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At least 595 records · Page 33

Navy Ratchets Up Resilience Through Agency/Utility Collaboration

The Naval Construction Battalion Center (NCBC) in Gulfport, Mississippi, and Mississippi Power Company (MPC) have integrated a 15-acre solar photovoltaic (PV) array, battery storage, and backup generation with an innovative microgrid. The Navy and utility teams are helping ensure mission readiness at NCBC while increasing renewable energy generation on the grid in MPC's service area. The NCBC/MPC resilience effort will allow the base to more effectively deploy disaster recovery activities in the event of a grid outage.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

A Fast and Scalable Genetic Algorithm-Based Approach for Planning of Microgrids in Distribution Networks: Preprint

As a result of climate change, extreme weather events are occurring more frequently and with increasing impact. This trend poses a significant challenge for distribution utilities and system operators to ensure that there is uninterrupted power supply to critical loads in their networks; thus, the level of proactive preparation of the distribution system to be able to handle severe impacts of extreme weather events represents the system's resilience. One method that distribution systems use to prepare for extreme events is to form multiple microgrids and thereby isolate themselves from the grid supply by using local generation as much as possible to supply critical loads. But partitioning an existing system into multiple feasible islands capable of supporting critical loads is still challenging for distribution systems - first, because of the size of the graph partitioning problem and, second, because of the difficulty in properly formulating the desired attributes of such islands or microgrids. Therefore, this paper presents a genetic algorithmbased approach that facilitates incorporating multiple objectives for grid partitioning by formulating two types of problems - node allocation and edge elimination - and it considers multiple topological and resilience-enhancing objectives. The performance of the proposed genetic algorithm-based approach is numerically evaluated on multiple test systems as well as on a real distribution feeder in Colorado, USA.

edge elimination↗

The International Space Station: Operations and Assembly - Learning From Experiences - Past, Present, and Future

As the Space Shuttle continues flight, construction and assembly of the International Space Station (ISS) carries on as the United States and our International Partners resume the building, and continue to carry on the daily operations, of this impressive and historical Earth-orbiting research facility. In his January 14, 2004, speech announcing a new vision for America s space program, President Bush ratified the United States commitment to completing construction of the ISS by 2010. Since the launch and joining of the first two elements in 1998, the ISS and the partnership have experienced and overcome many challenges to assembly and operations, along with accomplishing many impressive achievements and historical firsts. These experiences and achievements over time have shaped our strategy, planning, and expectations. The continual operation and assembly of ISS leads to new knowledge about the design, development and operation of systems and hardware that will be utilized in the development of new deep-space vehicles needed to fulfill the Vision for Exploration and to generate the data and information that will enable our programs to return to the Moon and continue on to Mars. This paper will provide an overview of the complexity of the ISS Program, including a historical review of the major assembly events and operational milestones of the program, along with the upcoming assembly plans and scheduled missions of the space shuttle flights and ISS Assembly sequence.

Fuller, Sean↗

TH-B-BRC-00: How to Identify and Resolve Potential Clinical Errors Before They Impact Patients Treatment: Lessons Learned

Radiation treatment consists of a chain of events influenced by the quality of machine operation, beam data commissioning, machine calibration, patient specific data, simulation, treatment planning, imaging and treatment delivery. There is always a chance that the clinical medical physicist may make or fail to detect an error in one of the events that may impact on the patient’s treatment. In the clinical scenario, errors may be systematic and, without peer review, may have a low detectability because they are not part of routine QA procedures. During treatment, there might be errors on machine that needs attention. External reviews of some of the treatment delivery components by independent reviewers, like IROC, can detect errors, but may not be timely. The goal of this session is to help junior clinical physicists identify potential errors as well as the approach of quality assurance to perform a root cause analysis to find and eliminate an error and to continually monitor for errors. A compilation of potential errors will be presented by examples of the thought process required to spot the error and determine the root cause. Examples may include unusual machine operation, erratic electrometer reading, consistent lower electron output, variation in photon output, body parts inadvertently left in beam, unusual treatment plan, poor normalization, hot spots etc. Awareness of the possibility and detection of error in any link of the treatment process chain will help improve the safe and accurate delivery of radiation to patients. Four experts will discuss how to identify errors in four areas of clinical treatment. D. Followill, NIH grant CA 180803.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

TH-B-BRC-01: How to Identify and Resolve Potential Clinical Errors

Radiation treatment consists of a chain of events influenced by the quality of machine operation, beam data commissioning, machine calibration, patient specific data, simulation, treatment planning, imaging and treatment delivery. There is always a chance that the clinical medical physicist may make or fail to detect an error in one of the events that may impact on the patient’s treatment. In the clinical scenario, errors may be systematic and, without peer review, may have a low detectability because they are not part of routine QA procedures. During treatment, there might be errors on machine that needs attention. External reviews of some of the treatment delivery components by independent reviewers, like IROC, can detect errors, but may not be timely. The goal of this session is to help junior clinical physicists identify potential errors as well as the approach of quality assurance to perform a root cause analysis to find and eliminate an error and to continually monitor for errors. A compilation of potential errors will be presented by examples of the thought process required to spot the error and determine the root cause. Examples may include unusual machine operation, erratic electrometer reading, consistent lower electron output, variation in photon output, body parts inadvertently left in beam, unusual treatment plan, poor normalization, hot spots etc. Awareness of the possibility and detection of error in any link of the treatment process chain will help improve the safe and accurate delivery of radiation to patients. Four experts will discuss how to identify errors in four areas of clinical treatment. D. Followill, NIH grant CA 180803.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

TH-B-BRC-02: Troubleshooting Issues with Linear Accelerator

Radiation treatment consists of a chain of events influenced by the quality of machine operation, beam data commissioning, machine calibration, patient specific data, simulation, treatment planning, imaging and treatment delivery. There is always a chance that the clinical medical physicist may make or fail to detect an error in one of the events that may impact on the patient’s treatment. In the clinical scenario, errors may be systematic and, without peer review, may have a low detectability because they are not part of routine QA procedures. During treatment, there might be errors on machine that needs attention. External reviews of some of the treatment delivery components by independent reviewers, like IROC, can detect errors, but may not be timely. The goal of this session is to help junior clinical physicists identify potential errors as well as the approach of quality assurance to perform a root cause analysis to find and eliminate an error and to continually monitor for errors. A compilation of potential errors will be presented by examples of the thought process required to spot the error and determine the root cause. Examples may include unusual machine operation, erratic electrometer reading, consistent lower electron output, variation in photon output, body parts inadvertently left in beam, unusual treatment plan, poor normalization, hot spots etc. Awareness of the possibility and detection of error in any link of the treatment process chain will help improve the safe and accurate delivery of radiation to patients. Four experts will discuss how to identify errors in four areas of clinical treatment. D. Followill, NIH grant CA 180803.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

TH-B-BRC-03: Measurement and Calibration Discrepancy: Advanced Warning Guidance

Radiation treatment consists of a chain of events influenced by the quality of machine operation, beam data commissioning, machine calibration, patient specific data, simulation, treatment planning, imaging and treatment delivery. There is always a chance that the clinical medical physicist may make or fail to detect an error in one of the events that may impact on the patient’s treatment. In the clinical scenario, errors may be systematic and, without peer review, may have a low detectability because they are not part of routine QA procedures. During treatment, there might be errors on machine that needs attention. External reviews of some of the treatment delivery components by independent reviewers, like IROC, can detect errors, but may not be timely. The goal of this session is to help junior clinical physicists identify potential errors as well as the approach of quality assurance to perform a root cause analysis to find and eliminate an error and to continually monitor for errors. A compilation of potential errors will be presented by examples of the thought process required to spot the error and determine the root cause. Examples may include unusual machine operation, erratic electrometer reading, consistent lower electron output, variation in photon output, body parts inadvertently left in beam, unusual treatment plan, poor normalization, hot spots etc. Awareness of the possibility and detection of error in any link of the treatment process chain will help improve the safe and accurate delivery of radiation to patients. Four experts will discuss how to identify errors in four areas of clinical treatment. D. Followill, NIH grant CA 180803.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

Lunar accelerometer network gravitational observatory (LANGO)

With ground-based interferometers detecting hundreds of gravitational-wave (GW) events, GW astronomy has continued to blossom. U.S. and European scientists are developing plans to construct third-generation ground-based interferometers. ESA has proceeded through the mission formulation phase of space-based interferometer in a lower-frequency band, 10 –4 –0.1 Hz. Despite all these exciting developments, there is still a missing frequency band, 0.1–10 Hz. This mid-frequency band is rich with interesting astrophysical events. Coalescence and merger of intermediate-mass black holes (IMBHs) will occur in this frequency band. Coalescing stellar-mass BHs will pass through this frequency band days before they reach the frequency band of LIGO and Virgo. Detection of such signals would enable a mid-frequency detector to issue an advance notice to the high-frequency GW detectors, as well as to optical, x-ray and γ-ray telescopes. We propose Lunar Accelerometer Network Gravitational Observatory (LANGO) to detect GWs in this frequency band. In the first phase (LANGO 1), we propose to deploy four ambient-temperature (250 K) accelerometers in the tetrahedral or in a square configuration on the hemisphere facing the Earth. After successful operation at 250 K, LANGO would be upgraded to a cryogenic (4 K) version with over two orders of magnitude increased sensitivity (LANGO 2), with coherent rejection of seismic noise implemented. LANGO is a full-tensor detector, capable of determining the source direction and wave polarization. Each test mass (TM) is suspended as a pendulum with resonance frequency ∼ 0.01 Hz, thus is only weakly coupled to the lunar surface horizontally. LANGO is designed to detect the relative motion of globally separated, nearly free, TMs by using the Moon as a large quiet platform. LANGO 1 and 2 accelerometers aim at sensitivities ⩽ 10 –11 m s –2 Hz –1/2 and ⩽ 10 –13 m s –2 Hz –1/2 in the horizontal axes over the frequency band of 1 mHz–10 Hz, which yield GW sensitivities 1.1 x 10 -21 Hz -1/2 and 3.8 x 10 -24 Hz -1/2 at 1 Hz, respectively. The LANGO accelerometers will be 10 3 –10 5 times more sensitive than Apollo seismometers. With such sensitivity, LANGO will also make great contribution to the advancement of lunar geophysics.

79 ASTRONOMY AND ASTROPHYSICS↗

UAS Integration in the NAS Detect and Avoid Subproject: Kitty Hawk - NASA Collaboration Discussion

NASA is conducting research under the UAS Integration in the NAS Project to develop standards that will enable mid-size and large unmanned aircraft to fly unrestricted in the National Airspace System. As these efforts move into its second phase, NASA is planning a series of flight tests and demonstrations, integrating industry partners' technologies. These events will not only provide valuable data to inform the RTCA Special Committee 228 DAA and C2 MOPS, but also provide an opportunity for the UAS community to test their technologies in a realistic environment. An overview of NASA UAS-NAS research will be presented touching on human systems integration, modeling and simulation and guidance and control. Plans for Flight Test 6 and Systems Integration Operationalization (SIO) will also be presented. The purpose of this meeting is to share with Kitty Hawk, at a high level, UAS-NAS research and discuss potential future collaboration between NASA and Kitty Hawk.

Shively, Jay↗

Best Practices in Integrated Resource Planning: A guide for planners developing the electricity resource mix of the future

Most states today require regulated electric utilities to file an IRP every 1 to 5 years, and some utilities voluntarily prepare these plans. Planning needs have changed in recent years due to emerging load growth, plant retirements, rising costs, and more extreme weather events – among other factors. In response, Synapse Energy Economics and Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory produced a joint report, Best Practices in Integrated Resource Planning: A guide for planners developing the electricity resource mix of the future. The guide offers best planning practices for electricity systems undergoing a major transition, but also contains a wealth of practical guidance to develop technically sophisticated, clearer, more effective, and state-of-the-art electric utility resource plans. The guide is for resource planning professionals and stakeholders involved in resource planning processes. This diverse group includes utility personnel tasked with conducting resource planning and making investment decisions, state regulatory commissions that develop planning guidance and oversee the resource planning process, and stakeholders that represent a wide range of interests—utility consumer advocates, environmental groups, industrial customers, local governments, independent power producers, and many other

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

A Study of the Impact of Peak Demand on Increasing Vulnerability of Cascading Failures to Extreme Contingency Events

The vulnerability of large power systems to cascading failures and major blackouts has become evident since the Northeast blackout in 1965. Based on analyses of the series of cascading blackouts in the past decade, the research community realized the urgent need to develop better methods, tools, and practices for performing cascading-outage analysis and for evaluating mitigations that are easily accessible by utility planning engineers. PNNL has developed the Dynamic Contingency Analysis Tool (DCAT) as an open-platform and publicly available methodology to help develop applications that aim to improve the capabilities of power planning engineers to assess the impact and likelihood of extreme contingencies and potential cascading events across their systems and interconnections. DCAT analysis will help identify potential vulnerabilities and allow study of mitigation solutions to reduce the risk of cascading outages in technically sound and effective ways. Using the DCAT capability, we examined the impacts of various load conditions to identify situations in which the power grid may encounter cascading outages that could lead to potential blackouts. This paper describes the usefulness of the DCAT tool and how it helps to understand potential impacts of load demand on cascading failures on the power system.

indexes↗

NUCLEAR INCIDENT CAPABILITIES, KNOWLEDGE & ENABLER LEVERAGING

The detonation of a 10 Kiloton Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) is a serious scenario that the United States must be prepared to address. The likelihood of a single nuclear bomb exploding in a single city is greater today than at the height of the Cold War. Layered defenses against domestic nuclear terrorism indicate that our government continues to view the threat as credible. The risk of such an event is further evidenced by terrorists desire to acquire nuclear weapons. The act of nuclear terrorism, particularly an act directed against a large population center in the United States, will overwhelm the capabilities of many local and state governments to respond, and will seriously challenge existing federal response capabilities. A 10 Kiloton IND detonation would cause total infrastructure damage in a 3-mile radius and levels of radiation spanning out 3,000 square miles. In a densely populated urban area, the anticipated casualties would be in excess of several hundred thousand. Although there would be enormous loss of life, housing and infrastructure, an IND detonation is a recoverable event. We can reduce the risk of these high-consequence, nontraditional threats by enhancing our nuclear detection architecture and establishing well planned and rehearsed plans for coordinated response. It is also important for us to identify new and improved ways to foster collaboration regarding the response to the IND threat to ensure the demand and density of expertise required for such an event is postured and prepared to mobilize, integrate, and support a myriad of anticipated challenges. We must be prepared to manage the consequences of such an event in a deliberate manner and get beyond notions of total devastation by adopting planning assumptions around survivability and resiliency. Planning for such a scenario needs to be decisive in determining a response based on competencies and desired outcomes. It is time to synthesize known threats and plausible consequences into action. Much work needs to be accomplished to enhance nuclear preparedness and to substantially bolster and clarify the capacity to deploy competent resources. Until detailed plans are scripted, and personnel and other resources are postured, and exercised, IND specific planning remains an urgent need requiring attention and action. Although strategic guidance, policies, concepts of operations, roles, responsibilities, and plans governing the response and consequence management for the IND scenario exist, an ongoing integration challenge prevails regarding how best to get capable and competent surge capacity personnel (disaster reservists) and other resources engaged and readied in an up-front manner with pre-scripted assignments to augment the magnitude of anticipated demands of expertise. With the above in mind, Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) puts science to work to create and deploy practical, high-value, cost-effective nuclear solutions. As the Department of Energy's (DOE) applied research and development laboratory, SRNL supports Savannah River Site (SRS) operations, DOE, national initiatives, and other federal agencies, across the country and around the world. SRNL's parent at SRS also employs more than 8,000 personnel. The team is a great asset that seeks to continue their service in the interest of national security and stands ready to accomplish new missions. Overall, an integral part of the vision for SRNL's National and Homeland Security Directorate is the establishment of a National Security Center at SRNL, and development of state of the science capabilities (technologies and trained technical personnel) for responding to emergency events on local, regional, or national scales. This entails leveraging and posturing the skills, knowledge and experience base of SRS personnel to deliver an integrated capability to support local, state, and federal authorities through the development of pre-scripted requests for assistance, agreements, and plans. It also includes developing plans, training, exercises, recruitment strategies, and processes to establish a 1,000 plus person nuclear disaster workforce capable of providing surge capacity support that can be deployed in part or in all.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Trial Implementation of the High-Impact, Low-Frequency Power Grid Event Risk Framework to Support Informed Decision-Making

In 2015, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) developed a multi-hazard risk-assessment framework for modeling high-impact, low-frequency (HILF) power grid events to support risk-informed decisions for power grid management and emergency planning. The identified framework elements are based on a systematic and comprehensive characterization of hazards to the level of detail required for modeling risk. In 2016, PNNL performed a trial implementation of the framework for a single hazard category and a set of key power grid asset types as a way to test the framework. A specific realization of a HILF event is referred to as an initiating event, or initiator. An initiating event is the manifestation of a hazard, and can be, for example, an earthquake of specified magnitude at a specified epicenter. Other examples of HILF events include geomagnetic disturbances and pandemics. For this test implementation, grid assets of a benchmark power system transmission network were assigned proxy geographical coordinates associated with Washington State locations; and real-world seismic hazard information was used for those locations. Based on the fragility of the grid assets to events of different severities, the set of possible failure scenarios (i.e., combinations of different asset failures) and their associated probabilities were determined, and recovery of grid assets and restoration of the network were considered. These combinations of failures and their subsequent recovery constitute a HILF event sequence that results in a given level of consequence, such as loss of power over a given geographic area for a given duration. The concurrent quantitative consideration of event probabilities and event consequences characterizes a risk model. For HILF event sequences, risk was expressed as expected unserved energy per year. This implementation demonstrates the feasibility and value of using the HILF event risk framework despite some of the identified challenges. This report discusses this trial implementation and presents risk results and insights from the implementation.

Veeramany, Arun↗

Detailed Characterization of Nuclear Recoil Pulse Shape Discrimination in the DarkSide-50 Direct Dark Matter Experiment

While evidence of non-baryonic dark matter has been accumulating for decades, its exact nature continues to remain a mystery. Weakly Interacting Massive Particles (WIMPs) are a well motivated candidate which appear in certain extensions of the Standard Model, independently of dark matter theory. If such particles exist, they should occasionally interact with particles of normal matter, producing a signal which may be detected. The DarkSide-50 direct dark matter experiment aims to detect the energy of recoiling argon atoms due to the elastic scattering of postulated WIMPs. In order to make such a discovery, a clear understanding of both the background and signal region is essential. This understanding requires a careful study of the detector's response to radioactive sources, which in turn requires such sources may be safely introduced into or near the detector volume and reliably removed. The CALibration Insertaion System (CALIS) was designed and built for this purpose in a j oint effort between Fermi National Laboratory and the University of Hawaii. This work describes the design and testing of CALIS, its installation and commissioning at the Laboratori Nazionali del Gran Sasso (LNGS) and the multiple calibration campaigns which have successfully employed it. As nuclear recoils produced by WIMPs are indistinguishable from those produced by neutrons, radiogenic neutrons are both the most dangerous class of background and a vital calibration source for the study of the potential WIMP signal. Prior to the calibration of DarkSide-50 with radioactive neutron sources, the acceptance region was determined by the extrapolation of nuclear recoil data from a separate, dedicated experiment, ScENE, which measured the distribution of the pulse shape discrimination parameter, $f_{90}$, for nuclear recoils of known energies. This work demonstrates the validity of the extrapolation of ScENE values to DarkSide-50, by direct comparison of the $f_{90}$ distributio n of nuclear recoils from ScENE and an AmBe calibration sour! ce. The combined acceptance as defined by ScENE and the \textit{in-situ} AmBe calibration were used to establish the best WIMP exclusion limit on an argon target. Unfortunately, radioactive sources used for the calibration of DarkSide-50 are universally accompanied by gamma decays, which obscure the low energy region where most WIMP interactions are expected to occur and seem to make continuing dependence on an external measurement such as ScENE inevitable. However, this work presents a novel method of nuclear recoil calibration employing event selection, unique to the design of DarkSide-50, which produces a nearly pure sample of nuclear recoils. Further, it describes the execution of a neutron calibration campaign, from planning to analysis, which yielded a valuable data set for defining the acceptance region. Together with the event selection techniques, this allows for the definition of the acceptance region independent of ScENE values. Two analytical models of the $f_{90 }$ distribution are described and their results for nuclear recoils are compared. Finally, a detailed study of integrated noise in nuclear and electron recoil

72 PHYSICS OF ELEMENTARY PARTICLES AND FIELDS↗

Delta Advanced Reusable Transport (DART): An alternative manned spacecraft

Although the current U.S. Space Transportation System (STS) has proven successful in many applications, the truth remains that the space shuttle is not as reliable or economical as was once hoped. In fact, the Augustine Commission on the future of the U.S. Space Program has recommended that the space shuttle only be used on missions directly requiring human capabilities on-orbit and that the shuttle program should eventually be phased out. This poses a great dilemma since the shuttle provides the only current or planned U.S. means for human access to space at the same time that NASA is building toward a permanent manned presence. As a possible solution to this dilemma, it is proposed that the U.S. begin development of an Alternative Manned Spacecraft (AMS). This spacecraft would not only provide follow-on capability for maintaining human space flight, but would also provide redundancy and enhanced capability in the near future. Design requirements for the AMS studied include: (1) capability of launching on one of the current or planned U.S. expendable launch vehicles (baseline McDonnell Douglas Delta II model 7920 expendable booster); (2) application to a wide variety of missions including autonomous operations, space station support, and access to orbits and inclinations beyond those of the space shuttle; (3) low enough costing to fly regularly in augmentation of space shuttle capabilities; (4) production surge capabilities to replace the shuttle if events require it; (5) intact abort capability in all flight regimes since the planned launch vehicles are not man-rated; (6) technology cut-off date of 1990; and (7) initial operational capability in 1995. In addition, the design of the AMS would take advantage of scientific advances made in the 20 years since the space shuttle was first conceived. These advances are in such technologies as composite materials, propulsion systems, avionics, and hypersonics.

Lewerenz, T.↗

Fossils, molecules and embryos: new perspectives on the Cambrian explosion

The Cambrian explosion is named for the geologically sudden appearance of numerous metazoan body plans (many of living phyla) between about 530 and 520 million years ago, only 1.7% of the duration of the fossil record of animals. Earlier indications of metazoans are found in the Neoproterozic; minute trails suggesting bilaterian activity date from about 600 million years ago. Larger and more elaborate fossil burrows appear near 543 million years ago, the beginning of the Cambrian Period. Evidence of metazoan activity in both trace and body fossils then increased during the 13 million years leading to the explosion. All living phyla may have originated by the end of the explosion. Molecular divergences among lineages leading to phyla record speciation events that have been earlier than the origins of the new body plans, which can arise many tens of millions of years after an initial branching. Various attempts to date those branchings by using molecular clocks have disagreed widely. While the timing of the evolution of the developmental systems of living metazoan body plans is still uncertain, the distribution of Hox and other developmental control genes among metazoans indicates that an extensive patterning system was in place prior to the Cambrian. However, it is likely that much genomic repatterning occurred during the Early Cambrian, involving both key control genes and regulators within their downstream cascades, as novel body plans evolved.

Non-NASA Center↗

Challenges for the CMS computing model in the first year

CMS is in the process of commissioning a complex detector and a globally distributed computing infrastructure simultaneously. This represents a unique challenge. Even at the beginning there is not sufficient analysis or organized processing resources at CERN alone. In this presentation we discuss the unique computing challenges CMS expects to face during the first year of running and how they influence the baseline computing model decisions. During the early accelerator commissioning periods, CMS will attempt to collect as many events as possible when the beam is on in order to provide adequate early commissioning data. Some of these plans involve overdriving the Tier-0 infrastructure during data collection with recovery when the beam is off. In addition to the larger number of triggered events, there will be pressure in the first year to collect and analyze more complete data formats as the summarized formats mature. The large event formats impact the required storage, bandwidth, and processing capacity across all the computing centers. While the understanding of the detector and the event selections is being improved, there will likely be a larger number of reconstruction passes and skims performed by both central operations and individual users. We discuss how these additional stresses impact the allocation of resources and the changes from the baseline computing model.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Integrating planning and reactive control

Our research is developing persistent agents that can achieve complex tasks in dynamic and uncertain environments. We refer to such agents as taskable, reactive agents. An agent of this type requires a number of capabilities. The ability to execute complex tasks necessitates the use of strategic plans for accomplishing tasks; hence, the agent must be able to synthesize new plans at run time. The dynamic nature of the environment requires that the agent be able to deal with unpredictable changes in its world. As such, agents must be able to react to unanticipated events by taking appropriate actions in a timely manner, while continuing activities that support current goals. The unpredictability of the world could lead to failure of plans generated for individual tasks. Agents must have the ability to recover from failures by adapting their activities to the new situation, or replanning if the world changes sufficiently. Finally, the agent should be able to perform in the face of uncertainty. The Cypress system, described here, provides a framework for creating taskable, reactive agents. Several features distinguish our approach: (1) the generation and execution of complex plans with parallel actions; (2) the integration of goal-driven and event driven activities during execution; (3) the use of evidential reasoning for dealing with uncertainty; and (4) the use of replanning to handle run-time execution problems. Our model for a taskable, reactive agent has two main intelligent components, an executor and a planner. The two components share a library of possible actions that the system can take. The library encompasses a full range of action representations, including plans, planning operators, and executable procedures such as predefined standard operating procedures (SOP's). These three classes of actions span multiple levels of abstraction.

Wilkins, David E.↗