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At least 577 records · Page 32

An Integrated Low-Speed Performance and Noise Prediction Methodology for Subsonic Aircraft

An integrated methodology has been assembled to compute the engine performance, takeoff and landing trajectories, and community noise levels for a subsonic commercial aircraft. Where feasible, physics-based noise analysis methods have been used to make the results more applicable to newer, revolutionary designs and to allow for a more direct evaluation of new technologies. The methodology is intended to be used with approximation methods and risk analysis techniques to allow for the analysis of a greater number of variable combinations while retaining the advantages of physics-based analysis. Details of the methodology are described and limited results are presented for a representative subsonic commercial aircraft.

Olson, E. D.↗

Probabilistic Risk Assessment of Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System Failure Considering Safety and Security Initiating Events

In order to quantify the probable risk associated with a safety system, nuclear safety risk evaluation process is applied which is generally performed in three steps. The first step is to calculate the damage frequency of a critical system. This step is followed by the radioactive source term estimation due to the potential system damage. The final step is the assessment of off-site consequences. The safety risk formula is shown by Eq. (1). P{sub F} is the probability of safety system failure (the probability used describes a random, independent event), and C is the consequence value. R{sub SAF} = P{sub F} * C (1) The security risk associated with an attack on critical infrastructure and/or special nuclear materials theft is usually evaluated using three- term risk equation (probability of attack, probability of adversary success, and consequence). A security threat and the related initiating events are not considered in a pure safety risk analysis. The vulnerability of the physical protection system is performed independently even though the consequence resulting from a security initiating event can be similar to a safety related initiating event and thus gets double counted. The security risk can be calculated using Eq. (2) R{sub SEC} = P{sub A} * P{sub S} * C (2) PA is the probability of attack, P{sub S} is the probability of adversary success (P{sub S} = 1 - P{sub I} P{sub N}). P{sub I} being the probability of interruption which accounts for the probabilities of detection of all timely detection elements along an adversary path. PN being the probability of neutralization: the result of engagement of the response force with the adversaries after the interruption has occurred. C is the consequence magnitude from a successful attack. The two security probabilities do not describe random, independent events. As a result, because of the differences in the randomness and independence of the respective safety and security probabilities, the safety and the security risks are currently calculated separately. The consequence term in nuclear safety and security risk evaluation have the same definition. An effort is made here to study the effect on the overall risk by considering security initiating events along with the subsequent failure of the intermediate safety element. The target selected is a spent fuel storage pool for analyzing the public risk arising from the interplay between nuclear security and safety initiating events. EASI (Estimate of Adversary Sequence Interruption) model is used to calculate the probability of interruption related to a security system that leads to the calculation of the security initiating event frequency. Further progression of this initiating security event to a top event is analyzed using a Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) tool, SAPHIRE (version 8) to obtain a joint pool damage frequency. For the progression of events leading to a top event, the failure of the intermediate safety elements is assumed to be external random events such as heavy load drop and fire events. The objectives of this study is to (1) determine the double accounting of frequency of failure, risk and allocated resources in the scenario of a non-random security initiating event leading to a safety random event chain (2) compare the damage frequency from pure security with the frequency of combined security-safety failure event and pure safety failure events. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Zero Emissions Coal Syngas Oxygen Turbo Machinery

Siemens Energy, Inc. (formerly Siemens Westinghouse Power Corporation) worked with Clean Energy Systems and Florida Turbine Technologies to demonstrate the commercial feasibility of advanced turbines for oxy-fuel based power systems that discharge negligible CO 2 into the atmosphere. The approach builds upon ultra supercritical steam turbine and advanced gas turbine technology with the goal of attaining plant efficiencies above 50% in the 2015 timeframe. Conceptual designs were developed for baseline, near term, and long term oxy-fuel turbine cycles, representing commercial introductions of increasingly advanced thermal conditions and increasing exposure to steam-CO 2 mixtures. An economic analysis and market demand study was performed by Science Applications International Corp. (SAIC), and indicated that long-term oxy-fuel turbine cycles start to look attractive in 2025 when the CO 2 tax is assumed to reach $\$$40/ ton, and by 2030 it has a clear advantage over both IGCC with sequestration and pulverized coal with sequestration. A separate risk analysis of the oxy-fuel combustor, HP turbine, re-heater, and IP turbine of the long-term cycle identified and categorized risks and proposed mitigation measures. In 2007 the program began to focus on a potential oxy-fuel turbine power generation demonstration project in the 2012 -13 time period while still maintaining a link to the requirements of the long-term oxy-syngas cycle. The SGT-900 turbine was identified as the best fit for modification into an intermediate pressure turbine (IPT) for this application. The base metals, bond coats, thermal barrier coatings (TBCs), and rotor materials used in the SGT-900 were tested for their ability to operate in the steam- CO 2 environment of the oxy-fuel OFT-900. Test results indicated that these same materials would operate satisfactorily, and the plan, is to use SGT-900materials for the OFT-900. Follow-on programs for corrosion testing and evaluation of crack growth rates in oxy-fuel environments have been proposed to build on these results and provide quantifiable assessments of the effects of oxy-fuel environments on the service lives of turbine components.

20 FOSSIL-FUELED POWER PLANTS↗

TU-D-201-07: Severity Indication in High Dose Rate Brachytherapy Emergency Response Procedure

Purpose: Understanding the corresponding dose to different staff during the High Dose Rate (HDR) Brachytherapy emergency response procedure could help to develop a strategy in efficiency and effective action. In this study, the variation and risk analysis methodology was developed to simulation the HDR emergency response procedure based on severity indicator. Methods: A GammaMedplus iX HDR unit from Varian Medical System was used for this simulation. The emergency response procedure was decomposed based on risk management methods. Severity indexes were used to identify the impact of a risk occurrence on the step including dose to patient and dose to operation staff by varying the time, HDR source activity, distance from the source to patient and staff and the actions. These actions in 7 steps were to press the interrupt button, press emergency shutoff switch, press emergency button on the afterloader keypad, turn emergency hand-crank, remove applicator from the patient, disconnect transfer tube and move afterloader from the patient, and execute emergency surgical recovery. Results: Given the accumulated time in second at the assumed 7 steps were 15, 5, 30, 15, 180, 120, 1800, and the dose rate of HDR source is 10 Ci, the accumulated dose in cGy to patient at 1cm distance were 188, 250, 625, 813, 3063, 4563 and 27063, and the accumulated exposure in rem to operator at outside the vault, 1m and 10cm distance were 0.0, 0.0, 0.1, 0.1, 22.6, 37.6 and 262.6. The variation was determined by the operators in action at different time and distance from the HDR source. Conclusion: The time and dose were estimated for a HDR unit emergency response procedure. It provided information in making optimal decision during the emergency procedure. Further investigation would be to optimize and standardize the responses for other emergency procedure by time-spatial-dose severity function.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

Directed Acyclic Graphs: A Tool for Understanding the NASA Human Spaceflight System Risks - Human System Risk Board

For over a decade, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has tracked and configuration-managed approximately 30 risks to astronaut health and performance that occur before, during and after spaceflight. The Human System Risk Board (HSRB), a Health and Medical Technical Authority (HMTA) Board at NASA Johnson Space Center, is the entity responsible for identifying, assessing, analyzing, and monitoring the official understanding of the risk or risk posture for each of the Human System Risks and determining – based on evaluation of the available evidence – when that risk posture changes. The ultimate purpose of tracking and researching these risks is to find ways to reduce the risk that astronaut crews face during spaceflight. Historically, research, development and operations relevant to one risk have been conducted in isolation from other risks; these individual risk ‘silos’ enabled initial characterization of each specific risk. In spaceflight however, the impact of exposure to risk for astronaut crews is cumulative, and not independent of exposures or other risks, as all the adverse effects of the spaceflight environment begin at launch, continue throughout the duration of the mission and in some cases across the lifetime of the crews. In January of 2020, the HSRB at NASA embarked on a pilot project designed to assess the potential value of causal diagramming as a tool to facilitate understanding of these cumulative and interdependent effects as applied within Human System Risk management. This process uses directed acyclic graphs as a means of formalizing a shared mental model of the causal flow of risk among Risk Board stakeholders. Initially this model was to improve communication among those stakeholders, but the potential value exceeds communication alone. The causal diagrams are formulated as directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) to function as a type of knowledge graph for reference for the board and its stakeholders. This document is a sister document to NASA/TM 20220006812 Directed Acyclic Graph Guidance Documentation (1). In that document, the basic guidance for creating and standardizing directed acyclic graphs as tools for cross-risk analysis is provided. This document contains the initial configuration managed DAGs that were created as a result of applying those principles. These initial versions were accepted by the HSRB in January of 2022. Each of the Human System Risks are represented by a DAG that has been reviewed by the larger Human Health and Performance community at NASA including life scientists, physical scientists, physicians, nurses, pharmacists, exercise specialists and more. These results show the starting point for Human System Risk DAGs as shared mental models and communication aids across the boundaries of the various expertise needed to understand and mitigate the human risks in spaceflight. Because they are a starting point, each of these DAGs can be expected to change over time as new or refined evidence becomes available. The process for updating these DAGs can be found in the JSC-66705 Human System Risk Management Plan (2) that is publicly available on the NASA Technical Reports Server.

Erik L. Antonsen↗

Economic Assessment of Nuclear Hybrid Energy Systems: Optimization using RAVEN

The energy market supply is under pressure to achieve competing goals, such as minimizing the cost of electricity and greenhouse gas emissions while achieving grid resilience and reliability and meeting regulatory requirements. To study different scenarios for possible evolutions of the energy market that assume a certain renewable penetration and the possible introduction of hybrid nuclear reactors, the HYBRID modeling and simulation project has been initiated by INL. The term hybrid nuclear reactor here refers to nuclear power plants that not only produce electricity, but can also sell heat to an industrial process, like a hydrogen generation or water desalination plant. The RAVEN (Risk Analysis Virtual Environment) code developed at INL together with the modeling language Modelica (the Dymola compiler is used) have been selected as the main modeling tools for the HYBRID modeling and simulation project. This summary outlines the challenge, presents an overview of the developments in the RAVEN code needed to solve it and shows an illustrative example calculation. The HYBRID modeling and simulation project is a multi laboratory effort, involving research teams from three different U.S. national laboratories, led by the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) and supported by the Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) and the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Towards Automated Assessment of Vulnerability Exposures in Security Operations

Current approaches for risk analysis of software vulnerabilities using manual assessment and numeric scoring do not complete fast enough to keep pace with the maintenance work rate to patch and mitigate the vulnerabilities. This paper proposes a new approach to modeling software vulnerability risk in the context of the network environment and firewall configuration. In the approach, vulnerability features are automatically matched up with networking, target asset, and adversary features to determine whether adversaries can exploit a vulnerability. The ability of adversaries to reach a vulnerability is modeled by automatically identifying the network services associated with vulnerabilities through a pipeline of machine learning and natural language processing and automatically analyzing network reachability. Our results show that the pipeline can identify network services accurately. We also find that only a small number of vulnerabilities pose real risks to a system. However, if left unmitigated, adversarial reach to vulnerabilities may extend to nullify the effect of firewall countermeasures.

Huff, Philip↗

Difficult Decisions Made Easier

NASA missions are extremely complex and prone to sudden, catastrophic failure if equipment falters or if an unforeseen event occurs. For these reasons, NASA trains to expect the unexpected. It tests its equipment and systems in extreme conditions, and it develops risk-analysis tests to foresee any possible problems. The Space Agency recently worked with an industry partner to develop reliability analysis software capable of modeling complex, highly dynamic systems, taking into account variations in input parameters and the evolution of the system over the course of a mission. The goal of this research was multifold. It included performance and risk analyses of complex, multiphase missions, like the insertion of the Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter; reliability analyses of systems with redundant and/or repairable components; optimization analyses of system configurations with respect to cost and reliability; and sensitivity analyses to identify optimal areas for uncertainty reduction or performance enhancement.

Source record↗

Propensity and Risk Assessment for Solar Particle Events: Consideration of Integral Fluence at High Proton Energies

For future space missions with longer duration, exposure to large solar particle events (SPEs) with high energy levels is the major concern during extra-vehicular activities (EVAs) on the lunar and Mars surface. The expected SPE propensity for large proton fluence was estimated from a non-homogeneous Poisson model using the historical database for measurements of protons with energy > 30 MeV, Phi(sub 30). The database includes a continuous data set for the past 5 solar cycles. The resultant SPE risk analysis for a specific mission period was made including the 95% confidence level. In addition to total particle intensity of SPE, the detailed energy spectra of protons especially at high energy levels were recognized as extremely important parameter for the risk assessment, since there remains a significant cancer risks from those energetic particles for large events. Using all the recorded proton fluence of SPEs for energies >60 and >100 MeV, Phi(sub 60) and Phi(sub 100), respectively, the expected propensities of SPEs abundant with high energy protons were estimated from the same non-homogeneous Poisson model and the representative cancer risk was analyzed. The dependencies of risk with different energy spectra, for e.g. between soft and hard SPEs, were evaluated. Finally, we describe approaches to improve radiation protection of astronauts and optimize mission planning for future space missions.

Kim, Myung-Hee↗

Poor Baseline Pulmonary Function May Not Increase the Risk of Radiation-Induced Lung Toxicity

Purpose: Poor pulmonary function (PF) is often considered a contraindication to definitive radiation therapy for lung cancer. This study investigated whether baseline PF was associated with radiation-induced lung toxicity (RILT) in patients with non-small cell lung cancer (NSCLC) receiving conformal radiation therapy (CRT). Methods and Materials: NSCLC patients treated with CRT and tested for PF at baseline were eligible. Baseline predicted values of forced expiratory volume in 1 sec (FEV1), forced vital capacity (FVC), and diffusion capacity of lung for carbon monoxide (DLCO) were analyzed. Additional factors included age, gender, smoking status, Karnofsky performance status, coexisting chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), tumor location, histology, concurrent chemotherapy, radiation dose, and mean lung dose (MLD) were evaluated for RILT. The primary endpoint was symptomatic RILT (SRILT), including grade ≥2 radiation pneumonitis and fibrosis. Results: There was a total of 260 patients, and SRILT occurred in 58 (22.3%) of them. Mean FEV1 values for SRILT and non-SRILT patients were 71.7% and 65.9% (P=.077). Under univariate analysis, risk of SRILT increased with MLD (P=.008), the absence of COPD (P=.047), and FEV1 (P=.077). Age (65 split) and MLD were significantly associated with SRILT in multivariate analysis. The addition of FEV1 and age with the MLD-based model slightly improved the predictability of SRILT (area under curve from 0.63-0.70, P=.088). Conclusions: Poor baseline PF does not increase the risk of SRILT, and combining FEV1, age, and MLD may improve the predictive ability.

62 RADIOLOGY AND NUCLEAR MEDICINE↗

Bowtie Analysis of the Effects of Unmanned Aircraft on Air Traffic Control

Within the aviation domain, there is a growing industry demand to develop and integrate remotely piloted operations into the National Airspace System. However, it is not yet well understood how the integration of unmanned aircraft with impact air traffic control, and specifically, the air traffic controllers who are at the sharp end of this safety critical system. This research presented in this paper aimed to begin to address this gap in understanding by identifying and exploring potential hazards associated with introducing Unmanned Aircraft into the national airspace system, and identify possible mitigations to reduce identified risks. A bowtie risk analysis methodology was used to identify and analyze hazards. A focus-group format discussion was conducted with nine subject matter experts as participants. Findings identified five areas of potential risk, each associated with multiple hazards. Mitigations for each hazard are reported. Findings have essential implications for the safe and efficient integration of unmanned aircraft into the national airspace.

unmanned aerial vehicles↗

Risk-Informed Decision Making: Application to Technology Development Alternative Selection

NASA NPR 8000.4A, Agency Risk Management Procedural Requirements, defines risk management in terms of two complementary processes: Risk-informed Decision Making (RIDM) and Continuous Risk Management (CRM). The RIDM process is used to inform decision making by emphasizing proper use of risk analysis to make decisions that impact all mission execution domains (e.g., safety, technical, cost, and schedule) for program/projects and mission support organizations. The RIDM process supports the selection of an alternative prior to program commitment. The CRM process is used to manage risk associated with the implementation of the selected alternative. The two processes work together to foster proactive risk management at NASA. The Office of Safety and Mission Assurance at NASA Headquarters has developed a technical handbook to provide guidance for implementing the RIDM process in the context of NASA risk management and systems engineering. This paper summarizes the key concepts and procedures of the RIDM process as presented in the handbook, and also illustrates how the RIDM process can be applied to the selection of technology investments as NASA's new technology development programs are initiated.

Dezfuli, Homayoon↗

Evaluation of a proposed expert system development methodology: Two case studies

Two expert system development projects were studied to evaluate a proposed Expert Systems Development Methodology (ESDM). The ESDM was developed to provide guidance to managers and technical personnel and serve as a standard in the development of expert systems. It was agreed that the proposed ESDM must be evaluated before it could be adopted; therefore a study was planned for its evaluation. This detailed study is now underway. Before the study began, however, two ongoing projects were selected for a retrospective evaluation. They were the Ranging Equipment Diagnostic Expert System (REDEX) and the Backup Control Mode Analysis and Utility System (BCAUS). Both projects were approximately 1 year into development. Interviews of project personnel were conducted, and the resulting data was used to prepare the retrospective evaluation. Decision models of the two projects were constructed and used to evaluate the completeness and accuracy of key provisions of ESDM. A major conclusion reached from these case studies is that suitability and risk analysis should be required for all AI projects, large and small. Further, the objectives of each stage of development during a project should be selected to reduce the next largest area of risk or uncertainty on the project.

Gilstrap, Lewey↗

Risk and Cost Analysis of Utilizing FLEX Equipment for O&M Cost Reduction in Nuclear Power Plants

Several Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) operators in USA have announced to close their plants despite there are remaining years on their operating licenses. The cause of these closures is because the plant operators suffer financial losses. Approximately 80% of USA NPPs would have undergone financial losses if they were situated in a deregulated electricity market. In a deregulated market, electricity generators are independent entities separate from the transmission companies and Independent System Operator (ISO) which manages the market. NPPs in this market are termed merchant NPPs, and their profitability is determined solely from electricity generation revenues. Meanwhile, regulated and public power nuclear units’ profitability is determined by the regulatory process in place for each unit. Due to the complexity of differentiating each regulated and public power NPP’s regulations 36 NPPs are at an immediate risk of retiring early to stop losses, while 27 units will likely to follow in the long run. Today, cost is well-recognized and important factor in NPP decision-making that cannot be ignored. Therefore, it is essential to consider risk and cost together in decision-making to strengthen the position of the nuclear industry in an economically challenging energy market. With operational and maintenance (O&M) cost at 70% of the total operating expenditure of an NPP and some plants closing prematurely despite excellent safety record, there is an urgent need to address the high O&M cost. One of the novel entities that provide additional safety resulting in reduced risk of nuclear power plants is Flex equipment. Flex strategies were postulated by the US NRC in the wake of Fukushima Dai-chi accident to address beyond design-basis accidents and improve plant flexibility. Flex strategy comprise both onsite and off-site component storage for the provision of additional materials and equipment. This work explored innovative ways of utilizing the onsite Flex equipment during regular plant operation, for purposes in addition to the intended use of beyond design basis accidents. This report describes the risk and cost analysis of using Flex equipment during regular or unplanned maintenance.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Delayed Complications in Patients Surviving at Least 3 Years After Stereotactic Radiosurgery for Brain Metastases

Purpose: Little is known about delayed complications after stereotactic radiosurgery in long-surviving patients with brain metastases. We studied the actual incidence and predictors of delayed complications. Patients and Methods: This was an institutional review board-approved, retrospective cohort study that used our database. Among our consecutive series of 2000 patients with brain metastases who underwent Gamma Knife radiosurgery (GKRS) from 1991-2008, 167 patients (8.4%, 89 women, 78 men, mean age 62 years [range, 19-88 years]) who survived at least 3 years after GKRS were studied. Results: Among the 167 patients, 17 (10.2%, 18 lesions) experienced delayed complications (mass lesions with or without cyst in 8, cyst alone in 8, edema in 2) occurring 24.0-121.0 months (median, 57.5 months) after GKRS. The actuarial incidences of delayed complications estimated by competing risk analysis were 4.2% and 21.2% at the 60th month and 120th month, respectively, after GKRS. Among various pre-GKRS clinical factors, univariate analysis demonstrated tumor volume-related factors: largest tumor volume (hazard ratio [HR], 1.091; 95% confidence interval [CI], 1.018-1.154; P=.0174) and tumor volume {<=}10 cc vs >10 cc (HR, 4.343; 95% CI, 1.444-12.14; P=.0108) to be the only significant predictors of delayed complications. Univariate analysis revealed no correlations between delayed complications and radiosurgical parameters (ie, radiosurgical doses, conformity and gradient indexes, and brain volumes receiving >5 Gy and >12 Gy). After GKRS, an area of prolonged enhancement at the irradiated lesion was shown to be a possible risk factor for the development of delayed complications (HR, 8.751; 95% CI, 1.785-157.9; P=.0037). Neurosurgical interventions were performed in 13 patients (14 lesions) and mass removal for 6 lesions and Ommaya reservoir placement for the other 8. The results were favorable. Conclusions: Long-term follow-up is crucial for patients with brain metastases treated with GKRS because the risk of complications long after treatment is not insignificant. However, even when delayed complications occur, favorable outcomes can be expected with timely neurosurgical intervention.

62 RADIOLOGY AND NUCLEAR MEDICINE↗