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At least 595 records · Page 33

Post-Irradiation Examinations of High Burnup PWR Fuel Rods - Initial Results

The High Burnup Spent Fuel Data Project (herein referred to as the “project”), sponsored by the US Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Energy (NE), is focused on experimentally evaluating the effects of long-term storage and transportation on high burnup (HBU) (defined as >45 gigawatt days per metric ton uranium) pressurized water reactor (PWR) spent nuclear fuel (SNF) [1]. To support this project, in the fall of 2017, an instrumented bolted-lid cask (project cask) at the North Anna reactor site was loaded with intact, HBU PWR fuel assemblies (project assemblies) having four different kinds of cladding and will be reopened in approximately 10-years for inspection. To support pre- and post-storage SNF rod characterization, 25 “sister rods” that are similar to the rods being stored in the project cask were extracted from seven different fuel assemblies at the North Anna nuclear power plant for post-irradiation examination (PIE).

Bevard, Bruce Balkcom↗

Microfluidic package and method of making the same

The present invention relates to encapsulated microfluidic packages and methods thereof. In particular embodiments, the package includes a device, a cradle configured to support the device, and a lid having a bonding surface configured to provide a fluidic seal between itself and the device and/or cradle. Other package configurations, as well as methods for making such fluidic seals, are described herein.

Branch, Darren W.↗

Examining Light-Induced Degradation with Combined-Accelerated Stress Testing

While further understanding is sought, the results suggest that a module can show no degradation in performance through a qualification test light soak, (IEC 61215: 2021 MQT 19.1 requirement of 10 kW minimum on one side). Yet, such cells may degrade significantly by LID under conditions within the statistical extremes of the natural environment applied in combined-accelerated stress testing (CAST).

combined-accelerated stress testing↗

The MAX facility for CFD code validation

ANL has recently completed construction of a fluid dynamics test facility devised to provide validation data for CFD simulation tools used to evaluate various aspects of nuclear power plant design and safety. Experiments with the facility involve mixing air jets within a 1x1x1.7m long glass tank at atmospheric pressure. A particle image velocimetry system measures flow velocity and turbulence quantities within the tank while a high-speed infrared camera records temperatures across the tank lid. The tandem of high fidelity thermal and turbulence data is particularly useful for benchmarking transient heat transfer phenomena such as thermal striping. This paper describes the MAX facility, preliminary data obtained during shakedown tests, and the results of companion CFD calculations employing RANS-based Star-CCM+ and large eddy simulations with Nek 5000. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Salt-stone Oxidation Study: Leaching Method - 13092

Cementitious waste forms can be designed to chemically stabilize selected contaminants, such as Tc{sup +7} and Cr{sup +6}, by chemically reduction to lower valance states, Tc{sup +4} and Cr{sup +3}, respectively, and precipitation of these species in alkaline media as low solubility solid phases. Data for oxidation of this type of cementitious waste form cured under field conditions as a function of time is required for predicting the performance of the waste form and disposal facility. The rate of oxidation (oxidation front advancement) is an important parameter for predicting performance because the solubilities of some radionuclide contaminants, e.g., technetium, are a function of the oxidation state. A non-radioactive experiment was designed for quantifying the oxidation front advancement using chromium, as an approximate redox-sensitive surrogate (Cr{sup +6} / Cr{sup +3}) for technetium (Tc{sup +7} / Tc{sup +4}). Nonradioactive cementitious waste forms were prepared in the laboratory and cured under both laboratory and 'field conditions'. Laboratory conditions were ambient temperature and sealed sample containers. Field conditions were approximated by curing samples in open containers which were placed inside a plastic container stored outdoors at SRS. The container had a lid and was instrumented with temperature and humidity probes. Sub-samples as thin as 0.2 mm were taken as a function of distance from the exposed surface of the as-cast sample. The sub-samples were leached and the leachates were analyzed for chromium, nitrate, nitrite and sodium. Nitrate, nitrite, and sodium concentrations were used to provide baseline data because these species are not chemically retained in the waste form matrix to any significant extent and are not redox sensitive. 'Effective' oxidation fronts for Cr were measured for samples containing 1000, 500 and 20 mg/kg Cr added as soluble sodium chromate, Na{sub 2}CrO{sub 4}. For a sample cured for 129 days under field conditions, leachable Cr (assumed to be the oxidized form, i.e., Cr{sup +6} was detected in the top 15 to 20 mm of the sample spiked with 1000 mg/kg Cr. Below about 20 mm, the Cr concentrations in leachates were below the detection limit (< 0.010 mg/L) which indicates that the oxidation as the result of exposure to air was limited to the top 20 mm of the sample after exposure for 129 days and that the bulk of the waste form was not affected, i.e., the Cr was stabilized and insoluble. For samples cured in the laboratory, leachable Cr was detected in the top 8 mm of the Cr 1000 sample cured in the laboratory for 37 days. Between 8 and 14 mm, the concentration Cr in the leachate dropped by a factor of about 20 to just above the detection limit. These depth of penetration results indicate that the rate of advancement of the oxidation front for samples spiked with 1000 mg/kg Cr cured under 'field conditions' for 129 days is less than that for the sample cured in the laboratory for 37 days, i.e., 0.156 and 0.216 mm/day, respectively. Additional data are presented for samples spiked with 500 and 20 mg/kg Cr. In summary, cementitious waste forms are porous solids with a network of interconnected pores ranging in diameter from 10 E-10 m to greater than a few mm. The oxidation process is assumed to occur as the result of oxygen transport through the interconnected porosity which may be filled with air, aqueous salt solution, or both. Upon oxidation, the Cr becomes soluble and can be transported in solution through aqueous pore fluid or leachate. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Safety Aspects of Dry Spent Fuel Storage and Spent Fuel Management - 13559

Dry storage systems are characterized by passive and inherent safety systems ensuring safety even in case of severe incidents or accidents. After the events of Fukushima, the advantages of such passively and inherently safe dry storage systems have become more and more obvious. As with the storage of all radioactive materials, the storage of spent nuclear fuel (SF) and high-level radioactive waste (HLW) must conform to safety requirements. Following safety aspects must be achieved throughout the storage period: - safe enclosure of radioactive materials, - safe removal of decay heat, - securing nuclear criticality safety, - avoidance of unnecessary radiation exposure. The implementation of these safety requirements can be achieved by dry storage of SF and HLW in casks as well as in other systems such as dry vault storage systems or spent fuel pools, where the latter is neither a dry nor a passive system. Furthermore, transport capability must be guaranteed during and after storage as well as limitation and control of radiation exposure. The safe enclosure of radioactive materials in dry storage casks can be achieved by a double-lid sealing system with surveillance of the sealing system. The safe removal of decay heat must be ensured by the design of the storage containers and the storage facility. The safe confinement of radioactive inventory has to be ensured by mechanical integrity of fuel assembly structures. This is guaranteed, e.g. by maintaining the mechanical integrity of the fuel rods or by additional safety measures for defective fuel rods. In order to ensure nuclear critically safety, possible effects of accidents have also to be taken into consideration. In case of dry storage it might be necessary to exclude the re-positioning of fissile material inside the container and/or neutron moderator exclusion might be taken into account. Unnecessary radiation exposure can be avoided by the cask or canister vault system itself. In Germany dry storage of SF in casks fulfills both transport and storage requirements. Mostly, storage facilities are designed as concrete buildings above the ground, but due to regional constraints, one storage facility has also been built as a rock tunnel. The decay heat is always removed by natural air flow; further technical equipment is not needed. The removal of decay heat and shielding had been modeled and calculated by state-of-the-art computer codes before such a facility has been built. TueV and BAM present their long experience in the licensing process for sites and casks and inform about spent nuclear fuel management and issues concerning dry storage of spent nuclear fuel. Different storage systems and facilities in Germany, Europe and world-wide are compared with respect to the safety aspects mentioned above. Initial points are the safety issues of wet storage of SF, and it is shown how dry storage systems can ensure the compliance with the mentioned safety criteria over a long storage period. The German storage concept for dry storage of SF and HLW is presented and discussed. Exemplarily, the process of licensing, erection and operation of selected German dry storage facilities is presented. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Radioactive Spent Ion-Exchange Resins Conditioning by the Hot Supercompaction Process at Tihange NPP - Early Experience - 12200

Spent ion-exchange resins are considered to be problematic waste that, in many cases, requires special approaches and precautions during their conditioning to meet the acceptance criteria for disposal. In Belgium, for economical reasons, the Volume Reduction Factor is a key criterion. After Tractebel Engineering performed a technical and economical comparison of the industrially available systems, Tihange NPP decided to install a spent ion-exchange resins hot supercompaction unit with Tractebel Engineering in the role of architect-engineer. The treatment and conditioning unit processes the spent ion-exchange resins through the following steps: dewatering of the resins, drying the resins under deep vacuum, discharging the dried resins into compactable drums, super-compacting the drums to generate pellets, grouting the pellets into standard 400 litres waste drums (overpacks) licensed for final disposal in the near-surface repository in Belgium. Several developments were required to adapt the reference process and equipment to PWR spent ion-exchange bead resins and Belgian radioactive waste acceptance criteria. In order to avoid cracks on the compacted drum, and external surface contamination from resin leaks, some improvements were achieved to minimize spring-back as well as the risk of cracking the drum wall. Placing the compactable drum inside a second, slightly larger drum, guarantees clean and reproducible pellets. Currently the commissioning phase is on-going. Numerous process validation tests have been completed. An acceptance file was transmitted to the Belgian Waste Management Authority recently. This will be followed by demonstration tests necessary to obtain their final acceptance of the installation. More than 3 800 drums of mixed powdered and bead resins have been processed by the reference Hot Compaction process, achieving a Volume Reduction Factor (VRF) of 2.5. The equipment has been proven to be a reliable technology with low operation and maintenance costs. Tractebel Engineering has managed the construction of a new application of this process in Belgium at Tihange NPP. Several developments were required to adapt the reference process and equipment to PWR spent ion-exchange bead resins and Belgian radioactive waste acceptance criteria. The chosen method of conditioning (draining, drying and compaction of the spent resins followed by grouting of the pellets in a 400 litres drum) immobilizes the spent resins under the form of a solid, compact, stable, and non dispersible block free of interstitial water. The various series of inactive tests which were conducted at Tihange NPP, helped among others to determine the best design of the compactable drum and lid and to set the value of critical parameters such as vapour temperature at the end of drying, speed, force and duration of compaction. In an environment of very limited space for interim storage and in the absence of an operational final repository site, or in the case of high final disposal costs, the process exhibits the following key advantages: - Achieving a Volume Reduction Factor (VRF) close to 1 (overpack included) for the interim storage instead of increased volumes observed with other currently available processes; - Achieving a water free end product; - Creating a flexible waste product for interim storage (pellet), which can be retrieved and routed into alternative types of package later, if not initially grouted; - Using well proven standard technologies like drying and compaction; - Flexible use of the system components for the supercompaction of other operational solid waste streams when not conducting resins conditioning campaigns. (authors)

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Impact Analyses and Tests of Metal Cask Considering Aircraft Engine Crash - 12308

The structural integrity of a dual purpose metal cask currently under development by the Korea Radioactive Waste Management Cooperation (KRMC) is evaluated through analyses and tests under a high-speed missile impact considering the targeted aircraft crash conditions. The impact conditions were carefully chosen through a survey on accident cases and recommendations from the literature. The missile impact velocity was set at 150 m/s, and two impact orientations were considered. A simplified missile simulating a commercial aircraft engine is designed from an impact load history curve provided in the literature. In the analyses, the focus is on the evaluation of the containment boundary integrity of the metal cask. The analyses results are compared with the results of tests using a 1/3 scale model. The results show very good agreements, and the procedure and methodology adopted in the structural analyses are validated. While the integrity of the cask is maintained in one evaluation where the missile impacts the top side of the free standing cask, the containment boundary is breached in another case in which the missile impacts the center of the cask lid in a perpendicular orientation. A safety assessment using a numerical simulation of an aircraft engine crash into spent nuclear fuel storage systems is performed. A commercially available explicit finite element code is utilized for the dynamic simulation, and the strain rate effect is included in the modeling of the materials used in the target system and missile. The simulation results show very good agreement with the test results. It is noted that this is the first test considering an aircraft crash in Korea. (authors)

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The MacArthur Maze Fire and Roadway Collapse: Consequences for SNF Transportation - 12476

In 2007, a severe transportation accident occurred near Oakland, California, on a section of Interstate 880 known as the 'MacArthur Maze', involving a tractor trailer carrying gasoline which impacted an overpass support column and burst into flames. The subsequent fire caused the collapse of portions of the Interstate 580 overpass onto the remains of the tractor-trailer in less than 20 minutes, due to a reduction of strength in the structural steel exposed to the fire. The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission is in the process of examining the impacts of this accident on the performance of a spent nuclear fuel transportation package, using detailed analysis models, in order to determine the potential regulatory implications related to the safe transport of spent nuclear fuel in the United States. This paper will provide a summary of this effort and present results and conclusions. The detailed thermal models of the MacArthur Maze fire scenario with ANSYS and COBRASFS have produced preliminary results indicating that in a fire of this severity, the peak fuel cladding temperature would almost certainly exceed the short-term limit of 570 deg. C (1058 deg. F), and would likely exceed the Zircaloy burst temperature limit of 750 deg. C (1382 deg. F) assumed in previous transportation studies. Additional work is needed to refine and verify some of the details of these complex models, but the overall results are consistent with previous fire analyses with similar models, and with the results obtained for the HAC fire evaluations with these models. These results as well as future results produced by these models can therefore be considered as reliable estimates of the temperatures that would be experienced in fire conditions of the severity of the MacArthur Maze fire scenario. The structural analyses show that the GA-4 package is robust enough to withstand the impact of the overhead span without suffering major damage or deformation to the containment boundary. The greatest potential for local package damage in this scenario appears to be at the bolted closure end. The thermal expansion response of the closure bolts and impact limiter attachment bolts were evaluated in a separate analysis, and it was determined that both the lid and impact limiters are expected to remain in place. The response of the closure seal is currently being evaluated separately in the context of the accident's overall potential to release radioactive material in the environment. (authors)

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Experimental test plan for PWR sister rods in the high burnup spent fuel data project

The High Burnup Spent Fuel Data Project (herein referred to as the 'project'), sponsored by the US Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Energy (NE), is focused on experimentally defining the effects of long-term storage and transportation on high burnup (HBU) pressurized water reactor (PWR) fuel (>45 gigawatt days per metric ton uranium). The goals of the project are to provide confirmatory data for model validation and potential improvement; to provide input to future dry storage cask design; to support license renewals and new licenses for Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation facilities; and to support transportation licensing for high burnup used fuel. In support of these project goals, an instrumented TN-32B bolted-lid cask at the North Anna reactor site will be loaded with intact, HBU PWR fuel assemblies (project assemblies) having four different kinds of cladding: standard Zircaloy-4, low-tin Zircaloy-4, ZIRLO, and M5. In approximately 10 years, the instrumented cask will be opened for inspection and several fuel rods from the project assemblies will be characterized. To support the project goals, the project pulled 25 'sister rods', 9 from the project assemblies and 16 from similar HBU assemblies, for characterization. The 25 sister rods are all high burnup and cover the range of cladding alloys. The 25 sister rods were shipped to Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) in early 2016 for detailed nondestructive and destructive examination. Examinations are intended to provide baseline data on the initial physical state of the cladding and fuel prior to the loading, drying, and long-term dry storage process. Further examinations are focused on determining the effects of temperatures encountered during and following drying. Similar tests will be performed on rods taken from the project assemblies at the end of the storage period (the 'cask rods') to identify any significant changes in the fuel rods that may have occurred during the dry storage period. Additionally, some of the sister rods will be used for separate effects testing to expand the applicability of the project data to the fleet, and to address some of the data-related gaps associated with extended storage and subsequent transportation of high burnup fuel. A draft test plan is being developed that describes the experimental work to be conducted on the sister rods. This paper summarizes the draft test plan and necessary coordination activities for the multi-year experimental program to supply data relevant to the assessment of the safety of long-term storage followed by transportation of high burnup used fuel. (authors)

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Material Investigation and Long-term Sealing Behavior of Helicoflex{sup R} Metal Seals used in Containers for Spent Nuclear Fuel - 17135

In Germany spent nuclear fuel is stored and transported in casks that possess bolted lid systems equipped with double jacket metal seals of Helicoflex{sup R} type in order to enable safe enclosure of the radioactive inventory. A dry interim storage period of 40 years was planned and the casks are licensed for that time span. However, due to political reasons and delayed disposal projects this time span is expected to increase significantly. It is therefore necessary to evaluate the long-term sealing behavior of the casks exceeding 40 years of operating time. In this paper, we discuss our approach to investigate the aging behavior of such metal seals, and to predict the long-term sealing behavior. Accelerated aging component tests with seals are performed at temperatures up to 150 deg. C to investigate the course of seal force, usable resilience and leakage rate. Even though these tests have already shown a significant decrease in seal force and usable resilience after aging times of less than 1 year, for most seals the leakage rate stayed better than the specified value. However, observation of the leakage rate has to be continued to determine the aging effect on the seal properties. As a main influence on the seal long-term behavior the increasing permanent deformation of the outer jacket has been recognized. It is made of aluminum or silver which means that the temperatures that are relevant for the aforementioned application in casks lead to creep deformation. For further investigation of seal behavior a comprehensive research program concerning the material characteristics and aging behavior of the individual seal components, with an emphasis on the outer jacket material, has been launched. The aim is to get a better understanding of the time and temperature dependent creep mechanisms and deformation. The examinations are separated into tests on seal segments and tests on standardized specimen. In order to be able to study the aging process, seal segments are compressed in flanges and stored at temperatures ranging from room temperature to 150 deg. C. After defined time intervals the segments are analyzed by using standardized tests including structure investigation and creep tests. The results are compared with the behavior of the specimen basic raw material. This is done to ensure comparability of the thin jacket material and additional sheet material used for standardized tests. Thus, the prediction of component changes after different aging times at different temperatures can be made. As a result forecasts on the long term seal behavior are intended. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Thermal Analysis of a Pipe Over-pack Container with a Combustible Waste Matrix for Los Alamos National Laboratory - 17307

Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) Technical Area 55 (TA 55) utilizes several different container types to store and transfer special nuclear material and waste for numerous programs. The Nuclear Process Infrastructure - Infrastructure Operations Group (NPI-2) analyzes and certifies containers to meet the specifications for distinct processes and storage. Engineering analysis performed on these containers include but are not limited to: leak testing, filter efficiency testing, pressure drop test, drop testing, water penetration testing, polymer (o-ring) hardness testing, and thermal steady state testing. Of all of these tests, thermal steady-state testing is most crucial to ensure critical components for specific containers do not fail under an internal heat payload. This testing provides data for setting heat payload limits for different containers. The Pipe Over-pack Container (POC) is a vented carbon steel container with a removable lid designed for storing or transferring nuclear waste. Additionally, TA 55 has been tasked to manage and store all of its Transuranic (TRU) waste for the foreseeable future. Being able to place more material into a single container conserves the physical storage space available at TA 55. The Pipe Over pack Handling and Operations Manual requires each user to ensure that the maximum temperature of each component in the POC is not exceeded. Conducting a thermal steady-state test with a combustible waste matrix on the POC can benefit stakeholders on increasing the material limits of the container. The results of these measurements will establish new wattage limits to meet LANL's transportation requirements. The current LANL Transportation Safety Document (TSD) limits the amount of heat source plutonium to 10 grams per POC, corresponding to approximately 5 Watts of heat. The result of this test was provided to the Packaging and Transportation (OS-PT) group to evaluate new wattage limits that can satisfy the needs of TA 55, while maintaining a safe packaging configuration. (authors)

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The SAVY 4000 Container Storage Program at Los Alamos National Laboratory - 17313

Incidents involving release of nuclear materials stored in containers of convenience such as food pack cans, slip lid taped cans, paint cans, etc. has resulted in the U.S. Defense Nuclear Safety Board concerns over the lack of prescriptive performance requirements for interim storage of nuclear materials. Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) has shared in these incidents and in response proactively moved into developing a performance based storage container design, the SAVY-4000{sup R}. The SAVY-4000{sup R} is the first vented general use nuclear material container demonstrated to meet the requirements of DOE M 441.1-1, Nuclear Material Packaging Manual. The SAVY-4000{sup R} is an innovative and creative design demonstrated by the fact that it can be opened and closed in a few seconds without torque wrenches or other tools; has a built-in, fire-rated filter that prevents the build-up of hydrogen gas, yet retains 99.97% of plutonium particulates, and prevents release of material even in a 12 foot drop. Finally, it has been fire then drop tested and will reduce the risk to the public in the event of an earthquake/fire scenario. This will allow major nuclear facilities to credit the container towards source term Material at Risk (MAR) reduction. The container was approved for nuclear material storage in the TA-55 Plutonium Facility on March 15, 2011, and there are currently over 2000 SAVY-4000{sup R} containers available for use within the facility. A Safety Analysis Report was developed to demonstrate Manual 441.1-1 compliance and was approved April, 2014. The first four SAVY-4000{sup R} containers were packaged with plutonium on August 2, 2011. Key aspects of the SAVY-4000{sup R} vented storage container design will be discussed which include design description, qualification and testing, surveillance strategy, and the design life extension program as enhanced by surveillance activities with the intent to extend well beyond the current five year design life. (authors)

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Standards and Guidelines for the Design of Trunnions of RAM Transport Packages - 17365

Trunnion systems of packages for the transport of radioactive materials have to guarantee the safe handling of package during crane operations (lifting, tilting) and to secure package tie down to the transport vehicle, if the trunnions are used as attachment points during transport. The design of trunnions is based on IAEA Regulations SSR-6, the supporting Advisory Material SSG-26 and further appropriate technical standards and/or guidelines. For package approval procedures in Germany the guideline BAM-GGR 012 has to be applied. If a package is handled inside a german nuclear power plant, the standard KTA 3905 has to be fulfilled additionally. In this paper the requirements of KTA 3905 [4] concerning the trunnion systems as load attaching points (LAP) are discussed in connection with the recommendations in the guideline BAM-GGR 012 [3]. This guideline is prepared at BAM Federal Institute for Materials Research and Testing for analysis and assessment of bolted lid and trunnion systems of Type B(U) transport packages. The quality assurance questions concerning trunnion systems are discussed as well. (authors)

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Reviewing Spent Nuclear Fuel Dry Cask Storage Programs to Identify Challenges for an Integrated Waste Management System - 17535

Under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA), the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has responsibility for removing commercial spent nuclear fuel (SNF) from nuclear power plant sites and disposing of the SNF in a deep geologic repository. However, the methods used by commercial nuclear power plants for onsite storage of their SNF define the starting conditions for DOE efforts to develop a waste management system that includes packaging, transportation, storage, and disposal of commercial SNF. The NWPA (as amended) also charges the U.S. Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board (Board) with evaluating the technical and scientific validity of DOE activities related to the management and disposal of SNF and high-level radioactive wastes (HLW). DOE's efforts related to developing an integrated program for storing, transporting, and disposing of SNF and HLW were the focus of a public meeting held by the Board on August 24, 2016, in Washington, D.C. To prepare for the public meeting, the Board's staff compiled information on the dry cask storage systems in service at nuclear power plant sites in order to identify issues that would need to be addressed by DOE in planning to transport SNF away from the sites. This paper is based on a briefing presented to the Board members by the Board's staff before the public meeting. Post-meeting findings and recommendations of the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board are documented in the Board letter to the Department of Energy dated December 8, 2016. A note about terminology: in this paper, the phrase 'dry cask storage system' is generic and applies to a complete system used for dry storage of commercial SNF.Within these storage systems, commercial SNF is sealed inside a container called either a cask or a canister depending upon the specific type of storage system used. This distinction is discussed in more detail in the body of this paper. When referring to the containers holding SNF in particular systems, this paper uses the terms 'casks' or 'canisters,' as appropriate. When discussing the collective group of all containers, this paper uses the phrase 'casks and canisters'. Dry cask storage of SNF is a widespread practice throughout the U.S. commercial nuclear industry. As of August 1, 2016, more than 2300 storage casks and canisters were loaded at U.S. commercial nuclear power plant sites. This number is expected to increase by more than 200 casks and canisters annually, reaching a total of approximately 4500 by 2025. Multiple vendors have developed their own unique designs of dry cask storage and transportation systems. The majority of storage system designs (75 percent) feature SNF loaded in welded stainless steel canisters that are stored in ventilated concrete overpacks that allow for convection cooling. Some older dry cask storage system designs do not include a welded stainless steel canister; instead, SNF is loaded directly into a heavily shielded metal cask to minimize radiation exposure to workers and prevent atmospheric release of radionuclides. These types of systems are sealed by O-rings compressed under a bolted lid. After loading, dry cask storage systems are located on concrete pads at Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations (ISFSI) at nuclear power plant sites and will remain there until the time when they will be transported to a consolidated interim storage facility or a deep geologic repository. Eventual transportation of canistered SNF will include removing the stainless steel canisters from the concrete overpacks, possibly repackaging the SNF, and loading the canisters into specially designed transportation casks for shipment by truck, rail, or barge. In the case of the non-canistered casks, some are approved for transportation and can be shipped after impact limiters are installed on the casks. SNF will need to be removed from casks not approved for transportation and transferred to transport-approved casks. This paper highlights five issues and challenges presented by the nuclear industry's use of dry cask storage systems that will need to be addressed by DOE in developing an integrated waste management system. One example, among the five, is that several dry-storage casks and canisters have received Nuclear Regulatory Commission certificates of compliance for storage only and do not have certificates of compliance for transportation. This will pose a challenge when the SNF must be moved to a consolidated interim storage facility or a deep geologic repository. Another example is that, when loaded with SNF, the total weight of new, larger transportation cask designs will exceed 142 metric tonnes (156 tons) which, when combined with the weight of the rail-car, will exceed the gross weight limit for unrestricted operation on some rail lines. This will also affect future transportation planning for shipments of SNF. All five issues and challenges are discussed in detail in the body of the paper. (authors)

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Development of a multi-purpose container system for the storage, transport and disposal of PWR spent fuel in the UK - 15466

Radioactive Waste Management Limited (RWM) is a wholly owned subsidiary of UK's Nuclear Decommissioning Authority, and is responsible for implementing UK Government policy on geological disposal of higher activity radioactive waste. An aspect of the generic work programme that underpins the current generic disposal concepts includes the development of the associated disposal containers. To date RWM has focused on the development of a range of disposal container designs that fulfil the requirements for transport and disposal in a Geological Disposal Facility (GDF) for legacy high heat generating wastes, one of which includes legacy Pressurised Water Reactor (PWR) spent nuclear fuel (SF). In line with a number of European countries exploring deep geological disposal, the conceptual disposal container solution developed for this waste type has a capacity of 4 PWR fuel assemblies. Since 2013, the feasibility of developing an alternative higher capacity disposal container design based around the Multi-Purpose Container (MPC) concept has been explored. In general terms, MPCs are containers that are designed to meet requirements for safe containment of radioactive waste during storage, transport and disposal. The fundamental design philosophy of the MPC is that once the waste is packaged in an MPC, it would not need to be handled again. That is, after a period of initial cooling in a fuel pond, the SF could be packaged for long term dry storage and would not require direct handling for its eventual transport to, and disposal in, a GDF. The novel feature of the MPC system design considered is the inclusion of an additional overpack specifically for the final deep geological disposal phase. The conceptual MPC and its associated storage, transfer, transport and thick walled carbon steel disposal overpack have been developed to a conceptual level of design detail to demonstrate concept feasibility, with the final design solution confirming a MPC system with a capacity of 12 PWR SF assembles. This represents the highest capacity PWR MPC system that complies with the mass and rail gauge limits of the UK W6a rail gauge. Such a capacity realises a contents loading three times that of the standard PWR disposal container and presented technical challenges from both a structural performance and thermal perspective; necessitating the need for the inclusion of features to enhance heat transfer from the central fuel assemblies within the MPC and novel lid features on the transport container overpack to maintain structural integrity and containment during the hypothetical accident conditions of transport tests. In developing the MPC system conceptual design it is recognised that, depending upon the safety functions of the MPC disposal overpack, the choice of carbon steel material may not be suitable for all geological environments. Consequently, the MPC system design and its materials of construction will require further evaluation once detailed knowledge of the disposal concept to be implemented, its safety functions and geological environment are known. (authors)

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Development of disposal container designs for disposal of high level waste and legacy spent fuel in the UK - 15471

Radioactive Waste Management Limited (RWM), a fully owned subsidiary of the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA), is responsible for the implementation of geological disposal in the UK. Three illustrative concepts of a geological disposal facility (GDF), corresponding to three generic geological environments - higher strength rock, lower strength sedimentary rock and evaporite rock - have been developed to demonstrate the viability of geological disposal of intermediate level waste, high level waste and spent fuel. It is envisaged that HLW which has been encapsulated in Waste Vitrification Plant (WVP) canisters, advanced gas-cooled reactor (AGR) SF which has been stripped of their spacers and packaged into slotted fuel cans, and PWR SF will be packaged into disposal containers for disposal. A set of schematic designs of these disposal containers was developed in the late 2000's. The design concept for the higher strength rock environment was based on the joint Posiva/SKB disposal container design, and the design concept for the lower strength sedimentary rock and evaporate rock illustrative environments was based on the disposal container concept from Switzerland's National Cooperative for the Disposal of Radioactive Waste (Nagra). The size, mass and dimensions of the disposal containers in the scheme designs vary significantly. The construction method and the lid closing method also vary between the disposal containers for the different waste contents. A design study has indicated that optimization of the number of HLW WVP canisters and the number of AGR slotted fuel cans in the disposal containers, standardizing construction method and closure arrangement across the containers for each geology type, providing handling features at both ends of the disposal container, and balancing of shielding around the containers, could bring significant advantage to the overall GDF programme by reducing the number of disposal containers, reducing GDF footprint, and reducing the extent of excavations, spoil generated and materials that are required for construction. A project to develop the scheme designs to conceptual level was carried in 2011 to 2013. In this project, the above changes were taken into account, technical underpinning of the designs was carried out and manufacturing method was considered. Two disposal container variants for different host rock environments have been developed: - Variant 1, for compatibility with the higher strength rock illustrative disposal system design. This is constructed from copper, with a cast iron insert and is based on the joint Posiva/SKB disposal container design. - Variant 2, for compatibility with the lower strength sedimentary rock and evaporite rock illustrative disposal system designs. This is a steel container based on the NAGRA disposal container design. Each variant has three internal configurations to accommodate 3 HLW vitrified canisters, 16 consolidated cans of AGR SF and 4 PWR spent fuel assemblies. These designs have been shown to bring significant benefit to the GDF designs, bringing a significant reduction to the operating programme and GDF programme cost, including reducing the number of disposal containers by 33% for HLW, 50% for AGR SF and reducing the size of the GDF footprint by 25%. (authors)

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In-situ visual inspection of the CASTOR V/21 used nuclear fuel dry storage cask: a demonstration of camera system capabilities - 15505

On June 11, 2014 the Gesellschaft fur Nuklear Service (GNS) CASTOR V/21 spent fuel dry storage cask was inspected in-situ at the Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center (INTEC). The purpose of this inspection is to demonstrate and document the technology necessary to perform inspections of spent fuel dry storage casks. The inspection includes internal temperature measurement, internal radiation measurement, and a visual examination using a bore-scope type camera system inserted through the cask fill/drain penetration. It is concluded from this inspection that in-situ inspections of bolted lid spent fuel storage containers is possible using current camera technologies. Using 3D Phase Measurement Technology, measurements of entities such as cracks or corrosion are possible. The internal surfaces of the CASTOR V/21 cask that were inspected were free of corrosion and exhibited no evidence of degradation. One crack identified in previous inspections was examined and appeared the same as in the previous inspections. (authors)

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