘precursors’ of reversals (events that indicate that a reversal is upcoming) or what they might be. We investigate if machine learning (ML) techniques can reliably identify precursors of reversals based on time-series of the axial magnetic dipole field. The basic idea is to train a classifier using segments of time-series of the axial magnetic dipole. This training step requires modification of standard ML techniques to account for the fact that we are interested in rare events—a reversal is unusual, while a non-reversing field is the norm. Without our tweak, the ML classifiers lead to useless predictions. Perhaps even more importantly, the usable observational record is limited to 0–2 Ma and contains only five reversals, necessitating that we determine if the data are even sufficient to reliably train and validate an ML algorithm. To answer these questions we use several ML classifiers (linear/non-linear support vector machines and long short-term memory networks), invoke a hierarchy of numerical models (from simplified models to 3-D geodynamo simulations), and two palaeomagnetic reconstructions (PADM2M and Sint-2000). The performance of the ML classifiers varies across the models and the observational record and we provide evidence that this is not an artefact of the numerics, but rather reflects how ‘predictable’ a model or observational record is. Studying models of Earth’s magnetic field via ML classifiers thus can help with identifying shortcomings or advantages of the various models. For Earth’s magnetic field, we conclude that the ability of ML to identify precursors of reversals is limited, largely due to the small amount and low frequency resolution of data, which makes training and subsequent validation nearly impossible. Put simply: the ML techniques we tried are not currently capable of reliably identifying an axial dipole moment (ADM) precursor for geomagnetic reversals. This does not necessarily imply that such a precursor does not exist, and improvements in temporal resolution and length of ADM records may well offer better prospects in the future.

Kyle Gwirtz↗

NASA NTRS2024

Considerations for Using Autonomous Flight Termination Software in Crewed Launch Vehicles

Autonomous flight termination systems (AFTS) are being progressively employed onboard launch vehicles to replace ground personnel and infrastructure needed to terminate flight or destruct the vehicle should an anomaly occur. This automation uses on-board real-time data and encoded logic to determine if the flight should be self-terminated. For uncrewed launch vehicles, FTS systems are required to protect the public and governed by the United States Space Force (USSF). For crewed missions, NASA must augment range AFTS requirements for crew safety and certify each flight according to human rating standards, thus adding unique requirements for reuse of software originally intended for uncrewed missions. This bulletin summarizes new information relating to AFTS to raise awareness of key distinctions, summarize considerations and outline best practices for incorporating AFTS into human-rated systems.

Avionics↗

NASA NTRS2025

Astronaut Physiological Deconditioning and Exercise Prescription Countermeasures in Spaceflight

The human skeletal muscular and cardiovascular systems are adapted to the upright posture of Earth’s gravitational environment. Astronauts experience an altered gravity environment in spaceflight that leads to a number of physiological changes and decrements to these systems that can decrease overall crew performance. Countermeasures, including prescribed exercise during spaceflight, is vital for astronauts to maintain optimal health and performance. The degree of physiological deconditioning is dependent on a multitude of factors such as sex, age, mission duration, fitness level, and gravity environments experienced. Deconditioning begins immediately upon entering an altered gravity environment and physiological decrements of the skeletal muscular and cardiovascular systems are measurable among astronauts within a few days. Thus, to maintain their physical fitness, ability to perform mission duties, and be able to egress vehicles when needed, it is imperative that astronauts participate in exercise during all phases of flight. This is especially important for long duration flights where deconditioning effects can be more deleterious. The NASA Office of the Chief Health and Medical Officer 3001 Standards Team develops requirements utilized by commercial and international partners to better understand spaceflight-induced physiological changes and countermeasures and expected outcomes with or without exercise.

exercise physiology↗

DOE OSTI2022

Energy Management Information Systems Cybersecurity Best Practices

Energy management information systems (EMIS) are a broad and rapidly evolving family of tools that monitor, analyze, and control building energy use and system performance. Critical systems are often integrated with or operate on the same networks as EMIS scope systems, necessitating stable, continuous, and secure communication. When connecting EMIS to building automation and utility control systems, there are also many physical assets that could cause harm to the building and its occupants if a malicious act or human error were introduced. It is imperative to ensure all EMIS scope systems are connected securely to the EMIS and do not open vulnerable pathways to other facility networks and operations. The Federal Energy Management Program (FEMP) promotes best practices for impactful utilization of EMIS at federal facilities. This best practice document is part of a series of fact sheets created to help accelerate the market adoption and use of EMIS in the federal sector. It provides an overview of required EMIS cybersecurity standards for compliance and authority to operate along with additional recommendations.

cybersecurity↗

DOE OSTI2022

Energy Management Information Systems Cybersecurity Best Practices

Energy management information systems (EMIS) are a broad and rapidly evolving family of tools that monitor, analyze, and control building energy use and system performance. Critical systems are often integrated with or operate on the same networks as EMIS scope systems, necessitating stable, continuous, and secure communication. When connecting EMIS to building automation and utility control systems, there are also many physical assets that could cause harm to the building and its occupants if a malicious act or human error were introduced. It is imperative to ensure all EMIS scope systems are connected securely to the EMIS and do not open vulnerable pathways to other facility networks and operations. The Federal Energy Management Program (FEMP) promotes best practices for impactful utilization of EMIS at federal facilities. This best practice document is part of a series of fact sheets created to help accelerate the market adoption and use of EMIS in the federal sector. It provides an overview of required EMIS cybersecurity standards for compliance and authority to operate along with additional recommendations.

Cybersecurity↗

DOE OSTI2020

New Beginnings: Optimising Waste and End-state at UK Nuclear Sites to Enable Environmental Permit surrender (the GRR) - 20193

The decommissioning of nuclear sites involves the management of large volumes of radioactive waste, other conventional waste, and the clean-up of land and groundwater contamination. In the UK, the disposal of radioactive waste from nuclear sites is regulated by the Environment Agency (England), Natural Resources Wales (Wales) and the Scottish Environment Protection Agency (Scotland). All three environment agencies seek to make sure that the generation and disposal of radioactive waste is optimised: ensuring impacts to people are 'as low as reasonably achievable' (ALARA). With a large proportion of UK nuclear sites embarking on decommissioning, the environment agencies have collaboratively developed new guidance: the 'Management of radioactive waste from the decommissioning of nuclear sites: Guidance on the Requirements for Release from radioactive substances regulation' (referred to as the GRR)[1]. The environment agencies worked in liaison with the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR), the UK nuclear safety regulator, and the UK government body responsible, the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA). Prior to finalising the guidance, a 12 month trial was completed at three of the NDA's nuclear sites, enabling the environment agencies to test their draft GRR guidance against 'real world scenarios' and the challenge of incorporating its requirements into decommissioning plans. Experience gained during the trial was incorporated into the current version of the GRR, published in July 2018. The GRR represents the 'new beginning' of this paper's title because for the first time, the UK environmental regulators have expressed in detail their requirements for surrender of environmental permits for nuclear sites. The GRR provides a framework for a UK nuclear site to plan, assess and justify its management of radioactive waste and deliver through decommissioning, an optimal, environmentally safe and sustainable end-state. This paper will describe the requirements and technical standards within the GRR, the establishment of defensible clean-up criteria and the production of a Waste Management Plan (WMP), supported by a Site-Wide Environmental Safety Case (SWESC). It will describe the experience gleaned by operators and regulators during the trial and it will highlight current work by regulators to implement the new approach proportionately. Finally, this paper will look forward and outline planned amendments to legislation in the UK affecting nuclear sites that should enable the full benefits of the GRR to be realised in the future. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2024

Fabrication and Testing of DOE Standard Canister Closure Leak Test Assembly

DOE manages over 300 types of spent nuclear fuel (SNF), many of which are located at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) site. Managing this large variety of SNF for storage, transportation, and disposal poses a challenge to DOE. The Idaho Cleanup Project and INL are collaborating on the DOE SNF Road-Ready Demonstration (“Road-Ready Demonstration”), which will develop and demonstrate the designs, technology, processes, and regulatory framework for packaging DOE-managed SNF for “road-ready dry storage.” Road-ready dry storage is an SNF management concept in which SNF is packaged into dry, sealed canisters that are then placed in onsite storage in anticipation of later transport and disposition. The forward-looking goal of the Road-Ready Demonstration is to establish the foundation for a large-scale road-ready dry storage program at the INL site. In support of establishing a large-scale road-ready dry storage program at the INL site, the Road-Ready Demonstration will first package Fort St. Vrain SNF currently in dry storage at INL into several DOE Standard Canisters (DOESCs). These DOESCs will in turn be loaded into another containment similar to commercial multi-purpose canisters. This multi-purpose canister will then be compatible with a transportation or storage system, such as a storage cask for interim storage or transportation package for offsite transport. These DOESCs will remain sealed over the course of their storage, transportation, and applicable disposal functions. The closure process for the DOESC will include fuel and basket loading, welding, inspection, leak testing, and, if needed, repair. As a follow-up to previous discussions on the design of the DOE Closure Leak Test Assembly (LTA), this report describes recent fabrication and testing efforts performed at INL. DOESCs are sealed by two sequential gas tungsten arc welds, both of which are performed by remotely operated and semiautomatic welding systems. The first weld is a circumferential pipe weld that completes the assembly of the canister body and lid assembly. The second and final closure weld attaches the vent plug to the vent socket via a butt joint. After the second weld is performed, the welds are helium leak tested using an evacuated envelope technique. The LTA was designed for both remote and manual operation. This report describes the fabrication and performance testing associated with the evacuated envelope technique. INL staff designed, fabricated, and tested the LTA at INL facilities. This testing included establishing technique and system sensitivities in accordance with ASME and American National Standards Institute N14.5 requirements. Forthcoming work will cover such areas as design optimization, process and personnel qualification, and implementation in Road-Ready Demonstration operations.

42 ENGINEERING↗

DOE OSTI2023

Fabrication and Testing of DOE Standard Canister Closure Leak Test Assembly – 24139

DOE manages over 300 types of spent nuclear fuel (SNF), many of which are located at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) site. Managing this large variety of SNF for storage, transportation, and disposal poses a challenge to DOE. The Idaho Cleanup Project and INL are collaborating on the DOE SNF Road-Ready Demonstration (“Road-Ready Demonstration”), which will develop and demonstrate the designs, technology, processes, and regulatory framework for packaging DOE-managed SNF for “road-ready dry storage.” Road-ready dry storage is an SNF management concept in which SNF is packaged into dry, sealed canisters that are then placed in onsite storage in anticipation of later transport and disposition. The forward-looking goal of the Road-Ready Demonstration is to establish the foundation for a large-scale road-ready dry storage program at the INL site. In support of establishing a large-scale road-ready dry storage program at the INL site, the Road-Ready Demonstration will first package Fort St. Vrain SNF currently in dry storage at INL into several DOE Standard Canisters (DOESCs). These DOESCs will in turn be loaded into another containment similar to commercial multi-purpose canisters. This multi-purpose canister will then be compatible with a transportation or storage system, such as a storage cask for interim storage or transportation package for offsite transport. These DOESCs will remain sealed over the course of their storage, transportation, and applicable disposal functions. The closure process for the DOESC will include fuel and basket loading, welding, inspection, leak testing, and, if needed, repair. As a follow-up to previous discussions on the design of the DOE Closure Leak Test Assembly (LTA), this report describes recent fabrication and testing efforts performed at INL. DOESCs are sealed by two sequential gas tungsten arc welds, both of which are performed by remotely operated and semiautomatic welding systems. The first weld is a circumferential pipe weld that completes the assembly of the canister body and lid assembly. The second and final closure weld attaches the vent plug to the vent socket via a butt joint. After the second weld is performed, the welds are helium leak tested using an evacuated envelope technique. The LTA was designed for both remote and manual operation. This report describes the fabrication and performance testing associated with the evacuated envelope technique. INL staff designed, fabricated, and tested the LTA at INL facilities. This testing included establishing technique and system sensitivities in accordance with ASME and American National Standards Institute N14.5 requirements. Forthcoming work will cover such areas as design optimization, process and personnel qualification, and implementation in Road-Ready Demonstration operations.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2026

Fermilab PIP II machine protection system digitized data noise elimination scheme and its FPGA implementation

In Fermilab's PIP-II machine protection system, beam loss signals from various detectors are digitized at 125 MS/s. Noise from both high-frequency sources and low-frequency 60 Hz AC power equipment can contaminate the data. To suppress noise across these ranges especially 60 Hz and its harmonics, which overlap with beam loss signal frequencies advanced digital processing beyond standard filtering is required. Several real-time functional blocks were simulated and tested on an FPGA: (1) a dual time-constant discharging integrator filter, (2) a de-ripple baseline extraction and storage block, and (3) a fast-recovery discharging integrator. The nonlinear IIR integrator filter removes high-frequency noise and feeds into the baseline extractor. Upon detecting abrupt beam loss, it switches to a longer time constant to prevent baseline distortion. The de-ripple block calculates a valid baseline by averaging over multiple 60 Hz periods, storing results in a 4096-word FPGA RAM. This baseline is subtracted from raw data before integration by the fast-recovery block, which resets quickly after use. All blocks achieved expected performance.

Wu, J. [Fermilab] (ORCID:0000000344329521)↗

DOE OSTI2026

Impact of Molten Gallium on the Microstructure and Corrosion Behavior of Aluminum and Uranium-Aluminum Alloys for Used Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing

Test reactors around the world utilize highly enriched uranium fuel to achieve high neutron fluxes for materials testing. Once spent, the remaining uranium is a valuable resource for subsequent fuel fabrication. However, some of these test reactor cores consist of curved plate-type fuel elements, fabricated using aluminum alloy 6061 (AA6061) cladding to encapsulate a uranium-aluminum alloy (UAlx) fuel matrix. These assemblies require non-standard reprocessing approaches for uranium recovery, as aluminum dissolves readily in acidic solutions, generating large volumes of waste and complicating downstream chemical separations. In this work, we investigate a novel chemical decladding strategy based on the interaction between AA6061/UAlx and molten gallium (Ga). Ga is known to induce severe degradation of aluminum metal through liquid metal embrittlement (LME), even at relatively low Ga concentrations. By penetrating the aluminum crystal lattice, Ga disrupts grain cohesion and facilitates fracture or dissolution of the aluminum matrix. Thermodynamic analysis of the Al–Ga binary phase diagram suggests that Ga may offer a viable pathway to selectively weaken or dissolve the AA6061 cladding, and potentially the aluminum component of the UAlx fuel matrix within. To this end, parametric experiments were performed at 50 °C and 100 °C across a range of Al–Ga atomic fractions. At lower Al fractions, the AA6061 was completely molten after 2 hours of exposure to the Ga metal. In contrast, samples with higher Al fractions (0.9 Al, 0.1 Ga) contained residual solids after 2 hours, which were characterized by microstructural examination using electron backscatter diffraction (EBSD) and transmission electron microscopy (TEM). These Al-Ga compositions were also evaluated using FactSage thermodynamic modeling to further elucidate the relationship between phase diagram behavior and LME.

11 - NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2021

Securing Distributed Energy Resource Integration

The penetration of distributed energy resources (DER) is growing at much higher rates than predicted 20 years ago. Far from being used only in residential settings, DER are now installed on distribution and transmission circuits. In this position, they do not have the same properties as traditional generators and are more flexible in many cases. The growing penetration and range of uses for DER motivate the need to reliably and safely integrate them into the grid. Operators must be able to rely on them not only for normal operation, but also during abnormal conditions like black starts or adverse cyber scenarios. To that end, we study the communications, device interfaces, and potential consequences of DER operation under abnormal and adversarial conditions. The weaknesses of communications networks are studied based on the industrial protocols used, and the benefits of security features are examined. The device interfaces are found to be vulnerable to attack based on the requirements in the IEEE-1547 standard for DER interconnection and interoperability, which is expected to be adopted in the next ten years. In addition to exploring the requirements of the standard, we show that these vulnerabilities and others do exist and can be used maliciously in a modern storage system DER. Consequences of these vulnerabilities range from exacerbated grid instability, to simultaneous loss of large portions of DER penetration, to physical damage to inverters or DER themselves and other sensitive equipment. We tie these outcomes to specific attacker actions in an effort to give operators a better threat intelligence view that allows them to prioritize mitigations. Finally, we discuss mitigations that could prevent many of the adversarial scenarios described. Some solutions can be added to existing infrastructure, while others may require longer term planning for grid modernization with consideration for security.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗

NASA NTRS2012

Vehicle Health Management Communications Requirements for AeroMACS

As the development of standards for the aeronautical mobile airport communications system (AeroMACS) progresses, the process of identifying and quantifying appropriate uses for the system is progressing. In addition to defining important elements of AeroMACS standards, indentifying the systems uses impacts AeroMACS bandwidth requirements. Although an initial 59 MHz spectrum allocation for AeroMACS was established in 2007, the allocation may be inadequate; studies have indicated that 100 MHz or more of spectrum may be required to support airport surface communications. Hence additional spectrum allocations have been proposed. Vehicle health management (VHM) systems, which can produce large volumes of vehicle health data, were not considered in the original bandwidth requirements analyses, and are therefore of interest in supporting proposals for additional AeroMACS spectrum. VHM systems are an emerging development in air vehicle safety, and preliminary estimates of the amount of data that will be produced and transmitted off an aircraft, both in flight and on the ground, have been prepared based on estimates of data produced by on-board vehicle health sensors and initial concepts of data processing approaches. This allowed an initial estimate of VHM data transmission requirements for the airport surface. More recently, vehicle-level systems designed to process and analyze VHM data and draw conclusions on the current state of vehicle health have been undergoing testing and evaluation. These systems make use of vehicle system data that is mostly different from VHM data considered previously for airport surface transmission, and produce processed system outputs that will be also need to be archived, thus generating additional data load for AeroMACS. This paper provides an analysis of airport surface data transmission requirements resulting from the vehicle level reasoning systems, within the context of overall VHM data requirements.

Kerczewski, Robert J.↗

NASA NTRS2002

Designing Crane Controls with Applied Mechanical and Electrical Safety Features

The use of overhead traveling bridge cranes in many varied applications is common practice. In particular, the use of cranes in the nuclear, military, commercial, aerospace, and other industries can involve safety critical situations. Considerations for Human Injury or Casualty, Loss of Assets, Endangering the Environment, or Economic Reduction must be addressed. Traditionally, in order to achieve additional safety in these applications, mechanical systems have been augmented with a variety of devices. These devices assure that a mechanical component failure shall reduce the risk of a catastrophic loss of the correct and/or safe load carrying capability. ASME NOG-1-1998, (Rules for Construction of Overhead and Gantry Cranes, Top Running Bridge, and Multiple Girder), provides design standards for cranes in safety critical areas. Over and above the minimum safety requirements of todays design standards, users struggle with obtaining a higher degree of reliability through more precise functional specifications while attempting to provide "smart" safety systems. Electrical control systems also may be equipped with protective devices similar to the mechanical design features. Demands for improvement of the cranes "control system" is often recognized, but difficult to quantify for this traditionally "mechanically" oriented market. Finite details for each operation must be examined and understood. As an example, load drift (or small motions) at close tolerances can be unacceptable (and considered critical). To meet these high functional demands encoders and other devices are independently added to control systems to provide motion and velocity feedback to the control drive. This paper will examine the implementation of Programmable Electronic Systems (PES). PES is a term this paper will use to describe any control system utilizing any programmable electronic device such as Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC), or an Adjustable Frequency Drive (AID) 'smart' programmable motion controller. Therefore the use of the term Programmable Electronic Systems (PES) is an encompassing description for a large spectrum of programmable electronic control devices.

Lytle, Bradford P.↗

DOE OSTI2024

Digital-Twin-Enabling Technologies for Online Condition Monitoring of Nuclear Power Plant Components

Online condition monitoring is an area of active research that may enable optimized scheduling, maintenance, and safety of nuclear power plant components, reducing unnecessary derates while simultaneously improving operational capacity. Digital twins (DTs) are one avenue to conduct online condition monitoring and are currently being explored by national laboratories and universities alike. DTs for online condition monitoring are, in essence, state concurrent models that emulate a physical process which predicts a parameter and compares it against a measured value. A DT’s goal is to provide additional insights by combining and interpreting various sources of information for preventative maintenance scheduling optimization or early fault detection. DTs for condition monitoring are projected to be valuable for meeting requirements under 10 CFR 50.55a, “Codes and Standards,” and 10 CFR 50.65, “Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants”. However, DT technologies are still under significant development, and the process for developing a DT for condition monitoring has not been formalized. Therefore, in this work, we present an initial framework for developing a DT, discuss and review the various challenges and considerations for DT deployment, and identify the opportunities that a DT can improve. The presented framework is intended to help developers formulate a strategy when approaching DT development for condition monitoring. In conclusion, a DT use case for a reactor coolant pump is presented to demonstrate the proposed framework.

advanced sensor instrumentation↗

NASA NTRS2016

Characterization of Evidence for Human System Risk Assessment

Understanding the kinds of evidence available and using the best evidence to answer a question is critical to evidenced-based decision-making, and it requires synthesis of evidence from a variety of sources. Categorization of human system risks in spaceflight, in particular, focuses on how well the integration and interpretation of all available evidence informs the risk statement that describes the relationship between spaceflight hazards and an outcome of interest. A mature understanding and categorization of these risks requires: 1) sufficient characterization of risk, 2) sufficient knowledge to determine an acceptable level of risk (i.e., a standard), 3) development of mitigations to meet the acceptable level of risk, and 4) identification of factors affecting generalizability of the evidence to different design reference missions. In the medical research community, evidence is often ranked by increasing confidence in findings gleaned from observational and experimental research (e.g., "levels of evidence"). However, an approach based solely on aspects of experimental design is problematic in assessing human system risks for spaceflight. For spaceflight, the unique challenges and opportunities include: (1) The independent variables in most evidence are the hazards of spaceflight, such as space radiation or low gravity, which cannot be entirely duplicated in terrestrial (Earth-based) analogs, (2) Evidence is drawn from multiple sources including medical and mission operations, Lifetime Surveillance of Astronaut Health (LSAH), spaceflight research (LSDA), and relevant environmental & terrestrial databases, (3) Risk metrics based primarily on LSAH data are typically derived from available prevalence or incidence data, which may limit rigorous interpretation, (4) The timeframe for obtaining adequate spaceflight sample size (n) is very long, given the small population, (5) Randomized controlled trials are unattainable in spaceflight, (6) Collection of personal and environmental data on the astronaut population may create opportunities for advanced analytics and human-environment modeling that goes beyond that achieved in isolated experimental designs; and (7) Translation of relevant research to operations is a complex, transdisciplinary enterprise in which the approach must apply across the physical, biological, behavioral, and social sciences. The approach to synthesizing evidence must address both source and fidelity of data, and reflect the most general attributes of quality of evidence in science and engineering: reliability and validity. The authors are developing a two-factor approach which includes the various kinds of evidence required to understand risks and for the integrated interpretation of all evidence that is essential to develop standards and countermeasures. A unified framework for aggregating and assessing different kinds of evidence provides a consistent, traceable, evidence-based decision-making process to translate research to operations in an environment where engineers, scientists, physicians, and managers all engage in analyzing the trade space of vehicle design, standards, requirements and solutions for spaceflight.

Steinberg, S. L.↗