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Advanced Reactor Safeguards & Security Program: Cybersecurity Scenarios

The use of digital control systems and automation in advanced nuclear power systems introduces different types of vulnerabilities compared to legacy (i.e. analog) control systems that cyber adversaries can exploit. These vulnerabilities pose a challenge to reactor operators and cyber operations staff due to the dynamic nature of the event in which a human response or a lack of response can potentially evolve into a worsening plant condition. Using the Department of Homeland Security Cyber and Infrastructure Security Agency’s (CISA) critical infrastructure exercise framework, this document presents several cyber security scenarios typical of digital control systems that could be used in advanced reactor designs. These scenarios can be used in tabletop exercises to evaluate cyber security posture or conduct training on different aspects of cyber security, including detection, threat hunting using indicators of compromise, evaluating incident response, risk mitigation, incident reporting, information sharing and recovery.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Securing The Future: 2026 Manufacturing & Critical Infrastructure Threat Landscape

This report outlines the current state of manufacturing weaknesses introduced by the complexities of modern environments, including cloud services and Internet of Things (IoT) devices, with particular attention paid to the unique vulnerabilities encountered by SMMs. It also highlights CyManII’s strategic initiatives and collaborative solutions to mitigate these risks and strengthen the cybersecurity posture of the manufacturing ecosystem. Utilizing data from 2025 to inform forward-looking mitigation strategies, this report provides manufacturers with a clear understanding of both current and emerging cybersecurity threats, as well as practical opportunities to strengthen their cyber ecosystems. The following sections detail key vulnerabilities and threat vectors, along with actionable mitigation strategies, many of which have been developed or piloted through CyManII-led efforts. A thorough understanding of these risks and mitigation strategies is essential for manufacturers seeking to strengthen the security and resilience of their manufacturing operations.

3D Printing↗

FIC Consequence Profile - Hypothetical Cybercrime Syndicate Adversary Dossier

The FIC team has engaged PNNL’s Shamrock Cyber team to produce this Consequence Profile. This Consequence Profile is an Adversary Dossier, which provides the foundation for a thorough understanding of unacceptable mission outcomes, and the threats and vulnerabilities that make these outcomes plausible. The dossier helps stakeholders and development teams understand each other’s viewpoints. It also provides a means for reducing overall risk by prioritizing threats and vulnerabilities based on unacceptable outcomes. The Consequence Profile can be used as is, or as content to inform other reports tailored to a specific audience. It is intended to enable decision makers at all levels to improve the security posture of the system.

Beaman, Jacob E.↗

Explorer-II: Wireless Self-Powered Visual and NDE Robotic Inspection System for Live Gas Distribution Mains

Carnegie Mellon University (CMU) under contract from Department of Energy/National Energy Technology Laboratory (DoE/NETL) and co-funding from the Northeast Gas Association (NGA), has completed the overall system design, field-trial and Magnetic Flux Leakage (MFL) sensor evaluation program for the next-generation Explorer-II (X-II) live gas main Non-destructive Evaluation (NDE) and visual inspection robot platform. The design is based on the Explorer-I prototype which was built and field-tested under a prior (also DoE- and NGA co-funded) program, and served as the validation that self-powered robots under wireless control could access and navigate live natural gas distribution mains. The X-II system design ({approx}8 ft. and 66 lbs.) was heavily based on the X-I design, yet was substantially expanded to allow the addition of NDE sensor systems (while retaining its visual inspection capability), making it a modular system, and expanding its ability to operate at pressures up to 750 psig (high-pressure and unpiggable steel-pipe distribution mains). A new electronics architecture and on-board software kernel were added to again improve system performance. A locating sonde system was integrated to allow for absolute position-referencing during inspection (coupled with external differential GPS) and emergency-locating. The power system was upgraded to utilize lithium-based battery-cells for an increase in mission-time. The resulting robot-train system with CAD renderings of the individual modules. The system architecture now relies on a dual set of end camera-modules to house the 32-bit processors (Single-Board Computer or SBC) as well as the imaging and wireless (off-board) and CAN-based (on-board) communication hardware and software systems (as well as the sonde-coil and -electronics). The drive-module (2 ea.) are still responsible for bracing (and centering) to drive in push/pull fashion the robot train into and through the pipes and obstacles. The steering modules and their arrangement, still allow the robot to configure itself to perform any-angle (up to 90 deg) turns in any orientation (incl. vertical), and enable the live launching and recovery of the system using custom fittings and a (to be developed) launch-chamber/-tube. The battery modules are used to power the system, by providing power to the robot's bus. The support modules perform the functions of centration for the rest of the train as well as odometry pickups using incremental encoding schemes. The electronics architecture is based on a distributed (8-bit) microprocessor architecture (at least 1 in ea. module) communicating to a (one of two) 32-bit SBC, which manages all video-processing, posture and motion control as well as CAN and wireless communications. The operator controls the entire system from an off-board (laptop) controller, which is in constant wireless communication with the robot train in the pipe. The sensor modules collect data and forward it to the robot operator computer (via the CAN-wireless communications chain), who then transfers it to a dedicated NDE data-storage and post-processing computer for further (real-time or off-line) analysis. The prototype robot system was built and tested indoors and outdoors, outfitted with a Remote-Field Eddy Current (RFEC) sensor integrated as its main NDE sensor modality. An angled launcher, allowing for live launching and retrieval, was also built to suit custom angled launch-fittings from TDW. The prototype vehicle and launcher systems are shown. The complete system, including the in-pipe robot train, launcher, integrated NDE-sensor and real-time video and control console and NDE-data collection and -processing and real-time display, were demonstrated to all sponsors prior to proceeding into final field-trials--the individual components and setting for said acceptance demonstration are shown. The launcher-tube was also used to verify that the vehicle system is capable of operating in high-pressure environments, and is safely deployable using proper evacuating/purging techniques for operation in the potentially explosive natural gas environment. The test-setting and environment for safety-certification of the X-II robot platform and the launch and recovery procedures, is shown. Field-trials were successfully carried out in a live steel pipeline in Northwestern Pennsylvania. The robot was launched and recovered multiple times, travelling thousands of feet and communicating in real time with video and command-and-control (C&C) data under remote operator control from a laptop, with NDE sensor-data streaming to a second computer for storage, display and post-processing. Representative images of the activities and systems used in the week-long field-trial are shown. CMU also evaluated the ability of the X-II design to be able to integrate an MFL sensor, by adding additional drive-/battery-/steering- and support-modules to extend the X-II train.

03 NATURAL GAS↗

Audit Report on "The Office of Science's Management of Information Technology Resources"

The Department of Energy's Office of Science (Science) and its facility contractors are aggressive users of information technology (IT) to support fundamental research in areas such as energy, environmental remediation and computational sciences. Of its $4 billion Fiscal Year 2008 budget, Science spent about $287 million to manage its IT program. This included cyber security activities, acquisition of hardware and software, and support service costs used to maintain the operating environments necessary to support the missions of the program. Prior Office of Inspector General reports have identified various issues with Science's management of its IT programs and resources. For instance, our report on Facility Contractor Acquisition and Management of Information Technology Hardware (DOE/IG-0768, June 2007) noted that the Science sites reviewed spent more than necessary when acquiring IT hardware. In another example, our review of The Department's Efforts to Implement Common Information Technology Services at Headquarters (DOE/IG-0763, March 2007) disclosed that Science's reluctance to adopt the Department of Energy Common Operating Environment (DOE-COE) at Headquarters contributed to the Department's inability to fully realize potential cost savings through consolidation and economies of scale. In light of the magnitude of the Office of Science IT program and previously identified program weaknesses, we initiated this audit to determine whether Science adequately managed its IT resources. Science had taken a number of actions to improve its cyber security posture and align its program to Federal requirements. Yet, our review disclosed that it had not taken some basic steps to enhance security and reduce costs. In particular, we found that: (1) For their non-scientific computing environments, all seven of the field sites reviewed (two Federal, five contractor) had implemented security configurations that were less stringent than those included in the Federal Desktop Core Configuration. This configuration was designed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology and its use was mandated by the Office of Management and Budget; (2) Although we previously highlighted weaknesses and recommended corrective actions, Science still had not fully established or enforced IT hardware standards for acquiring hardware such as desktop and laptop computers or related peripherals, contributing to significant unnecessary expenditures; and (3) While we have noted in a series of past reports that significant savings could be realized from aggregating demand for IT services and products across the enterprise, Science had not implemented a common infrastructure for users at its Federal sites and continued to maintain an IT environment independent of the Department's Common IT Operating Environment. The weaknesses identified were attributable, at least in part, to a lack of adequate policies and procedures for ensuring effective cyber security and hardware acquisition practices. In addition, Science had not effectively monitored the performance of its field sites to ensure that previously reported internal control weaknesses were addressed and had not implemented an appropriate mechanism to track its IT-related costs. Without improvements, Science may be unable to realize the benefits of improved security over its information systems, reduce costs associated with hardware acquisition, and lower IT support costs through consolidation of services. In particular, we determined that Science could potentially realize savings of more than $3.3 million over the next three years by better controlling hardware costs and implementing standards for certain equipment. Furthermore, Science could continue to pay for duplicative IT support services and fail to take advantage of opportunities to lower costs and apply potential savings to mission-related work. During the course of our audit work, we learned from Science officials that they had initiated the process of revising the Program Cyber Security Plan to better clarify its policy for implementing Federal cyber security requirements. In addition, we noted that the Oak Ridge National Laboratory had taken action to establish and enforce hardware standards on both its administrative and scientific workforce. Although these actions are positive steps, additional action is needed to strengthen Science's IT program. To that end, our report contains several recommendations that, if fully implemented, should help Science improve the management of its IT resources.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

INFORMATION: Management Alert on Environmental Management's Select Strategy for Disposition of Savannah River Site Depleted Uranium Oxides

The Administration and the Congress, through policy statements and passage of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act), have signaled that they hope that proactive actions by agency Inspectors General will help ensure that Federal Recovery Act activities are transparent, effective and efficient. In that context, the purpose of this management alert is to share with you concerns that have been raised to the Office of Inspector General regarding the planned disposition of the Savannah River Site's (SRS) inventory of Depleted Uranium (DU) oxides. This inventory, generated as a by-product of the nuclear weapons production process and amounting to approximately 15,600 drums of DU oxides, has been stored at SRS for decades. A Department source we deem reliable and credible recently came to the Office of Inspector General expressing concern that imminent actions are planned that may not provide for the most cost effective disposition of these materials. During April 2009, the Department chose to use funds provided under the Recovery Act to accelerate final disposition of the SRS inventory of DU oxides. After coordination with State of Utah regulators, elected officials and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Department initiated a campaign to ship the material to a facility operated by EnergySolutions in Clive, Utah. Although one shipment of a portion of the material has already been sent to the EnergySolutions facility, the majority of the product remains at SRS. As had been planned, both for the shipment already made and those planned in the near term, the EnergySolutions facility was to have been the final disposal location for the material. Recently, a member of Congress and various Utah State officials raised questions regarding the radioactive and other constituents present in the DU oxides to be disposed of at the Clive, Utah, facility. These concerns revolved around the characterization of the material and its acceptability under existing licensing criteria. As a consequence, the Governor of Utah met with Department officials to voice concerns regarding further shipments of the material and to seek return of the initial shipment of DU oxides to SRS. Utah's objections and the Department's agreement to accede to the State's demands effectively prohibit the transfer of the remaining material from South Carolina to Utah. In response, the Department evaluated its options and issued a draft decision paper on March 1, 2010, which outlined an alternative for temporary storage until the final disposition issue could be resolved. Under the terms of the proposed option, the remaining shipments from SRS are to be sent on an interim basis to a facility owned by Waste Control Specialists (WCS) in Andrews, Texas. Clearly, this choice carries with it a number of significant logistical burdens, including substantial additional costs for, among several items, repackaging at SRS, transportation to Texas, storage at the interim site, and, repackaging and transportation to the yet-to-be-determined final disposition point. The Department source expressed the concern that the proposal to store the material on an interim basis in Texas was inefficient and unnecessary, asserting: (1) that the materials could remain at SRS until a final disposition path is identified, and that this could be done safely, securely and cost effectively; and, (2) that the nature of the material was not subject to existing compliance agreements with the State of South Carolina, suggesting the viability of keeping the material in storage at SRS until a permanent disposal site is definitively established. We noted that, while the Department's decision paper referred to 'numerous project and programmatic factors that make it impractical to retain the remaining inventory at Savannah River,' it did not outline the specific issues involved nor did it provide any substantive economic or environmental analysis supporting the need for the planned interim storage action. The only apparent driver in this case was a Recovery Act-related goal established by the Department to accelerate the general disposition of the SRS material. We recognize that decisions such as the one proposed for the SRS inventory of DU oxides are often more complex and nuanced than might appear on the surface. Consideration of factors such as cost, state interest, posture of local regulators, etc., are important elements in this process. Although, we have not completed sufficient work to reach an independent judgment on the merits of this matter, we wanted to ensure that the Department was aware of the concerns that have been raised before imminent decisions and resource commitments were made regarding the path forward.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Evaluation of Storage for Transportation Equipment, Unfueled Convertors, and Fueled Convertors at the INL for the Radioisotope Power Systems Program

This report contains an evaluation of the storage conditions required for several key components and/or systems of the Radioisotope Power Systems (RPS) Program at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL). These components/systems (transportation equipment, i.e., type ‘B’ shipping casks and the radioisotope thermo-electric generator transportation systems (RTGTS), the unfueled convertors, i.e., multi-hundred watt (MHW) and general purpose heat source (GPHS) RTGs, and fueled convertors of several types) are currently stored in several facilities at the Materials and Fuels Complex (MFC) site. For various reasons related to competing missions, inherent growth of the RPS mission at the INL and enhanced efficiency, it is necessary to evaluate their current storage situation and recommend the approach that should be pursued going forward for storage of these vital RPS components and systems. The reasons that drive this evaluation include, but are not limited to the following: 1) conflict with other missions at the INL of higher priority, 2) increasing demands from the INL RPS Program that exceed the physical capacity of the current storage areas and 3) the ability to enhance our current capability to care for our equipment, decrease maintenance costs and increase the readiness posture of the systems.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Leveraging U.S. nuclear weapons policy to advance U.S. nonproliferation goals : implications of major theories of international relations.

National policymakers are currently considering a dilemma of critical importance to the continued security of the United States: how can U.S. nuclear weapons policies be leveraged to benefit U.S. nuclear nonproliferation goals in the near-term, without sacrificing U.S. national security? In its role supporting U.S. nuclear weapons policy, Sandia National Laboratories has a responsibility to provide objective technical advice to support policy deliberations on this question. However, to best fulfill this duty Sandia must have a broader understanding of the context of the problem. To help develop this understanding, this paper analyzes the two predominant analytical perspectives of international relations theory to explore their prescriptions for how nuclear weapons and nonproliferation policies interact. As lenses with which to view and make sense of the world, theories of international relations must play a crucial role in framing the trade-offs at the intersection of the nuclear weapons and nonproliferation policy domains. An analysis of what these theories suggest as courses of action to leverage nuclear weapons policies to benefit nonproliferation goals is then offered, with particular emphasis on where the policy prescriptions resulting from the respective theories align to offer near-term policy changes with broad theoretical support. These policy prescriptions are then compared to the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review to understand what the theories indicate policymakers may have gotten right in their dealing with the nuclear dilemma, and where they may have gone wrong. Finally, a brief international relations research agenda is proposed to help address the dilemma between nuclear deterrence and nuclear nonproliferation policies, with particular emphasis on how such an agenda can best support the needs of the policy community and a potential 'all things nuclear' policy deliberation and decision-support framework.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Utility of Social Modeling for Proliferation Assessment - Preliminary Assessment

This Preliminary Assessment draft report will present the results of a literature search and preliminary assessment of the body of research, analysis methods, models and data deemed to be relevant to the Utility of Social Modeling for Proliferation Assessment research. This report will provide: 1) a description of the problem space and the kinds of information pertinent to the problem space, 2) a discussion of key relevant or representative literature, 3) a discussion of models and modeling approaches judged to be potentially useful to the research, and 4) the next steps of this research that will be pursued based on this preliminary assessment. This draft report represents a technical deliverable for the NA-22 Simulations, Algorithms, and Modeling (SAM) program. Specifically this draft report is the Task 1 deliverable for project PL09-UtilSocial-PD06, Utility of Social Modeling for Proliferation Assessment. This project investigates non-traditional use of social and cultural information to improve nuclear proliferation assessment, including nonproliferation assessment, proliferation resistance assessments, safeguards assessments and other related studies. These assessments often use and create technical information about the State’s posture towards proliferation, the vulnerability of a nuclear energy system to an undesired event, and the effectiveness of safeguards. This project will find and fuse social and technical information by explicitly considering the role of cultural, social and behavioral factors relevant to proliferation. The aim of this research is to describe and demonstrate if and how social science modeling has utility in proliferation assessment.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Constructing a resilience index for the Enhanced Critical Infrastructure Protection Program

Following recommendations made in Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7, which established a national policy for the identification and increased protection of critical infrastructure and key resources (CIKR) by Federal departments and agencies, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2006 developed the Enhanced Critical Infrastructure Protection (ECIP) program. The ECIP program aimed to provide a closer partnership with state, regional, territorial, local, and tribal authorities in fulfilling the national objective to improve CIKR protection. The program was specifically designed to identify protective measures currently in place in CIKR and to inform facility owners/operators of the benefits of new protective measures. The ECIP program also sought to enhance existing relationships between DHS and owners/operators of CIKR and to build relationships where none existed (DHS 2008; DHS 2009). In 2009, DHS and its protective security advisors (PSAs) began assessing CIKR assets using the ECIP program and ultimately produced individual protective measure and vulnerability values through the protective measure and vulnerability indices (PMI/VI). The PMI/VI assess the protective measures posture of individual facilities at their 'weakest link,' allowing for a detailed analysis of the most vulnerable aspects of the facilities (Schneier 2003), while maintaining the ability to produce an overall protective measures picture. The PMI has six main components (physical security, security management, security force, information sharing, protective measures assessments, and dependencies) and focuses on actions taken by a facility to prevent or deter the occurrence of an incident (Argonne National Laboratory 2009). As CIKR continue to be assessed using the PMI/VI and owners/operators better understand how they can prevent or deter incidents, academic research, practitioner emphasis, and public policy formation have increasingly focused on resilience as a necessary component of the risk management framework and infrastructure protection. This shift in focus toward resilience complements the analysis of protective measures by taking into account the three other phases of risk management: mitigation, response, and recovery (Figure 1). Thus, the addition of a robust resilience index (RI) to the established PMI/VI provides vital information to owners/operators throughout the risk management process. Combining a pre-incident focus with a better understanding of resilience, as well as potential consequences from damaged CIKR, allows owners/operators to better understand different ways to decrease risk by (1) increasing physical security measures to prevent an incident, (2) supplementing redundancy to mitigate the effects of an incident, and (3) enhancing emergency action and business continuity planning to increase the effectiveness of recovery procedures. Information provided by the RI methodology is also used by facility owners/operators to better understand how their facilities compare to similar sector/subsector sites and to help them make risk-based decisions. This report provides an overview of the RI methodology developed to estimate resilience and provide resilience comparisons for sectors and subsectors. The information will be used to (1) assist DHS in analyzing existing response and recovery methods and programs at facilities and (2) identify potential ways to increase resilience. The RI methodology is based on principles of Appreciative Inquiry, which is 'the coevolutionary search for the best in people, their organizations, and the relevant world around them' (Cooperrider et al. 2005). Appreciative Inquiry identifies the best of 'what is' and helps to envision 'what might be.' The ECIP program and the RI represent a new model (using Appreciative Inquiry principles) for information sharing between government and industry (Fisher and Petit 2010). A 'dashboard' display, which provides an interactive tool - rather than a static report, presents the results of the RI in a convenient format. Additional resilience measures can be modeled to illustrate how such actions would impact the asset's RI value.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

International physical protection self-assessment tool for chemical facilities.

This report is the final report for Laboratory Directed Research and Development (LDRD) Project No.130746, International Physical Protection Self-Assessment Tool for Chemical Facilities. The goal of the project was to develop an exportable, low-cost, computer-based risk assessment tool for small to medium size chemical facilities. The tool would assist facilities in improving their physical protection posture, while protecting their proprietary information. In FY2009, the project team proposed a comprehensive evaluation of safety and security regulations in the target geographical area, Southeast Asia. This approach was later modified and the team worked instead on developing a methodology for identifying potential targets at chemical facilities. Milestones proposed for FY2010 included characterizing the international/regional regulatory framework, finalizing the target identification and consequence analysis methodology, and developing, reviewing, and piloting the software tool. The project team accomplished the initial goal of developing potential target categories for chemical facilities; however, the additional milestones proposed for FY2010 were not pursued and the LDRD funding therefore was redirected.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Utility of Social Modeling for Proliferation Assessment - Enhancing a Facility-Level Model for Proliferation Resistance Assessment of a Nuclear Enegry System

The Utility of Social Modeling for Proliferation Assessment project (PL09-UtilSocial) investigates the use of social and cultural information to improve nuclear proliferation assessments, including nonproliferation assessments, Proliferation Resistance (PR) assessments, safeguards assessments, and other related studies. These assessments often use and create technical information about a host State and its posture towards proliferation, the vulnerability of a nuclear energy system (NES) to an undesired event, and the effectiveness of safeguards. This objective of this project is to find and integrate social and technical information by explicitly considering the role of cultural, social, and behavioral factors relevant to proliferation; and to describe and demonstrate if and how social science modeling has utility in proliferation assessment. This report describes a modeling approach and how it might be used to support a location-specific assessment of the PR assessment of a particular NES. The report demonstrates the use of social modeling to enhance an existing assessment process that relies on primarily technical factors. This effort builds on a literature review and preliminary assessment performed as the first stage of the project and compiled in PNNL-18438. [ T his report describes an effort to answer questions about whether it is possible to incorporate social modeling into a PR assessment in such a way that we can determine the effects of social factors on a primarily technical assessment. This report provides: 1. background information about relevant social factors literature; 2. background information about a particular PR assessment approach relevant to this particular demonstration; 3. a discussion of social modeling undertaken to find and characterize social factors that are relevant to the PR assessment of a nuclear facility in a specific location; 4. description of an enhancement concept that integrates social factors into an existing, technically based nuclear facility assessment; 5. a discussion of a way to engage with the owners of the PR assessment methodology to assess and improve the enhancement concept; 6. a discussion of implementation of the proposed approach, including a discussion of functionality and potential users; and 7. conclusions from the research. This report represents technical deliverables for the NA-22 Simulations, Algorithms, and Modeling program. Specifically this report is the Task 2 and 3 deliverables for project PL09-UtilSocial.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Assembly, Test and Launch Operations for a Nuclear-enabled NASA Mission: Considerations that are Specific to Use of a Nuclear Payload

For more than five decades, Radioisotope Power Systems (RPS) have played a critical role in the exploration of space, enabling missions of scientific discovery to destinations across the solar system by providing electrical power to explore remote, challenging and extreme environments. In particular, RPS enable deep space missions where increased heliocentric distances reduce the ability of solar power to adequately meet spacecraft and instruments power requirements. Some previous notable missions that were enabled by RPS include Nimbus III, the Apollo Surface Experiments, the Pioneers 10 and 11, the Viking Mars Landers, Galileo, Ulysses, Cassini, New Horizons and Curiosity. The current operating set of missions that are enabled by RPS are Voyagers 1 and 2, Cassini, New Horizons, and Curiosity. The Multi-Mission Radioisotope Thermal Generator (MMRTG) is the current RPS used for missions. An enhanced version of this generator outfitted with higher efficiency thermoelectrics is under development for potential use in the future. Other previously deployed power systems include the Multi-hundred Watt Radisotope Thermo-electric Generator (MHW RTG) and the General Purpose Heat Source Radisotope Thermo-electric Generator (GPHS RTG). The common thread for all of these power systems is that they are fueled with Pu-238. The use of this unique isotope involves additional planning activities and requires specific actions when the devices are delivered to Kennedy Space Center (KSC), launch site, and incorporated into the assembly, test and launch operations (ATLO) process to ensure mission success, met safety and security challenges. It has been forecasted that the use of a nuclear reactor system is on the horizon. This system could be used for either specifically powering S/C propulsion system or for surface power use once the mission arrived at its destina-tion. Since a nuclear-fission-based system has never been handled or integrated into a spacecraft at KSC, this nuclear reactor system would potentially require further challenges that must be accounted for in the ATLO process. This paper will explain ATLO considerations for the recent RTG-enabled launches that have occurred and planned in the near future (Mars 2020 NASA mission). It will also describe where further challenges that need to be met for the placement of a nuclear reactor (either for propulsion or transportation for surface power use) onto a space mission. Specifically, the following topics will be addressed: • Approach for nuclear safety planning for nuclear material use and its transportation to launch site • Planning for security posture for nuclear materials at launch site • Preparation for transportation of the nuclear power system from the fueling/testing location to the launch site • Preparation of documentation and procedures for nuclear material use at launch site • Planning for coordination between power system and space mission groups • Planning for appropriate staffing and scheduling of operations

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Sensitivity of a Subject-specific Ankle Sprain Simulation to Extrinsic Versus Intrinsic Biomechanical Factors

Ankle sprains are the most common musculoskeletal injury in sport and military activity, despite existing prophylactic strategies. The purpose of this report was to develop a probabilistic simulation of lateral ankle sprains during single-limb drop landing, towards accelerating innovation in ankle sprain prevention. A deterministic, subject-specific musculoskeletal model was extended with automation and probabilistic distributions on sprain-related biomechanical factors. Probabilistic simulations were generated using traditional Monte Carlo techniques and the advanced mean value method, a more computationally-efficient approach. Predicted distributions of peak ankle joint rotations, velocities, and moments borne by supporting passive structures agreed favorably with the deterministic model and with reports of real sprain biomechanics. Parameter sensitivities identified that predictions were most strongly influenced by drop height, subtalar joint posture at contact, invertor/evertor co-activation, and passive ankle stiffness. The advanced mean value method predicted confidence bounds comparable to a 1000-trial Monte Carlo simulation, and required only 14 model evaluations and 4-min processing time. The extended probabilistic simulation may be useful to virtually test new prophylactic strategies for ankle sprains, and is made available for open-source use (https://simtk.org/projects/sprain-sim).

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

Cyber–Physical Correlation Effects in Defense Games for Large Discrete Infrastructures

In certain critical infrastructures, correlations between cyber and physical components can be exploited to launch strategic attacks, so that disruptions to one component may affect others and possibly the entire infrastructure. Such correlations must be explicitly taken into account in ensuring the survival of the infrastructure. For large discrete infrastructures characterized by the number of cyber and physical components, we characterize the cyber–physical interactions at two levels: (i) the cyber–physical failure correlation function specifies the conditional survival probability of the cyber sub-infrastructure given that of the physical sub-infrastructure (both specified by their marginal probabilities), and (ii) individual survival probabilities of both sub-infrastructures are characterized by first-order differential conditions expressed in terms of their multiplier functions. We formulate an abstract problem of ensuring the survival probability of a cyber–physical infrastructure with discrete components as a game between the provider and attacker, whose utility functions are composed of infrastructure survival probability terms and cost terms, both expressed in terms of the number of components attacked and reinforced. We derive Nash equilibrium conditions and sensitivity functions that highlight the dependence of infrastructure survival probability on cost terms, correlation functions, multiplier functions, and sub-infrastructure survival probabilities. We apply these analytical results to characterize the defense postures of simplified models of metro systems, cloud computing infrastructures, and smart power grids.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Cybersecurity Resiliency of Marine Renewable Energy Systems-Part 1: Identifying Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities and Determining Risk

Technology innovation, market demand, and the potential impacts of a changing climate are driving the marine renewable energy (MRE) industry to develop market-ready systems to provide low-carbon electricity for emerging, off-grid markets. The advanced operational and information technology devices used in MRE systems create a pathway for a cyber threat actor to gain unauthorized access to data or disrupt operation. To improve the resiliency of MRE systems as a predictable, affordable, and reliable source of energy from oceans and rivers, guidance was developed for an end users' organization that describes a framework for identifying and managing cybersecurity risk. The development of the cybersecurity guidance is based on standards described in the Risk Management Framework and Cybersecurity Framework developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). This paper is the first of a two-part series that describes an approach to determine the cybersecurity risk for MRE systems based on assessing potential cyber threats, identifying vulnerabilities (people, processes, and technology, including physical and operational environment), and evaluating the consequences a cyberattack would have on operation of the MRE system and impact on end users' mission and business objectives. MRE developers and stakeholders can use this approach to assess their current cybersecurity risk posture to incorporate appropriate cybersecurity controls to reduce the consequences and impacts from a cyberattack on MRE systems. This approach can be refined further as MRE systems are deployed and operational configurations are available.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Cybersecurity Framework Profile for Electric Vehicle Extreme Fast Charging Infrastructure

This document is the Cybersecurity Framework Profile (Profile) developed for the Electric Vehicle Extreme Fast Charging (EV/XFC) ecosystem, including the four domains that relies on the ecosystem (i) Electric Vehicles (EV); (ii) Extreme Fast Charging (XFC); (iii) XFC Cloud or Third-Party Operations; and (iv) Utility and Building Networks. This Profile utilizes the NIST Cybersecurity Framework Version 1.1 and provides voluntary guidance to help relevant parties develop Profiles specific to their organization to understand, assess, and communicate their cybersecurity posture as a part of their risk management process. The Profile is intended to supplement, not replace, an existing risk management program or cybersecurity standards, regulations, and industry guidelines that are in current use by the EV/XFC industry.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗

Cybersecurity Risk Profiles for Distributed Energy Resource Management Systems

Managing the digitalization of increasingly diversity energy resources is a complex challenge for energy systems planners and managers. As the penetration of solar photovoltaics (PV) and other distributed renewable energy resources (DERs) expands, distributed energy resource management systems (DERMS) will play an increasingly important role in managing, monitoring, and controlling DERs as electric systems before more distributed, interconnected, and networked. However, the cybersecurity implications of DERMS deployments are not well understood today. A lack of understanding around the cybersecurity implications of DERMS deployments and variability in the security posture of DERMS vendors, owners, and operators could introduce new security risks to evolving electric power systems. This paper describes cybersecurity attack scenarios on DERMS, identifies related cybersecurity standards and guidelines, reviews the security features of state-of-the-art DERMS solutions, and offers cybersecurity guidance for DERMS vendors, owners, and operators to protect DERMS' unique capabilities. Standardizing cybersecurity requirements for DERMS could help improve the security of DERMS integrations and improve innovations that are more secure by design. The cybersecurity guidance found in this paper is intended to offer a unified approach and lay the foundation for future standardization of DERMS cybersecurity to reduce risk to the solar industry and other renewable energy stakeholders when integrating these technologies with electric power systems.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗