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DOE OSTI2021

Modeling the Fundamental Radiation Chemistry of the Organic Diluent, and the Effect of Metal Ion Complexation on the Radiochemical Behavior of Active Compounds

All used nuclear fuel (UNF) reprocessing technologies must operate efficiently in the presence of an intense, multi-component (predominantly alpha, beta, and gamma) radiation field. Consequently, radiation-induced degradation of reprocessing systems is of concern, as it negatively impacts process performance over time due to the destruction of both active compounds (ligands, phase modifiers, holdback agents, etc.) and the formation of degradation products. Reprocessing solvent system radiolysis has been linked to changes in separation efficiency and physical properties of solvent mixtures, solvent-recycle longevity, crud formation, and other unexpected outcomes that impact the efficient recovery of valuable materials (e.g., the actinides) and the volume of hazardous radioactive waste for final disposal, i.e., in a geological repository. Consequently, a fundamental understanding of radiolytic processes and their effects on reprocessing solvent system performance is critical for: (i) the cost-effective development and innovation of separation technologies; (ii) the design and implementation of predictive radiation chemical models for process monitoring and lifetimes; and (iii) potentially the ability to exploit radiolytic phenomenon to our benefit, e.g., strategic radiolysis of active molecules to liberate specific degradation products that aid subsequent process stages. Despite extensive investigation into the radiolytic behavior of active solvent system compounds, little attention has been given to understanding (i) the radiation chemical behavior and modification of the organic diluent and (ii) the effect of metal ion complexation on the radiochemical behavior of active compounds.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗

DOE OSTI2020

Developing a Decision Support Engine to Enable Irrigation Modernization - Poster

Irrigation systems in the United States are some of the oldest continually utilized infrastructure in existence today, with some systems exceeding 100 years in age. They are operated to meet farming demands but are managed through a balance of varying influence: policies limiting water usage, stakeholder interests, and environmental impacts. Irrigation modernization is defined as a set of activities that update and improve existing irrigation systems, including, but not limited to improving water quantity, development of distributed energy resources for surrounding communities, ecosystem services, and improved agricultural yields. Modernizing an existing irrigation system can enable stakeholders to combat changing environmental and population demands but is difficult because the complexity involved in determining the potential benefits and consequences of irrigation modernization is high. We are combining a large amount of various geospatial, tabular, and temporal data with subject matter expertise into a decision support engine that will enable stakeholders to determine the benefits and consequences of irrigation modernization in their irrigation systems. A web-based GIS will allow the user to construct the modifications out of a palette of modernization options, which will be sent to the analytics engine for computations, and back to the web client for a graphical display and comparison of relevant metrics. Our development process involves four phases: 1) identify mechanisms of modernization, 2) identify data requirements, data streams, first principles and applicable algorithms necessary to quantify modernization mechanisms, 3) create ‘modules’ for each modernization mechanism, these modules will form the decision support engine, each capable of performing independently but can also inform other modules when needed, 4) Merge the decision support engine with a user interface, capable of ingesting user inputs and returning insights into the impacts of a modernization project as they relate to economic, environmental, monetary, and energy generation. Once complete, it is our intention that this tool will be fundamental in irrigation modernization projects, providing a strong analytical basis from which stakeholders can quickly make informed decisions regarding project development.

13 HYDRO ENERGY↗

DOE OSTI2023

Methodology and Tool for the Physical Security Analysis of Micro and Advanced Reactors

This work proposes a dynamic evaluation methodology to relax the conservatism in physical security evaluation, by leveraging an ongoing work in the Light Water Reactor Sustainability pathway. This methodology is implemented in a dynamic risk assessment tool named Event Modeling Risk Assessment using Linked Diagrams (EMRALD). The work extends EMRALD’s capability to support a sandbox feature where analysts can easily create attack scenarios and modify advanced/small modular reactor (A/SMR) security and safety features using templates. This approach saves time and cost since the analysis does not require creating detailed computer-aided design models, as is commonly required in commercial force-on-force software tools. EMRALD is completely free to use at https://emraldapp.inl.gov. We have developed basic templates including physical barriers, intrusion sensors, physical areas, and safety actions, that can be downloaded from EMRALD’s GitHub site: https://github.com/idaholab/EMRALD. These templates use generic data commonly used for training purposes, which do not reflect any actual operating nuclear reactor. Users may adjust the data in the templates with their own dataset and/or create new templates in EMRALD. The proposed methodology combines security and safety by assessing sabotage effects up to the radiological consequence to the public instead of merely the core damage state. This practice follows the industry standard for advanced non-light-water reactors currently proposed for endorsement by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The combination of security and safety is expressed in an achievability-consequence chart. EMRALD can be used to generate data for this chart. A hypothetical case study using a representative sodium-cooled fast reactor (SFR) facility is presented in this report to demonstrate this methodology. This case study does not contain any actual nuclear plant information. This work will benefit A/SMR vendors and utilities to implement security by design during the reactor design iteration phase, such that they do not have to perform upgrades and retrofits to the reactor after it is installed to improve its physical protection system. The tool may also be used to analyze domestic or foreign reactor designs to support the International Nuclear Security Techniques for Advanced Reactors (INSTAR) bilateral missions. Future works are planned to implement the methodology on a reference SFR reactor and a reference high-temperature gas-cooled reactor to obtain insights and lessons-learned for the A/SMR community.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

DOE OSTI2020

A Tool for the Risk-Informed Management of Critical Mission Resilience

We describe a methodology and tool for the risk-informed management and planning of mission resilience. By mapping concepts of resilience onto the elements of a streamlined risk model we are able to tap the substantial portfolio of established risk concepts to provide rapid insights in the evaluation and high-level screening of prospective resilience enhancement measures. This provides a risk-informed, levelized basis for the comparison of disparate resilience solutions and the means of establishing preferences. The methodology begins with identification of critical missions met by a site, and establishment of the supporting physical assets. Scenarios that would result in failure of these assets are systematically identified. Each scenario comprises three elements: realization of a hazard or threat resulting in loss of resources (the current focus being on power, natural gas, and water) to the asset, failure of measures in place to protect the asset against those losses, and realization of the consequent impacts. These scenarios are quantified in terms of their probabilities of occurrence and the magnitude of the resultant consequences (mission outage time), allowing risk-prioritization to focus resilience enhancement considerations. What-If? analyses are conducted through adjusting elements of the risk calculation to reflect the deployment of prospective resilience measures, by which means the efficacies of each of those measures can be compared using common risk metrics across diverse resilience strategies. This paper will also describe the insights from example applications.

resilience, risk, risk assesment, energy, water↗

DOE OSTI2023

Hypothetical Solar Cyberattack Scenarios and Impacts

This report offers approachable, plausible scenarios of cyberattacks affecting photovoltaic assets and interconnected infrastructure. It may be used by State Energy Officials and Public Utility Commission Staff to educate themselves on the potential consequences of these scenarios and the practical, high-level actions that may be implemented now to mitigate future impacts. It highlights plausible consequences of inadequate cyber provisions for PV systems and offers potential state actions to alleviate the identified risks.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

DOE OSTI2023

Closed Loop Time and the Topology of Totality

The author suggests a cosmology based on just two principles: (1) no boundaries to spacetime and (2) no physical infinities. On the hypothesis that these are exactly true, and that charge conjugation, parity and time reversal invariance (CPT) is a perfect symmetry at the big bang, answers are provided to many puzzles, such as what happened to the antimatter, what happened before the big bang, and what will happen in the far future? Consequences are that our universe U is closed (with positive curvature) and so the total energy, angular momentum and charge of the universe must be zero. At the big bang a universe-antiuniverse pair, UU¯ is created as a virtual fluctuation in what we may call Outer SpaceTime, along with a vast number of other disconnected universes—the multiverse. The CPT-conjugate U¯ has identical physics (and matter content) to U; other UU¯ pairs in the multiverse have different physics parameters. A consequence is that time at the fundamental particle level à la Feynman must be distinct from thermodynamic time. The UU¯ forms a closed loop.

Albrow, Michael G.↗

DOE OSTI2022

Risk Management and Risk Aversion, from Benefit to Impediment

Risk management is a critical tool for improving the probability of project success by identifying, assessing, prioritizing, and attempting to control threats to project realization. For industries that require high operational reliability due to the potential consequences of off-normal events, such as the nuclear, aerospace, and chemical sectors, a major focus of risk management is the preservation of process safety. Due to the nature of the processes or systems under consideration, the associated process safety analyses (such as risk and safety assessments) and safety features can require significant resources. These costs are typically tolerated either due to the need to satisfy regulatory requirements or based on the assumption that they generally decrease the occurrence of unwanted events and therefore improve the probability of project success. However, as the level of acceptable or tolerable risk from unwanted events decreases, the required resources necessary for ensuring and demonstrating satisfaction of these criteria can grow and in turn can become one of the dominant impediments to project success. This paper outlines a high-level theoretical framework for the consideration of dominant project risks, which includes potential project failure from both the occurrence of high consequence off-normal events and the inability to achieve project completion due to the resource needs and innovation losses associated with extreme risk aversion. Utilizing such an integrated approach permits an attempt to optimize the probability of successful project realization while also providing valuable insight into the proper level of acceptable risk. The work is presented as a first step, in hopes of spurring additional discussion and analysis regarding appropriate levels of risk tolerance and the balance of project benefits.

Grabaskas, David↗

DOE OSTI2023

Cyber-Informed Engineering Principles: What’s in it for me?

CIE is an emerging method to integrate cybersecurity considerations into the conception, design, development, and operation of any physical system that has digital connectivity, monitoring, or control. CIE complements—but does not replace—the application of cybersecurity standards or practices currently in place within an organization. Rather, it expands cybersecurity decisions into the engineering space, not by asking engineers to become cyber experts, but by calling on engineers to apply engineering tools and make engineering decisions that improve cybersecurity outcomes. CIE examines the engineering consequences that a sophisticated cyber attacker could achieve, and drives engineering changes that may provide deterministic mitigations to limit or eliminate those consequences. Engineers and technicians that design critical energy infrastructure installations can integrate the 12 principles of CIE into each phase of the engineering lifecycle, from concept to retirement. These principles are aimed at system or design engineers, operators, and technicians, rather than software engineers or operational cybersecurity practitioners, because the engineers who design, build, operate, and maintain the physical infrastructure are best positioned to leverage a system’s engineering design to diminish the severity of cyber attacks or digital technology failures. This approach creates new opportunities for engineering teams—and not just cybersecurity teams—to secure the system using the physics and mechanics of engineering controls—not just digital monitoring and controls.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

DOE OSTI2020

Distribution Development for Residual Inventory at the New York West Valley Site - 20400

The New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) is the owner of the Western New York Nuclear Service Center (WNYNSC), a 1,351 ha site located approximately 48 km south of Buffalo, New York. In 1962, Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. (NFS) entered into Agreements with the Atomic Energy Commission and New York State to construct the first commercial reprocessing plant of nuclear fuel in the United States. NFS, a private company, built and operated the spent fuel reprocessing plant and waste disposal facilities, processing 640 Mg of spent nuclear fuel from 1966 to 1972 under an Atomic Energy Commission license. Nuclear fuel reprocessing operations ended in 1972 and never reopened, leaving behind radioactive and chemical wastes. Operations led to contamination in a number of facilities and locations. Some of that contamination has migrated from waste disposal zones to other layers, formations, and features on and off the WNYNSC. Phase I decommissioning activities are ongoing and involve the removal of a number of areas and structures that have been associated with contamination. The purpose of this work is to outline the approach for characterizing contamination not associated with disposed wastes, contaminated structures, or specific releases. In this work, the term, residual radiological activity, is used to describe environmental contamination that exists subsequent to the completion of Phase I decommissioning activities, that is not associated with disposed wastes, contaminated structures, or specific releases. Contamination from the Site was quantified relative to data that characterize the concentrations of radionuclides that exist in background. Background concentrations are those present in the area but having no influence from Site related activities. The existence of residual radiological activity that is elevated relative to background has the potential to contribute to future risks to human health and the environment. As a consequence, the residual inventory information is used to inform the West Valley Probabilistic Performance Assessment (PPA) model to characterize potential future risks to human health and the environment. The centralized West Valley Data Management System (DMS) was the source of information for the data assembled in this analysis. The DMS is a fairly large compilation consisting of thousands of records from investigation studies, with sample dates ranging from 1990 to present. Samples from monitoring wells, boreholes, geoprobe studies, surface water, surface soils, storm water outfalls, ventilation stack filters, plant and animal tissues, and more are included in the DMS. Results are typically reported in units of activity per unit volume. For the purpose of the analyses presented here, all results were converted into consistent units of pCi per unit volume. Since 1990, data have been collected from various locations across the WNYNSC at different times with varying frequency over the course of several decades. As a consequence, a number of potential issues can arise with respect to the assembly of a dataset that is deemed adequate for the characterization of residual radiological activity. These issues were assessed and resolved to the extent possible through careful consideration of the properties of the distributions. The intent was to use data which characterize the current state of the Site. Radionuclides can be designated to one of several groups depending on their origin. In this work the groups considered were 1) Naturally Occurring Radioactive Material (NORM), 2) fallout, and 3) Other (including power plant, medical research, etc). This grouping is a useful construct with respect to the interpretation of fixed laboratory results. For example, NORM radionuclides that exist within a decay chain should have approximately equivalent distributions of concentrations if they are representative of background conditions. Insights such as these can be used as a check to identify sample results that need to be further investigated or omitted due to issues associated with reported results from fixed laboratory analyses. This type of analysis provided a foundation for the assessment of the adequacy of sample results for use in subsequent components of an assessment. The general process for the assessment of residual radiological contamination at the Site consists of a sequence of several steps. First, for each analyte, several statistical tests were performed to assess the weight of evidence against the null hypothesis that the mean of the distribution of concentrations was equal to zero. If the mean of the distribution of concentrations for a given radionuclide was not found to be greater than zero, then it was removed from consideration as a component of the residual radiological contamination. If there was significant evidence to reject the hypothesis of the mean being equal to zero, the second step was to compare the distribution of the data from the Site to that of the corresponding background. A suite of tests was used to compare the distributions of the site and background data. The results of these tests were collectively used to determine if site data are elevated relative to background. The third step was to develop distributions using a Bayesian framework to characterize the distribution of mean of the increment present above background for each of the radionuclides. The Bayesian model implemented allowed for the comparison of site-specific records to background concentrations to better approximate contamination attributed to the Site. A final screening step was employed for radionuclides that exceed background. This screening step compared 95% upper confidence limits (UCLs) from the increment distribution developed in the previous step to the risk screening levels. This approach yields a list of analytes that were determined to be elevated relative to background.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2020

Challenges and Practical Solutions for Conducting Structural MARSSIM Surveys in Elevated Radon Environments - 20413

The Multi-Agency Radiation Survey and Site Investigation Manual (MARSSIM) [1] provides comprehensive guidance for the development and implementation of radiological surveys conducted to demonstrate compliance with a dose- or risk-based cleanup goal during final status survey. The MARSSIM methodology follows an integrated strategy combining direct measurements and sampling to assess uniform residual contamination, and scanning surveys to identify localized areas of elevated activity. Building surveys assessing residual surface contamination present unique challenges from reliance on field measurements that may be subject to less than ideal environmental conditions. Additionally, limited characterization and excessive conservatism incorporated into the conceptual site model may result in derived concentration guideline levels (DCGL) and, as a consequence of relatively inefficient field instrumentation, corresponding attributable count rates generally comparable to background. The presence of elevated ambient radon concentrations and associated progeny deposition both exacerbate these intrinsic survey challenges and introduce a series of technical, logistic, and administrative obstacles that can wreak havoc on the statistical legitimacy of each component of the MARSSIM process. Short-lived radon progeny including polonium-218, lead-214, bismuth-214, and polonium-214 produce excessive alpha and beta radiation that may decrease instrument sensitivity through an increase in background count rates, and, at worst, may result in incorrect survey unit failure through the simulation of residual surface activity. Aside from the obvious solution of exhaustive radon mitigation, the primary objectives are to distinguish between radon progeny deposition and actual surface activity, and collect sufficient defensible data. The following is a technical discussion of the consequences of performing building MARSSIM surveys in the presence of elevated ambient radon atmospheres, conceptual examples, and an overview of practical strategies to minimize the effects of radon interference while collecting sufficient defensible data to complete the survey. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2024

Development of Data Reporting Standards for High-Temperature Gas-cooled Reactor (HTGR) Nuclear Energy University Program (NEUP) Thermal-Fluid Experiments

Since 2009, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Energy's Nuclear Energy University Program (NEUP) has been at the forefront of nuclear research, specifically concentrating on advancing high-temperature gas-cooled reactor (HTGR) technologies. By Fiscal Year 2023, NEUP has authorized 35 projects dedicated to HTGR research, each contributing significantly to the enhancement of our understanding of this technology. The outcomes of these diverse projects have been disseminated through final NEUP reports, peer-reviewed journal articles, and presentations at academic conferences, forming a comprehensive tapestry of knowledge. Despite the substantial value of these findings, their dissemination has been fragmented, posing challenges for accessibility to researchers and policymakers and leading to underutilization of DOE investments. Recognizing this critical gap and its potential consequences for the future of nuclear research, the Advanced Reactor Technologies (ART) Gas-Cooled Reactor (GCR) program conducted an extensive survey of completed and ongoing HTGR NEUP projects. This survey enabled the compilation of crucial data, resulting in the development of a specialized public-access database tailored for computational fluid dynamics and system code validation, specifically designed for HTGR applications. However, the data collection process revealed a significant challenge in central data organization due to individual researchers from different institutes employing varying logics and preferences for recording and documenting experimental data. Consequently, an urgent need has been identified to establish a standardized reporting format for HTGR experimental projects. Addressing this issue is essential for enhancing collaboration, maximizing the impact of DOE investments, and ensuring the seamless advancement of HTGR technologies in nuclear research.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2020

Advanced Test Reactor Experiment Safety Analysis

This presentation contains general information about the Advanced Test Reactor experiment safety analysis program. Accidents and dose consequence are discussed in general terms. Pictures of ATR facilities and experiments are included. In cases where experiments are shown, identification numbers have been removed. Department of Energy limits on dose consequence are provided. These limits are found in many non-CUI documents and a derived from publicly available sources. A summary of the presentation content is as follows: -Define Experiment Safety Analysis -Discuss what we are protecting and the applicable limits -Show how safety analysis fits into the experiment process -Explore the scope of experiment activities and associated accidents -Present how we categorize accidents and establish accident frequencies -Identify how controls are implemented and process improvements

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2024

HTGR Validation: NEUP Survey and Database - Data Reporting Standard for HTGR Thermal-Fluid Experiments

Since 2009, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Energy's Nuclear Energy University Program (NEUP) has been at the forefront of nuclear research, specifically concentrating on advancing high-temperature gas-cooled reactor (HTGR) technologies. By Fiscal Year 2024, NEUP has authorized 36 projects dedicated to HTGR research, each contributing significantly to the enhancement of our understanding of this technology. The outcomes of these diverse projects have been disseminated through final NEUP reports, peer-reviewed journal articles, and presentations at academic conferences, forming a comprehensive tapestry of knowledge. Despite the substantial value of these findings, their dissemination has been fragmented, posing challenges for accessibility to researchers and policymakers and leading to underutilization of DOE investments. Recognizing this critical gap and its potential consequences for the future of nuclear research, the Advanced Reactor Technologies (ART) Gas-Cooled Reactor (GCR) program conducted an extensive survey of completed and ongoing HTGR NEUP projects. This survey enabled the compilation of crucial data, resulting in the development of a specialized public-access database tailored for computational fluid dynamics and system code validation, specifically designed for HTGR applications. However, the data collection process revealed a significant challenge in central data organization due to individual researchers from different institutes employing varying logics and preferences for recording and documenting experimental data. Consequently, an urgent need has been identified to establish a standardized reporting format for HTGR experimental projects. Addressing this issue is essential for enhancing collaboration, maximizing the impact of DOE investments, and ensuring the seamless advancement of HTGR technologies in nuclear research.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI1975

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 16, No. 2, March-April 1975]

Nuclear Safety covers significant developments in the field of nuclear safety. The scope is limited to topics relevant to the analysis and control of hazards associated with nuclear energy, operations involving fissionable materials, and the products of nuclear fission and their effects on the environment. Primary emphasis is on safety in reactor design, construction, and operation; however, safety considerations in regard to the entire fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing, nuclear waste disposal, handling of radioisotopes, and environmental effects of these operations, are also treated. Table of Contents for this issue follows. Table of Contents for this issue follows. GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 127 Quality Assurance in the Construction of Nuclear Power Plants by Sidney A. Bernsen, 141 1974 ANS Topical Meeting on Fast Reactor Safety by M. H. Fontana; CONTROL AND INSTRUMENTATION: 150 GBR-4 Protection Systems: Failures and Their Consequences by Peter Burgsmüller, J. J. Dekais, Albert Krähe, Raffaello Pignatelli, and Gottfried Vieider, 162 Standby Emergency Power Systems. Part 2—The Later Plants by E. W. Hagen; PLANT SAFETY FEATURES: 180 Radiotoxic Hazard Measure for Buried Solid Radioactive Waste by J. Hamstra, 190 The Thirteenth AEC Air-Cleaning Conference by D. W. Moeller, D. W. Underhill, and M. W. First, 203 Book Review: Nuclear Criticality Safety; CONSEQUENCES OF EFFLUENT RELEASE: 204 Environmental Radiation Effects of Nuclear Facilities in New York State by M. S. Terpilak and B. L. Jorgensen, 222 Book Review: Thermal Ecology; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 223 Set-Point Drift in Nuclear Power-Plant Safety-Related Instrumentation Adapted by the Nuclear Safety Staff, 224 Diesel-Generator Operating Experience at Nuclear Power Plants, 227 Summary of Operating U. S. Power Reactors as of Jan. 1, 1975, 232 Selected Safety-Related Occurrences Reported in November and December 1974 Compiled by William R. Casto, 235 Recent Occurrences at Nuclear Reactors and Their Causes Compiled by William R. Casto; CURRENT EVENTS: 243 General Administrative Activities Compiled by Wm. B. Cottrell, 251 Action on Power-Reactor Projects Undergoing Regulatory Review or Consideration Compiled by Wm. B. Cottrell, 266 Action on Nonreactor Projects Undergoing Regulatory Review or Consideration Compiled by Wm. B Cottrell, 268 Proposed Rule Changes as of Jan. 1, 1975; MISCELLANY: 149 Course in Italy on High-Energy Radiation Dosimetry and Protection (Announcement), 250 Course at Northwestern on Safety of Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants (Announcement), 266 Symposium of the Combined Effects on the Environment of Radioactive, Chemical, and Thermal Releases from the Nuclear Industry (Announcement), 271 Short Course on Engineering for Extreme Winds and Tornadoes (Announcement), 272 Three 1-Week Courses at MIT on Nuclear Power-Reactor Safety (Announcement), 272 Harvard University Short Courses (Announcement).

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2025

SURVEILLANCE DETECTION FOR TRANSPORTATION OPERATIONS PERSONNEL TO PREVENT HIJACKING, THEFT, SABOTAGE, AND MALICIOUS SECURITY EVENTS DURING TRANSPORTING NUCLEAR MATERIAL

The secure transportation of high-consequence materials, including nuclear and radiological assets, is a critical global priority in the face of escalating terrorism, security threats, and violent protests targeting these operations. Effective surveillance detection—the ability to identify, assess, and respond to potential threats across a continuum of scenarios—is paramount in addressing these challenges. This paper outlines a phased, multi-tiered training program designed to strengthen the surveillance detection capabilities of organizations responsible for nuclear material transport. The proposed training program adopts a progressive approach, gradually increasing in technical complexity to provide participants with comprehensive knowledge and tools for implementing robust security strategies. It targets a wide spectrum of stakeholders, including competent authorities, regulators, inspectors, shippers, carriers, law enforcement, and emergency response personnel, equipping them to plan, evaluate, and safeguard nuclear material transportation effectively. Each phase of the program emphasizes distinct elements of the surveillance detection continuum and transport security, focusing on critical topics such as threat identification, adversary task timelines, protective methodologies, and attack mitigation strategies. The training framework is anchored in technical exchanges and scenario-driven courses that reflect real-world complexities and challenges. By addressing the surveillance detection continuum comprehensively—from early threat assessment to active countermeasures—the program reinforces global efforts to secure nuclear assets. It aligns with international security objectives and fosters a strong security culture within participating organizations, ensuring personnel are prepared to counter potential threats and maintain the safe, secure movement of these materials. Ultimately, this initiative aims to enhance preparedness, security, and response capabilities, supporting the global mission to safeguard high-consequence materials against evolving threats.

Zineddin, Dr. Z. [ORNL] (ORCID:0009000848740725)↗

DOE OSTI2026

Responsible Adoption of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in Electric Grid Operations

The future of the grid will be powered by AI—or undermined by it. Artificial intelligence is rapidly reshaping grid operations, improving fault detection, forecasting accuracy, and real-time optimization. As AI systems move closer to operational decision loops, however, they introduce new consequence pathways: expanded attack surfaces, model integrity risks, regulatory exposure, and human-automation challenges. This talk presents a consequence-driven framework for deploying AI responsibly in the electric grid. Attendees will gain practical strategies to strengthen resilience, boost reliability, and deploy AI securely — ensuring the grid of the future is not only smarter but safer.

25 - ENERGY STORAGE↗

DOE OSTI2025

Data Centers and Digital Assurance Introduction to Supply Chain and Cybersecurity for Data Centers, Session 1

The first session of the TADA (Technical Assistance for Digital Assurance) Data Centers Cohort Workshop, held on October 30, 2025, introduced foundational concepts of Digital Assurance in the context of data center and grid integration. Sponsored by the U.S. Department of Energy, the workshop brought together utilities, data center operators, developers, and vendors to address cybersecurity and supply chain vulnerabilities. The session emphasized the growing criticality of data centers within the electric grid and the need for secure, real-time, bidirectional communication. Participants explored the principles of Digital Assurance, including cybersecurity, cyber-informed engineering (CIE), and lifecycle security, and applied a threat-vulnerability-consequence framework to identify and mitigate risks at the data center–grid interface. Discussions covered a range of threats such as spoofed dispatch signals and insider threats, architectural vulnerabilities like SCADA interfaces and insecure protocols, and potential consequences including cascading grid failures. The session also raised strategic questions about business value, vendor assurance, and defining cyber boundaries and responsibilities. This foundational workshop set the stage for deeper technical analysis and the development of actionable frameworks in subsequent sessions. Session 1 of 3.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2020

CCE Case Study: Stinky Cheese Company

This document explores how to apply Consequence-driven Cyber-informed Engineering (CCE) to identify and mitigate catastrophic effects resulting from cyber-enabled sabotage in a case study. For this case study, we will examine a fictional organization named the Stinky Cheese Company.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗