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All sources NASA NTRS DOE OSTI

DOE OSTI2020

Climate Change Science Review 2018 and Associated Social and Economic Impacts

Climate change and its impacts on average temperature, water supply, agriculture, coastal flooding, biodiversity, social and economic stability, human migration, and overall global stability is one of the leading threats emerging for humanity, and is likely to increase as a threat for decades to come. This report represents a snapshot of climate change data, information, and understanding, as of 2018, and can serve as a kind of benchmark for changes going forward in time. This report covers temperature change and heat effects, atmospheric and ocean circulation, freshwater supply changes, sea level rise and flooding, extreme climate events, oceanic deoxygenation, land degredation, social and economic changes, migration, and food. Data and information on all these issues represent a compelling body of knowledge supporting the scientific hypothesis describing climate change, and an important mile marker in our effort to track the unfolding nature of the problem. A slide presentation that summarizes the content of this report is in Appendix A and can serve as an executive summary for the report.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

DOE OSTI2020

Protein Factory on a Chip for Rapid Therapeutics

The potential for new, re-emerging, or engineered pandemic threats could challenge our nation's biosecurity, requiring rapid and flexible countermeasure development platforms. In healthcare, one of the main hindrances to the timely development of protein-based therapeutics for cancer, infectious disease, and other diseases has been a slow and expensive quality-controlled production stage. We present a protein-based technology that has the potential to address these crucial problems in biosecurity and healthcare by maximizing protein production and system portability, while minimizing production latency and cost. Specifically, we have developed a reusable, portable first-generation platform that leverages the advantages of cell-free protein synthesis (CFPS) and flow cells to create practical amounts of clinically relevant therapeutics. We have demonstrated that this technology is reusable and programmable, enabling a single platform that can synthesize multiple dosages of various therapeutics and vaccine in the field. Implementing this technology could mitigate pandemic threats by providing a rapidly-deployable (just-in-time), versatile (precision medicine) production of biologic therapeutics to the infected patient’s locale (point-of-care). In drug development, once promising drug variations are identified, the platform can be scaled to quickly produce practical amounts of protein for patient testing in the matter of days (vs. months) at a fraction of the cost of existing technology.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2020

National-Tribal Critical Infrastructure Protection: Collaboration for Extraordinary National Security Benefit

This paper examines national and tribal collaborative opportunities to get ahead of the critical infrastructure insecurity problem. Recommendations are viewed through the lens of the Sandia Labs Tribal Cyber-Energy initiative and national security projects. Recommendations include 1) Collaboratively address national priority and shared challenges to gain faster and better solutions to national priority problems on a smaller yet comprehensive American Indian and Alaskan Native sovereign single-point of authority scale 2) Utilize newer standards-based technologies to provide scalable, capable, and manageable solutions for greatly expanded and connected national critical infrastructures 3) Employ Cyber-Physical-Resilient design preliminary analysis to define concept- to-disposition design requirements for preemptive critical infrastructure risk mitigation and baked-in security; 4) Develop data-centric protection to provide increased information asset protection as data shifts from data-owner operated on-premises infrastructure to virtual service provider data-steward owned and operated off-premises infrastructure; and 5) Balance shared solutions with the National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity and Risk Management frameworks, and the System Security Engineering Guidelines. As yet unallocated federal funding would support research, development, the timely application of National-Tribal critical infrastructure protection, and critical infrastructure Cyber disruption response and recovery with extraordinary mutual benefits for the foreseeable future. The Critical Infrastructure Insecurity Problem: Rapid modernization and expansive connectivity are due to advances in Information and Communications Technologies that have sweeping cyber impact across all critical infrastructure sectors. Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition and Industrial Control Systems are particularly impacted as systems long separated from the Internet are now being connected and computerized. Virtualization and mobility create a Data Everywhere-User Anywhere paradigm that has evaporated the enterprise network perimeter. There are multi-front technological challenges at play, where long depended on technologies simply don't scale to current needs resulting in a digital dichotomy of competing old and new standards. New standards-based technologies scale but are not as well-known or as widely deployed, which leaves decision makers, stakeholders, and the workforce in a quandary, caught mid-stream between the technological past and the virtual future. Rapid and expansive cyber threat accompanies disruptive change in connectivity and computational dependencies. A lack of action will exacerbate the problem if new technologies roll out without baked-in security design. The Risk: If National-Tribal CIP collaboration to design in security is not done, then an ongoing state of insufficient bolt-on security and elevated threat exposure will remain for years to come.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

DOE OSTI2020

Major Power Rivalry and Nuclear Risk Reduction: Perspectives From Russia, China, and the United States

Since its founding in 1992, the Center for Global Security Research (CGSR) has had an abiding interest in nuclear threat reduction. In the 1990s it did some of the leading thinking about cooperative threat reduction with post-Soviet entities. In the early 2000s it focused increasingly on strengthening the nonproliferation regime. Since 2015 one of its primary interests has been exploring the future of cooperative strategies to reduce nuclear/strategic dangers. That future faces many challenges, both technical and geopolitical. By 2020, a rising sense of urgency of nuclear danger had clearly taken shape in the United States and internationally, driven in significant measure by the renewal of major power rivalry and potential military flashpoints among those powers. And that urgency has driven a rising national and international exploration of what can be done to reduce nuclear dangers.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

DOE OSTI2020

COVID-19 and the Power Sector in Southeast Asia: Impacts and Opportunities

The COVID-19 pandemic is unique among the range of threats encountered over the last century, and its specific impacts do not necessarily resemble those of other disasters. In the near term, the pandemic is causing demand shocks, workforce impacts, supply chain complications, and a global, economic contraction with long-term consequences as yet unknown. In contrast, with natural disasters the principal impacts are more acute. These include infrastructure destruction, displaced populations, and often localized economic impact; however, the long-term response to both of these threats–pandemics and destructive forces of nature–requires similar approaches to building short-term and long-term resilience that prepare power sectors for safe and reliable operation during times of disruption.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

DOE OSTI2020

Assessing the Vulnerability of Unmanned Aircraft Systems to Directed Acoustic Energy

The increasingly large payloads of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UASs) are exponentially increasing the threat to the nuclear enterprise. Current mitigation using RF interference is effective, but not feasible for fully autonomous systems and is prohibited in many areas. A new approach to UAS threat mitigation is needed that does not create radio interference but is effective against any type of vehicle. At the present time there is no commercial counter-UAS system that directly assaults the mems gyros and accelerometers in the Inertial Measurement Unit on the aircraft. But lab testing has revealed resonances in some IMUs that make them susceptible to moderate amplitude acoustic monotones. Sandia's energetic materials facility has enabled a quick and thorough exploration of UAS vulnerability to directed acoustic energy by using intense acoustic impulses to destabilize or down a UAS. We have: 1) detonated/deflagrated explosive charges of various sizes; 2) accurately measured impulse pressure and pulse duration; 3) determined what magnitude of acoustic insult to the IMU disrupts flight and for how long and; 4) determined if the air blast/shock wave on aircraft/propellers disrupts flight.

42 ENGINEERING↗

DOE OSTI2020

Autonomous Tools for Attack Surface Reduction

The electric power grid is a complex critical infrastructure that forms the lifeline of modern society, and its secure and reliable operation is of paramount importance to national security and economic well being. However, recent findings documented in authoritative sources indicate the threat of cyber-based attacks growing in numbers and sophistication. However, securing the grid against stealthy cyber attacks is a challenging task due to legacy nature of the infrastructure coupled with dynamic nature of threat landscape and ever growing sophistication of the adversaries. Additionally, the grid’s attack surface continues to grow with the increased dependence on digital communications and control that now extends to each consumer through smart meters and distributed energy resources. Unfortunately, this expansive surface increases the grid’s vulnerability and further exposes critical control systems in both substations and control centers. To respond to this emerging need, we had successfully assembled an interdisciplinary team with academic- industry partnership to successfully conduct research, development, evaluation, demonstration, and commercialization of attack surface reduction tools, whose goal is to significantly reduce the cyber attack surface in the North American power grid. Our proposed project was a synergistic collaborative effort leveraging the synergistic expertise of the team members across power systems, cyber security and CPS security, testbeds, field deployments and demonstration, and successful commercialization. The team consisted of leading experts from two major universities – Iowa State University, Washington State University – complemented by reputed researchers from two DOE national laboratories – Pacific Northwest National Lab, and Argonne National Lab, one major utility vendor GE Global Research, and one utility partner – Cedar Falls Utilities (CFU). The team members have proven track record of successful academic-industry collaboration in interdisciplinary R&D projects, and bring onboard some of the best state-of-the-art testbed resources, industry-grade SCADA/EMS/DMS environment for experimentation and field demonstration.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2021

Federal Fleet Resilience Planning

Federal fleet operations span the diverse geography of the country as the vehicles provide services in support of equally diverse agency missions. Fleets face the potential for disruption of services from natural disasters, infrastructure failures, and human threats. This report reviews some of the hazards, threats, and disruptions that fleets may face, describes an approach to fleet management that incorporates resilience, and provides an overview of fleet resilience considerations. While this report is not comprehensive, it describes considerations for integrating resilience into fleet management organizational priorities.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

DOE OSTI2021

Federal Fleet Resilience Planning

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗

DOE OSTI2021

Cyber Security Summer School 2021 [Slides]

LANL is committed to training the next generation of cyber security professionals and researchers for the US Department of Energy. Alumni are prepared to mitigate rapidly-evolving threats to national security by applying best-practice analysis and developing novel tools. The 2021 summer school ended with another recruiting success, recruiting 5 students into A-4,T, and NIE-- as staff or students. The research track students further strengthened LANL’s cyber mission by applying their skills to develop innovative solutions to help address national cyber threats. The investigation track students learned the necessary concepts and skills for responding effectively to cyber security incidents

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

DOE OSTI2021

Distributed Wind Resilience Metrics for Electric Energy Delivery Systems: Comprehensive Literature Review

While most people have a general concept of what it means to be “resilient,” an examination of definitions from different sources reveals that there are key commonalities but key differences as well. The lack of a generally accepted definition and application of resilience extends to electric energy delivery systems. Without an accepted definition, it is difficult to implement programs or processes to improve resiliency. In this paper, existing work from industry, regulatory bodies, and national laboratories to define and apply resilience to electric energy delivery systems is studied to understand the key components to define resilience and better understand associated metrics. This understanding is then applied to distributed wind for a specific example of how resilience of a system is affected by the technologies and generation sources used to support it. A key finding is that there is no “one size fits all” process for resilience. Each system has a “distinctiveness” characteristic, which qualifies the possibility of differences in resilience due to different threats, geography, stakeholders, risk tolerance, and mitigations. The distinctiveness characteristic extends to distributed wind, where different configurations may lend the distributed wind to contribute to the resilience of systems in a variety of ways. The findings of this research demonstrate the need for a resilience framework that can be readily applied by stakeholders to improve resilience based on the specific system, threat, risk tolerance and stakeholders.

17 WIND ENERGY↗

DOE OSTI2021

Tensor Text-Mining Methods for Malware Identification and Detection, Malware Dynamics Characterization, and Hosts Ranking

Malware is one of the most persistent and costly cyber threats endangering reputation, confidentiality, integrity, and availability for organizations and national security. Consequently, many of the incident detection and prevention systems, and incident responders have begun to utilize machine learning as a helper in the fight against malware and other cyber threats. However, cyber defenders rely on interpretability and generalizability, yet the popular machine learning methods are black-box and often use traditional supervised solutions that do not generalize to novel malware. Therefore, there is a need to improve the existing solutions. At the same time, the majority of the prior research ignored essential evaluation criteria when reporting the results of their methods, which disables the safe reproducibility of the methods in a production environment. Tensor decomposition, on the other hand, enables interpretable unsupervised analysis of the large-scale data for the discovery of hidden patterns. Our findings, performed on real-world and large-scale experiments, show that tensor factorization-based methods yield performance results that surpasses or competes with existing supervised solutions with the added benefit of interpretability and generalizability. With the ability to analyze complex and large-scale data using tensors, we report results that reflect real-world production environments. We propose to develop new game- changing tools for malware identification and characterization that can trace malware evolution, rank the infected or malicious hosts, and streamline the work of incident response teams, malware analysts, and incident detection and prevention systems.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

DOE OSTI2021

Cybersecurity Guide for Distributed Wind

Distributed wind sits at the intersection of grid-connected, off-grid and behind-the-meter cyber-physical electrical energy systems. The unique physical properties and communications requirements for distributed wind systems mean that there are unique cybersecurity considerations, but there is little to no existing guidance on best practices for cybersecurity. This document is intended to be a starting point for distributed wind stakeholders including manufacturers, installers and integrators, and operators (facility, aggregator, or utility). We discuss common distributed wind architectures and describe their role in the larger power system, pointing out some of the key connections to be aware of. Cybersecurity cannot exist in a vacuum, but rather must consider all the system and all its connections holistically. The role of distributed wind and the functions it can serve are described to gain understanding of the full range of capabilities. The purpose and application of relevant standards that may apply to certain distributed wind systems is presented. These standards may not apply to all installations, but even for systems that are not required to meet these standards they can be a good reference for best practices. A holistic threat perspective is used to describe the adversaries, threats, and potential impacts of cyberattacks, with special emphasis on what sets distributed wind systems apart from other distributed energy resources (DER). Finally, we present the recommendations for cybersecurity, both in terms of needs of the system and roles that specific stakeholders should fulfill. Distributed wind systems can come in a variety of architectures and applications, so there is no one-size-fits-all approach to cybersecurity. However, this document contains the relevant information for stakeholders to identify the cybersecurity needs of their system, refer to relevant standards, and apply best practices in a manner most consistent with their security and operational goals.

17 WIND ENERGY↗

DOE OSTI2020

Vulnerabilities in Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning Applications and Data

Artificial intelligence (AI) applications driven by machine learning (ML) are transformational technologies within the international nuclear security regime. Advancements realized by AI—faster and improved data insights, more efficient and automated processes, reductions in human error—enable nuclear security applications such as behavior analysis for insider threat mitigation, source tracking of stolen nuclear material, and facial recognition software for physical protection. In addition to the advantages, however, there are also inherent vulnerabilities and threats associated with its use and risk mitigations must be built into any AI/ML-enabled systems. This work provides a background on AI and ML and different data types used in the field, including open-source intelligence information (OSINT) that is discoverable by AI tools and application data that are used by AI tools for decision-making and automation. Current and potential AI applications and vulnerabilities related to their use within the nuclear security regime are also discussed.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

DOE OSTI2020

Artificial Intelligence for Digital Security and Protections

Proper functioning of nuclear power plants relies on a mix of well-regulated human and machine-driven workflows. This regulation supports nuclear safety through a series of processes and many of the tasks that support these processes have a repetitive nature that make artificial intelligence (AI) informed by machine learning (ML) a potential aid in a variety of tasks. AI is being evaluated for activities that include inspections, fuel processing, monitoring, and other activities. The introduction of any new technology presents a potential new attack vector. In the case of AI/ML, there are many attacks that have already been discovered and over time the attacks can be expected to follow the growth pattern observed in cyber security. While future planning is necessary, current efforts need to be established now to predict the threat emergence over the next year 10 years and mitigate potential threats. Based on these observations, AI/ML will need to become trustworthy, which corresponds to techniques and procedures that emphasize AI explainability along with resilience techniques to data, algorithms, models, and systems. This kind of system robustness is the foundation for defenses against AI/ML-specific attacks. Attempting to look forward and take a broad view of capabilities provides input to research roadmaps and the ability to distill vulnerabilities into specific use cases may provide greater assistance in understanding the technology benefits while introducing new risks. The impact of current and future AI in three areas—capabilities, challenges, and recovery strategies—represents an initial attempt at balancing both.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

DOE OSTI2022

Cyber-Attack Detection and Accommodation for the Energy Delivery System

The goals of this project were to create a software system with a suite of key algorithms for cyber-attack detection and accommodation providing domain layer protection for critical power generation assets. Example assets included gas and steam turbines, heat recovery steam generators, and electrical generators. The aggressive algorithm goals were aimed at reducing the false positive rates in threat detection to <1% using learnings from many evolving disciplines (power turbine and generator physics, power system modeling, modern control theory, system identification, machine learning, deep learning, mathematics and data science). Additional goals for the algorithms involved localizing threats on-the-fly to know in which monitoring node the effects of attacks are present, and then providing accommodation to keep the system running uninterrupted much of the time in the presence of the attack. Accommodation had a performance goal of providing resiliency when up to 50% of monitoring nodes are in an attack state.

cybersecurity, cyber-physical↗

DOE OSTI2022

Evaluation of Joint Cyber/Safety Risk in Nuclear Power Systems

This report presents an analysis of the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) for a generic Boiling Water Reactor (BWR)-4 NPP. The Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) developed Hazards and Consequences Analysis for Digital Systems (HAZCADS) process is applied to the ECCS and its subsystems to identify unsafe control actions (UCAs) which act as possible cyber events of concern. The analysis is performed for two design basis events: Small-break Loss of Coolant Accident (SLOCA) and general transients (TRANS), such as unintended reactor trip. In previous work, HAZCADS UCAs were combined with other cyber-attack analysis to develop a risk-informed approach; however, this was for a single system. This report explores advanced systems engineering modeling approaches to model the interactions between digital assets across multiple systems which may be targeted by cyber adversaries. The complex and interdependent design of digital systems has the potential to introduce emergent cyber properties that are generally not covered by hazard analyses nor formal nuclear Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA). The R&D and supporting analysis presented here explores approaches to predict and manage how interdependent system properties effect risk. To show the potential impact of a successful cyber-attack to formal PRA event tree probabilities, HAZCADS analysis was also used. HAZCADS was also used to model the automatic depressurization system (ADS) automatic actuation. This analysis extended to an integrated system analysis for common-cause failure (CCF). In this aspect, the HAZCADS analysis continued by analyzing plant design details for system connectivity in support of critical plant functions. A dependency matrix was developed to depict the integrated functionality of the interconnected systems. Areas of potential CCF are indicated. Future work could include adversary attack development to show how CCF could be caused, resulting in PRA events. Across the multiple systems that comprise the ECCS, the analysis shows that the change in such probabilities was very different between systems. This indicates that some systems have a larger potential risk impact from successful cyber-attack or digital failure, which indicates a need for these systems to have a higher priority for design and defensive measures. Furthermore, we were able to establish that a risk analysis using any arbitrary threat model establishes an ordering of components with regard to cyber-risk. This ordering can be used to influence the overall system design with an eye to lowering risk, or as a way to understand real-time risk to operational systems based on a current threat landscape. Expert knowledge of both the analysis process and the system being analyzed is required to perform a HAZCADS analysis. The need for a tiered risk analysis is demonstrated by the results of this report.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

DOE OSTI2022

Integration of Electric Power Infrastructure into the Drinking Water Shared Risk Framework: Prototype Development

An existing shared risk framework designed for assessing and comparing threat-based risks to water utilities is being extended to incorporate electric power. An important differentiating characteristic of this framework is the use of a system-centric rather than an asset-centric approach. This approach allows anonymous sharing of results and enables comparison of assessments across different utilities within an infrastructure sector. By allowing utility owners to compare their assessments with others, they can improve their self-assessments and identification of "unknown unknowns". This document provides an approach for extension of the framework to electric power, including treatment of dependencies and interdependencies. The systems, threats, and mathematical description of associated risks used in a prototype framework are provided. The method is extensible so that additional infrastructure sectors can be incorporated. Preliminary results for a proof of concept calculation are provided.

42 ENGINEERING↗